Author: kasmir

“It is your historic responsibility to act.” – Dr. Joanne Liu, International President of Médecins Sans Frontières

It was 1976, when a blood sample taken from a Belgian nun in Zaire (now Congo) arrived in a laboratory in Antwerp for testing. The unassuming vial had been transported on a commercial plane, in someone’s hand-luggage containing a note. It was thought the patient had contracted yellow fever but further tests were needed for clarification. It was this blood sample that contained the first identified case of a deadly virus – Ebola haemorrhagic fever.  With further investigation, the virus was understood to have spread in a remote village north of Kinshasa, by contaminated needles. That same year, a total of 431 Ebola deaths were recorded, followed by a couple of sporadic isolated epidemics. Once the excitement of the discovery had subsided, the virus was then seemingly buried and forgotten. Fast forward 40 years and we see the worst outbreak of the Ebola virus on record, claiming, to date, 11,193 lives.

From July 2014, the horror in which the virus spread, with devastating consequences, was aired on international media, showing scenes that seemed to be from a sci-fi movie. Fear spread as quickly as the virus itself. Communities were unprepared and did not understand what was happening, blaming the health care workers in their special space suits for bringing the disease to them. Villages with unexplained deaths were stigmatised and many feared to report cases. It was only those in the last grips of illness who sought help from the clinics which were filled to capacity. Many lay on the streets dying in agony waiting to be admitted.

It is now believed that the first victim of the 2014 epidemic was a two year-old boy from a remote village in Guinea. His three-year-old sister also fell sick and died, followed by their mother. The symptoms the family displayed were mistaken for another not so lethal disease common to the area, which allowed the virus to spread undetected for three months. The virus then made its way to neighbouring Sierra Leone and Liberia through its porous borders and once it reached the heavily populated cities, such as Freetown, the death rate spiralled out of control.

The difference in the death rate between the richer countries like Nigeria, and the poorest such as Liberia, is significant. Nigeria has had 8 deaths caused by Ebola where as Liberia, the worst affected country, has had 4,806 deaths to date. At its peak, between 300-400 new cases were being reported on a weekly basis in August and September alone. The countries most successful in managing the virus had well-coordinated infrastructure already in place. Liberia and Sierra Leone however were still recovering after a period of protracted civil war ending only in 2003. Populations were also extremely weary of their governments in these countries and moves to ban the sale and consumption of bush meat, from which the virus originates, were largely ignored by the communities who believed this initiative to be part of another government scandal.

Many lessons and important policy implications have surfaced from this epidemic. Contrary to popular belief, it was not high-tech drugs and equipment that halted the spread of the virus which Hollywood would lead us to believe. Instead the outbreak demonstrated the importance of educating communities about symptoms and the need for a strong healthcare system. Before the crisis began Liberia had only 51 doctors for its entire population of 4.2 million. The high levels of urbanization within the affected countries meant that close human contact allowed the disease to proliferate at an increased rate than in a remote village. Teaching the communities the importance of taking loved ones with Ebola-like symptoms to the specialised treatment clinics and limiting contact with infected people was also crucial to stop the virus spreading further.

The heroic efforts of the health care workers and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) were of course central to the coordinated fight against Ebola. However, the delayed reaction from international institutions to deal with the epidemic has been greatly criticised. Despite early calls from the MSF of the overwhelming numbers of sick people flooding the treatment facilities, the World Health Organisation took 5 months to finally call the epidemic a “public health emergency.” This meant that efforts to contain the virus could have been put in place sooner, limiting the spread at the most critical moment. Traditional burial techniques needed to be stopped immediately. It was soon clear that this practice spread the virus the most through the touching and kissing of the still highly infectious deceased bodies. One particular funeral in Sierra Leone was found to be responsible for as many as 365 Ebola deaths alone. But with limited communication tools in the initial phase of the epidemic, stopping the practice was hard to achieve. Communities were also hostile to the special workers tasked with taking bodies away for safe burial to limit the spread of infection. According to the communities’ beliefs, denying their loved ones a traditional funeral would spell terrible consequences for the inhabitants. This lead many communities to hide their sick, performing secret funerals thus exposing more people to the virus.

As resources were increasingly stretched, the focus on Ebola as the priority has caused other problems. Death rates from patients suffering from treatable illnesses such as malaria and cholera have increased dramatically. Pregnant woman fearing contamination also had nowhere to go when complications occurred. Ebola has also destroyed families and communities; a new report shows that as many as 12,000 orphans have been left behind in Sierra Leone.

On the 9^th May 2015 the epidemic was officially declared over in Liberia but recently three new cases were discovered.  The Ebola epidemic makes it painfully obvious that much progress is needed to prevent a similar scenario taking place in the future. Funding now needs to go into building hospitals and training health care workers to match population size. Perhaps the most important acknowledgement however is the need to coordinate and put in place a global response to future epidemics. Leaders can no longer think in terms of their own borders and instead they need to consider the global community in which they operate.

Author Biography

Marie Mulville is currently studying for a Master’s in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at City University in London. Marie’s interests include the Middle East, European Politics and Security.

You can find her on Twitter: @Marie_Mulville

*Cover image ‘ Ebola must go‘ by UNMEER

The United Kingdom relies on its relationship with Europe, far more than Europe relies on the UK.

The election of a Conservative majority to the House of Commons on May 7th has done nothing but increase questions over Britain’s relationship with the European Union. Over the coming months (or even years), Commons debates, Prime Ministers Questions and news broadcasts will be dominated by one repetitive question: Should the UK remain part of the EU?

The camp of Conservative MPs, joined by Douglas Carswell, that will fight for separation are relying on one eventuality: that upon leaving the union, the EU will allow Britain access to the single market. Supporters of the ‘no’ camp highlight the Norwegian model, where as a member of the European Economic Area Norway has tariff free access to the single market. An alternative is the Swiss model, where negotiations are held on a sector-by-sector basis. Critics however highlight an amicable divorce to be a pipe dream. Yes, the EU has a lot to gain from trading with the UK, however it appears extremely unlikely that after leaving the union its neighbours will be quite so pragmatic. John Major recently criticised this pick and mix approach to Europe, stating that “it is a fallacy of the Eurosceptics to say we would just have automatic access to the single market”.

The UK Economy

So why is the EU so important to the UK? Membership allows access to this £11 trillion single market, which is greater than the USA and Japanese economies combined. This market consists of 21 billion businesses, giving UK consumers access not only to tariff free goods, but also greater opportunities to work. In 2007, an EU Commission study outlined that the creation of the single market resulted in a 2.2% rise in GDP alongside an extra 2.75 million jobs – benefitting the UK economy by £25 billion.

The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills has also commented on the importance of the EU. 51% of Britain’s exports go to the EU (over £200 billion) compared to 13% to the United States. It is estimated that this figure is double what it would have been without the UK’s integration into the single market. However, possibly the most important figure is the 3.5 million jobs that are either directly or indirectly linked with the European Union. Many of these jobs originate from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Behind the United States, China, France and Hong Kong, the UK is the fifth largest recipient of FDI in the world. In Sunderland, Nissan produces more cars than the entire Italian automotive industry. Without access to the single market, there are fears that firms would relocate elsewhere in Europe in order to avoid the high external tariff. Therefore, it is essential for the UK to remain part of the union to preserve its economic stability and export base.

Britain’s position in the Union does not only benefit large firms such as Nissan, but also helps small businesses’ grow. The rules on freedom of movement and labour mean that firms in the UK have access to a larger labour force, a more diverse range of skills and workers willing to work for less.

Despite the advantages to firms, this is one of the most contentious issues over Britain’s membership of the union. Certain members of the Conservative party feel that migrant labour is detrimental to the UK, taking job opportunities away from British workers. In his on-going quest for reform, David Cameron has stressed the importance of being able to limit European workers from claiming benefits, thus reducing the burden on the UK Government. Despite objections, small businesses’ really do benefit from the EU, and not only from the freedom of movement. European wide trademarks and patents result in minimal bureaucracy and uniform regulation. Competition law also seeks to protect UK businesses’, restraining monopoly power with a wider reach than the Competition and Markets Authority, whose jurisdiction remains in the UK only. The EU is designed to increase economic activity, both protecting and enhancing the scale of British business.

The UK’s Global Role and Influence

The majority of arguments in this debate centre around the economy. However, the UK’s membership of the EU has far broader implications on its standing in the globalised world. Although it seemed contradictory, Sir Alec Douglas-Home as foreign secretary, suggested that the “only way to preserve our independence for the future is to join a larger group”. Despite EU membership, Britain’s influence has clearly decreased since 1945. One traditional argument that will be voiced in these debates on the EU is that international influence is a minor concern; the citizens of the UK must come first. Yet global issues affect Britain. It is the second largest manager of investment funds, holds the second largest share of world service exports while a quarter of its GDP relies on exporting goods. The UK must maintain, or even increase, its international presence and influence on discussions about trade, the global economy, energy and security. The European Union represents a useful and effective tool in this regard. The common position adopted by European nations, the Commission and Council increases the relevance of European (and British) demands. The leveraging effect this has on Britain’s influence is vital.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is a clear policy that emphasises Europe’s common position. The ability of member states to come together, assess a security problem and find a solution supported by the states means the voice of the UK is backed by the union as a whole. Examples of the extended influence on international affairs include the two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict and the strong European position towards Russia in light of the Ukraine crisis. By giving the UK a basis to find a common stance and approach, they have the opportunity to have a greater impact of global decisions.

Although these facts are beneficial to the UK they are not a defining argument in the union debate. The UK’s relationship with the United States however is of paramount importance. Membership of the EU strengthens this bilateral relationship. For the United States, the UK is the largest point of investment into the EU. In simple terms, the UK provides the gateway for US businesses into the single market. This is obviously beneficial for the UK economy, with increased investment, goods, consumption and GDP. At the G7 summit, Barack Obama recently stated that “we [the United States] are very much looking forward to the UK staying part of the European Union because we think its influence is positive not just for Europe, but also for the world”. Obama touched on the importance of British influence, although for him, a more pressing concern will be US business interests. If the UK opts out of the EU, the United States will have to choose a new option, most likely Germany. The two countries have extremely close ties, with 55 million Americans holding German heritage. From an economic and influence perspective the sharing of some sovereignty over policy making appears a small price for economic benefit and an improved global position.

About the Author

Caspar Everett is an International Relations and Modern History student at the University of St Andrews. His interests include the role of military intervention, international law and domestic policy in the UK and United States. Caspar has a keen interest in communications and campaigning, writing speeches in the 2015 General Election.

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Cover image ‘UK EU Flag’ by GPPW

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is an international institution that was formed in 1969 as a result of an arson attack upon the Al Asqa Mosque in Jerusalem. The flames that engulfed this symbolic site caused shock and indignation throughout the Islamic world, and the OIC was formed as a result. The man who committed this act of arson, named Denis Rohan, did so to bring about a holy war, a desire that to some extent reflects what Huntington described twenty years later as the “clash of civilisations”. This new form of conflict has seen a departure from the traditional wars of the past and instead sees loosely defined cultural entities pick up the mantle of being the dominant actors in the international system. If the actions of the Australian-born Rohan represent the clash of civilisations between Islam and the West, then the origin of the OIC can be directly attributed to this conflict. By analysing this organisation we can learn much about the current state of relations between civilisations, but more importantly we can see cracks within the Islamic civilisation that are currently trying to mend themselves.

The OIC Today

Today the OIC boasts an eclectic mix of 57 member states that are spread out across four continents. After the United Nations the OIC is the second largest intergovernmental organisation in the world, and it seeks to represent the best interests of Muslim populations within its member states. Its sheer size would suggest that it is a key player in the international system; and as acts of violence are increasingly being committed by and against Muslims the need for the OIC has never been so apparent.

Based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, the OIC provides an arena where representatives of Islam can come together and “protect the interests of the Muslim world, in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony”. Similar to the model of international organisation that we witness today, the OIC seeks to achieve peace through promoting greater dialogue, economic interdependence and an agreement to foster security between its members. A subtle difference between the OIC and the UN however, is that it often represents the Muslim populations within non-Muslim states. Thus to an extent the OIC supports the claim that the important borders in the world are no longer between nations, but between cultures. The OIC is not however trying to supplant the authority of the UN, and by committing itself to the UN Charter it has sought to supplement its work, not replace it.

A Clash Within a Civilisation

Its main state representatives demonstrate the conflict lines that are drawn throughout the Muslim world, as Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq and Iran all claim membership to the OIC. Even Russia, which has a Muslim population twice the size of London, possesses observer status in this international institution; demonstrating the truly curious mix of nation states that come together under one roof to strive for peace in the Muslim world. Just imagine what it would mean for the security of the international system if the OIC were successful in achieving its goals. Russia may not be propping up a brutal regime in Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran may feel no need to fight a proxy war in Yemen; and Iraq may not be ravaged from within by the blight that is the Islamic State (IS). The OIC offers the potential for cooperation between Muslims where today there is conflict, and the Islamic civilisation that can be characterised by much infighting could instead possess a single coherent peaceful identity. But, for whatever reason, this is sadly not the case.

Despite its claims to represent the “collective voice of the Muslim world”, the OIC is almost never mentioned or heard in global political discourse. Who then represents and speaks for the Islamic civilisation? Unfortunately the Islamic entity that receives more attention then any other, despite its goals and methods completely misrepresenting Islam, is the Islamic State. Bad news may travel faster than good news, but the complete absence of the OIC from any current discussion on Islam symbolises a whitewashing of moderate Muslims from the political discussion. Meanwhile IS may not be the most accurate representation of Islam, but its voice is the one that we hear above all others.

The Spectrum of Islam

However, whilst the actions of both IS and the OIC belong to two opposite ends of the spectrum, we can draw a comparison between the sentiment that underpin much of their existence. IS declared a Caliphate in 2014, a Muslim state that would act as a “leader for Muslims everywhere”. Meanwhile the OIC seek to “galvanise the Ummah (Islamic Community) into a unified body”. Both seem to have noted the clear lack of unity amongst the Islamic world, and have sought out methods and approaches to remedy this. How they go about achieving this goal differs drastically, and reflects a fascinating debate present in International Relations about how to counter anarchy. The difference here is that the anarchy they are trying to counter is an Islamic one, as the absence of a single Muslim governing body has seen conflict spread throughout this civilisation. IS have established a Muslim state that seeks to take Muslims everywhere out of anarchy, whilst the OIC seek to establish an international organisation that does not replace anarchy but seeks to govern it instead. These two approaches represent the contrast between revolution and evolution, as IS wants to completely change the state of the Muslim world whilst the OIC merely want to adapt the Muslim world to exist more peacefully within the current system.

Although these two competing approaches differ, the problem that they both seek to address suggests that there is not a clash of civilisations, but rather a clash within a civilisation. The conflict between Islam and the West is often highlighted as the greatest conflict of our time, yet to refer to Islam as a single acting entity would seem to be misguided when so much violence we see is being committed between Muslims. Both IS and the OIC have sought to remedy this problem, but they have adopted different approaches for different reasons. Through sheer barbarity, IS hope to unite the fractious Islamic world to aid in their fight against the West, whilst the OIC want to unite the Islamic community to contribute and maintain a global peace. If these are the two competing voices of Islam that are on offer, then surely it is obvious which one we should be listening to. Whilst we observe this conflict from afar, we also contribute to it by characterising Islam in the way that we do. The OIC is by far a finished product, and it is highly questionable whether the undemocratically elected heads of state that make up the OIC can be seen to represent normal Muslims. What the OIC does represent however is an opportunity for progress, as countries that often fight one another have proven when they choose to sit together in meetings of the OIC. What we must not do however is disregard this organisation as irrelevant, and every effort should be made for moderate Islam to regain its voice and for the OIC to prove that actions are louder then words.

About the Author

Jacob Goodison is currently Head of International Relations at the International Centre for Parliamentary Studies, where he researches capacity gaps in foreign governments and NGO’s, and recommends training programmes to these organisations to help them govern more effectively. He received a first class honours Bachelors Degree in International Relations from the University of Leeds, and had a short internship placement at Leeds City Council.

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Cover image ‘Flag of OIC‘ licensed under Public Domain via Wikimedia Commons

The collapse in the price of oil in the latter half of 2014 was as dramatic as it was unexpected. In June 2014, with global prices steadily north of $110 a barrel, Alex Salmond, the then First Minister of Scotland and leader of the separatist Scottish National Party, infamously based the case for Scottish independence on the belief that North Sea oil would fund the country, a belief based on price predictions of around $113 a barrel. Then prices tumbled. By December 2014 oil prices had dropped to $70 a barrel.

The causes for this collapse have been well publicised. Increasing oil production within the US was ignited by an explosion of fracking contracts. The shale revolution saw the US overtake Saudi Arabia as the biggest oil producer in 2014. Increasing supplies were met with waning demand, most often attributed to the lethargic world economy characterised by decreasing growth in China and underwhelming recovery amongst European economies. As the US began to establish a significant percentage of market share, a threatened Saudi Arabia, for so long the kingpin of the oil market, decided to flood the market. The Kingdom convinced the 12 OPEC members to commit to producing 30 million barrels per day (bpd) in the face of falling prices. It seemed economically illogical, yet rig numbers amongst the cartel reached a record high. Saudi Arabia accelerated the fall in oil price to squeeze all producers, confident that it was best placed to survive. OPEC oil is the cheapest to produce, breaking even at $10 a barrel. Tight oil (shale), by comparison, breaks even at around $75 a barrel. Yet the squeeze did not stop the growth of American shale production and prices rallied by 45% in early 2015.

Faced with this rally, Saudi Arabia remained resolute and continued to produce high quantities of oil. In May 2015, Saudi production was 25,000 bpd higher than in April and overall OPEC produced a million barrels more than its 30 million bpd target. US production finally began to suffer. March production fell short of April drilling reports by 36,000 barrels per day and July production is predicted to fall by 91,000 bpd from current June figures. Falling US supply should logically lead to an increase in global prices, but its decline was easily compensated for by increased OPEC production which succeeded in squeezing the American market share. The price rally also faltered, with global prices currently resting at around $60 a barrel.

It is wrong to categorise Saudi Arabia’s actions as a political play, for the target of the Saudi flood is not the Obama administration. The Kingdom is wary of Iranian ambition, increasing IS-sponsored violence within its country and a retreating American presence within the region. Antagonising the USA is not a tactically astute decision given the security threats that border Saudi Arabia and the increasing dialogue between the Israelis and the Saudis illustrates the severity of these mutual fears. Instead, manufacturing low prices was a calculated attack on the investment banks who dared to challenge the Kingdom’s market dominance by investing in the US shale revolution. It is also an economic decision based on preserving long-term demand by stimulating the world economy with low oil prices.

Advances in green energy, climate change fears, and a more efficient global economy which is burning less oil burnt per unit of GDP have all fuelled Saudi concerns that demand may soon peak. As a rentier state dependent on oil revenues, the Kingdom needs to maintain and prolong global demand. Its actions have ensured that the world has become drunk on cheap oil. Demand is predicted to rise to a record 95 million bpd in the final quarter of 2015 and Saudi Arabia has managed to maintain a market share that will reap substantial reward from this growth.

Analysts have highlighted a number of factors that could see the price of oil change, but it is unlikely that these would profoundly affect the overall market. Ongoing unrest affecting production in Libya and Iraq was touted as a potential cause of a price rise. Yet Libyan production has increased and Iraqi production hit a record high this May. An impending agreement in the Iranian nuclear negotiations could see the release of Iranian oil onto the market. Some 40 million barrels of Iranian oil sit on Iranian tankers awaiting the termination of trade sanctions that a nuclear agreement could bring. Yet this is likely to be nothing more than an adrenalin shot to the overall market pattern, with Iran unlikely to develop a significant increase in output within the next year. Instead, the threat to Saudi Arabia may be itself.

Functioning at high levels of production, and heading into the months where OPEC states must divert more of its oil to keep their cities habitable in the summer sun, Saudi Arabia has drastically reduced its capacity to react to changes in oil prices. Spare capacity amongst OPEC states may shrink to just 1.7 million bpd, leaving the cartel less able to react to surges in demand. Saudi Arabia has succeeded in maintaining its market dominance, yet the Kingdom is now vulnerable to growing global demand; demand that they themselves initiated through low prices. China’s economic growth did slow through 2014 and into the first quarter of 2015, but still remains around 7%. India’s growth rate is expected to exceed China’s, reaching 7.5% this year. Even America, with lower growth rates, is consuming more oil, with cheap fuel leading Americans to drive more miles than ever before. Together these three economies have contributed nearly 80% to the world’s growth in 2015. Their continued growth, alongside the potential for greater growth amongst countries where economic results remain sluggish, will increase demand.

Added to the current geo-political threats to supply such as Middle Eastern security and increasing Russian sanctions and the potential for future prices to rise is clear. In placing all of their cards on the table, Saudi Arabia may not have the resources required to once again keep prices low. The increase in price would reinvigorate US shale production and Saudi Arabia’s market dominance would be once again challenged. Yet this time its ability to fight back would be greatly diminished. The reintroduction of Iranian oil, once the second largest OPEC contributor, could help the cartel maintain its market share. However the increasing hostility between Tehran and Riyadh would curtail Saudi Arabia’s ability to dictate production levels as it has over the last year. Oil prices are stabilising, but for the Kingdom, the stakes are being raised.

About the Author

Tom Walpole is currently studying Arabic and Middle East Studies at the Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies at Exeter University. During his degree, Tom lived in Cairo and has focused his studies on security policy and Islamist movements within the Middle East. Tom is also alumnus of the European Youth Parliament and has an interest in researching the potential role of the European Union in Foreign Affairs.

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Cover image ‘Opec Headquarters in Vienna‘ by alex.ch

The elections for Turkish Grand National Assembly on 7 June 2015 have halted the AKP’s long hold on power. Despite remaining the largest party, election results were a surprise to the AKP. The new government is likely to change dynamics in the region.

Among 31 political parties competed to gain seats at the national assembly, four parties were able to pass the harsh 10% electoral threshold with AKP gaining 40.70%, CHP 25.16%, MHP 16,50%, HDP 12,99%.

AKP failure and Kurdish victory

Results have paralysed President Erdoğan’s plans to change the constitution to increase the power of the ceremonial presidential role. In this perspective perhaps democracy is the true winner of the elections as voters punished the AKP for Erdoğan’s ambitions to create a Putin- style super presidency.

However Erdoğan’s masterplan was not the only cause of AKP’s nine points loss from the last elections in 2011. For AKP opponents, campaigns to halt increasing state authoritarianism and violation of democratic rights gained a momentum at the 2013 Gezi Park protests. Ranging from Kemalists to anti-capitalist Muslims, Nationalists to Kurds and the LGBT, politics in Turkey have experienced an unconventional coalition of opposing views in the expense of disposing AKP policies. Recent corruption allegations and power struggles inside the AKP was another prominent factor for decreasing public trust towards the AKP. For the most part, civil war in Syria and Iraq has been unfortunate for the AKP and the government has received heavy criticism for interfering with Middle Eastern conflicts and disorganised refugee policies. In fact Turkish unemployment has been rising consecutively for the last two years and the influx of almost two million refugees had a destructive affect on employment for many Turks at the border cities.

The success of the pro-Kurdish party HDP on the other hand is a victory story. By obtaining almost 13% of the votes, the HDP has become the third largest party in the parliament. The HDP’s gamble to pass the 10% threshold has worked with “trust” votes, meaning voters from other political groups have voted HDP in the June elections for the sake of preventing millions of HDP votes to being redistributed mostly to the AKP as a result of the threshold policy. In addition to Kurdish votes,

HDP attracted support from urban liberals across Turkey on issues including gender equality and LGBT rights.

 Winners according to provinces

 Kurdish campaign and Syrians at home: increasing Turkish nationalism

 Although the June 7 elections saw an increase in HDP votes across Turkey, far-right nationalist party MHP has also increased both its votes and its seats at the parliament. By looking into issues feeding Turkish nationalism, the MHP’s relative success can be explained. For a long time, Kurdish struggle was intertwined with PKK terrorism and the strong ties between the HDP and the jailed PKK leader Öcalan have inevitably made resentful Turks turn their support to MHP. Moreover, tensions about Syrian refugees and the AKP’s Middle East policies might have been the reasons for some Turks to turn their hopes to the MHP which is expected to follow a less ambitious foreign policy.

What next in Turkey?

With no party with majority, coalition would be the first move. As of two weeks after the elections, a picture of a coalition is still uncertain. With the AKP having lost the majority, different coalition possibilities are present.

A coalition between the CHP and the HDP could mean increasing social and democratic rights for Kurds and equal rights for LGBT. However this coalition cannot form a majority without MHP support and given the MHP’s strong stance against rights for the Kurdish minority, a coalition between the CHP, HDP and MHP seems very unlikely.

Another option is the grand coalition that is the government of the two main political powers. However a coalition between the AKP and the CHP seems hard as political Islamist AKP and secular Kemalist CHP are ideologically opposing views. On the other hand, an AKP-MHP coalition could have been likely as both are right parties. However, the AKP cannot afford alienating the Kurdish movement by forming a government that would oppose addressing Turkey’s Kurdish question.

As a constitutional requirement, parties must form a government within 45 days of an election and if all the democratic channels fail, elections could be called again.

In Turkey, the role of parliament speaker has been traditionally given to the majority party. With no party having the majority, the party that will get the post is unknown. However, by the 3^rd of July the speaker must be elected and the way it’s done will be an indicator of cross party agreements leading to a coalition.

HDP supporters celebrating their party’s victory in Diyarbakır

Key issues are awaiting

Turkey sits between the turmoil in Syria, the threat from Iran, the economic crisis in Greece and Russian aggression in the region. This incredible and perhaps quite unfortunate location gives Turkey a prominent role in the current global political agenda. Turkey is also becoming crucial in the energy security of the region. Accession negotiations with the EU are almost on hold due to a mutual lack of willingness, the Eurozone crisis and the possibility of a British exit. Additionally, the Cyprus Conflict is still unresolved and issues with Armenia are deadlocked.

Turkey could achieve a greater peace with a coalition. A coalition that does not discriminate or alienate as secular against conservative or Turkish against Kurdish could redefine the politics of Turkey. An integrated Kurdish political movement to Turkish politics under HDP’s current vision is likely to change the dynamics of the region. Turkey matters for everyone searching for political answers in Europe, in the Middle East and in Asia, and this is precisely why we should keep a close watch on Turkey this summer.

Author Biography:

 Emir Tan is a student of politics and international relations at the University of Kent. His research interests include EuroAsian issues (the European Union and Russia), foreign policy analysis, political philosophy, Turkish politics and political economy.

*Cover image ‘: 041 : ‘ by la_imagen

The suppression or the “slow burning genocide” of the Rohingya Muslims is not a problem concerning human rights but that of identity, a similar argument Karl Marx implied with his Jewish question in 1843. The Rohingya Muslim identity is layered with perceptions and expectations which international political authorities have either ignored or simply avoided the topic altogether. As a consequence, the only way it seems the Rohingya Muslims will ever find themselves politically equal before humanely equal is by answering the question of identity. Until then we may become accustomed to the discovery of more graves which simply extends the matter by asking the same questions in different ways.

From past to present

Who or what are the Rohingya? Rohingya translates as ‘inhabitants of Rohang’, the name used when Bengali Muslims in the 17^th century were captured and enslaved by the Kingdom of Arakan, now known as Rakhine. The Kingdom was later conquered by the Burmese in 1785. Tensions between the Muslims and the Arakanese only arose after the British conquest in 1825 when high levels of immigration saw Bengalis move in; the Arakanese blamed mass immigration for the lack of jobs. However the line would be drawn during the Second World War when the British armed the Muslims to fight the Arakanese, allies of Japan. Then came the fight for independence in 1948.

The plight of the Rohingya Muslims has lasted over three decades, emphatically deteriorating in the last couple of years. In post-independent Burma [or Myanmar] between 1948 and 1962, three successive governments had initially recognised the Rohingya as citizens of the State. However in 1960 as U Nu is elected to office as the first Prime Minister of Burma, his policy to replace socialist ideology with Buddhism and his lax attitude towards separatism caused a resentful military to overthrow him in a coup led by General Ne Win. Ne Win would go on to rule under socialist principles with a one-party system, removing the previous form of a semi-functioning representative democracy. As such in 1978 Ne Win would lead a campaign against the Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine State, forcing their abdication from Western Burma. Ever since, Burma has experienced political unrest with riots and protests against the ruling party which also includes opposition to the implementation of martial law in 1989. In  2011 signs of change emerged as the military handed over power but the resulting political factions and struggle for democracy would continue to exclude the Rohingya Muslims from the process. Consequently, according to the UN, the Rohingya Muslims have now become one of the most persecuted minorities in the world.

The Rohingya Identity Problem

After graves of over 150 bodies were discovered in camps across South East Asia, based on the response it would seem the buried had more of a home in the ground than above the ground. A crackdown on human trafficking may be a cause as smugglers look to dump what is a potential illegal and cheap workforce anywhere and everywhere. But it is more that being Rohingya bares a cost of having nowhere to go; firstly because the majority who reside in Burma are being forced out and secondly the places in which they are arriving, force them to go back or prove more risky.

An explanation offered by Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Begum in an interview with Al-Jazeera in 2012 stated: the Rohingya refugees were not Bangladesh’s problem and that Bangladesh could not accommodate for anymore refugees when it was already host to 300,000 Rohingya refugees. Though it may seem that proximity is the only reason for the journey to Bangladesh from Burma, it is also the labelling of the Rohingya as ‘Bengali’ and in so doing, the labelling proposes a home. The debate as to whether the Rohingya are originally from the Rakhine State or Bangladesh hides the fact that they are denied residency and citizenry by means of violent discrimination in their current homes. As Sheikh Hasina herself refuted, the questions should be asked of Burma and not Bangladesh.

The Rohingya are subject to all forms of violence, that is the reality and it is made worse by the rhetoric of Burmese officials who completely reject any accountability. For instance, in 2013 the official spokesperson for the Rakhine State government declared that ethnic cleansing was not taking place because the Rohingya are not an ethnic group. A couple of months later speaking at Chatham House, Prime Minister Thein Sein refused acknowledgment of the issue by claiming “we do not have the term ‘Rohingya’”.  Not only are the Rohingya denied citizenry but almost denied existence and this has enabled religion to be politicised as a result, legitimating sectarian violence on the grounds that the Rohingya are Muslims and therefore unlike Burmese Buddhists.

The Muslim Problem

It is all too easy to spew out facts and figures about the dead and the dying in order to collectivise an international response and sell a story that is read for a moment and forgotten in an instance. However, what is often marginalised in this story is the fact that Asia is experiencing a Muslim problem which it is dealing with based on international narratives.

Ever since the tragic events of 9/11, to be Muslim has been an almost difficult identity to uphold made more so difficult by the birth of Islamist terrorist groups. In Britain, only recently teachers complained about having to spy on Muslim children who may be deemed radical as a part of the government’s Prevent initiative. In the US, a Muslim woman was refused a can of Coke because the flight attendants feared it would be used as a weapon; in the very same country a Muslim teen has just won a case against Abercrombie & Fitch who refused to employ her on the grounds of her headscarf. In 2014 France banned Muslim women from wearing headscarves in public service jobs and Denmark announced its ban on both kosher and halal meats. All of this was taken to the next level by the likes of China and Tajikistan. The former decided to ban Muslim clothing on buses and ‘Islamic beards’, whilst the latter deemed it appropriate to class Muslim women wearing the hijab as prostitutes and also banning Arabic names. In a more political context Egypt joined in by overthrowing and then banning the fairly elected Muslim Brotherhood and shooting down supporters whilst sentencing its members to death; and Bangladesh similarly executed the leaders of its largest Islamist party by opening up closed cases where once amnesty had originally been granted post-independence in 1971.

Unfortunately these events have been used by Burmese Buddhists who have decided to abandon a core principle of Buddhism – non-violence. Not more so evidenced by the leading figure on the issue, the Buddhist Monk – Wirathu, who refers to himself as the ‘Burmese Bin Laden’. His videos are watched countless times on Youtube whilst he openly shares his dislike of Muslims by declaring “[Muslims] target young innocent girls and rape them” followed by “in every town, there is a crude and savage Muslim majority”. He continues and theorises that the Middle East has been financing the military prowess of the 5% that make up Burma’s total population. By Middle East, he is of course implying Arab and by Arab he is implying Muslim. His words of wisdom have had a much unwanted effect. Monks have slaughtered Rohingya Muslims simply on the basis that they continued practising their religion when they were told not to. Furthermore, Wirathu has encouraged the non-Muslim Burmese populace to buy from their own and boycott Muslim businesses which further leaves the Rohingya Muslims with very little to live off.

Where now?

As recent events indicate, all these issues have now become apparent as many have sought to travel to areas where they aspire to live free from persecution, most notably Malaysia alongside Thailand and Bangladesh. But as we have now witnessed these destinations have led to greater catastrophes. The Rohingya Muslims have become victims of places where they thought they would find freedom yet now they are having to flee from these destinations. It is now estimated that numbers fleeing from Burma [and Bangladesh] have increased from 11,000 in 2011/12 to 68,000 in 2014/15. These numbers will continue to surge as will the death toll if a solution is not found soon but this all depends on how the international community deals with the identity problem. But sadly history informs us that such cases tend to worsen before they get better.

Author Biography

Rubel Mozlu has recently obtained an MSc from the University of Bristol in International Relations with the intention of pursuing a PhD on the topic of philosophy, religion and terrorism. His MSc main thesis focused on ‘Liberal Democracy and Culture’ with a particular focus on Egypt’s revolutions and Bangladesh’s election boycott. His current interests are in the MENA region, Islamic history, Western and Eastern Philosophy and Culture.

The suppression or the “slow burning genocide” of the Rohingya Muslims is not a problem concerning human rights but that of identity, a similar argument Karl Marx implied with his Jewish question in 1843. The Rohingya Muslim identity is layered with perceptions and expectations which international political authorities have either ignored or simply avoided the topic altogether. As a consequence, the only way it seems the Rohingya Muslims will ever find themselves politically equal before humanely equal is by answering the question of identity. Until then we may become accustomed to the discovery of more graves which simply extends the matter by asking the same questions in different ways.

From past to present

Who or what are the Rohingya? Rohingya translates as ‘inhabitants of Rohang’, the name used when Bengali Muslims in the 17^th century were captured and enslaved by the Kingdom of Arakan, now known as Rakhine. The Kingdom was later conquered by the Burmese in 1785. Tensions between the Muslims and the Arakanese only arose after the British conquest in 1825 when high levels of immigration saw Bengalis move in; the Arakanese blamed mass immigration for the lack of jobs. However the line would be drawn during the Second World War when the British armed the Muslims to fight the Arakanese, allies of Japan. Then came the fight for independence in 1948.

The plight of the Rohingya Muslims has lasted over three decades, emphatically deteriorating in the last couple of years. In post-independent Burma [or Myanmar] between 1948 and 1962, three successive governments had initially recognised the Rohingya as citizens of the State. However in 1960 as U Nu is elected to office as the first Prime Minister of Burma, his policy to replace socialist ideology with Buddhism and his lax attitude towards separatism caused a resentful military to overthrow him in a coup led by General Ne Win. Ne Win would go on to rule under socialist principles with a one-party system, removing the previous form of a semi-functioning representative democracy. As such in 1978 Ne Win would lead a campaign against the Rohingya Muslims in the Rakhine State, forcing their abdication from Western Burma. Ever since, Burma has experienced political unrest with riots and protests against the ruling party which also includes opposition to the implementation of martial law in 1989. In  2011 signs of change emerged as the military handed over power but the resulting political factions and struggle for democracy would continue to exclude the Rohingya Muslims from the process. Consequently, according to the UN, the Rohingya Muslims have now become one of the most persecuted minorities in the world.

The Rohingya Identity Problem

After graves of over 150 bodies were discovered in camps across South East Asia, based on the response it would seem the buried had more of a home in the ground than above the ground. A crackdown on human trafficking may be a cause as smugglers look to dump what is a potential illegal and cheap workforce anywhere and everywhere. But it is more that being Rohingya bares a cost of having nowhere to go; firstly because the majority who reside in Burma are being forced out and secondly the places in which they are arriving, force them to go back or prove more risky.

An explanation offered by Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Begum in an interview with Al-Jazeera in 2012 stated: the Rohingya refugees were not Bangladesh’s problem and that Bangladesh could not accommodate for anymore refugees when it was already host to 300,000 Rohingya refugees. Though it may seem that proximity is the only reason for the journey to Bangladesh from Burma, it is also the labelling of the Rohingya as ‘Bengali’ and in so doing, the labelling proposes a home. The debate as to whether the Rohingya are originally from the Rakhine State or Bangladesh hides the fact that they are denied residency and citizenry by means of violent discrimination in their current homes. As Sheikh Hasina herself refuted, the questions should be asked of Burma and not Bangladesh.

The Rohingya are subject to all forms of violence, that is the reality and it is made worse by the rhetoric of Burmese officials who completely reject any accountability. For instance, in 2013 the official spokesperson for the Rakhine State government declared that ethnic cleansing was not taking place because the Rohingya are not an ethnic group. A couple of months later speaking at Chatham House, Prime Minister Thein Sein refused acknowledgment of the issue by claiming “we do not have the term ‘Rohingya’”.  Not only are the Rohingya denied citizenry but almost denied existence and this has enabled religion to be politicised as a result, legitimating sectarian violence on the grounds that the Rohingya are Muslims and therefore unlike Burmese Buddhists.

The Muslim Problem

It is all too easy to spew out facts and figures about the dead and the dying in order to collectivise an international response and sell a story that is read for a moment and forgotten in an instance. However, what is often marginalised in this story is the fact that Asia is experiencing a Muslim problem which it is dealing with based on international narratives.

Ever since the tragic events of 9/11, to be Muslim has been an almost difficult identity to uphold made more so difficult by the birth of Islamist terrorist groups. In Britain, only recently teachers complained about having to spy on Muslim children who may be deemed radical as a part of the government’s Prevent initiative. In the US, a Muslim woman was refused a can of Coke because the flight attendants feared it would be used as a weapon; in the very same country a Muslim teen has just won a case against Abercrombie & Fitch who refused to employ her on the grounds of her headscarf. In 2014 France banned Muslim women from wearing headscarves in public service jobs and Denmark announced its ban on both kosher and halal meats. All of this was taken to the next level by the likes of China and Tajikistan. The former decided to ban Muslim clothing on buses and ‘Islamic beards’, whilst the latter deemed it appropriate to class Muslim women wearing the hijab as prostitutes and also banning Arabic names. In a more political context Egypt joined in by overthrowing and then banning the fairly elected Muslim Brotherhood and shooting down supporters whilst sentencing its members to death; and Bangladesh similarly executed the leaders of its largest Islamist party by opening up closed cases where once amnesty had originally been granted post-independence in 1971.

Unfortunately these events have been used by Burmese Buddhists who have decided to abandon a core principle of Buddhism – non-violence. Not more so evidenced by the leading figure on the issue, the Buddhist Monk – Wirathu, who refers to himself as the ‘Burmese Bin Laden’. His videos are watched countless times on Youtube whilst he openly shares his dislike of Muslims by declaring “[Muslims] target young innocent girls and rape them” followed by “in every town, there is a crude and savage Muslim majority”. He continues and theorises that the Middle East has been financing the military prowess of the 5% that make up Burma’s total population. By Middle East, he is of course implying Arab and by Arab he is implying Muslim. His words of wisdom have had a much unwanted effect. Monks have slaughtered Rohingya Muslims simply on the basis that they continued practising their religion when they were told not to. Furthermore, Wirathu has encouraged the non-Muslim Burmese populace to buy from their own and boycott Muslim businesses which further leaves the Rohingya Muslims with very little to live off.

Where now?

As recent events indicate, all these issues have now become apparent as many have sought to travel to areas where they aspire to live free from persecution, most notably Malaysia alongside Thailand and Bangladesh. But as we have now witnessed these destinations have led to greater catastrophes. The Rohingya Muslims have become victims of places where they thought they would find freedom yet now they are having to flee from these destinations. It is now estimated that numbers fleeing from Burma [and Bangladesh] have increased from 11,000 in 2011/12 to 68,000 in 2014/15. These numbers will continue to surge as will the death toll if a solution is not found soon but this all depends on how the international community deals with the identity problem. But sadly history informs us that such cases tend to worsen before they get better.

Author Biography

Rubel Mozlu has recently obtained an MSc from the University of Bristol in International Relations with the intention of pursuing a PhD on the topic of philosophy, religion and terrorism. His MSc main thesis focused on ‘Liberal Democracy and Culture’ with a particular focus on Egypt’s revolutions and Bangladesh’s election boycott. His current interests are in the MENA region, Islamic history, Western and Eastern Philosophy and Culture.

Cover image ‘Bangladesh: Rohingyas 2015‘ by European Commission DG ECHO

The US and European Union have labeled Palestinian Islamist group Hamas as a terrorist organisation. Whilst the international community unilaterally seems to agree with this label, Hamas’ internal formation brings forth several questions. Born as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987, the organization’s charter ideologically aligns itself with a fundamentalist creed furthered hugely by the group’s military arm. However, the same charter equally points to a social arm, which aims to use grassroots pragmatism to empower Palestinians who have been somewhat disenchanted by their rival Fatah, formerly the Palestinian National Liberation Movement and now a faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO).

Whilst the ballot box has pointed to a shift in Hamas’ fundamentalist streak as the 2006 national elections saw a roaring victory for the organisation, in the aftermath of the 2007 Gaza war many still remain unsure of the organisation’s turn to pragmatism.  Hamas may be an eternal threat to Israel and a terrorist in the eyes of the West; however, it represents a captivating movement whose trajectory merits further exploration. It would be far too simple to adhere to a yes or no binary analysis of Hamas, especially as questions arise daily with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict deepening.

The emergence of Hamas into mainstream politics happened around the time of the Oslo agreement in 1993 when the organisation turned from a mere quasi-clandestine movement to a strongly-supported social enigma and more importantly, a legitimate rival to the secular Fatah. At the time of the first intifada (uprising) in 1987, Hamas remained undoubtedly fundamentalist. The group saw a rapprochement with Israel as futile and therefore fostered the non-recognition of the state of Israel – stated clearly in the Hamas charter. Actions of violent retaliation came to embody the intifada years, both from Israel and Palestine where Hamas had been involved. The intifada also came to symbolize a unity amongst Palestinians over the question of Palestine, to which the Palestinian Authority (PA) had no legitimate answer. Unsurprisingly, the growing dissatisfaction and disappointment with the then status quo aided in affirming Hamas as a clear alternative and gave the group a validated raison d’etre. During the negotiations and after the signing of Oslo, a large part of Hamas’ activity relied on violent retaliation, for example, large-scale suicide bombings. Hamas truly took advantage of the political paralysis invoked by the aftermath of Oslo, continuing to act violently. This has been specially marked by the Hebron massacre of 1994, which catalyzed a series of attacks launched by the group as acts of revenge.

Has Hamas moved towards moderation?

From the first intifada in 1987 to the Oslo signing in 1993, much of Hamas’ activity remained fundamentalist. Yet, despite the outwardly fundamentalist persona of the organisation in the intifada and Oslo era, there had been signs of ideological shifts towards pragmatism. Two proposed hudna (cease-fires), one in 1995 and one in 1997 would lead us to believe that the group had wanted to occasion peace, and demonstrated a willingness to compromise. However, this is an easily refuted statement due to the very formation of Hamas – consisting of both hardliners and pragmatists that make up the leadership. The need for moderation simply sprouted from internal pressures, especially as the more pragmatic leaders began to champion the cessation of the group’s military wing and talks of potential participation in the elections (then to be held in 1996) took precedence. The 1996 elections, however, never happened. Hamas boycotted the elections for fear of losing the legitimacy that the group had acquired in light of the weakening PA after Oslo.

Due to its growing popularity, it would have been an error for Hamas to compromise on its ideology. For Hamas, eschewing the elections and honoring the charter’s principles proved to be a tactical move, allowing the organisation to uphold its reason for existence and highlight the importance of resistance to Palestinians over the question of Palestine. So what led to a change in behavior, which then resulted in a participatory agenda from the group?

Electoral participation in 2006 and thereof the accession into the PA’s structural system marked a move towards moderation for the Islamist group. This accomodationist trend has been the core of several ‘bullets to ballot box’ discussions, whereby many have tried to decipher the change in Hamas’ motives. Certainly the international community deeply questioned this transition, completely baffled by the notion of Hamas’ victory and its status as a legitimate partner in peace talks. Despite the disillusionment, the organisation swept to victory claiming 76 of the 132 parliamentary seats. Seemingly uncharacteristic at the time, the electoral participation of Hamas can be put down to the group’s awareness of the shift in the balance of power. This shift indicated that Hamas could turn its growing public support into tangible seats and witness an unanticipated victory.

Was moderation to last?

Whatever the premise behind Hamas’ decision to participate electorally, the Gaza War of 2007-2009 revealed that Hamas found it difficult to completely give up its fundamentalist agenda. Once the party entered the reality of the political arena, it faced several major challenges. In the context of the Gaza conflict, we therefore witness Hamas’ relapse to militia, its armed wing that the party refused to disband. Hamas’ hardliners in June 2007 used military force to defeat Fatah and took control of the Gaza Strip, leading to two distinct political entities operating in the name of ‘free Palestine’. The switch from ideological moderation to full blown violent attacks is not inexplicable in the advent of the Gaza conflict in 2007. The political realities on the grounds can explain why Hamas resorted once again to violent tactics.

After the electoral victory in 2006, Hamas was met with hostility from not only Israel but also the US and the EU. The threat that Hamas presented to Israel, its rival Fatah and the international community unsurprisingly led to a rejection of Hamas from all three actors as a legitimate elective. The ballot box for Hamas may have represented a path to integration, however met with animosity, the group had to consolidate its power in other ways. Unfortunately, the sad truth remains that Hamas, whilst fighting for the Palestinians, is still dictated by a harsh ‘ideologue vs. pragmatic’ dichotomy. The overarching notion remains that, for as long as Hamas suffers from a divided internal structure, the group will continuously find it difficult to be accepted as a key player in the political realm whereby the fate of Palestine is to be decided.

It is important to note the relevance of Hamas to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict despite the group’s refusal to adhere or relinquish arms. Whether Hamas moderates or not, it remains a pivotal player. Hamas and Fatah continue to remain bitterly divided and thus the ballot box, since 2006, has remained untouched. Furthered by the ideology of resistance, Hamas continues to seek support from Palestinians and a recent victory in student elections near Ramallah has proven that Hamas is still able to gather significant support, defeating rivals aligned with Fatah. We must not forget the realities of the Palestinian conflict, the growth and evolution of Hamas since its first emergence. As Hamas exists and operates in stateless boundaries, it is extremely difficult to fully comprehend the complex nuances attached to its plight as a resistance movement. Its ideology will continue to be the subject of frequent oscillation between moderation and fundamentalism serving to many a debate on the strategy of the organisation.

About the Author

Ayooshee Dookhee is a Politics and International Relations graduate from Royal Holloway, University of London. She is currently working for a public policy, public affairs and campaigns consultancy in London. In September 2015, she will be starting a Masters in International Relations with a focus on Middle East politics at the University of Leiden in The Netherlands. She has a growing interest for issues and conflicts in the Middle East having completed her dissertation on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Her further interests are in international human rights, women’s rights, gender and minority equality and the politics of the European Union.

Cover image ‘Israeli West Bank barrier’ by Montecruz Photo

Self-Determination – A Kurdish Nation-State?

With the Middle East now undeniably one of the most unstable regions today, the Kurdish question has been resurrected yet again. The chaos caused by ISIS in Iraq and Syria has created opportunities for Kurdish actors to increase their strength politically. As new developments take hold, the on-going saga bears implications for Turkey, Iraq, Syria and of course Iraqi Kurdistan, which hopes to emerge as a new autonomous state from those crumbling around it.

Kurdish minorities and their place in the Middle East

The Kurdish bid for independence highlights the difficulty the region has had in building national identities based on various minorities that live within the countries’ borders. Since the rise of the Islamic State, much has been blamed on the Skyes-Picot line; a remnant of colonial times that is still at the heart of issues today. In the aftermath of World War One and following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the newly created borders that sprung from the secret agreement between France and Great Britain paid little regard to the various tribal, ethnic and sectarian divisions. The countries that emerged grouped together various communities and religions that had lived side by side for centuries. The various waves of displacement under Saddam Hussein, the Iraq War of 2003 and now ISIS has changed what was once a religiously pluralistic country.

The Kurds are one of the largest minorities without a sovereign state of their own; 30 million inhabitants live within the borders of Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran. The biggest concentration of Kurdish inhabitants is found in Turkey, but no matter where they have settled, their existence has always been built on shaky ground. One such episode took place under Saddam Hussein in the 1980’s and became known as “the War of Annihilation” which resulted in the killing of 180,000 Kurds in an attempt to “Arabize” the region. Iranian Kurds have also suffered repression and marginalization and Kurdish history itself is dominated by in-fighting between the various groups.

Kurdistan’s fight against ISIS

The growth of ISIS power and efforts to push back the Islamic State has helped elevate the cause of Kurdistan, Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdish region. When the city of Mosul fell in the summer of 2014, Kurdistan’s regional leader, President Barzani deployed its Peshmerga forces to the disputed borders between Kurdish territory and Iraq to defend the region against ISIS attacks. This opportunistic maneuver meant an increase in territory for the region of Kurdistan, which included Kirkuk, a city at the heart of the Iraqi-Kurd tensions for its high oil producing capacity. Although initially successful in its counter attack, by the beginning of August 2014, the Peshmerga were beginning to lose momentum. The Kurdish army was now fighting on two fronts and their soviet era weaponry was no match for the jihadists, who had captured state of the art American equipment. It was only when the Yazidi “genocide” was broadcast around the world did the threat of ISIS become real and bolstered support from the international community for action. On August 8^th, Obama announced the go ahead for US-led air strikes in Iraq on humanitarian grounds.

The US and the Kurdish Question

The complexity of the Kurdish predicament is apparent when looking at the inconsistent approach Washington has adopted in response to Kurdish aspirations. The Obama administration, in light of past events and alliances, has had to tread carefully. The Kurdish Peshmerga forces and Turkish fighters from the PKK (a world wide recognized terrorist organization), are currently the only ground forces successfully pushing back the Islamic State. This is where the problem arises for Washington. Although US funding and support for the Kurdish forces has helped short-term aims of pushing back ISIS, the US runs the risk of further empowering Kurdish aspirations. By taking back ISIS held territory, the Kurds could find themselves in a stronger position to claim for their own the de-facto borders ISIS leaves behind. This could lead to further instability in the region and would see the break-up of Iraq’s borders, which the US has been trying hard to keep intact since the war in 2003 under “One Iraq”. This scenario has already taken place in Syria. Following the civil war, the Kurds took advantage of the void left by Bashar Al- Assad’s forces fighting ISIS. The PYD (Kurdish Democratic Party) has since been self-governing 3 states within Syria with the help of the People’s Protection Unit (PYD).

Oil as Freedom

The question of oil has complicated Kurdish relations with its neighbors and increasing tensions between the two sides has made Baghdad hostile to Kurdish aims. The Iraqi constitution states that the Kurds should be allocated 17% of the country’s oil revenues, a figure which is representative of its population. Since its inception, the Kurds have accused Baghdad of giving less than agreed. Tensions have continued to grow since the discovery that Kurdish territory is situated on oil rich land, estimated to be a quarter of Iraq’s total oil reserves. With Western companies such as ExxonMobil and Chevron flocking to the region to help exploit the oil, Iraq’s government saw the Kurds as one step closer to achieving independence if it could control its oil and gas resources independently from Baghdad. Turkey has also aligned itself with Kurdistan as its position is influenced by tensions with Baghdad’s Shi’ia led government that supports Assad. The problem lies in the constitution which made no provisions on how to treat newly discovered resources, thus making it open to interpretation. With Kurdistan unilaterally exporting its oil to Turkey and thus breaching the constitution in the eyes of Baghdad, the Iraqi government has responded by withholding the revenue payments to its semi-autonomous region.

Independence for the Iraqi Kurds continues to be a difficult issue to solve. Kurdistan’s position raises many issues and presents a difficult balancing act with past history and new alliances forming. The various actors in the region, who all have a stake in the Kurdish question, will watch carefully the future developments that unfold. Will The Kurds win or lose from their fight against ISIS is yet to be known.

About the author

Marie Mulville is currently studying for a Master’s in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy at City University in London. Marie’s interests include the Middle East, European Politics and Security.

@Marie_Mulville

The rearrangement of political actors may change the country’s development vector.

The history of parliamentary elections in Turkey can be considered as the most dynamic element of a historical process in the country’s republican period. In recent years, the parliamentary majority and the opportunity to form a government has been due to the activities of the Justice and Development Party (or Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi in Turkish), more commonly referred to as the AKP. Results of the elections, which were announced on the 7th of June, suggest that Turkey is on the threshold of change although at such an early stage it is difficult to say if this change will be positive or negative and how it will affect the economic and political situation.

Over the years the previous government, formed by the AKP leadership, managed to find innovative solutions to improve the transport system, strengthen relationships with a number of neighboring countries, to carry out systemic changes in healthcare as well as a possible solution to the energy issue, agreeing to build a “Turkish Stream gas pipeline” with Russia.

Despite the fact of positively oriented reforms there is also a  list of events that are used against AKP by its political opposition to compromise the government (a wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Turkey began on 28 May 2013, initially to contest the urban development plan for Istanbul’s Gezi Park on Taksim square,  «Balyoz» that is known as  an alleged Turkish military coup plan which reportedly dates back to 2003 and was to stir up chaos and justify a military coup;  process against «Ergenekon» members who have been indicted on charges of plotting to foment unrest, among other things like assassinating intellectuals, politicians, judges, military staff, and religious leaders, with the ultimate goal of toppling the incumbent government; «Devrimci Karargah» that first came to public attention in April 2009, when some of its members were involved in a six-hour gun battle with police in the Istanbul neighbourhood of Bostanci, leading to the death of a policeman and a bystander. The organization’s leader Orhan Yılmazkaya and 20 of its members were arrested in September 2009 and  finally a «Parallel government»  process was triggered by an attack on February 7, 2012  when “Jamaat”  tried to control the security services of Turkey, and 12-25 of December when the same group determined the government as a main aim).  The synthesis of this two opposite components formed non-homogenous position of civil society before the elections on 7 th of June 2015.

The current Turkish government formed by the ruling AKP faces various difficulties and losses to certain political positions when it came to this year elections. An additional impetus to rivet their attention to events in Ankara becomes the need for constitutional changes planned as early as 2012, and the desire to transform the current leadership in the “presidential republic”.

According to the legislative platform, the process of events on election results is simple: if the parliamentary majority forms the government, then accordingly this office continues to work until the next election. However, in the absence of the expected formation of a coalition majority an extraordinary election is held in 3 or 6 months.

The particular intrigue of this election was probably the question of whether the pro-Kurdish party HDP would pass the 10% threshold to become parliamentarians, and if the current AKP would fall below 45%. Nobody doubted that the MHP and the CHP would make the parliament as usual. The results were eagerly awaited by those who wondered whether there would be the need for a coalition between the AKP and some of those who overcame the 10% barrier.

After the elections on the 7th of June when almost 99.9% of the votes where counted, the results appeared as following: AKP obtained 40,81%, CHP – 25%, MHP – 16,33% and pro-Kurdish HDP – 13,08%. On the agenda just one question arrived: with the AKP having lost the majority, what were the possible formations of government?

In his first interview, the leader of MHP Devlet Bahcheli made it clear that there are no possibilities to create a coalition with the AKP, and that they are ready for early elections, but after a week MHP changed its position and defined that if the coalition would be created it has to include AKP. As such, the selection of a possible coalition is limited: The first option would be an AKP-CHP coalition – a party that has built its election campaign on the fact that the AKP would deprive a majority government, however some experts are in favor of the possibility of such a coalition. The second option is more radical and more akin to the arrival of Hamas in power of the Palestinian Authority as if the HDP gained power, the Kurdish question would suddenly be on the current government’s agenda.

The first version of the coalition suggests that the CHP needs to form a coalition government with the AKP, which automatically resulted in mass discontent supporters on both sides. In addition, CHP – the party founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is aimed at preserving the principles of “secularism” in the same form as it was in the period of the First President of the country. Coalition CHP – AKP, firs of all,  strikes to the image of both parties, acting as classical opponents of each other. The second option, an AKP coalition with the HDP, with whom negotiations have been conducted repeatedly, is probably the main reason to discredit the AKP in the eyes of voters, which in principle meant that for the next elections, the majority party will have to lose a significant share of electoral votes. This time supporters of the AKP, which will not be able to overcome the coalition with the Party will have to address the Kurdish issue in Turkey. If the coalition does not take place in the near future it will form an permanent government, and after 3-6 months, Turkey might expect early elections.

However, the possibility of a coalition between the opposition parties HDP & CHP should not be discounted, having been mentioned by both the leader of the HDP, Salahaddin Demirtash, and deputy head of the CHP, Sezgin Tanrykulu. There is still a small issue on how to persuade for coalition MHP leader Devlet Bahcheli, that firstly expressed in more than categorical, saying that “even if the coalition of the AKP with HDP or AKP with HDP and CHP held, then MHP is prepared solely represent the opposition bloc in parliament, if the coalition will not, then the MHP expects early elections» but changed his own position and made it more flexible after a week of discussions and meetings with Recep Tayyip Erdogan and colleagues from other parties.

In the case of the creation of a permanent government, the AKP will continue to work to create the image of a “progressive” party with democratic values and the presence of “the Islamic factor” as a key in the implementation of its policies, and its opponents continue to discredit. AAnother case scenario could be creating a new party instead of the AKP, a sort of continuity with the best experience and under the patronage of the President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, which could be lead by the former president of Turkey Abdullah Gul.

In general, the situation created after the elections on June the 7th addresses many questions primarily in regards to the AKP that is looking for a way to form a government with the nation’s 40.81% of the vote and the lack of a worthy partner for the creation of a coalition in parliament. Opponents, in particular the CHP and HDP, are speaking of the impossibility of a dialogue with the AKP rather than seeking the most advantageous point solutions in tandem with those whose representation in Parliament, even in the absence of an absolute majority is more than significant. Participants need to break the division in order to take advantage of any situation or to translate into the mainstream of early elections. This fact certainly will be a key factor in determining the course of Turkey.

Author Biography

Ilsur Nafikov has a PhD in history and works as an assistant Lecturer of the Department of Political history and world Politics at the Kazan Federal University. He also works as a correspondent for the Tatar national broadcasting company “TNV”. Among his interests are religious revival, the Islamic factor in the European space, church-state relations and the Islamic factor in the formation of regional security. To date he has written more than more than 15 scientific articles and manuals.