Author: kasmir

For the past fifteen years, the Peruvian economy has been booming; since the start of the last decade, the country has experienced a healthy dose of GDP growth, which has more than doubled since 2000, coming from a little more than 50 billion US Dollars in that year, to 200 billion US Dollars in 2014 (Fig. 1), representing an average growth of 7.8% each year in that period.

A similar trend is seen in the GDP per capita (PPP); a well-known but inexact measure of living standards within countries. According to The World Bank, in the year 2000, GDP per capita in Peru was over 5100 US Dollars, but by 2014 that figure had risen to over 12,000 US Dollars. This is the Peruvian miracle; an unexpected and very important economic growth at a time when almost all the developed world was in crisis.

The causes for this rise are mainly explained by foreign, as opposed to internal, factors. In 2000 Peru was shocked by a corruption scandal that reached the top spheres of central government and saw the then President Fujimori flee the country to try to resign by fax from Japan before being removed from office by the Congress on the grounds of moral incapacity. He is now in jail, sentenced on corruption charges and for violation of human rights during his presidential terms.

In that context, Peru was in no shape to carry the ‘emerging market’ slogan just yet, but the developed world was just recovering from the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the dot-com bubble four years later after the 9/11 attacks occurred in United States of America. This is related to Peru because in a world in crisis, investors no longer saw the dollar as a safe haven and instead retreated to commodities such as gold and silver, among others, and Peru was a top destination for this type of investment.

Gold prices rose fivefold, from 300 USD/oz in 2001 to more than 1800 USD/oz in 2011 and silver rose from less than 10 USD/oz to more than 50 USD/oz in the same period. The prosperity in commodities prices and an unstable world led to this Peruvian miracle that it is now studied and praised by many; even COFACE and Bloomberg have called Peru one of the new ‘hot emerging markets’ for the near future.

However, there is a problem: commodities are no longer hot investments. Their prices are gradually declining and the developed world is slowly returning to the path of growth which has led many to think that the Peru ‘miracle’ is almost certainly over and Peru will return to modest rates of economic growth this year as predicted by the International Monetary Fund. But what if we look beyond the GDP in Peru? What has this growth left for the country?

Figure 2 shows the poverty situation of Peruvian population from 2004 to 2014, using the oldest official and comparable statistics in poverty for Peru (it is safe to assume that the situation was even worse in the 1990s).

In 2004, more than half the population in Peru was living in poverty or extreme poverty and roughly 40% was non-poor. Ten years of strong economic growth has certainly improved the poverty situation in Peru; the percentage of non-poor people almost doubled and meanwhile the total poor population has gone from 58% to just over 22% last year, an important reduction that signals a positive trend in living conditions.

A sound macroeconomic management by central government was able to carry and maintain this growth during a long period of time; The World Economic Forum ranked Peru 21 out of 144 surveyed countries in macroeconomic environment in its latest Global Competitiveness Report, thanks to its balanced budget, low inflation prospects and low government debt.

Whilst this all sounds like good news, upon closer inspection there is still one problem: The Peruvian population is not living particularly better now and most of it – more than 8 out 10 Peruvians – are still living at the bottom of socioeconomic classes. This means that a large percentage of population considered non-poor is still within the poverty threshold or at risk of becoming poor soon. GDP growth has improved the economic situation in Peru but the country is still far from becoming a developed society, or even ensuring that its population lives with better standards.

Peru is at a crossroads: it is still considered one of Latin America’s stars but it is currently experiencing constant political instability created by corruption, particular interests and failed promises by its governments – the last three elected presidents are either in jail or under investigation on corruption charges – which is already affecting growth prospects and will continue to do so. But more importantly it will affect the kind of lives people are able to live in Peru; many economic reforms are needed in the country, but political and social reforms are even more crucial in securing long term growth and ultimately a better-off Peruvian population.

Author Biography

Pedro Mario Portocarrero Moreno is a Peruvian Economist, with a broad perspective on economic and social issues, I am currently working as professor of economics at a university in Peru but soon will be a Social Policy master’s student at The London School of Economics and Political Science. My main interests are development studies, policy implementation, politics and economics.

In 1846, after a long battle, Britain’s Corn Laws were repealed exposing the market to international competition and reducing the price of bread which dominated the staple diet of ordinary Britons of the day. This was a great victory for the British working class over the landed elite.

It also marked a seminal moment in the Industrial Revolution. Shifting labour and resources from agriculture to manufacturing is only possible if there is enough surplus food to feed industrial workers. The Corn Laws were a barrier to this and its removal allowed Britain’s march to modernity to increase unhindered.

Fast forward to today and trade liberalisation is seen as a requisite for economic development as set out by the Washington Consensus. Indeed the EU actively promotes less developed countries (LDCs) to reduce barriers to increase export revenues and improve living standards. This has been criticised by the likes of Noam Chomsky and Naomi Klein for facilitating the exploitation of poor countries by large multinationals. It is my opinion that the truth of this key policy area is significantly more nuanced than either of these.

The EU’s thinking is in line with most economists and indeed few could argue that free trade does not boast GDP. To understand why one needs to look at the theory.

Neoclassical trade theory focuses on the idea of comparative advantage and specialisation. If every country specialises in a particular good or commodity they hold a comparative advantage in, then resources will be maximised and the standard of living along with it. This is unquestionably true, however it is often overlooked that comparative advantage maximises output based on current resources and level of development.

Trade liberalisation fosters efficiency by increasing competition but unfortunately this competition can also kill fledgling industries before they have grown significant enough to survive against more advanced foreign competition. This argument for protectionism is known as the Infant Industry Argument. Looking at the British example we can understand how it works in reality.

Ha-Joon Chang in his book Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (London 2002) makes a compelling case that without protectionism, the British industry would never have survived in the face of cheaper international competition. The Industrial Revolution had its origins in cotton, an industry in which India had a significant advantage over Britain until the late 18^th Century due to its abundance of cheap labour. Without barriers to trade, Indian imports would have killed the Industrial Revolution before it began.

With access to cheap imports restricted and high domestic labour costs, Britain was forced to turn to alternative sources of production, in particular coal, thus starting the process of industrialisation. The Theory of Comparative Advantage would dictate that Britain should have allowed such imports as it was the best way of maximising contemporary resources, but history tells us otherwise. British industry started to grow at unprecedented rates until they were in a position that trade liberalisation became beneficial for the theoretical reasons outlined above.

Both free trade and protectionism have their advantages. In policy terms I still believe that trade liberalisation is for the most part economically beneficial but protectionism does have a role to play. Nevertheless, protectionism must only be used to support growing industries, not to protect out of date or uncompetitive forms of manufacturing. It also must not be used to protect agriculture from the rigorous international competition.

We should not deal in black and white when it comes to economics; in most cases free trade is beneficial, but in certain limited circumstances the argument for erecting protectionist barriers is persuasive.

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Author Biography

Callum Trimble-Jenkins is a recent graduate of Trinity College Dublin having studied Philosophy, Politics, Economics and Sociology, majoring in Economics. He is currently working in communications for an international NGO having previously edited Ireland’s only student run financial newspapers The Bull. Callum is particularly focused on issues of economic policy making, European affairs and British politics. Hailing from Northern Ireland he also watches developments in his homeland with keen interest.

You can find him on Twitter

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*Cover image ‘WTO Ministerial Conference 2011‘ by the World Trade Organisation

For the first time since the USA Patriot Act was signed into law in the aftermath of September 11, the United States has scaled back the scope of its security provisions with the USA Freedom Act of 2015. A consequence of Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013, it has signaled a normative shift in American policy on issues of mass surveillance, government secrecy and information privacy. North of the border in Canada, the national debate on privacy and security is taking a different path. Over the past year, the Conservative government has introduced multiple pieces of legislation that affect security, privacy, and the power of policy agencies.

Most recently, the Anti-Terrorism Act 2015 officially came into Canadian law on June 18 following months of deliberation among a Conservative-majority Parliament. Also known as Bill C-51, the legislation ensures enhanced powers to Canada’s spy agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). It criminalizes the promotion of terrorism and provides police with new powers of preventative surveillance and arrest, among other provisions. Conservatives proclaim the bill is necessary to combat the threat of domestic and international terrorism, while critics believe it constrains too many fundamental freedoms in the process. Some fear C-51 establishes criminal offences that infringe upon the right to free expression, granting security agencies unprecedented and intrusive powers to monitor and share information about Canadians with little proportionate oversight or accountability.

Public support for the bill in the face of sustained criticism can best be explained by two deadly incidents targeting soldiers that raised concerns of terrorist activity in Canada last fall. On October 20, Martin Couture-Rouleau killed Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. Two days later, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed Corporal Nathan Cirillo at the War Memorial in Ottawa, before storming Parliament. The federal government was quick to declare both incidents terror attacks and vowed to take steps to strengthen Canada’s abilities to identify and neutralize potential threats to national security. The sustained campaign of the Islamic State, as well as international terror incidents including the Paris and Copenhagen attacks of January 2015, have facilitated public support for enhanced security powers in Canada. In March, for instance, a poll by the Angus Reid Institute found that 82 percent of Canadians surveyed supported the bill, while 36 percent believed it did not go far enough. Prime Minister Stephen Harper unveiled Bill C-51 on January 30, stating that his goal is to deal with the threat posed by supporters of the Islamic State and other anti-Western terror groups. The legislation is the most comprehensive reform of Canadian security policy since the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act became law following the September 11 attacks.

According to an official government press release, here is what Bill C-51 will implement:

1. Stop those who promote terrorism by creating a new Criminal Code offence that will criminalize the advocacy or promotion of the commission of terrorism offences (now in force);
2. Counter terrorist recruitment by giving our judges the authority to order the seizure and forfeiture of terrorist propaganda material and the removal of terrorist propaganda from Canadian websites (now in force);
3. Provide the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) with the ability, under the authority of a court, to intervene to prevent specific terrorist plots (now in force);
4. Enhance the Passenger Protect Program by further mitigating threats to transportation security and preventing travel by air for the purpose of engaging in terrorism-related activities (these amendments to the Secure Air Travel Act and related amendments will come into force on a date fixed by an order of the Governor in Council);
5. Make it easier for our police forces to temporarily detain and apply to a court to have conditions imposed on suspected terrorists before they can harm Canadians and toughening penalties for violating court-ordered conditions on terrorist suspects (these amendments to strengthen the terrorism recognizance with conditions and peace bond powers will come into force in 30 days);
6. Enable the responsible sharing of relevant national security information across federal departments and agencies (the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and related amendments will come into force on a date fixed by an order of the Governor in Council);
7. Ensure that the Government is better able to protect and use classified information when denying entry and status to non-citizens who pose a threat to Canada; (these amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act will come into force on a date fixed by an order of the Governor in Council); and,
8. Provide witnesses and other participants in national security proceedings and prosecutions with additional protection (most of these amendments are now in force).

Overall, the aim and effect of Bill C-51 is to increase the powers and reach of Canada’s security services. Implementing the above includes amendments to the Criminal Code, the CSIS Act, and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, as well as new laws to increase the scope of the national security network. The new laws are laid out in the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act. It gives CSIS powers beyond intelligence gathering (to actively target threats and derail plots); criminalizes terrorist propaganda and the promotion of terror; lowers the legal threshold to detain those suspected of terrorism; extends preventive detention for suspected terrorists from three to seven days; legally entrenches a no fly list; and grants government agencies authority to share private information with domestic and foreign entities. Sweeping and contentious, controversy surrounding the bill has initiated a national debate on privacy protections and the threat of terrorism in Canada.

Bill C-51 has sparked serious concerns about the potential impact on the basic civil liberties of all Canadians. Of special significance are the Canada Information Sharing Act and the amendments to the Criminal Code and CSIS Act, which could legitimize unlawful detainment of and the mass collection of surveillance data on Canadian citizens. Among others things, C-51 widens the definition of what might be encompassed under the category of “terrorist activity”; greatly expands the information-sharing capacity of the federal government; greatly expands the boundaries and conditions of the no-fly list; extends the length of preventive detention while lowering minimum conditions; creates new criminal offences for promoting or advocating terrorism (including an ambiguous “terrorism in general”); and enables CSIS to apply secretly for judicial disruption warrants that would permit it to break Canadian law and violate charter rights.

The bill has raised concerns about its use of intentionally vague language left open to broad interpretation, which could lead to abuses. The ambiguity of the wording allows the government to conduct surveillance on Canadians with unprecedented ease. If a department deems there is credible evidence of “terrorist activity”, it is allowed to conduct surveillance on citizens and share that information with all levels of government. Targeted activities are too broadly defined, making it likely that legitimate expressive activities will be sanctioned – including social protest, environmental / aboriginal activism and labor unrest. Further, the bill changes the conditions which dictate whether or not an individual can be detained without evidence, and probable cause for arrest, both of which drastically lower the necessary legal threshold for jailing suspected terrorists. Security agencies only need a warrant to take action against supposed extremists, and only when the action taken will violate a charter right or Canadian law. It is the first time any law in Canada has pre-authorized the potential breach of charter rights.

With the new and increased powers for CSIS and other agencies, the need for independent oversight and effective review mechanisms is greater than ever. The proposed expansion of intrusive state powers into civil society through C-51 is accompanied by no improvement to the framework’s accountability system. Even before C-51 became law, Canada was unique among Western democracies for having no parliamentary oversight to the activities of its security agencies. That has not changed. The independent watchdog that the Conservative government points to as providing necessary oversight to CSIS, the SIRC (Security Intelligence Review Committee), is under-resourced and under-staffed. Thus, critics believe the committee will be unable to effectively monitor the new powers CSIS will receive under the government’s proposed antiterrorism legislation. Its powers have not kept pace with the expanded mandate of the security services it reviews.

Founded in 1984, the SIRC’s responsibilities include providing an external review mechanism for CSIS and acting as a tribunal to consider complaints about activities carried out by CSIS. Yet the SIRC has just 14 staff members and received under $ 3 million CAD last fiscal year for its work investigating complaints against CSIS and reviewing the spy agency’s activities. By comparison, CSIS had over 3,000 staff and financial expenditures of $496 million CAD in 2012-2013. As a result, SIRC staff carries out retroactive reviews of only a small selection of CSIS activities. Recent SIRC reports have also noted issues in getting timely and full information from CSIS, and the secrecy surrounding CSIS means its reports have to be comprehensively edited and redacted. Conservative spokespersons argue the SIRC already provides robust accountability. The government has also made the claim that greater “judicial oversight” arises out of C-51, even though the disruption warrants constitute secret judicial enabling of law breaking, turning judges into agents of the executive rather than overseers of the law. Other agencies, such as the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), are not subject to a review body at all. Without a much larger investment in an already weak accountability system, Canada’s security agencies will be lacking legitimate and capable oversight mechanisms to address or correct practices and procedures that result in violations of Canadian’s rights.

Several civil liberty organizations, lawmakers, former CSIS employees and several former Canadian prime ministers have expressed concern about the lack of oversight and effective review mechanisms for the law. Edward Snowden himself has stated that “Canadian intelligence has one of the weakest oversight frameworks of any western intelligence agency in the world” and went on to point out the critical importance of real accountability in protecting liberal freedoms when under pressure from the national security state. The new law is currently being challenged in Canada’s Supreme Court by a journalists’ group and a civil rights organizations that call it an attack on constitutional freedom, an inversion of the judiciary’s role as a protector of constitutional rights, and a violation of judges’ independence from government. Moreover, a July report by the United Nations Human Rights Committee raised further objections about Canada’s new anti-terror legislation, saying it could violate the international covenant on civil and political rights. It is concerned sweeping powers in the law do not contain enough legal safeguards to protect people’s rights, and says the government should consider rewriting the law to ensure it complies with the international civil rights agreement. Bill C-51 is only part of a long list of issues the committee is raising on how well Canada is meetings its obligations under the civil and political human rights covenant. The government has dismissed these criticisms.

In a practical sense, the fearful and politicized context in which C-51 was introduced is not conducive to pragmatic recognition of the long-term causes and solutions to terror threats. The new powers provided to CSIS are best understood as powers of disruption: CSIS can disrupt and perhaps even detain, but even under C-51, it cannot arrest or charge. Its new powers are used in cases in which there is not enough evidence to justify laying criminal charges under existing terrorism and related offences. As such, they are likely to provide only temporary solutions to real security problems presented by those radicalized to violent extremism. Rather than potentially violating the rights of large numbers of its citizens, the Canadian government would be better off to put more focus on engaging in constructive dialogue with disaffected communities and individuals susceptible to radicalization. Without a comprehensive Hearts and Minds campaign dedicated to countering extremist sentiment and helping marginalized groups in Canada, the measures of disruption undertaken by the government to combat terrorism will continue to be counterproductive. Furthermore, there exists no evidence these new powers are even needed. In recent years, successful counterterrorism operations within Canada include the arrest of the Toronto 18; the foiling of a plot to blow up a VIA train; and the recent arrest of young people who allegedly planned to open fire on shoppers at a Halifax mall. All were accomplished under past laws.

In Canada’s intensifying war on terror, political battle lines are now clearly drawn. The law is to be a major factor in the country’s 42nd general election on 19 October, with the Conservatives expected to argue that they alone can be trusted to protect Canadians. The left-leaning New Democrats and Green parties oppose and have vowed to repeal C-51, and while the center-left Liberals voted in favor of the bill, they have promised to add effective oversight if elected. In the lead up to the vote, Prime Minister Harper has made several calculated decisions to capitalize on popular sentiments of terror and fear to secure another victory for his party. Exploiting international events to stoke fear in Canada, he has claimed the imminent threat of organized terror groups to Canadians and that an “international jihadist movement has declared war”. Fearful of such threats, some Canadians have turned to Islamophobia. Since the October shooting in Ottawa, several mosques across the country have been violently vandalized. In recent months, however, public support for C-51 continues to slide as Canadians learn more about the bill’s sweeping powers and lack of effective oversight. According to a Forum Research poll, 50 percent now disapprove of it, while just 38 percent approve. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Harper continues to attack critics of the bill as soft on terrorism, while fuelling fears and hatred of Islam by declaring that Muslims practice ways that are “contrary to our values”. Political leaders have the responsibility to empower and protect their citizenry instead of capitalizing on fear and oppression for electoral gains. The reality in Canada suggests otherwise.

Cover Image by Sally T. Buck under a CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 Creative Commons license

The salience of this particular question is articulated well by Almond and Verba as they note that civic culture and political participation are essential for a healthy democracy. Aside from the decline in voter turnout, there is a pervasive and tangible sense of general mistrust of politicians and the centralised Westminster model of governance.

Young people in Britain are increasingly turning to alternative forms of political engagement over more traditional forms of political behaviour which has led to increasing doubts about the legitimacy of the incumbent Conservative government. Indeed, the riots that followed the 2015 General Election serve to demonstrate the precarious nature of British politics in its current state and highlight the need to examine the underlying causes of this increasing political disengagement.

Low self-efficacy among younger generations can no doubt be seen as a key factor contributing to the decline in participation via traditional political means such as voting. This lack of faith in their capacity to influence political outcome through behaviour such as voting leads to a disenchanted generation, and one with little belief in the legitimacy of the governing party. The lack of proportionality present in the ‘First Past the Post’ electoral system has led to a frustrated but non-politically apathetic young generation of voters. These individuals turn to alternative methods of participation in a bid to get their voices heard on the main political stage.

The weaknesses of the FPTP system were first noted in 1951 by Vernon Bogdanor who drew attention to the fact that the Conservative party gained a majority of 17 seats in parliament despite the fact that they gained one point less than Labour. The FPTP voting system wastes a substantial number of votes either by making extra votes for the winning candidate irrelevant or making votes cast for the losing candidate irrelevant. This lack of direct translation of votes into outcomes leads to low self-efficacy amongst the electorate.

The aftermath of the 2015 UK General Election best illustrates the salience of low self-efficacy in contributing to general political disenchantment. Statistics have demonstrated that the FPTP system has allowed for the least proportional result to occur in the country’s history during the latest General Election. Data provided by the Electoral Reform Society demonstrated that 24.2% of seats in parliament are now held by MPs who would not be there if a proportional voting system were in place. As Katie Ghose, chief executive of the ERS, said: “This election is the nail in the coffin for our voting system. First past the post was designed for a time when nearly everyone voted for one of the two biggest parties. But people have changed and our system cannot cope.”

Disillusionment with the current political voting system is validated by the post-election austerity protests. The turn to alternative methods of political participation, and in particular ones existing outside the Westminster system, supports the low self-efficacy thesis. Younger generations see their interests to be better represented by alternative forms of political participation. In an era of party policy convergence, partisan de-alignment, and the rise of new social movements, standard voting does not suffice to satisfy the increasingly political aware younger generations. Between 70,000 and 150,000 people are thought to have marched on the streets of London, along with other demonstrations in Bristol, Liverpool and Glasgow. This was a reaction to David Cameron’s unexpected majority in the election and the austerity measures that would follow as a result of his party’s governance. Not only is this a clear indication of a turn towards alternative methods of political participation but it also demonstrates the increasing importance of new social movement. This very protest was organised by ‘The People’s Assembly Against Austerity’. This movement along with others such as ‘38 degrees’ draw in vast membership figures largely by defining themselves as separate from the current ‘unfair system’. They are seen as offering a voice to those who feel unheard and act as an alternative access point to central government, outside of the Westminster party system.

Finally, the rise in the use of social media and the internet have provided young people with an alternative platform to express political opinions and arguably exert more pressure on government than traditional voting would. The capacity of the internet to act as an agenda setter, and its role in mobilising non-governmental groupings across the globe verifies this.

The powerful transnational ties generated via social media, and the creation of global movements like ‘Anonymous’ and the rise of internet hacktivism all present a challenge to not only to the British government, but governments across the world.

Vamosi drew attention to the substantial impact of young social activists committing online crime. He notes a particular case where nearly 3,000 activists attacked Paypal, Mastercard and Visa for severing ties with wikileaks, in so called ‘Operation Payback’. Following this, a dozen people between the ages of 19 and 24 were arrested.

This utilisation of technology to make a political statement demonstrates young people’s alienation from standard forms of political engagement and their turn towards alternatives. Indeed the very origins of the hacktivist movement began with ‘Hactivismo’, a group that supports the freedom of information and created software to circumvent Internet censorship. This set the precedence for the utilisation of new technology to place pressure on governments and avoid giving certain policy choices legitimacy.

This in Britain is supported further by the use of new communication technologies via the internet during the student led mass demonstrations in 2010. The occupation network was characterised by its informality and its use of “the online realm as an informational space where students could formulate, develop and distribute demands…without any external interference from the authorities or the mainstream media”.

The twitter account used by the occupation network gained 15,000 followers in just 5 days which triggered intense media attention further illustrating the substantial link between self-efficacy and the utilisation of alternative forms of political engagement.

Young people increasingly believe themselves to be much more capable of influencing and pressurising governments through alternative forms of political participation. The significant capacity of the Internet to bypass traditional media outlets, set the political agenda and act as a tool of mobilisation makes it increasingly more attractive, when compared to the slow process of voting.

Author Biography

Bulkies Abeidah is currently a student of Politics and International Relations, at Royal Holloway University of London, with an interest in Middle Eastern Politics, Human Rights, Foreign Policy and Counter-terrorism.

You can find her on Linkedin

*Cover image ‘May 5: Vote‘ by John Keane

Rediscovering the War on Drugs

A recent military operation staged in Peru last month was a timely reminder of the connections that can be drawn between terrorism, new war paradigms and the persistence of the illicit global drugs trade.

The incident in question saw the rescue of thirteen adults and twenty-six children who had been held captive for more than two decades by the Shining Path Maoist rebel group in the remote Apurímac, Ene and Mantaro River Valley (VRAEM). Shining Path was responsible for agitating internal conflict in Peru for much of the 1980s, with estimates of the number of civilians killed as a result of the overall violence ranging between 11,000 – 70,000.

The Shining Path movement declined rapidly in the nineties in large part due to the capture of the group’s leader, Abimael Guzmán, but authorities have since struggled to eradicate the group completely. As of today, Shining Path continues to be concentrated in the mountainous, jungle terrain of the tri-river area, and is complicit in the production and transportation of cocaine along some of the most entrenched drug trafficking routes in South America. The Peruvian government last year was forced to abandon much of its anti-narcotic activity in this last remaining Shining Path stronghold and faces ongoing difficulty in governing the greater region. Both the United States and the European Union continue to define Shining Path as a terrorist organisation. In 2013, Peru officially became the largest cocaine-producing country in the world, though some argue that Colombia has again supplanted Peru in the top spot as of this year.

The trajectory of Shining Path is thus a useful analogue in attempting to discover the status of the so-called ‘War on Drugs’ today, particularly in terms of how it feeds into related trends of terrorist activity and territorial ungovernability. The decade in which Shining Path was most active coincided with the decade in which the War on Drugs was first consolidated in the USA. Although initially declared by President Nixon as early as 1971, it was not until the 1980s that the War on Drugs really gained traction through a plethora of zero-tolerance policies implemented under the Reagan administration.

The Reagan policy approach has been surprisingly resistant to reform despite repeated criticism and an arguable lack of evidence as to its effectiveness. For example, mandatory minimum sentencing is perceived to be a key cause behind rocketing prison populations in the United States. The disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentencing continues to bypass nuance and context when evaluating the criminality of particular drug crimes. In broader terms, the refusal to move wholly towards a compassionate, health-based policy approach alludes to an institutionalised punitive mindset that is in stark contrast to the ongoing decriminalisation of marijuana across many American states.

As the mainstream interest in the War on Drugs waned in the 1990s, it nevertheless left behind in its wake a strong, unyielding framework for the definition, processing and tackling of both drug usage and drug crime that has consequently had repercussions not just in America, but all around the world. In many ways, the framework has become static and opaque; for all the money and rhetoric leveraged behind it, the War on Drugs has failed on two counts. It has failed to meaningfully disrupt the economics of incentive and risk within the illicit drugs market and it has failed to anticipate developments within the market, by which production transfers fluidly among regions to evade policing efforts and usage transfers among different types of drugs. Today, our ability to accurately chart trends within the sprawling shadow economy in which the drugs trade operates is woefully limited, and yet the relevant social dynamics continue to evolve in new ways.

To arrive at a more suitable understanding of the modern global drugs trade therefore requires a number of points be introduced, or indeed reintroduced, into the policy conversation. These are, namely, the ongoing interaction between the War on Drugs and the War on Terror; the interaction between production and user markets; and the role of the state in regulating sub-state and transnational forces, in terms of both the appropriateness and the effectiveness of such intervention.

Reconsidering the War on Drugs

The interaction between the War on Drugs and the War on Terror can be considered not only in terms of geographical congruence (for example, Afghanistan and the opium trade), but also in terms of conceptual congruence.

One of the most durable criticisms levied at the War on Drugs – a criticism that seemed to apply even more urgently to the War on Terror in the post-9/11 era – is that it is a fundamental conceptual error to wage war against groups and activities that are primarily social in character rather than militaristic. With the global drugs trade, just as with the variegated topography of international terror organisations, all sense of a ‘conventional’ war inevitably breaks down; there is no clearly defined enemy, there is no demarcated theatre of operations and, most crucially, there is no coherent understanding of what victory should ultimately look like. Such confusion prevailing at the policy level can and has led to mistakes on the ground; quagmire-like conflicts with changeable objectives, precipitous actions that collaterally and disproportionately affect civilians, and a lack of transparency that erodes civil liberties both at home and abroad.

Of course, some argue that the use of the term ‘war’ in this sense is metaphorical, applied only as a means of encapsulating the scope of the commitment to eradicate either drugs or terrorism respectively. If this be the case, then it is a misleading and hugely expensive metaphor to apply. Furthermore, with the current international security sphere being increasingly prone to the sort of hysteria and misinformation that makes strategic objectivity difficult to maintain, one should rightly question the use of hyperbole as a means of guiding the national interest.

However, it is fair to pose the question of whether or not drug cartels and terrorist organisations are today becoming so sophisticated and operating on such a scale that they now constitute organised groups that are tangible enough to justify military tactics and the full deployment of a state’s war apparatus. Although accurate figures are impossible to collate, the UN World Drug Report yearly characterises the illicit global drugs trade as one of the largest businesses in the world.

Similarly, the rise of ISIS over the course of 2014 in Iraq and Syria demonstrated the degree to which terrorist organisations can exploit pre-existing areas of instability to rapidly build up quasi-state infrastructures by way of territory gains, the seizure of lucrative assets such as oil fields, and the deployment of new media for recruitment and propaganda purposes. One could argue that the threat posed by the drugs trade and by international terrorism is more acute than ever and that the response must likewise be rigorous.

The scale of the problem – particularly when drugs are combined with terror, when drug production routes are integrated with drug user markets, and when cocaine trades in South America are juxtaposed with opium trades originating in Asia – is well and truly global. By persisting in using the terminology of war and of national security, however, it is the state that is emphasised and the national level that is privileged. When dealing with transnational phenomena, this tendency becomes problematic and can lead to misconceptions.

Firstly, there is the inclination to see the problem in terms of state borders and consequently this is where a state’s legitimacy, responsibility and resources may wind up being concentrated. However, illicit markets like the drug trade are agile and state borders are increasingly permeable; this recommends a policy approach that is formulated above and below the national level, but not necessarily, and assuredly not primarily, on the state-national level itself.

Other geographical divisions may also be magnified in a detrimental way, such as the false distinction between those states which deal with drug production within their borders, those states which deal mainly with drug usage and those states which contend with both production and usage. In other words, the global drug trade may be perceived in terms of a divide between developing and developed states that does not cohere with the reality on the ground. The narcotics system is whole and interdependent; transnational problems require holistic solutions. A focus on borders can lead to burdens of blame rather than international partnerships built on a genuine sense of shared responsibility. Similarly, a focus on production routes in developing countries fails to address the demand-side of the economic equation.

This could partly account for why American-led efforts to eradicate opium production in Afghanistan have been unable to stem the rise of poppy yields, despite the protracted war effort and significant funding that has now run into billions of dollars. Jobs creation and narcotics policing within Afghanistan are essential approaches, yes, but the incentives to engage in the opium trade within remote Afghan regions will not be fully curtailed until the demand for heroin in western societies is reduced in tandem with the supply. In the absence of an overarching, global response that connects production to use, supply to demand, opium profits continue to fuel instability, exacerbate corruption and, not least, finance international terror.

Wars without End

It is a clear sign of how much the security environment has changed in the twenty-first century that the global drugs trade and terrorism are now two of the gravest threats to stability. The state’s monopoly on the use of force has been broken. Drug trafficking and radicalisation permeate easily and rapidly through sovereign borders; and the evasive wars these phenomena have given rise to are increasingly fought above, below and through states and their frontiers. For this reason, innovation concerning the role of the state and its ability to address the major security threats of the day will be ever more necessary and, when this innovation comes, it cannot be based purely on the sophistication of war technology in the form of drones and surveillance techniques. Social policies that focus on issues of alienation, addiction and radicalisation will be paramount, as will economic policies that advocate openness, shedding light far into the shadow markets that enable the interrelated systems of terror and narcotics.

War has always had a devastating personal resonance, from heroic sacrifice to the families that grieve their loved ones. However, the wars of today seem personal in a different way in that they are now played out within our streets and our communities, involving perpetrators and victims who are for the most part civilians. As a result, it can often seem like states are at war with their own societies. If such a war were allowed to fully materialise, it would indeed be a war without end.

Author Biography

Heather Emond is an MSc graduate in International Relations from the London School of Economics, with a focus in advanced international security, European security and defence policy and Arab-Israeli Relations. Upon graduation, she worked in the fields of economic development and external affairs for local government in Edinburgh, assisting with a number of EU, international and telecommunications projects. More recently, Heather has collaborated with the United Nations Association of Edinburgh and is currently based in Northern Chile volunteering for a teaching programme co-delivered by the Chilean Ministry of Education and UN Development Programme.

Twitter: @HGEmond

*Cover image ‘Secretary of the Navy with Peruvian navy official‘ by the US Navy

As the United Kingdom (UK) seeks to renegotiate its relationship with the European Union (EU), it won’t be long before the following question will be put to the public ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union’?

Prime Minister Cameron addressing a European Council Press Conference- Photo Credit from The Daily Telegraph

If BREXIT is the outcome, the UK will enact Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which is the mechanism for a member state to leave the EU. Despite Eurosceptics viewing BREXIT an end in itself, it will rather be a new beginning – a re-set to the UK’s relationship with the EU. What are the options Britain could construct for life outside the EU?

The most commonly cited alternatives to EU membership are fourfold, each of which is reviewed below:

1. Membership of the European Economic Area (EEA)
2. Membership of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
3. A Customs Union relationship
4. A Free trade option, through the World Trade organisation (WTO)
5. Membership of the EEA (the ‘Norwegian option’)

The EEA is a free trade area, supporting the movement of goods, services, capital and people within a Single Market. There are 31 states within it, comprising the EU, and EFTA states excluding Switzerland.

Norway provides an example of a possible UK position post-BREXIT, as it is a part of the EEA and EFTA, but is not a EU member. The country has chosen to enter into the Single Market and has signed 74 Agreements to participate in the EU’s Foreign and Security policies, as well as Justice and Home affairs.

Access to the Single Market is fundamental to the country, with over 80% of exports going to the EU and 60% of imports coming from the EU. In total, including an access fee, Norway pays a yearly EU contribution of £350 million, making it the 10^th highest budget contributor, despite it being a non-EU member. However, Norway lacks influence over the Single Market’s rules, and does not have representation or votes within EU institutions. The country has essentially chosen that it is in its national interest to have a ‘democratic deficit’ between its people and Brussels.

Under Article 102 of the EEA Treaty, Norway does retain the right to reject EU legislation, which is not deemed in its interests. Indeed, the country remains outside EU rules for the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies, giving it independence over some of the more controversial EU policies. Otherwise, EU regulation remains on the statute book in areas such as financial services and social and employment policy. It is noteworthy that Norway is subject to only 300 new regulations each year while EU members accept over 1,000, a 70% reduction. According to the Bruges Group, this reduction in red tape equates to a 3.5% GDP boost to the EEA economies.

Overall, Norway shows that the EEA model has the ability to allow its members to control the majority of its own affairs, while adopting those parts of the EU project that are in its own interest. It can be argued that through the EEA, Norway remains in Europe but is not run by Europe.

For many, this is a desired model for a post-BREXIT UK, but according to the CBI, the lack of knowledge of the EEA means that many trade barriers remain in place, in practice, creating substantial uncertainties and negatively affecting growth, trade and employment.

It could be that the Norwegian model works for a country of its size, but whether it is a match for the complexities of the much larger UK economy is less clear.

2. EFTA Alone (a part of ‘the Swiss option’ aka. ‘Britzerland’)

EFTA is the next step in creating distance from the EU core, removing the internal market for services while retaining freedom to pursue separate social and employment policies. EFTA’s prime mission is to promote free trade and economic integration between its member states. Currently the association has four members: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.

The ‘Britzerland’ option comes from Switzerland being a member of EFTA but not of the EEA, which the Swiss rejected in a 1992 referendum. Switzerland, as a leading economy in Financial Services, has negotiated a package of over 120 bilateral agreements with the EU to mutual benefit, providing Swiss businesses tariff and duty free access to the Single Market in areas such as free movement of people, agriculture, the environment, justice and the elimination of technical barriers in goods, but it has no agreement on services. As a part of this arrangement the Swiss Government can cancel agreements if deemed no longer in their national interest.

Economically, like Norway, Switzerland is closely integrated with the EU on a sector-by sector basis, and the EU is its number one trading partner. The Swiss have managed to reduce trade barriers and are able to negotiate their own free trade deals as an independent trading nation. By adopting this relationship with the EU, however, Switzerland – like Norway – does not take a seat at the table within the EU’s institutions and has had to make substantial concessions to gain access to the Single Market, for example, 40% of Swiss legislation is derived from EU rules.

That said, Switzerland has retained control over which EU rules combines with Swiss Law. An example is immigration, where the Swiss have a ‘safeguard clause’ giving the right to cap immigration for a limited time period. This provides stronger control of its borders despite being a member of Schengen. Like Norway, the Swiss are not affected by the Common Agricultural and Fisheries policies, giving it more freedom to pursue its own policy agendas.

The country’s relationship with the EU has been strained through the complex integration of rules and regulations. This raises questions over the model’s sustainability.  If the UK were able to follow this option it would achieve more democratic accountability and sovereignty over its affairs. To gain membership of EFTA, however, the UK would need to gain support from member states and undergo a long negotiation with both EFTA and the EU. This could take years, as it took Switzerland nearly 10 years to achieve their current unstable status, making EFTA application potentially problematic.

A United Kingdom flag flying next to a European Union flag

A recent YouGov opinion poll stated that the British Public still support EU membership by 43% to 36% – Photo Credit Via Daily Mail

3. Membership of the Customs Union (The ‘Turkish Option’)

The next level of separation from the EU, EAA and EFTA is membership of the EU Customs union alone. The Customs Union is made up of all 28 EU members, and certain other states such as Turkey, Monaco, Andorra and San Marino. All members support free trade, and together agree on a common external tariff, with no customs levied on goods and services that move internally between the Union’s members.

Turkey, as part of the Customs Union and not a member of the EU, EEA or EFTA, is excluded from EU trade negotiations but is required to adopt rules on competition and state aid, but it is allowed to retain the duties collected. Turkey has access to the Single Market for goods, but not for services or agricultural products, which means that, unlike EEA members, it does not benefit fully from the Four Freedoms. Unlike the Swiss and Norwegian models, Turkey does not need to pay any budget contribution to the EU.

In other areas, Turkey has to accept the laws and decisions of the European Court of Justice, without any representation on the court, so Turkey and the EU have had to harmonize legislation and enter an on-going process of further integration.

This model appears to be unique to Turkey’s situation; as for the present it also involves a significant ‘democratic deficit’, albeit one the country has entered into through its own choice as a part of its process towards EU membership.

This post-BREXIT outcome lacks many supporters, due to the complicated characteristics of membership rules and other re-set options open to the UK, but is still a credible option. It is, however, hard to imagine that this outcome would be acceptable to the UK or the EU when the direction of the UK’s travel would be in reverse.

4. The WTO Option (The “Clean Break”)

Finally, the last BREXIT option creates the greatest distance of all from the EU, by relying on trade relations solely through membership of the WTO. Unlike, all other options, this would not require re-negotiation with the EU in terms of the fundamentals of its relationship but it would require negotiations on trade terms to establish a new Free Trade agreement.

The UK would regain its seat at the WTO, as the EU would no longer represent it, but as a part of this the UK would have to withdraw from the EU’s existing trade agreements and the country’s exports would face very high tariffs and limited EU market access.

This last option would achieve major budget savings as a result of having no EU membership fee to pay, which in 2014 cost £9.8 billion. On leaving the EU, the UK would lose the tariff concessions it gains from EU membership, and the EU could treat the UK in a disadvantaged manner as a ‘third country’ in relation to trade. The UK could also struggle to maintain its current levels of external trade, which is why opponents describe this option as one of splendid isolation, with adverse political and economic consequences.

Conclusion

Having considered all four possibilities it seems that that there is no one option that perfectly matches the likely needs and wishes of the UK post-BREXIT. The issue, for those who propose withdrawal, is what aspect of the UK’s relationship inside Europe today is of highest importance and should be retained in a post-BREXIT world. Is it economics, integration, sovereignty or democracy? And perhaps the bigger question is could these goals be equally well achieved through re-negotiation with the EU without the challenges of an EU divorce?

*Author Biography

Christopher Bowerin is currently an undergraduate studying Politics and Business Management at Oxford Brookes University. Christopher has a strong interest in European and American politics, Middle Eastern Affairs, international conflicts and post-war reconstruction.

Twitter: @KBowerin

*Cover image ‘UK EU Flag’ by GPPW

One of the most controversial issues in the context of the Ukraine crisis is the question of whether the US and its allies in NATO should send weapons to Ukraine and the Baltics to dissuade Russian aggression in the region. Catherine Lefèvre provides an overview of recent developments, arguing that while there are real concerns over the actions of Russia, arming Ukraine and the Baltics carries significant risks and could prove counter-productive. 

As the crisis in Eastern Ukraine continues, concern over Russian aggression grows in Eastern Europe and the Baltics. During the Munich Security Conference (MSC) in February 2015, many Eastern European leaders called for the arming of Ukraine against pro-Russian rebels. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have on many occasions expressed concern over their territorial integrity and fear is spreading amongst their populations in regards to a possible Russian intervention in their countries. But would it be wise to arm Ukraine and the Baltics against Russia?

Arming Ukraine

Western leaders have been discussing the possibility of sending weapons to Ukraine since last year to counter Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine, but up until now opinions on the matter are divided. During the MSC, the issue dominated the agenda as Western leaders extensively debated the issue.

Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov continues to firmly deny that Russian forces are involved in Eastern Ukraine and claims that the US and the EU carry responsibility for the crisis and the general deterioration of their relationship. US vice-president Joe Biden made clear during the MSC that “the United States and, God willing, all of Europe and the international community will continue to impose costs” on Russia until the supply of weapons and troops to separatists is cut.

It is important to note that opinions differ within the European Union (EU) as countries such as Germany strongly oppose supplying Ukraine with weapons. As German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated during the conference “I cannot envisage any situation in which the improved equipment of the Ukrainian army will convince Putin he will lose militarily”. The UK’s Prime Minister David Cameron stated that the UK would assist the Ukrainian army with advice, training and non-lethal equipment.

On the other hand Eastern European countries have been arguing in favour of supplying Ukraine with weapons. In June, Lithuania’s ambassador to Ukraine, Marius Yanukonis declared that his country was prepared to send weapons to the Ukrainian army, stating that “we are ready to help Ukraine by all means, especially military”. Through this move the ambassador hopes to encourage other NATO members to do the same.

Risks and rewards

The crisis in Eastern Ukraine and concern over Russian aggression has spread to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania: countries that have been part of the EU and NATO since 2004. Having attended the EU-NATO roundtable in Estonia in April, I can certainly vouch for the general sense of unease over Russian aggression among citizens in the Baltics. Without exception, I was told that there is a deep concern about Russia and that people are following the news closely for every step that the country takes.

Out of all the Baltic states, Lithuania is the country expressing the strongest concerns over being targeted by Russia. One Lithuanian I spoke to expressed anxiety over the fact that Lithuania borders a small Russian Baltic Sea exclave (Kaliningrad) that many Russians, sometimes armed, cross Lithuania to reach. Another reason of concern is that Lithuania also borders Belarus, a long-standing Russian ally.

Some of this concern can also be seen in the statement by a senior Lithuanian analyst at Vilnius’ Eastern Europe studies center, Marius Laurinavicius that Russia “need(s) a corridor from Kaliningrad to mainland Russia… just like they need one from Crimea to Donbas”. It is no secret that Russia and Belarus have been carrying out military exercises in Kaliningrad near the Lithuanian and Polish borders, which is a cause of concern for these countries.

The EU does not believe that Russia would ever attack a NATO country as that would trigger a response from all members as part of the mutual defence alliance. Some experts argue that Russia would use the pretext of ethnic Russians in the Baltics for an invasion. Out of the three Baltic states, Lithuania is the one with the least ethnic Russians, with around 5.88 per cent of the population belonging to this group. Interestingly, Poles make up the largest ethnic minority living in Lithuania with 6.65 per cent.

Due to the spread of concern over Russian aggression in Eastern Ukraine, the US has sent forces to the region. It sent 3,000 soldiers for military exercises with the armies of the three Baltic States in March. This move was well received by these countries and as Latvian Defence Minister Raimonds Vejonis stated “the presence of our allies in Latvia is a confirmation of solidarity and security in the region”. In April the US sent paratroopers to train Ukrainian National Guard units, with Russia criticising the move as jeopardising the peace process with the separatists in Eastern Ukraine.

The US and NATO have committed themselves to increasing military activities in Eastern Europe to reassure their partners and dissuade Russia. Both Russia and NATO have been organising war games and military exercises, signalling the increasing tension in Eastern Europe. In June EU members also decided to extend the ongoing economic sanctions imposed against Russia for an additional 6 months due to the Ukrainian crisis. The sanctions were first imposed on Russia in July 2014 due to its alleged support for pro-Russian separatists – something Russia has denied vehemently ever since.

The involvement of the US has also been subject to domestic politics. In June, the U.S. Senate voted 71-25 to pass a defence policy bill worth $612 billion that calls for providing weaponry to Ukrainian forces and prevents military bases from being closed. US president Barack Obama opposed the bill as it does not allow for the closure of unnecessary military facilities and complicates closing down the prison inGuantanamo Bay. The bill also forces the administration to deliver lethal military assistance to the Ukrainian army, something the White House has been avoiding as it could put additional strain on the country’s relationship with Russia.

Nevertheless, on the 23^rd of June the US took the decision to send military equipment to bases located in Eastern Europe in countries such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania to strengthen their security and dissuade Russia from starting another intervention in the region. US Defence Secretary Ash Carter said that “the tendency by Russia to try to turn back the clock and go backwards in history, rather than go forwards in history – we’re not going there with them”.

The defence secretary also said that the US, its allies and NATO have to scrap the “Cold War playbook” and think about the security challenges that Russia poses today. A week earlier Vladimir Putin further increased concerns by declaring that Russia would increase its nuclear arsenal with 40 intercontinental ballistic missiles this year in order to send a clear signal to NATO.

In light of these developments, is sending weapons ever really a good solution? It would not be the first time that the West has sent military supplies that ended up in the wrong hands. Military equipment such as tanks, vehicles, and ammunition that the US sent to Iraqi forces very quickly ended up in the possession of Islamic State.

Weapons can also encourage war rather than deter it, and who is to guarantee that Ukraine or the Baltic States will act responsibly? In 2008 Georgia used the training and military equipment it gained from the West in a war with Russia which lasted just a few days. Most of that equipment ended up being destroyed or disappearing altogether. Supplying these countries with weapons will further deteriorate relations with Russia and will only trigger a Russian response. Sending weaponry will only shift the focus to arming instead of resolving matters through diplomacy; if history has taught us anything it’s that arming two sides of a potential conflict very rarely, if ever, leads to peace.

—

Cover image ‘The last Bulwark of Ukraine‘ by Victor Dashkiyef

For the first time since the USA Patriot Act was signed into law in the aftermath of September 11, the United States has scaled back the scope of its security provisions with the USA Freedom Act of 2015. A consequence of Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013, it has signaled a normative shift in American policy on issues of mass surveillance, government secrecy and information privacy. North of the border in Canada, the national debate on privacy and security is taking a different path. Over the past year, the Conservative government has introduced multiple pieces of legislation that affect security, privacy, and the power of policy agencies. Most recently, the Anti-Terrorism Act 2015 officially came into Canadian law on June 18 following months of deliberation among a Conservative-majority Parliament. Also known as Bill C-51, the legislation ensures enhanced powers to Canada’s spy agency, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). It criminalizes the promotion of terrorism and provides police with new powers of preventative surveillance and arrest, among other provisions. Conservatives proclaim the bill is necessary to combat the threat of domestic and international terrorism, while critics believe it constrains too many fundamental freedoms in the process. Some fear C-51 establishes criminal offences that infringe upon the right to free expression, granting security agencies unprecedented and intrusive powers to monitor and share information about Canadians with little proportionate oversight or accountability.

Public support for the bill in the face of sustained criticism can best be explained by two deadly incidents targeting soldiers that raised concerns of terrorist activity in Canada last fall. On October 20, Martin Couture-Rouleau killed Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent in St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. Two days later, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed Corporal Nathan Cirillo at the War Memorial in Ottawa, before storming Parliament. The federal government was quick to declare both incidents terror attacks and vowed to take steps to strengthen Canada’s abilities to identify and neutralize potential threats to national security. The sustained campaign of the Islamic State, as well as international terror incidents including the Paris and Copenhagen attacks of January 2015, have facilitated public support for enhanced security powers in Canada. In March, for instance, a poll by the Angus Reid Institute found that 82 percent of Canadians surveyed supported the bill, while 36 percent believed it did not go far enough. Prime Minister Stephen Harper unveiled Bill C-51 on January 30, stating that his goal is to deal with the threat posed by supporters of the Islamic State and other anti-Western terror groups. The legislation is the most comprehensive reform of Canadian security policy since the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act became law following the September 11 attacks.

According to an official government press release, here is what Bill C-51 will implement:

1. Stop those who promote terrorism by creating a new Criminal Code offence that will criminalize the advocacy or promotion of the commission of terrorism offences (now in force);
2. Counter terrorist recruitment by giving our judges the authority to order the seizure and forfeiture of terrorist propaganda material and the removal of terrorist propaganda from Canadian websites (now in force);
3. Provide the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) with the ability, under the authority of a court, to intervene to prevent specific terrorist plots (now in force);
4. Enhance the Passenger Protect Program by further mitigating threats to transportation security and preventing travel by air for the purpose of engaging in terrorism-related activities (these amendments to the Secure Air Travel Act and related amendments will come into force on a date fixed by an order of the Governor in Council);
5. Make it easier for our police forces to temporarily detain and apply to a court to have conditions imposed on suspected terrorists before they can harm Canadians and toughening penalties for violating court-ordered conditions on terrorist suspects (these amendments to strengthen the terrorism recognizance with conditions and peace bond powers will come into force in 30 days);
6. Enable the responsible sharing of relevant national security information across federal departments and agencies (the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and related amendments will come into force on a date fixed by an order of the Governor in Council);
7. Ensure that the Government is better able to protect and use classified information when denying entry and status to non-citizens who pose a threat to Canada; (these amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act will come into force on a date fixed by an order of the Governor in Council); and,
8. Provide witnesses and other participants in national security proceedings and prosecutions with additional protection (most of these amendments are now in force).

Overall, the aim and effect of Bill C-51 is to increase the powers and reach of Canada’s security services. Implementing the above includes amendments to the Criminal Code, the CSIS Act, and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, as well as new laws to increase the scope of the national security network. The new laws are laid out in the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act. It gives CSIS powers beyond intelligence gathering (to actively target threats and derail plots); criminalizes terrorist propaganda and the promotion of terror; lowers the legal threshold to detain those suspected of terrorism; extends preventive detention for suspected terrorists from three to seven days; legally entrenches a no fly list; and grants government agencies authority to share private information with domestic and foreign entities. Sweeping and contentious, controversy surrounding the bill has initiated a national debate on privacy protections and the threat of terrorism in Canada.

Bill C-51 has sparked serious concerns about the potential impact on the basic civil liberties of all Canadians. Of special significance are the Canada Information Sharing Act and the amendments to the Criminal Code and CSIS Act, which could legitimize unlawful detainment of and the mass collection of surveillance data on Canadian citizens. Among others things, C-51 widens the definition of what might be encompassed under the category of “terrorist activity”; greatly expands the information-sharing capacity of the federal government; greatly expands the boundaries and conditions of the no-fly list; extends the length of preventive detention while lowering minimum conditions; creates new criminal offences for promoting or advocating terrorism (including an ambiguous “terrorism in general”); and enables CSIS to apply secretly for judicial disruption warrants that would permit it to break Canadian law and violate charter rights. The bill has raised concerns about its use of intentionally vague language left open to broad interpretation, which could lead to abuses. The ambiguity of the wording allows the government to conduct surveillance on Canadians with unprecedented ease. If a department deems there is credible evidence of “terrorist activity”, it is allowed to conduct surveillance on citizens and share that information with all levels of government. Targeted activities are too broadly defined, making it likely that legitimate expressive activities will be sanctioned – including social protest, environmental / aboriginal activism and labor unrest. Further, the bill changes the conditions which dictate whether or not an individual can be detained without evidence, and probable cause for arrest, both of which drastically lower the necessary legal threshold for jailing suspected terrorists. Security agencies only need a warrant to take action against supposed extremists, and only when the action taken will violate a charter right or Canadian law. It is the first time any law in Canada has pre-authorized the potential breach of charter rights.

With the new and increased powers for CSIS and other agencies, the need for independent oversight and effective review mechanisms is greater than ever. The proposed expansion of intrusive state powers into civil society through C-51 is accompanied by no improvement to the framework’s accountability system. Even before C-51 became law, Canada was unique among Western democracies for having no parliamentary oversight to the activities of its security agencies. That has not changed. The independent watchdog that the Conservative government points to as providing necessary oversight to CSIS, the SIRC (Security Intelligence Review Committee), is under-resourced and under-staffed. Thus, critics believe the committee will be unable to effectively monitor the new powers CSIS will receive under the government’s proposed antiterrorism legislation. Its powers have not kept pace with the expanded mandate of the security services it reviews.

Founded in 1984, the SIRC’s responsibilities include providing an external review mechanism for CSIS and acting as a tribunal to consider complaints about activities carried out by CSIS. Yet the SIRC has just 14 staff members and received under $ 3 million CAD last fiscal year for its work investigating complaints against CSIS and reviewing the spy agency’s activities. By comparison, CSIS had over 3,000 staff and financial expenditures of $496 million CAD in 2012-2013. As a result, SIRC staff carries out retroactive reviews of only a small selection of CSIS activities. Recent SIRC reports have also noted issues in getting timely and full information from CSIS, and the secrecy surrounding CSIS means its reports have to be comprehensively edited and redacted. Conservative spokespersons argue the SIRC already provides robust accountability. The government has also made the claim that greater “judicial oversight” arises out of C-51, even though the disruption warrants constitute secret judicial enabling of law breaking, turning judges into agents of the executive rather than overseers of the law. Other agencies, such as the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), are not subject to a review body at all. Without a much larger investment in an already weak accountability system, Canada’s security agencies will be lacking legitimate and capable oversight mechanisms to address or correct practices and procedures that result in violations of Canadian’s rights.

Several civil liberty organizations, lawmakers, former CSIS employees and several former Canadian prime ministers have expressed concern about the lack of oversight and effective review mechanisms for the law. Edward Snowden himself has stated that “Canadian intelligence has one of the weakest oversight frameworks of any western intelligence agency in the world” and went on to point out the critical importance of real accountability in protecting liberal freedoms when under pressure from the national security state. The new law is currently being challenged in Canada’s Supreme Court by a journalists’ group and a civil rights organizations that call it an attack on constitutional freedom, an inversion of the judiciary’s role as a protector of constitutional rights, and a violation of judges’ independence from government. Moreover, a July report by the United Nations Human Rights Committee raised further objections about Canada’s new anti-terror legislation, saying it could violate the international covenant on civil and political rights. It is concerned sweeping powers in the law do not contain enough legal safeguards to protect people’s rights, and says the government should consider rewriting the law to ensure it complies with the international civil rights agreement. Bill C-51 is only part of a long list of issues the committee is raising on how well Canada is meetings its obligations under the civil and political human rights covenant. The government has dismissed these criticisms.

In a practical sense, the fearful and politicized context in which C-51 was introduced is not conducive to pragmatic recognition of the long-term causes and solutions to terror threats. The new powers provided to CSIS are best understood as powers of disruption: CSIS can disrupt and perhaps even detain, but even under C-51, it cannot arrest or charge. Its new powers are used in cases in which there is not enough evidence to justify laying criminal charges under existing terrorism and related offences. As such, they are likely to provide only temporary solutions to real security problems presented by those radicalized to violent extremism. Rather than potentially violating the rights of large numbers of its citizens, the Canadian government would be better off to put more focus on engaging in constructive dialogue with disaffected communities and individuals susceptible to radicalization. Without a comprehensive Hearts and Minds campaign dedicated to countering extremist sentiment and helping marginalized groups in Canada, the measures of disruption undertaken by the government to combat terrorism will continue to be counterproductive. Furthermore, there exists no evidence these new powers are even needed. In recent years, successful counterterrorism operations within Canada include the arrest of the Toronto 18; the foiling of a plot to blow up a VIA train; and the recent arrest of young people who allegedly planned to open fire on shoppers at a Halifax mall. All were accomplished under past laws.

In Canada’s intensifying war on terror, political battle lines are now clearly drawn. The law is to be a major factor in the country’s 42nd general election on 19 October, with the Conservatives expected to argue that they alone can be trusted to protect Canadians. The left-leaning New Democrats and Green parties oppose and have vowed to repeal C-51, and while the center-left Liberals voted in favor of the bill, they have promised to add effective oversight if elected. In the lead up to the vote, Prime Minister Harper has made several calculated decisions to capitalize on popular sentiments of terror and fear to secure another victory for his party. Exploiting international events to stoke fear in Canada, he has claimed the imminent threat of organized terror groups to Canadians and that an “international jihadist movement has declared war”. Fearful of such threats, some Canadians have turned to Islamophobia. Since the October shooting in Ottawa, several mosques across the country have been violently vandalized. In recent months, however, public support for C-51 continues to slide as Canadians learn more about the bill’s sweeping powers and lack of effective oversight. According to a Forum Research poll, 50 percent now disapprove of it, while just 38 percent approve. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Harper continues to attack critics of the bill as soft on terrorism, while fuelling fears and hatred of Islam by declaring that Muslims practice ways that are “contrary to our values”. Political leaders have the responsibility to empower and protect their citizenry instead of capitalizing on fear and oppression for electoral gains. The reality in Canada suggests otherwise.

Cover Image by Sally T. Buck under a CC-BY-NC-ND 2.0 Creative Commons license

Thomas Lee is Assistant Director, Editor, and Social Media Manager at Global Public Policy Watch.

The importance of Yemen

Yemen is one of the poorest countries of the Arab World. Today it faces a major humanitarian crisis, is deep in civil war and faces extreme food insecurity. Yet, the country’s underdevelopment or socioeconomic discrepancies are not the burgeoning issue. It is the crumbling regime and the war-torn capital city of Sana’a that makes most headlines on Yemen. The government has been brought to its knees by the Houthi movement, a Zaydi group who launched an insurgency against the Republic of Yemen in 2004. Yemen’s current political state of affairs is chaotic as the Houthis currently retain power over the capital city and parliament. From local insurgency to a national civil war, the rise of the Houthis has been major cause for concern. This article aims to address the Houthi rise to power in the context of Yemen’s fragile political fabric.

Yemen may be poor by status but the country is a major regional and international player. Yemen is situated in the resource-rich Arabian Peninsula and has several important seaports and chokepoints, for example, the Bab Al-Mandeb strait. This is a significant chokepoint for international maritime trade as it connects the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and Red Sea and its importance can be likened to that of the Suez Canal. To this effect, it is not surprising why the civil war that has engulfed Yemen and brought the country to the brink of collapse has gathered so much attention.

Unveiling the crisis

The Arab Spring of 2011 symbolised a wave of revolution that swept through the Arab Middle East and North Africa. By that point, President Ali Abdullah Saleh had been clinging to power for over three decades. Notorious for governing an ungovernable landscape due its various political, tribal, religious and sectarian divides, President Saleh managed to hold onto power relying on nepotism and corruption. The uprisings in the Arab world confirmed discontent driven by feelings of exclusion and marginalisation and looked to mobilise against oppressing authoritarian regimes. Whilst these long-standing regimes promised reforms, they are nothing but brittle. Under intense pressure, President Saleh relinquished his powers in February 2012 and left an interim president in his place, Abdo Rabu Mansour al-Hadi. Tasked with political transition in Yemen, Hadi begun on a two-year transitory trajectory backed by an agreement brokered by the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). Plagued by insurgency and secessionist movements and dire poverty, Hadi’s presidency was jaded from the outset. Hadi’s biggest rival is the advancing Houthis – an incalculable threat to his parliament.

Who are the Houthis?

Akin to many Middle Eastern countries, the Yemeni demographic constitutes a patchwork of minority groups. This includes the Zaydi minority with the Houthi group being an offshoot of this minority sect whose roots lie in Shia Islam. However, it must be noted that the Zaydi offshoot is understood to have differing nuances from Shia Islam and doctrinally aligns closer with Sunni Islam. The war between the state and Houthi rebels began in 2004, led by a cleric named Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, who was later killed by Yemeni forces. The group then took its lead from the latter’s brother, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. Since 2004, the group has engaged in on-off rebellions of varying intensity fuelled by economical and political marginalisation, an anti-American and anti-Israel rhetoric and disenchantment with the Sunni-dominated government.

Repression of minorities in the Middle East is an old tale that has been argued to be one of the primary reasons for both past and present conflicts. Let us consider the causes of today’s civil unrest in Yemen as part of a bigger picture. The Houthis insurgency is not without reason, in fact, several historical, political, religious and development factors play part in their consolidation and hold of power today. In practical terms these factors played out in six rounds of conflict, which lasted between the years of 2004-2010 when a ceasefire was proposed.

Houthi Rise to Power

A Sectarian War

The Houthis’ reasoning behind the six rounds of conflict is simple: suppressed identity due to Sunni influence, at least at the beginning. The sectarian narrative is but one part of the broader narrative. The Shia/Sunni divide has for a long time dominated many civil wars in the Middle East but has failed to solely determine causes for conflict. Several news outlets often fall victim to headlines encouraging a sectarian lens through which to view the current crisis in Yemen. For the most part, it is not. It would make better sense to view the crisis as an amalgamation of issues and events, which also contribute to our understanding of the rise of the Houthis. One way the conflict can be deemed sectarian would be to consider the Houthi rebellion in light of their targets. These targets are factions who have different religious views to that of the Houthis, namely the Salafis, al-Qaeda and the Sunni-led party of al-Islah. In view of these events, the Houthi rise to power can represent a sectarian war. But, for too long events in the Middle East have been painted with the sectarian brush to a point where other underlying causes are conveniently buried. It is in the interest of many to label the on-going war as a sectarian battle; however, to be preoccupied with this line of reasoning would be to forget that Yemen is going through a political shift. And this shift is not solely driven by sectarian differences.

Even if the battle of schisms comes to embody this conflict, the quintessence of the matter lies in the brutality with which the threatened central government responded. Several villages in the north of Yemen were destroyed, whether the inhabitants sided with the Houthis or not, and innocent civilians were killed. The legitimacy of the central government after that was entirely indefensible.  Support for the Houthis rose outside of its calling because the transition government, much like in the Saleh era, retreated back to old regimes upholding fragile political fabrics paired with poor governance.

Cracks in Yemeni governance

The Houthi insurrection does have sectarian undertones but it is more than just a sectarian battle. The six rounds of conflicts between the years of 2004-2010 serves to credit the growing discontent from marginalised communities. As well as fighting the dilution of the Zaydi identity, the Houthis have been fighting a war against the state for reasons more aligned to the latter’s reckless governance. The Saleh regime failed to consider growing national and rural issues such as underdevelopment, socioeconomic injustices and other core tribal grievances. The central government, both in the Saleh era and the transition period post the Arab Spring, failed to recognise Yemen’s deeply fragmented rubric due to its cultural, religious, political and tribal heterogeneity.

The six rounds of rebellion between the state and the Houthis exacerbated the challenges the government had been facing for a long time and as a result revealed its vulnerabilities. The Houthi rise to power can be explained as a long process and can even be seen as quite calculated. Their rise has been aided by cracks in the Yemeni governance, which, ever since the unification of North Yemen and South Yemen in 1990 to form present-day Yemen, has been fragile. So when the Arab Spring swept across Yemen in 2011, it reinforced the Houthi influence and opened up avenues for the insurgency group to capitalise on such a prime opportunity to consolidate their power.  Further to this, in 2014 under international pressure, President Hadi cut off fuel subsidies, causing mass protests that further perpetuated the crisis and formed the mandate for a Houthi takeover.

Regional Dynamics

Evidential arguments highlighting the current crisis as one driven by political discontent and insecurity are indeed correct. Nevertheless, an issue in the Middle East would almost be invalidated if regional dynamics were ignored. And so, in discussing Yemen and if the sectarian narrative upholds, then the Yemeni situation is not without a discussion encroaching on the Iran-Saudi rivalry. The situation in Yemen upsets the balance of power in the Middle East and does not bode well for Saudi Arabia especially. It is argued that Houthi success is attributed to the resources provided by Iran, whose history with the movement begun even before the Sana’a takeover. Iran’s interest in backing the Houthi rebels is to ensure a stable Shia led governance in the southern Middle East where rival Sunni Saudis are potent.

For Saudi Arabia, the Houthi insurgency is of grave concern as instability in Yemen could propagate an Iranian foothold on the peninsula. This would thus explain the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen. Another reason for Saudi Arabia’s wariness is terrorism. The growing al-Qaeda presence is alarming for Saudi Arabia as it shares a long border with Yemen. Chaos in Yemen has laid the foundations for extremism and could lead to the proliferation of terrorism, which will have far fetching consequences regionally and internationally.

In the light of recent events, many are asking whether we are witnessing a proxy war. But this is hard to establish; the answers have been murky to say the least. It is a sound analysis of the current situation but perhaps the Yemeni civil unrest goes beyond the fight for regional dominance.

Present day Yemen: An outcry

What is happening in Yemen today is an issue of prolonged weak governing, corrupt leadership and foreign intervention on grounds that ultimately are not solely humanitarian.

All this withstanding, it is a humanitarian concern that has stemmed from political misdoings and mismanagement. The simmering months-long violence, despite ceasefires and failed political dialogue between different parties aiming to come to a cessation, has amounted to a civilian death toll of over 1,000 between March and April 2015. One can only imagine the numbers if we look at the crisis as a whole. A Houthi takeover has demonstrated resilience from the rebel group and certainly points to the fact that minorities can also come to power. However, this has been at the cost of innocent and vulnerable lives.

The fight is no longer about a rebellion against exclusion or feelings of marginalisation; this conflict is armed with violent repercussions that have left the poorest country of the Arab world devastatingly poorer. Saudi Arabia’s ‘Decisive Storm’, whilst having dented the Houthis’ advancement, has not succeeded in forcing the movement to surrender. In order to substantiate reforms, arms will need to be put down and talks of negotiations on how to govern a collapsed state need to take precedence. Perhaps then hope could be restored.

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About the Author

Ayooshee Dookhee is a Politics and International Relations graduate from Royal Holloway, University of London. She is currently working for a public policy, public affairs and campaigns consultancy in London. In September 2015, she will be starting a Masters in International Relations with a focus on Middle East politics at the University of Leiden in The Netherlands. She has a growing interest for issues and conflicts in the Middle East having completed her dissertation on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Her further interests are in international human rights, women’s rights, gender and minority equality and the politics of the European Union.

She can be found here.

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Cover image ‘Sana’a Medina Yemen – Daywatch‘ by drsno

Despite the horrendous cost of 185,000 – 249,000 estimated casualties since 2001, Afghanistan’s security and prosperity is still of major international concern. The country has been at war since the fall of the Taliban Regime, yet the resurgence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda during the so-called War on Terror is evident with 13,729 Afghan security forces killed and 16,511 wounded in the past 14 years.

As NATO-led combat operations have come to an end and with remaining NATO personnel due to leave in 2016, Afghanistan’s future is now largely in its own hands. However, economic and political instability, Taliban resurgence and the emergence of ISIL, means that the country remains in a fragile state. Accordingly, many security and foreign policy experts believe that 2015 marks the make or break year for a new Afghanistan.

The Process of NATO

The Pentagon has stated that Afghan defense forces have experienced a 59% increase in battlefield casualties in the past 6 months. It is statistics like this that have forced a reluctant President Obama to amend his plans for a complete American withdrawal by maintaining 9,800 military personal until the end of the year. The US government still aims to withdraw all American forces by 2016, but this deadline is currently under review.  In December 2014, the NATO-led force known as the ‘International Security Assistance Force’ finished operations and the follow-up mission known as ‘Resolute Support’ began, with 12,000 NATO soldiers from 14 partner nations providing training and logistical support to Afghan forces.

The Economic Climate facing Afghanistan 

The Afghan economy, despite international support, still remains stagnant. Economists note that the process of Western withdrawal is negatively affecting key sectors of the Afghan economy such as agriculture, construction and services which have struggled with under-investment and have been heavily reliant on international aid.

Unfortunately, the Afghan economy is highly dependent on the drugs trade as the country supplies 90% of the world’s opium. Economic growth is estimated to have fallen by 2% in 2014 and 9% between 2003-2012; unemployment is predicted at 8.5%, and 36% of the population now live in extreme poverty. The World Bank reports that the growth outlook for 2015 remains weak and the overall fiscal situation is precarious.

Afghanistan’s Political Leadership

The political instability that arose after the 2014 Afghan presidential election was evident with allegations of electoral fraud and threats of violence. Despite 4 million citizens choosing to cast their votes, this instability demonstrates how long the journey will be before Afghanistan emerges as a secure and functioning democracy. Finally, the electoral commission announced Ashraf Ghani as the winner and a power-sharing agreement was reached with the current Prime Minister, and Ghani’s former Presidential opponent, Abdullah Abdullah.

Since the inception of Ghani’s Presidency, achieving peace has been at the top of the government’s agenda. Other key domestic objectives include rooting out corruption, improving the crumbling state of services such as healthcare and criminal justice, creating 1 million jobs, cutting red tape, boosting trade and expanding women’s rights. Combined with this primary goal, these policies represent a long-term radical push to create a prosperous and independent Afghanistan.

In terms of foreign policy, the Ghani administration has begun the process of rebuilding diplomatic relations with Pakistan, which had been strained under the Presidency of Hamid Karzai. Ghani has increased the country’s willingness to work with the United States e.g. signing a bilateral security agreement, and has reached out to the two most proximal powers of Asia – India and China. The US Secretary of State John Kerry described this agenda as an “extraordinary moment of transformation” as this departs fundamentally from the policies of Karzai by building reconciliation efforts and seeking to establish strong relations with neighboring countries, both of which are essential for Afghanistan’s future.

In his address to the US Congress in March this year, Ghani moved beyond the immense challenges the country still faces to illustrate real progress across several areas. In education, UNICEF estimates that 3.2 million girls are now receiving lessons, which was banned under Taliban rule. In terms of women’s role in the democratic process, 38% of the recent electorate were women and, in the heart of government, 20% of the new Afghan cabinet are women, providing the ministers for higher education, women’s affairs and information and culture. In other developments, nation-wide health has improved dramatically with life expectancy increasing from 48 to 60, and media freedom has been established.

The Resilience of the Taliban

Despite the Taliban’s fall from power, the group is still making its presence known militarily. It continues to have a strong presence in the country, particularly in the southern and eastern regions with Afghan security forces estimating that it controls over 40 districts across the country. The Taliban maintain the view that the Afghan Government is a Puppet Government that continues to follow the demands of foreign powers and have stated that they will not stop fighting until foreign forces are removed entirely.

Deadly attacks such as the 2014 Peshawar School massacre, which killed 145 people in Pakistan, demonstrate the group’s significant presence across the Afghan and Pakistani border. June 2015 saw a sophisticated attack on the Afghan parliament, as well as an assault on a NATO convoy. Other attacks on Kabul have also occurred since the Taliban launched its annual ‘spring offensive’ against the Ghani administration.

In order to become a stronger political actor, the Taliban have set up a telephone hotline for Government employees to defect to the group. This is designed not just to strengthen the Taliban, but also to help mitigate in-house problems as the Taliban have faced the problem of members defecting to ISIL in the light of their gains in Iraq and Syria.  

The Terror Threat remains

Afghanistan in some ways is seen as a strategic gateway between the Middle East and the Asian continent. Consequently, many terrorist networks are seeking to establish a strong base within the country. Classified terror groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, ISIL and the Haqqani Network all have an active presence. Despite 14 years of war since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, and with Western nations now in a process of withdrawal, militant groups still believe that a complete military victory is a potential outcome.

However, the Taliban and ISIL, who represent the greatest threats to Afghanistan’s security, are reported to have declared war against one another. The Afghan Taliban declared that ISIL’s Caliphate was illegitimate, as the Taliban refused to declare their allegiance to Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi (Leader of ISIL). This has resulted in brutal fighting in contrast to the Taliban in Pakistan who have declared their alliance to ISIL

In recent days, it has been reported that ISIL’s Afghan commander was killed by a US drone strike. Despite this development it is believed that ISIL is seeking to infiltrate Afghanistan and use the country’s drug trade to finance its activities and ambitions to expand into Asia. This could put at risk all the progress and sacrifice the Afghan people and Western nations have made to the country’s security.

Attempts at Peace Negotiations  

In recent weeks, Afghanistan’s High Peace Council and Taliban officials have begun rounds of peace talks, firstly in Qatar in May and more recently in Islamabad.  President Ghani has suggested that these talks have laid the foundation for fully-fledged peace negotiations through building trust and establishing an agenda for negotiations. It is clear that Ghani, as well as Western nations, understands and respects the fact that the Taliban will always remain a significant force in Afghanistan.

President Ghani’s ambition for a peace settlement has been given strong support by Pakistan that is using its influence over Taliban forces to try to open up the prospect of negotiations. This is despite accusations of Pakistan funding, training and supporting the Taliban while also being a western ally.  The White House hailed the progress of the talks, stating that they represented an “Important step in advancing the prospects of a credible peace”. However, Afghan critics believe that these talks may increase Pakistani authority and influence over Afghanistan’s future.

Where now for Afghanistan?

As Afghanistan enters a new chapter with the new government representing the first democratic transfer of power in the country’s history, along with it comes new hope and opportunities for the Afghan people.  It is clear that President Ghani’s government seeks to build on the foundation established by President Karzai, which has put Afghanistan on the path of nation state renewal. In order for long-term peace to happen, the Taliban must be a part of the solution, yet today’s unity government must be sustained for an economic recovery, and for security to be maintained.

On the other hand, if the country’s national unity government collapses, the political, economic and security challenges facing the nation will overwhelm any chance of a strong and stable Afghanistan emerging in the near future.

On balance, green roots are evident and prospects are improving, but no one should underestimate the size of the hurdles still to be overcome. Sadly, Afghan’s long history shows how quickly social, economic and political progress can be lost when emerging consensus fails and conflict emerges again.

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Author Biography

Christopher Bowerin is currently an undergraduate studying Politics and Business Management at Oxford Brookes University. Christopher has a strong interest in European and American politics, Middle Eastern Affairs, international conflicts and post-war reconstruction.

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Cover image ‘UNAMA FEATURED PHOTO‘ by UNAMA