GPPW

Russia’s intervention in Syria has pushed the war back to the forefront of international media and escalated violence on the ground. Yet for all the column inches detailing the end of American hegemony in the Middle East and psycho-analysing the motives of Putin, the ongoing participation of Iran in the conflict has been largely consigned to footnotes. Russian bombs lead the headlines, whilst the prospect of an Iranian–backed Government offensive into land cleared by Russian air superiority is often consigned to mid-article statements.

The high-profile death in early October of Hossein Hamedani, the most senior Iranian commander to be killed in a foreign operation for over 36 years, highlighted the presence of Iranian troops in Syria. Not that Iranian involvement in Syria is a new phenomenon. Despite denying the presence of conflict troops in Syria, 18 high-ranking officers in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) have been killed in Syria in the last three years. Now Iranian troops are bolstering a Syrian state offensive on rebels in the Homs province. Before his death, General Hamedani was quoted as saying that a 130,000 strong force from the Basij (Iran’s paramilitary group) were ready to go to Syria if needed. Aside from the provision of troops, Tehran has also been funding the training of a new Syrian National Defence Force (NDF). IRGC commander-in-chief Mohammad Ali Jafari has stated that the NDF now comprises of 100,000 fighters.

It is clear that Iran continues to be one of the biggest supporters of the Assad regime, providing the troops and training needed to continue a civil war now four and a half years old.  Iranian wealth is also being diverted, in the forms of lines of credit and oil transfers, vital after Islamic State captured the last major government-controlled oil field in September.

Why is Iran invested in Syria?

As a close ally of Iran, losing the Assad regime would drastically curtail Iran’s influence in the Levant. The creation of a Sunni-led Syria would see the country align closer to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, Iran’s regional rivals. Supporting Assad is thus critical to maintaining the regional balance for Iran. Crucially, an allied Syria provides a secure passage for Iran to support Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shi’a movement armed with Iranian weaponry. Hezbollah forces have also fought hard in Syria to defend its Iranian lifeline, a decision that has caused sectarian tension within Lebanon itself. Hezbollah and the Assad regime have traditionally made up the centrepiece of Iranian foreign policy since the 1979 Revolution; the axis of resistance against Western and Israeli power in the Middle East. Losing Assad means losing one member of the axis as well as access to the second, a move leaving Iran hosting a party for one. Losing this influence would have real significance, leaving the Shi’a regime in Iran alone and at odds with the Sunni States of the Middle East led by Saudi Arabia.  Iran’s involvement in Syria is considerable, but it cannot be regarded as blind loyalty to a beleaguered ally. Iranian calculations have a much more international perspective.

An Iranian Resurgence

Punishing EU and UN sanctions on Iran reduced the Iranian rial to an all-time low against the US dollar in October 2012. Bans on oil imports particularly stung Tehran, whose uranium-enrichment strategy threatened to ostracise itself from the international community. Increasingly strained relations with Turkey, as well as the crisis in Syria, have all contributed to an internationally-isolated Iran.

So what has changed?

Russian and Iranian forces have taken the initiative in Syria, giving the imperilled Assad regime more security than it has enjoyed at any point during the war. The power vacuum of a post-Saddam Iraq has been readily capitalised on by Iran, who has increased economic ties with its neighbour and began to fund Iraqi Shi’a militias. A Shi’a dominated Iraqi government has been more receptive to Iranian influence, and Baghdad is now seen by some as a new member of the axis of resistance. In addition, the fight against ISIS has helped forge alliances between Sunni and Shi’a militias, a welcome turn for a country characterised by sectarian violence. Iran has, despite its own refutations, been accused of sending 30,000 of its own troops into Iraq to fight ISIS.

As well as gaining political traction in Baghdad, Iran has increased its support for the Houthis of Yemen after supporting the Shi’a group for several years with military aid and training. Joined by their hatred of Saudi Arabia’s blend of Wahhabism, the Houthis declared themselves part of the axis of resistance in 2015. However, Tehran did try to hold back the Houthis from attacking the Yemeni capital of Sana’a in 2014 for fear of invoking too great an international response. President Obama explained that Iran is:

“Making constant, calculated decisions that allow it to preserve the regime, to expand their influence where they can, to be opportunistic, to create what they view as hedges against potential Israeli attack, in the form of Hezbollah and other proxies, in the region. I think what Iran has been doing in Yemen is a perfect illustration of this.”

Through rational policies and calculated foresight, Iran has managed to establish influence in Iraq, secure its ally in Syria and fund proxies in Lebanon, Yemen and to a lesser extent Palestine, where it continues to provide weapons to Hamas despite disagreements over Syria. Added to this, Iran has managed to thaw its relationships with Jordan and Egypt, relations which had been frozen since the 1979 Revolution.

Paying the Bills

Funding campaigns and militias in Syria, Iraq and Yemen is not cheap. To finance their growing presence in the Middle East, Tehran has looked to the wider international community. In a bid to end the bitter sanctions, Tehran has sponsored a concerted ‘charm offensive’ at the UN, a process signalling an end to Iran’s more isolated past. The nuclear deal signed in the summer is a cornerstone of this new, diplomatic strategy. The deal, which sees Iran trade reduced nuclear capability for sanctions relief, has been heralded as a major diplomatic victory for the Obama administration. Agreements on the nuclear programme have led to the potential lifting of economic sanctions in early 2016, paving the way for international trade and investment. Indeed, the signing of the nuclear deal has opened the floodgates to a deluge of European trade missions to Tehran.

Aside from European investment, the easing of sanctions serves to release Iran from its main source of wealth: oil. Tehran now expects to increase oil production of 500,000 barrels a day by late November, with production to increase further in 2016. These developments will only build on the recent changes in Iranian economic fortunes, for, after two years of recession, the Iranian economy made a comeback in 2014. Ambitious Iranian development plans call for 8% annual growth from 2016-2021, but the World Bank does calculate that an Iran free from sanctions could see healthy GDP growth of 5.8 % and 6.7 % in 2016 and 2017 respectively. It appears that Iran is economically prepared for its more prominent role in the Middle East.

Consequences

In the perennial ideological and political battle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, a resurgent Iran only increases tensions. Characterised by an increase in hostile rhetoric, relations have soured even further in 2015. Iranian backed successes in Syria, Iraq and Yemen all directly impede the influence of the Kingdom. Indeed, Iran’s re-emergence on the oil-producing stage could further antagonise relations between Tehran and Saudi Arabia by biting into The Kingdom’s ability to control world prices.

Israeli-Iranian relations remain irrevocably bitter. The Syrian crisis serves as yet another messy point of conflict, with Israel even killing an IRGC General in an airstrike in January, despite claiming that the Iranian General was not the intended target. However, the nuclear deal did strain US-Israeli relations, with Obama ignoring Israeli lobbying against the deal. Creating cracks in the special relationship is another bonus for Iran.

In the last 3 years Iran has moved from a position of economic turmoil and political isolation to one of considerable regional power whilst normalising international relations, especially with Europe. There are hidden risks. Domestically, unemployment remains high and youth unemployment has frequently been the catalyst for political anger in the region. There is still no sight of victory for Assad in Syria, while the Islamic State continues to provide a source of extremist violence. The Houthis have not secured Yemen and a peace deal is now on the table. Sudan has also joined the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthi rebels. The presence of Sudanese troops in Yemen complicates the situation for Iran, with Tehran and Khartoum used to a close military relationship.

Nevertheless, it is clear that Iran can no longer be dismissed as a Persian Pariah, a rogue state akin to North Korea. Iran has successfully and astutely capitalised on dwindling Western presence in the region and looks economically sound enough to continue its larger role in the Middle East.

Author Bio

Tom Walpole is currently studying Arabic and Middle East Studies at the Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies at Exeter University. During his degree, Tom lived in Cairo and has focused his studies on security policy and Islamist movements within the Middle East. Tom is also alumnus of the European Youth Parliament and has an interest in researching the potential role of the European Union in Foreign Affairs.

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Cover image ‘Iranian Flag‘ by Blondinrikard Fröberg

During my time as an intern for MADRE, a New York-based nonprofit, I was exposed for the first time to the struggles of indigenous peoples, particularly indigenous women.  Indigenous populations in the Americas not only battle with the lasting effects of colonization by European powers, but also with the impact of modern globalization and urbanization.  Both of these phenomenon displace indigenous populations, removing them from their traditional lands or regions and encroaching upon their autonomy.  These lands often hold valuable natural resources subject to trade agreements, extraction projects, and external investments.  Nicaragua, Brazil, and others do not have the political will to consult indigenous groups before conducting projects.  Governments tend not to recognize, enforce protection, or implement indigenous  rights such as self-determination and refuse to consult indigenous populations prior to large-scale projects on indigenous land.

As a means to provide protection to these groups, the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007.  The idea was first presented in the UN Economic and Social Council, and it took almost twenty-five years of editing and redrafting before the final document was prepared.  It was initially rejected by the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, all countries with large indigenous populations, but the four later accepted it as non-legally-binding.  Most objections to the draft came over the issues of self-determination and land rights for indigenous groups, likely due to the economic ramifications governments would face by being barred free access from resource-rich land.  Bolivia became the first to adopt the declaration as law.

During the drafting of the UN declaration, the International Labour Organisation adopted the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention in 1989.  Although many countries in Latin America have ratified Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization, implementation has been severely lacking.  The Convention holds little support outside of Latin America- only twenty countries in total have ratified it.  Rather than define the term indigenous, the Convention allows self-identification as a protected right.  It also focuses on providing safeguards against discrimination and destruction of tradition and culture.

While international action is important to secure human rights for indigenous populations, it is the involvement of these peoples in their national governments that will help in reversing the trend of poor implementation.  Participation in decision-making and institutional processes can lend these groups a means with which to strengthen the execution of the international norms codified in such documents as the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  In Canada, for example, a record number of First Nations candidates ran for parliament ending in the most indigenous members elected ever.  One of these freshman members, Dan Vandal, stated that “First Nations issues will now come to the forefront in the House of Commons… We’re going to get a higher profile and hopefully a resolution of those issues. My role is going to be to speak loudly for the people of my community.”  Indigenous peoples face unique challenges that an outside representative simply would not be able to fully represent.  A strong political presence would also prevent indigenous issues from being ignored.  As indigenous groups increase their presence in government bodies, the more likely the issue of enforcement of human rights will fade along with the secondary issues caused by groups’ current vulnerability.

Author Biography

Beth Bickerton is a graduate of the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University, holding a degree in International Relations and French. She has previously worked in both nonprofit and governmental organizations, including the United States Supreme Court and the Social Science Research Council.  Her interests include the European Union, human rights, and wildlife conservation.

Cover image: United States Mission in Geneva under a CC BY-ND 2.0 Generic Creative Commons license

The recent stock market crash in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has had global repercussions. The complex interdependence of the international system of states, combined with the interconnectedness of financial markets, has resulted in some national, or even local, events having a significant impact across the globe. China, which has been emerging as a great power for the past decades, has strong influence both throughout the region and across the planet. Its rapid economic growth, industrialization, and urbanization have seen a huge rise in living standards and poverty alleviation (with China being named among Citigroup’s 3G countries, what Citigroup calls “global generators of growth for the future”) – a rise scarcely matched by any other example of economic development. It has also become the United States’ main contender for global supremacy, although the extent to which this may be the case is controversial. Kupchan in The Atlantic argues that:

Although the United States will be number two in 2050, its economy will be much smaller than China’s. Goldman Sachs projects that China’s GDP should match America’s by 2027, and then steadily pull ahead.

Therefore, the rise of China, be it a ‘Peaceful Rise’ or an antagonistic one, can be viewed as a prelude to a ‘succession of hegemonies’ – with the PRC becoming the global superpower and hegemon. Or, alternatively, others see it as preceding a change in the global distribution of power and the beginning of a multipolar system within which China would, among others, wield considerable influence as a great power.

The economic liberalization of China has also seen a huge increase in wealth and income inequality, with the Gini coefficient for family net wealth, according to The Guardian, rising from 0.45% to 0.73% between 1992 and 2012. As a result, a new class of billionaires and oligarchs has developed– a bourgeois elite within a nominally communist state. Despite antagonisms between China and the United States prior to 1972, their relations have softened in recent decades since (in a classic example of Cold War realpolitik) Richard Nixon visited Beijing that year with hopes of balancing against the Soviet Union by splitting the Communist Bloc. Later, China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, being integrated within the Washington Consensus and neoliberal order. The outsourcing of production by Western businesses to China and other emerging economies, in the pursuit of cheap labor markets, is a consequence. This is part of a ‘catch-up’ process during which, under the auspices of globalization, emerging economies are “converging” with the economies of the developed world. With a largely mixed economy, movement of capital is still very controlled and cronyism is rife between the nation’s economic and political elites. The neoliberal reforms have also seen the establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) for experimentation in free markets.

In its international relations, there are significant disputes between the PRC and many of its neighbors. Taiwan, for one, still considers itself to be the legitimate government for the whole of China. Consequently, there have been crises over the Taiwan Straits since the Communist Revolution in 1949. Since the Chinese intervention during the Korean War in 1950, the dynastic and autarkic despotism of North Korea – another nuclear state – has been one of its closest allies. The expansion of the PRC into Tibet in 1951 is a long-standing international dispute. The People’s Liberation Army also employs over two million members and the nation has a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons, giving it a large sphere of influence and a significant amount of power and leverage throughout the region. There is also a dispute between China and various neighbors over the status of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Globally, China has also left a footprint in various African states including Sudan, where its role in the Darfur genocide has been particularly nefarious.

Let us now turn to domestic issues. China’s political system is not considered to be democratic, being a one-party state under the rule of the Communist Party. The massacre of thousands of students during the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 is a reminder that the nation’s political system, unreformed since this event, still leaves much to be desired. Political reform is necessary if China’s political system is to serve as an exceptional example for other nations to emulate in a way similar to the spread of Western democracy. Without offering a real alternative to Western democracy, China cannot expect to wield as great a degree of political, economic or cultural influence as American unipolarity has seen. Specific issues also include the illiberal One Child Policy, which was previously enforced, and a two-child policy now currently enforced, by Chinese leaders as a result of fears over possible Malthusian disaster i.e. an inadequate quantity of resources to sustain a rapidly growing population. The great firewall of China has seen highly restrictive state control and monitoring of telecommunications and internet access. Ethnic relations in the country are also notoriously fragile, with, for instance, the Uigher population of the Xingjiang province having been subjected to many repressive policies by the Chinese state.

Despite this narrative, the supremacy of the United States in global politics is far from being succeeded. China’s rapid growth, both politically and economically, may indeed not result in anything like hegemonic domination. From issues of development to diplomacy and military power, the nation’s rise is certainly an important event in the recent history of international relations, and will continue to be over the coming decades. How this emergence will influence the rest of the globe/world is subject to question.

Author Biography:

Tom McLachlan is a recent MSc Global Politics graduate from the London School of Economics and Political Science’s (LSE) School of Government, having also acquired an undergraduate MA in International Relations and Modern History from the University of St Andrews. He has a background in think tanks and the UK Parliament. His main interests include U.S. foreign policy (being the subject matter of his undergraduate dissertation on the Bush administration), the politics of the Middle East, ethnic cleansing and genocide, self-determination, and international terrorism.

Cover image: Wolfgang Staudt under a CC-BY NC 2.0 Generic Creative Commons license

Morocco Local Elections: A Test For The Islamist Ruling Party

On 4^th September 2015, the people of Morocco were called to the ballot boxes for local and regional elections, the first since the 2011 elections which gave birth to a coalition government lead by an Islamist Party, the PJD.

These elections have been particularly significant for several reasons: they have been seen as a test for the ruling party; they have been considered the best way to see if the outcome of February 2011 protests have been stabilised; more than 1 million new voters registered on Morocco’s electoral lists, 46% of whom were women; a total of about one hundred and forty thousand candidates competed for almost thirty two thousand seats; these are the first elections in which all political actors agreed on the new regionalisation project, which guarantees more powers to the twelve regional elected councils; and finally, because the last round of local and regional voting goes back  six years.

Firstly, it is necessary to summarize the political forces which took part at the elections and present the most significant poll results; only after that will it be possible draw some conclusions.

The polls were contested by seven major political groups (there were at least thirty parties): the PJD (Parti de la Justice et du Développement, Justice and Development Party, the Islamist ruling party);the PAM (Parti Authenticité et Modernité, a party founded in 2008 to oppose the Islamic party and backed by the Monarchy); the Independence Party (Parti de l’Istiqlal, a conservative and monarchist party); the RNI (the National Rally of Independents, the political landmark for business men linked to the King); the Socialist Union’ the Popular Movement; and the Party of Progress and Socialism.

The election results showed the PJD gained 5021 local seats and 174 regional assembly seats, the PAM gained 6655 local seats and 132 regional seats, the Independence Party gained 5106 local seats and 119 regional seats. As a result, the Justice and Development Party did not just win the majority of regional seats, but also won the majority in very important cities such as Rabat (the capital), Casablanca (the economic capital), Marrakech, Tanger, Fes, Meknès, Agadiris. However, in the municipal elections, the PJD came third, obtaining the 15.9% of the votes, after the Independence Party (16.2%) and the PAM, which had 21.1% of the votes. On the basis of 14^th September’s poll results, elections of regional council presidents saw the PAM win five regional presidencies, while the PJD, the RNI and the Istiqlal Party won two each. That implies, because of the improved powers guaranteed at the regions, that  PJD mayors will be forced to strictly cooperate with PAM regional presidents.

Beyond any doubt, the PJD is the winner of this electoral round. In the wake of this poll victory Abdelali Hamieddine, a senior official of the Islamist Party, said “These results confirm the confidence of the Moroccan people in the work of the government”. There are a number of reasons which explain this victory: firstly the Islamist Party pragmatism, a distinguishing element of its political agenda and political discourse (totally free from religious references); the moderate public image of its leader and current PM Abdelillah Benkirane; and, last but not least, the innate weakness of the Left, the clear loser of this election.

This last point is worth examining in depth. The Left (meaning all leftist parties) does not have a clear, unique idea of the relationship it has, or it would like to have, with the monarchy and the established power. For instance, there is on the one hand the Socialist Union, which decided to boycott the 2011 elections because of the lacking of significant changes in the political system after the 20^th February Movement protests, but  it did take part in this election even though the political framework stayed basically the same. On the other hand, there is the Democratic Way Party (a radical leftist party), which decided not to took part at the elections and campaigned for a general boycott (four of its members were arrested in Rabat on 25^th August). A similar attitude leads to different and inconsistent political choices which determine internal divisions between the single parties, worrisome unable to stand together under the same umbrella, and, of course, all of this is perceived by the electorate and reflects poorly at the moment of vote.

The turnout at the polls was 53.67%, higher than the one registered in the previous election; the data acquires even more significance when remembering the astonishing number of new voters reported earlier. This high level of participation certainly represents a return of voters’ confidence in politics, and this is always a good sign.

It is legitimate assume that these elections could represent a turning point in the local politics of Morocco given that the PJD is satisfactorily represented. However, as noted above, because of the results in the regional presidencies, it is quite likely the formation of improbable coalitions in local councils will be seen.

Eventually, two points can be made regarding this election. Firstly, the PJD presence in local councils, meaning the chance to affect citizens’ everyday life, could be a key advantage for the Islamist Party in the upcoming 2016 general elections. Secondly, this could be the end of a political era where traditional parties, in accordance with the King, used to completely dominate every aspect of public life in Morocco. That would be the definitive proof that this Country, after the 2011 turmoil characterizing all MENA region, is undertaking, in a very promising way, a serious path towards a stable and functioning democracy.

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Author Biography

Gianluca Aquino holds a law degree from the University of Naples Federico II and is currently doing a Master’s Degree in Economy and the Institutions of Islamic Countries (MISLAM) at LUISS University in Rome. He is particularly interested in geopolitics and analysing national public policies, foreign policy towards regional and global actors and geopolitical dynamics. He believes that the Middle East and the southern bank of Mediterranean Sea represent crucial elements in the global theatre and his post-graduate studies focus on Islamic countries with an aim to contribute to national or supranational institution, a think tank or an NGO as a political analyst.

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Cover image ‘Election Wall‘ by Jonathan Morgan

Following the debacle that was the Copenhagen conference of 2009 and within a month from the terrible events of November 13^th, Paris hosts the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference from November 30^th to December 11^th. Despite early favourable rhetoric, and as the likelihood for a multilateral agreement grows and is reported more widely, a lot of work is needed between now and the conference to ensure that significant reforms help meet the 2®C target. Hollande and other international leaders still must ‘aller au charbon!’ – roll up their sleeves, to realise a cleaner world with fewer carbon emissions.

It has been a positive few months for climate campaigners. Kick-started by the Obama administration’s bi-lateral climate deal with China, which aims to dramatically cuts emissions in the US and caps China’s carbon pollution by 2030. Skeptical positions on climate change are continually being eroded alongside Oil prices, now so low that previously ‘Tough Oil’ is no longer economical. In addition, the political cycle in the Anglosphere has turned in favour of climate change action. Whilst this has provided a favourable climate to the talks, it may also have led to a false sense of security. Although these developments are positive, they may by no means be enough or certain to have the necessary impact. We need cautious optimism, an examination of what is realistic and strength to do what it necessary: not what is easy.

The groundwork has been laid. The US China climate deal is a significant achievement by its own merit and a closer examination of its core narrative gives us the impression that the two largest global polluters, combined to one third of global greenhouse gas emissions, may finally be ready to change.

These long overdue agreements come on the back of Chinese emissions rising nearly 171% between 2000 and 2011. This massive increase, driven by rapidly growing energy consumption due to strong economic growth, if left unmitigated would only grow further. With an energy mix, primarily focussed on coal consumption, further emissions will have dramatic implications, for everyone.

China has already pledged to reduce Carbon intensity and taken wider steps to change its emissions trajectory. Its State Cabinet released details to cap coal consumption at 4.2 billion tons in 2020 and senior members committed to reduce coal as a share of primary energy below 67% by 2017 through resource taxes and caps. While this is progress this new agreement goes much further. It commits Beijing to ensure 20% of total energy production to non-emitting power sources. As well as embed new policies to divert funding away from fossil fuels and carbon intensive industries.

In the US, the pace of carbon pollution reduction will double. President Obama set an ambitious goal to cut emissions in the range of 17% below 2005 levels, in 2020. They have gone much further in the Clean Power plan than some anticipated, the Department of Energy set a goal of reducing carbon pollution by 3 billion metric tons cumulatively by 2030. This has certainly been an innovative agreement firmly looking forward to address the 21^st century issues likely to be encountered. We can only take comfort that In response to the major trend of urbanisation in both China and the US the two countries are establishing a new initiative on Climate-Smart/Low-Carbon Cities under the U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group.  Under the initiative, the two countries will share city-level experiences with planning, policies, and use of technologies for sustainable, resilient, low-carbon growth.

The difficulty in this agreement in general is the lack of detail which leads swiftly to a lack of accountability. China has not set out how it will cap emissions by 2030 in any detail and neither has the US explained how it will reduce emissions by 26-28%.  With added pressures in the top-down society local government officials may feel pressure to been seen to do what has been demanded of them.  This lack of accountability creates a breeding ground for skeptics.

It could be argued that this deal has provided the single biggest cause for optimism and momentum in recent decades. We should, however, ensure that milestones are clearly marker and that at Paris the agreement includes strong measures for providing accountability and tracking ability, an irrefutable ratification mechanism is needed.     But, if we leave vast areas of the hard-fought agreements without accountability mechanisms, or at the discretion of polluters, we invite the skeptics in.

Recently those in the minority, who wish to stifle and oppose any policy to reduce carbon emissions, face two choices: shifting to the middle ground (so called Lukewarmers) or shift the rhetoric (“better to talk about global change”). These ‘Lukewarmers’ advocate adaption, not intervention, and in the new real-politik of multi-polarity it could be an attractive offer to some.

Proponents of the Lukewarmer view have a more mainstream view than the flat-out deniers. They subtly agree with the anthropogenic warming of the world, where they diverge is on the level of risk this poses to us. They cite figures showing intervention costing more than the damage through unmitigated climate change alone. Not only are these figures reductionist but they misinterpret the very nature of global warming expansionist unpredictability.

It is commendable that the majority of those that hold this position now accept the fundamental elements of the climate argument. It throws down a gauntlet to say “What would you sacrifice in order to meet our climate need?” However, it risks distorting and scapegoating action for potential reactions; it inevitably plays into the geo-political status quo and does little to ease the worry of nations with a lesser ability to cope with disaster. At Paris we need clear rhetoric and empirically led action to combat the Lukewarmer argument. It will help to have some fresh faces at the table.

Within the last couple of months the internal politics of two, once coherent, conservative and former  commonwealth countries,  have changed dramatically which will have consequences for Britain’s (and her allies) stance at Paris. The changes at the top in Australia and Canada to more sympathetic leaders in regards to combating climate change will have a profound effect on the momentum leading into the debate.

This will change the nexus of climate change diplomacy: Justin Trudeau, Canada’s new Prime Minister, has indicated his whole hearted support for a deal at Paris climate change conference, and to establish a new carbon-pricing scheme in Canada while in Australia, Malcolm Turnbull has yet to announce anything specific but has a long history of demanding action on it.  With both of the previous incumbents gone, who did not hold the climate change agenda in high priority, it can only provide further energy. The prospects for the Paris alliance have received a significant diplomatic boost.

Whilst there is cause for cautious optimism, the threat of premature euphoria still looms large. Climate campaigners have iterative victories to rally behind but now the hard work and short campaign begins. Politicians, Special Advisors and Diplomats on all sides should be preparing to set aside short-term approaches. Obama is clearly looking for a legacy but it is unclear whether the appetite for this deal is wide-spread given the influence of special interests in the run up to the elections.

Yes, we are likely to get a deal in Paris; and it is of fundamental import that we get one. However, we should not compromise on the detail for the sake of consensus. Playing and winning the long game includes victories at key moments, this is one. We all must look to our leaders, show them what they need to see to ensure they understand what we expect of them and hold them accountable.

The opportunity has arrived, the hard work now begins. What is the cost if we fail this time around?

Author Biography

Christos Gatsios is a Greco-British European of Australian heritage: a passionate Europhile, he has worked for three Westminster based think-tanks, and is currently supporting the leader of a leading London borough in private office.

Cover Image: Peter Daems under a CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 Creative Commons license

Keeping one eye open for bandits, avoiding landmines, evading disease – there are few civilian occupations fraught with the same risks faced by the aid workers of today. These brave and often highly qualified practitioners confront dangers every day, in some of the most rugged and underdeveloped locations in the world. The recent events at Kunduz hospital, when an American AC-130 tore into a hospital killing 22 medical staff and many patients, brought into sharp focus the risks faced by those within this profession. The incident, a case of what appears to have been a tragic lapse in communication, highlights the fragile yet essential relationship between security forces and NGOs. In Kunduz, it is said that the hospital was being monitored by intelligence assets for weeks prior to the attack, and so its peaceful purpose should have been abundantly clear. And yet, despite Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) regularly updating the international security forces on the coordinates of the site, it was targeted with precision and without mercy.

The defenders of the military will, with a degree of insensitivity and perhaps unfairly, point to the operational dangers of working in a fragile security environment. Dangers that they expect to face themselves. They may go on to question the real practicality of taking in anyone in need, that to take in combatants, without hesitation or examination, is not viable and puts the organisation at risk in asymmetric warfare. In reality, for the overall security and long-term progress of a region, the two bodies must endeavour to work in harmony. In the case of Afghanistan, and in other cases before, one cannot work without the other.

Afghanistan ranks as the most dangerous country to be an aid worker in 2015, a position it has retained from the previous year. According to some commentators, Somalia held this dubious title a year before that. It is a country that has suffered enormously in recent times and has been in constant need of international aid since. The country received £107m of aid from the UK, in 2013. The U.S. Department of State and USAID pumped a combined $235.32m into the country last year. Similarly to Afghanistan, the complex tribal make-up of past and present day has hampered peacekeeping operations and more expansive plans for the country’s long-term development, and have thus received the tag of ‘failed states’.

In the 1990s, after averting a famine with the potential for claiming millions of lives, the UN mandated further military involvement to secure the humanitarian operation in Somalia. It soon became clear that international agencies and forces were tampering with a ferocious tribal balance in the country, whereby there could be only one victor. The U.S took a leading role in protecting the humanitarian operation and most significantly, targeted the lawless individuals orchestrating chaos across the country.

In 1993, while Black Hawks hovered over the country’s capital and black-helmeted men of JSOC (Joint Special Operations Command) roped into the cavernous warrens of the city hunting the men who were threatening peace in the country, NGOs desperately sought to repair a tired and broken country. Food was distributed and, federal facilities started to shape up, while sports facilities began to appear even in remote towns of the largely forgotten north. Many NGOs, including Médecins Sans Frontières, set up shop in the capital. Its deep-sea port, availability of skilled workers and the proximity to the UN-secured airport made it the obvious choice. It was, however, this proximity to usable infrastructure and critical resources that brought aid agencies into contact with international security forces determined to pacify it.

Scott Peterson recorded the events that followed while serving as a journalist in the country. In the early hours of the morning on the 30 August, 1993, Special Forces Operators snaked down onto the roof of a building suspected of harbouring fugitives. They kicked through the door and opened fire. Journalists looked on curiously from a neighbouring rooftop, wondering why the office of UN Development Programme had been targeted, as members of its staff were bundled to the floor and hogtied (Peterson, 2001). On the 2 September, the building of another aid organisation, this time the compound of World Concern, was to have a surprise visit from Special Forces troops. This time, however, realising their mistake and much to their embarrassment, the Rangers involved instead opted for the traditional route of entry, with a polite knock on the door and a request to search the compound (Peterson, 2001). The frequency with which NGO employees were being wrongly targeted became such a point of frustration that some Médecins Sans Frontières workers even sardonically offered to take Rangers on a tour of all the offices in the area (Peterson, 2001). The commanding officer of the operation would later claim that the UN employees had been in an “off-limits area” with “contraband” on their person (Bowden, 2002, p.43).

The Somalia experience was clearly challenging for more reasons than botched raids by security forces. At a time where any Somali carrying a United Nations identity card faced a grim fate from local gangs, it was always going to be a painful mission. Putting the case of Kunduz and Somalia aside for a moment, cooperation with security forces and charitable organisations can work, but it must be accepted that mistakes are inevitable. Catastrophes like the strike on Kunduz are avoidable and similar lapses can be mitigated. The extent to which NGOs cooperate with the ‘peacekeeping operation’ does not always reflect the efforts shown by MSF in Kunduz. Furthermore, periodically providing the security forces with locational coordinates is certainly useful, but it cannot replace regular face-to-face liaison between these very different bodies. Military forces must convince NGOs that they respect the work of these charitable organisations and are not using them for their own ends. There were reports that security forces had been travelling under the guise of aid workers in Afghanistan which likely contributed to the high volume of attacks on aid organisations. NGOs should also realise that maintaining security in the region works to their benefit. MSF chose to cease operations in Afghanistan after 5 of its staff were shot in 2004. They cited the failure of the authorities to bring those responsible to justice as one reason for leaving. Despite this, MSF refuse to intervene or take side with any ‘government’ to maintain their political neutrality, even if it affects efforts to secure the areas they work in.

NGOs work under independent guidelines set by their own organisations. They quite rightly fight tooth and nail to maintain their political neutrality and will not have their objectives dictated to them, although at times this may be unavoidable with some organisations receiving government funding. Nevertheless, this often conflicting approach will inevitably cause friction with the security forces in the area as they pursue separate, but ultimately linked, objectives. NGOs and the military must accept that their own objectives are often intertwined, and that only through better cooperation can trust be restored for the betterment of the countries they are endeavouring to help.

Bibliography

Bowden, Mark, (2000) Black Hawk Down. London: Corgi.

Peterson, Scott (2001) Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, And Rwanda. New York: Routledge.

Author Biography

Hugh Coates is a recent graduate of Southampton University having studied History. He is particularly interested in American foreign affairs. His areas of specific knowledge include: covert operations and intelligence, particularly in the North African and Middle Eastern region.

You an find him on Twitter

*Cover image ‘Military Police Practice Medical Evacuations‘ by DVIDSHUB

“We are and always will be a nation of immigrants. We were strangers once, too. And whether our forbearers were strangers who crossed the Atlantic, or the Pacific or the Rio Grande, we are here only because this country welcomed them in and taught them that to be an American is about something more than what we look like or what our last names are, or how we worship,” stated President Barack Obama (USA) in his November 2014 speech to the U.S. American citizens  about his plan on immigration. The border between the United States and Mexico stretches 3,145 kilometres (1,954 miles), from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean. In some places, only a sign or a fence mark the border. In other places, it is reinforced with barbed wire or tall steel barriers that separate the two nations. Immigration to the U.S.A. has been unavoidable for years, especially at the U.S.A./Mexico Border. Migrants travel from as far as Central America at a chance at their “American Dream” risking everything they have and walking up to 12 or more days through the desert.

Aspects of the journey are typically individually depicted, however, not much is known about the journey to the United States  itself from migrants and what they encounter on their journey. Semi-structured interviews were conducted in Agua Prieta, Sonora, Mexico at a migrant centre and then common themes were classified afterwards. The interviews were conducted with seven participants including four men and three women from the nearby shelter and participants of the migrant centre. In addition, the migrant centre’s volunteer coordinator was also interviewed to gain a perspective on the changes and shifts in immigration and to identify new challenges that migrants face on their journey to the U.S.A.

Organisation
The Migrant Resource Center’s primary purpose is to provide assistance to those who have been recently deported or those migrants that are in transit to the U.S.A. by providing basic human needs, medical care, human rights violations and meals. The Migrant Resource Center as well provides orientation and information about the dangers of crossing the border. The purpose of orienting migrants is to inform them about their options so that they can make an educated decision about but not force them towards crossing the border illegally or not. The Migrant Resource Center’s Volunteer Coordinator explained the importance of the organisation and their presence for migrants that are in transit to the U.S.A.:

Their safety [is important]. We are at the border, there is a lot of smuggling of drugs, so we just worry about them, especially women and children [they] are vulnerable. That’s why we provide these resources for them- the shelters just in case they want to use it. Since they don’t have any money, these shelters are very safe. (Translated by author)

The reality is that migrants are unprepared for their journey. The migrants underestimate their journey and put too much faith into the hands of their “Coyotes” or human smugglers. The “Coyotes” are notorious for lying, abandoning migrants, overcharging and causing even more trouble for migrants. Over the course of the interviews with the migrants, there were three common new themes that were discovered. The old themes that had been aware of at the border included organised crime in paying the human smuggler, kidnapping, rape, and violence.

 The “Coyote”

The slang word for human smugglers amongst the migrants include “Coyote” and “Pollero (poultry dealer)” referring to the action of illegal human smuggler. Jamie shares that there are disadvantages to paying less for a “Coyote” which Jamie discovered is not knowing if the intention to help the migrants get to their final destination is there or not. Jamie paid for a cheaper “Coyote” because of a lack of funds and felt like he had been betrayed because he was a friend of his that was working with the mafia and assisting in trafficking drugs illegally to the U.S.A. The mafia is referred to by migrants and most people in Latin America to their human smugglers and often, those human smugglers are also involved in organised crime such as with the drug cartel. In relation to his journey and his friend he said:

This time I think he is, because he told me he wasn’t working with people anymore, that he was only with drugs but that he was still going to help us. And since I know the path, I told him I only needed help with the mafia and I could take the rest, but he played us really bad…We all had a bad time. The fact that I didn’t have any money made me choose a cheap “Coyote”. He told me I could pay him later there (U.S.A.) with work…He said you pay me there—they even got me boots and clothing. I thought they were doing that because he was my friend and I thought that everything was going to be fine, but no.

The Desert

A journey would take a migrant a few days at the most fifteen years ago, however, with the increasing border changes, migrants are being forced to push themselves to the extreme when crossing the desert walking up to 12 days or more at a time. After being paid less for his work at a family business and hearing about the potential to earn money in the U.S.A. Manuel set off with his sister, Nancy, to travel to the U.S.A.. Manuel recalls his experience through the desert, reflecting on the struggles he dealt with:

We were dehydrated and only being guided through the phone is also very difficult because we didn’t know the area. Guiding us one way and then sending us to the other. Sometimes, we would get lost, then we would call and from there, he would guide us.

Manuel’s narrative shows how much the border has changed. “Coyote’s” are deceiving migrants by convincing them they’ll guide them through the desert only to leave them alone in the desert to guide their way solo to the safe house.

The Mafia and the Dangers of the Journey

Perhaps the biggest change that has occurred in the last five years is the “quota” or the code and fee that is required to pass on behalf of the mafia. Migrants are now faced with paying a fee otherwise known as the “quota” that they must pay in order to pass through the desert. Jamie has been crossing back and forth into the U.S.A. for several years. Most recently, he was trying to return to the U.S.A. after going to Mexico to see his sick mother. Jamie reflects on his experience when he first crossed the border in 2004 versus recently crossing:

The first time in 2004, we arrived and we didn’t have to pay, there was no mafia, there was nothing. Some people used to pass drugs, but back then the famous ‘quota’ rate didn’t exist. We would arrive, stay at a hotel and the next day a taxi used to drive us to the line, we jumped and walked for a while. But now, not even the taxi’s want to drive there because they also get murdered. You need to have a code-permission, many things have changed, it’s very difficult, and they know you come like this with no money.

However, the trip is no longer a straight shoot path to the U.S.A., Migrants are also faced with trafficking drugs over the border with no decision. Jamie wanted to return to the U.S.A. after his mother had fallen ill and he had returned to Mexico to see her. Jamie reflects on the moment of being blindsided into trafficking drugs:

[We] were close to the border line and they [the “Coyote”] started to take out bags, filled with marijuana and they said I had to carry one. And I couldn’t say no, or I would be killed there in the middle of the mountain. So I said that I would help with the bag as far as I could. They told me I had to cross and jump or they would kill me.

In the end, Jamie decided to return to his home state of Michoacán, Mexico in fear of the Mexican mafia because he didn’t successfully carry out their requests. New dangers were identified that showed that the border and the journey has become more dangerous, including mafia fees and being left by guides to navigate via mobile. This essay examines these new factors that migrants encounter and the lengths at which migrants are being put at risk and exploited.

For years, Migrants have encountered several dangers at the border between Mexico and the United States including kidnapping, being forced into smuggling drugs, mafia encounters, rape and forced prostitution to name just the most common themes. However, new challenges have risen in recent years that are now faced by migrants including desert dangers, the mafia and the dangers of the journey and the “Coyote” experience. In this essay, we have shed a light at the new developments and changes occurring at the border. A migrant will do what it takes if it means providing a better life for their family. For migrants, the journey is only the beginning of a new experience for them enabling them in their search for a better life.

Author Biography

Ms. Blanca E. Chávez is a recent graduate from the University of Kent’s School of Politics and International Relations in Canterbury, UK with a Masters in International Relations. Chávez graduated with a Bachelors of Arts from the University of Washington in Seattle with a degree in American Ethnic Studies and Interdisciplinary Visual Arts in 2012. She is passionate about shedding light on broader issues at the U.S.A/Mexico border and capturing the shifts and changes. Chávez aspires to start a PhD Migration Studies in the UK or return to her homeland in the U.S.A.

You can find her on Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn

*Cover image ‘México Lindo‘ by Martin D

The rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a military and economic power is widely acknowledged. Today’s perceived wisdom suggests the future belongs to China and that the nation will overtake the United States as an economic power (if not as a military power) at some point this century.

It therefore seems obvious that the West should seek a coherent and effective policy to develop its relations with China. Building ties of mutual understanding is essential so that outlying points of disagreement and difference can be discussed honestly and openly in a constructive context. There remain, quite rightly, many areas on which China and the West do not see eye to eye, such as China’s increased military activity in the South China Sea alongside the ongoing and unacceptable human rights abuses which occur inside the country. Closer diplomatic ties between the West and China offers the best chance of progress on these issues.

Such high hopes, however, remain unfulfilled. A major contributory factor to this apparent failure is that Western approaches towards China seem to be fundamentally confused, with a near ferocious eagerness to forge closer trade links with China being undermined by mixed messages and inconsistency on the diplomatic front.

Take the United Kingdom as an example. The UK is just one among many Western nations who have seen a chance to cash in on China’s economic boom, and it has wasted no time in doing so. Earlier this year the UK, in a move which saw the country break with the position adopted by the US, joined the newly formed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, widely seen as a direct rival to the American favoured World Bank and International Monetary Fund. The United Kingdom’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, visiting China in September, announced that the PRC would be investing in and designing new nuclear power plants in the UK. Business links were also at the centre of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the UK in late October, just as they were at the heart of Xi’s visit to the United States in September.

Contradictions in Western diplomatic approaches

This eagerness to do business with China is not matched, however, by a consistency in the UK’s wider diplomatic approach. When on his trip to China, George Osborne made a point of not publicly challenging the Chinese government over its human rights record, a move which was lauded in China’s press and widely condemned in Britain. Yet, confusingly, the UK showed no such desire to appease China when human rights were raised both in public and in private during Xi Jinping’s state visit to the UK, making Osborne’s silence on the matter in September seem all the more confusing.

This strange mix of obsequiousness and confrontation is inconsistent and does nothing to assist the UK in strengthening either its economic or diplomatic links with China. Nor does a confused relationship with China help the UK in speaking out strongly for those who fall victim to human rights abuses in the nation. It is not just the UK, however, which seems to have a jumbled approach towards China on the diplomatic front. Xi Jinping, on his visit to the United States, had the pleasure of conversing with Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg in Mandarin and met countless business leaders in a demonstration of the strength of economic ties between the two nations. Just a few weeks later, however, President Obama himself openly noted in an official statement that excluding China from the wide-ranging and comprehensive Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal was a strategic incentive for the US to successfully complete negotiations over the deal, arguing that “we can’t let countries like China write the rules of the global economy”.

It is not hard to see that partly as a result of this seeming mismatch between strong economic ties, alongside limp efforts at a coherent long term diplomatic policy, there has been talk of relations between China and the West stalling completely. How can the West avoid this?

Strengthening the relationship to make a difference

A good place to start would be to foster greater co-operation between China and the West by focusing on areas of common interest, such as the preservation of global peace and the fight against terrorism. It is strange the West has failed to take advantage of Russia becoming less and less of a reasonable partner for China both economically and politically, for there are already several signs that China is not as close to Russia as it has been in the past. Over the conflict in Ukraine, for example, there appears to be a widening gulf between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. In July, Russia alone vetoed a proposed United Nations Security Council resolution on the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the 2014 downing of Flight MH17. Meanwhile Chinese premier Li Keqiang recently issued an affirmation of China’s recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty. China appears to have similar concerns over Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war. The People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, has recently expressed exasperation over Russian and US tactics over Syria. The West should seize this opportunity: by drawing China closer and strengthening diplomatic ties, Western powers can exert further pressure on Russia over the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria by isolating Vladimir Putin.

Western foreign policy makers should also reconsider the need for long term strategies towards China. It takes a great deal of time and effort to build strong diplomatic relations between nations. For China, a country whose government and policy agenda remains consistent over the course of decades, it is hard to know how far it should build relations with Western democracies, considering that the governments and policies of these democracies can change every four to five years. Where possible, Western governments need to ensure that they have a long term strategy in place for foreign policy which will survive a change of government, in order to tackle problems of inconsistent attitudes towards China.

Perhaps most importantly of all, however, a coherent, long term and consistent diplomatic effort to engage with China will help the West’s position in the future when it rightly challenges China for remaining overwhelmingly authoritarian and indifferent to human rights. China has itself claimed that it is prepared to talk about its record on human rights and recognises the many differences which exist between its government and those of Western liberal democracies. All too often, however, Western attempts to address serious concerns over Chinese imprisonment of political and religious opponents have been hampered by a high level of mutual distrust which exists between the two parties. This mistrust will only be overcome when Western governments form a considered and well-executed long term foreign policy which seeks to engage with China as an equal and an ally. Stronger diplomatic ties which eradicate mutual mistrust will increase the likelihood that China will respond more sympathetically to calls by Western governments for an end to human rights abuses. This alone is ample justification for more focused diplomatic efforts.

Trade links between China and the West, while a good base from which to start, have not been enough by themselves to achieve all this. A seemingly inconsistent and misguided foreign policy on the part of Western nations weakens chances of influencing the Chinese government over issues such as human rights. Genuine and sincere attempts at diplomacy are essential, not only because the West needs China’s co-operation to resolve some of the most pressing geo-political problems the world faces, but also to ensure that when China and the West have disagreements they are discussed frankly and honestly, in a matter that befits equal partners who differ from, yet respect, one another.

Author Biography

Thomas Cowie is currently an undergraduate at the University of Cambridge studying Classics. Having lived in China from 2005-06 his particular interests include Chinese foreign and domestic policy and China’s relations with the West. Other interests include the United Kingdom’s relationship with the EU.

Contact details: [email protected]

*Cover image ‘China festival of lights, dragon‘ by Alias 0591

Somalia has become an important, although under-reported theatre of operations in Washington’s efforts to combat international terrorism on the African continent. However, continued political instability and a change of military tactics by Al Shabaab threatens to undermine the recent successes of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the United States’ new found momentum in the region.

The increased political interest towards Somalia is at odds with the traditional lack of attention showed towards the country in the horn of Africa. Throughout most of the past quarter century, the political instability in Somalia which followed the fall of the Siad Barre regime has featured near the bottom of the international community’s agenda. Following the un-ceremonious withdrawal of US forces in 1994 shortly after the events commonly known as “Black Hawk Down” and the official end of UNOSOM II (United Nations Operations in Somalia), the plight of the Somali people was largely forgotten by international opinion. However, the attacks of 9/11 and the rapid success of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006, whose radical youth wing formed the nucleus of Al Shabaab, forced the African Union and Western governments to re-engage the situation in the horn of Africa. Their support would initially take the shape of formally recognising the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) held up in Baidoa, while tacitly supporting the military intervention of Ethiopia into the country. The overthrow of the ICU and the emergence of Al-Shabaab, which swore allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2012, has put Somalia firmly onto the map of the “Global War on Terror”.

The 2007 arrival of AMISOM, coupled with support from the United Nations Security Council and the establishment of a formal Federal government in Mogadishu, have led the United States and a select number of partners to pursue a much more assertive policy in the region. Indeed, Al-Shabaab has proved to be a growing source of regional instability with successive high-profile attacks in Kampala in 2010 and Nairobi in 2013, often conducted in retaliation to the presence of AMISOM. Since 2007, the United States has conducted drone strikes from its bases in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya in an effort to eliminate high ranking Al-Shabaab members. Recently, it has conducted covert Special Forces operations inside Somalia, and according to certain sources, elements from the Joint Special Operations Command and drones have been operating from bases inside Somalia itself. Moreover, the United States is providing financial and logistical support while training AMISOM and Somali government forces through controversial private security contractors. It is clear US involvement in Somalia closely follows a model of military operations that has been extensively developed by the Obama administration. The model advocates the use of specific Special Forces elements and drone strikes in a chosen theatre of operations, while the need for an important build-up in US military personnel is replaced by providing logistic and financial support to key regional allies.

In theory, this would avoid the necessity of direct US military intervention and thus reduce the chances of a political outcry against the intervention. This strategy, combined with the increasing military capabilities of AMISOM, has been somewhat successful. AMISOM operations have been able to achieve remarkable military successes, including securing Mogadishu, most of the Somali coastline and main urban centres such as Kismayo. The positive evolution in Somalia led President Obama to claim in 2014 that “this strategy of taking out terrorists who threaten us while supporting partners on the front lines is one that we have successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for years”.

These successes, however, mask the fundamental difficulties that lay ahead for the Somali government and especially AMISOM. Early military success were dependent on Al-Shabaab believing it could match the African Union mission in terms of conventional warfare. Its recent defeats and its substantial losses in terms of personnel and high ranking members has forced it to adapt. The organisation has adopted more asymmetrical methods such as the use of IEDs, suicide bombers or sudden raids on highly visible targets. The change in strategy has led to higher casualties in the ranks of AMISOM, which is spread thin over large distances and lacks the equipment necessary to face a drawn out insurgency. Al Shabaab has also continued to launch operations against member states of AMISON, such as this year’s murderous attack on the university Campus at Garissa in Northern Kenya. AMISOM remains the only fully competent fighting force on the ground, with the Somali National Army plagued by desertion and low morale over un-paid wages. 

Continued political in-fighting and the dominance of clan politics remains another major hurdle for the development of Somalia. This is best exemplified by the fact that on the eve of the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit in New York, efforts towards impeaching the Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud were finally dropped by the President of the Somali parliament. The news was especially welcomed by Western backers of the Somali Federal government unwilling to accept another power struggle in a country that has been without government for the last 25 years.

The current presidency has been continuously marred by allegations of corruption and the establishment of a democratic process, absent since 1967, also seems to be bogged down by the in-adequacies of the current administration. Having been elected by a parliament chosen by 135 clan leaders, the government had promised a transition towards full democracy by 2016.  In July it was obliged into acknowledging that a full democratic election would not be feasible in 2016. Instead, an electorate consisting of a few million voters would participate in the election, and the task would be left to the succeeding government. This constant state of political instability has continuously undermined the efforts to create any semblance of a cohesive state.

A number of other issues have hampered international efforts to stabilise Somalia. The Kenyan government has been accused of using heavy handed methods against the Somali community in the country. It has also threatened to close the Dadaab refugee camp in the North of the country, fostering growing resentment towards one of the key military elements of the AMISOM mission. Western efforts to tackle the financing of international terrorism have also forced international banks to end the wiring of funds from the large Somalian diaspora towards their relations in Somalia. The closure of these vital financial channels has put the survival of large segments of the population at risk since they depend on the remittances coming from abroad. This has only fostered desperation and breed resentment, threatening to create another humanitarian crisis and another generation attracted by the ideas espoused by Al-Shabaab.

The situation in Somalia has slowly improved but major hurdles in terms of security, increasing public engagement and political stability remain. The security outlook remains mitigated. The recent announcements by the European Union offering financial assistance to AMISOM and Britain’s commitment to send advisers to Somalia highlights increased confidence in AMISOM and renewed political vigour for the stabilisation mission. However, recent changes in Al Shabaab’s strategy along with its continued terror campaigns in neighbouring countries indicate that the conflict has now developed into a prolonged counter-insurgency war. The continued support of Western donors and the willingness of AMISOM’s contributing nations to engage in the conflict will be key to the success of the mission. The prospect of continued insecurity does not bode well for the positive evolution of the political process. The pretext of continued insecurity will most probably be used to delay any fundamental changes, as elections will continue to be postponed and the government will remain unaccountable. The lack of political progress will make it difficult to invigorate domestic support for the country’s political process, which could impact the level of Western and African support for the Federal Government and easily undo the fragile successes accumulated since 2007. Consolidating AMISOM’s military successes and improving the military capability of the Somalian federal government will thus be essential to guaranty political progress and rally the support of the Somali people. This will however demand patience, time and funds, all elements that have been in short store in recent times.

About the Author

Alexandre Raymakers is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Political Science holding a degree in International History and International Relations. He has extensive personal experience on the African continent having been born in Zimbabwe and lived in 4 different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. He has previously worked for the Swiss Embassy in Kenya and has been working in Strategic Communications in London for the past year. His interests include International Security, African politics and European Affairs.

Cover image ‘Troops Advance during Anti-Shabaab Operation in Somalia‘ by United Nations Photo

Last month saw the release of Apple’s latest iPhone. The company claims that the iPhone 6s is the most advanced smartphone in the world, stating:

“The only thing that’s changed is everything”

However this is not strictly true. Despite claims by Apple to increase the number of conflict free products, the company remains entangled alongside other electronic giants in a long standing debate over its use of tantalum (mined as coltan) – a “conflict mineral” from the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Through their sale, this group of minerals act to economically fuel the conflicts taking place, leading to claims such as Prendergast’s:

“There are few other conflicts in the world where the link between our consumer appetites and mass human suffering is so direct.”

The debate over the sourcing and trade of conflict minerals has veen taking place for years with very little change taking place. Yet with the release of 17 new Sustainable Development Goals and elections due to take place in DRC during 2016, this period offers an opportunity to rigorously reassess current approaches to the issue of conflict minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Congo’s “Golden Ticket”

Beneath the surface of the Democratic Republic of Congo lie some of the most mineral rich soils on earth. This bank of natural wealth, which could be a much needed economic asset to a nation currently occupying second to last place on the Human Development Index, has instead become a major contributing factor in the country’s long and bloodied history. The term “conflict minerals” describes a set of minerals mined in conditions of armed conflict and human rights abuses, which are then sold or traded by armed groups. The minerals are mined in the eastern part of the DRC and include coltan, cobalt, cobber, cassiterite, wolframite, gold and diamonds. The vast majority of these minerals are mined by 1 to 2 million artisanal or subsistence miners, who in turn support a larger network of up to 12 million dependents.

“This Century’s Bloodiest War”

Since 1996 over five million people have died in the ongoing conflicts taking place in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the highest death pole in a conflict since the Second World War. While conflict minerals have been correctly affiliated with these conflicts, it is important to draw the distinction between the part they play as a cause or as a facilitator. Minerals are rarely the cause of the fighting taking place in the eastern part of the DRC. In fact, reportedly only 8% of the conflicts are over access to natural resources.”Efforts to pass legislation are based on the mistaken assumption that because mineral trade is one dynamic in some of the region’s conflicts, this means minerals cause conflicts… minerals were not the origin of the conflict in the Congo.”

None-the-less, conflict minerals do play a significant role in abetting the conflict economy in eastern DRC, and thus should be considered highly relevant to discourse seeking to reconcile and resolve conflicts currently taking place in the region.

The multifaceted nature of conflict minerals make them a difficult enigma to entangle and discuss. At the crux of the issue lie the conflicts themselves, a chaotic mix of factions each with their own distinct motives. “The Congo War’s of the 1990s and their aftermath are widely regarded as some of the most complex and egregious conflicts of our time.” The simultaneously occurring conflicts between several militia take place in a region twice the size of France. In the north and south areas of the Kivu province alone, there are no less than 70-80 armed groups currently in action. The armed groups include a motley of militias with factions from adjoining countries such as Rwanda, local groups, as well parts of the Congolese army – the FARDC. The Democratic Republic of Congo plays host to MONUSCO, the United Nation’s longest and most expensive peacekeeping operation in the history of the organization. Figures from 2014 placed the total cost at $8.73 billion USD invested in what has heavily been criticised as a hugely expensive failure. The main reason cited for its failure has been the initial inability to recognize the root causes of the violence taking place: namely local disputes over land, power, influence, citerzenship and identity.

In the United Nations’ defence, it cannot be stated strongly enough that the lack of governance and infrastructure in the DRC majorly undermines any progress made. This vacuum of structure means that militia groups are able to act unimpeded, with no fear of consequences. “The armed groups saw themselves as outside the law – no one could control them.” In this context of lawlessness it is not suprising that the UN has been able to make very little progress.

The Frank-Dodd Act

Awareness of the economic relationship between mineral trade and armed conflict has been active in the West for well over a decade, but the increasing recognition of the link between conflict minerals and electronics reached its height in the years running up to 2010. Epitomized in an article published by the Enough Group entitled “Can You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the Worst Sexual Violence in the World”. The contributors called for consumers to campaign, targeting President Obama, Electronics companies and Congress in a bid “to end the atrocities once and for all”.

The Frank-Dodd Act was signed into Congress in July 2010. The legislation sought to “promote the financial security of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system.” It included within it Section 1502, enacted by Congress due to “concerns that the exploitation and trade of these metals by armed groups was helping to finance conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and is to contributing to an emergency humanitarian crisis.” Section 1502 requires companies registered on the US stock market to report annually whether the minerals used in their products are sourced from the eastern DRC and surrounding countries and if so, to report on the due diligence undertaken on the supply chain.

The result has seen various initiatives seeking to trace the source of the minerals, sifting through the numerous tiers in the supply chain. However the process is slow and expensive. US publicly traded companies spent around $709 million USD and a combined six million working hours in 2014 in order to comply with the necessary requirements disclosing conflict minerals in their supply chains.

An Open Letter written in 2014 and signed by 70 Congolese and Congo experts assessed the policy response to the discourse on conflict minerals and addressed various shortcomings in the Frank-Dodd Act. The letter states that, despite the successes of activists in shaping policy, the conflict minerals campaign fundementally misunderstands the relationship between minerals and conflict in eastern DRC. It claims that: “Armed groups are not dependent on mineral revenue for their existence. The eastern DRC is a fully militarized economy, in which minerals are just one resource among many that armed groups… can levy financing from.The M23, until recently the most powerful non-state armed group in DRC, never sought physical control over mining activity.”

The letter also criticizes section 1502 on the grounds that few local stakeholders were involved in the policy making, both at the time of the act and since. As a result the realities on the ground have not always been taken into account. Four years on from Frank-Dodd, the signatories of the letter discovered that only a small fraction of mining sites have received accredited certification and that the overwhelming majority of mining companies were, largely due to poor roads and the huge geographical expanse, being excluded from legal access to the international markets. Finding no failsafe implemented structure in place with which to guarantee the minerals they were buying weren’t financing conflict meant that many companies made the decision to go “Congo free”. This has had far reaching consequences, permeating throughout whole economic networks. School fees can no longer be paid, haircuts, new clothes – any inessential expenditure is stopped. Miners who can no longer earn a legal living through mining are faced with severely limited options. Many trade minerals illegally, some join militias to earn quick cash; neither option acts to improve the conflict situations as they stand. Any progress made by international efforts is further diluted by problems of internal corruption amongst powerful parties operating within DRC with sizable sums of revenue disappearing into the pockets of the “kleptocratic elite”.

Potential for Change?

In the years since the Frank-Dodd Act more attempts have been made to better address the difficulties in the mining and trade of minerals from eastern DRC. Policy-wise, the European Union introduced a voluntary conflict minerals regulation scheme in 2011 aimed at its members and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Recent efforts, such as those of groups such as “Better Sourcing” and the George Clooney/John Prendergast initiative “The Sentry” demonstrate an ongoing desire to tackle the enormously complicated subject. Traceability continues to be the buzz-word however a better awareness of the contextual holdbacks means there is more promise of meaningful results. However setbacks continue to present themselves: attempts to pass legislation allowing the concealment of conflict mineral sourcing may reverse any achievements made in the traceability movement. Oversimplified mass media coverage, berated by experts as being misinformed and unrepresentative, remains for many of the general public their first and last source of information.

The DRC still holds huge economic potential, with estimates from the International Monetary Fund predicting a 9.2% projected GDP growth in 2015. Advancement in mobile phone technology shows no signs of slowing and figures detailing iPhone 6s sales, which have broken the company’s sales records demonstrate a huge market of people willing to pay out for the latest technology. All parties agree that better handling of conflict minerals is an important step towards negotiating an abate in the violent unrest.

“It’s a company’s responsibility to source responsibility. It’s a government’s obligation to provide security and provide the basic needs for the population. It’s up to civil society to provide oversight and raise awareness on issues.”

Unless serious governmental reform takes place, any achievements made in this area will prove futile in solving the larger outlying issues. Elections due to take place next year have the potential to quote Apple: “change everything”. Whether this is for better or indeed for worse, we will have to wait and see.     

Author Biography

Hannah Taylor is a Social Anthropology graduate from the University of Sussex. Brought up in South Africa by British parents, later moving back to the UK at the age of 10; this early experience began a love of travel and different cultures and can be seen as the root of her love of the Anthropology of Africa. She also has strong interests in conflict and resolution, sustainability and women and youth in development. Hannah is pursuing a career in journalism complimenting it with anthropology, blending the two professions to present a culturally considered view of the world.You can find her on Twitter as @fieldscribe

*Cover image ‘Conflict minerals 7‘ by ENOUGH Project