GPPW

On the 30th of September 2015, Russian president Vladimir Putin started a bombing campaign in Syria, having allegedly given the United States only two hours’ warning of its intentions. In the following weeks, much thought and comment has been given to assessing Putin’s motives for this escalation of Russian involvement in Syria. The vast majority of this commentary has been following the established western narrative with regards to Russia, which focuses on the wider geopolitical context and Putin’s efforts to become a more important player in the Middle East. Support for Bashar al-Assad is generally seen in the context of Russia’s – and Putin’s – attempts to shift the global balance of power; often, Russian actions in Syria and the Middle East are considered in the same breath as Russian manoeuvrings in Ukraine, as part of a larger Russian expansionist project. By focusing on the larger geopolitical aspects of Russia’s involvement in Syria they fail to consider the domestic concerns that lie behind much of the Kremlin’s Syrian policy. These concerns, while not independent of a desire to expand Russia’s global influence, hint at opportunities for a more fruitful collaboration with the West than has been the case up until now.

The lack of cooperation that the West – and the United States in particular – had with Russia is because of an inherent western fear, embedded explicitly or implicitly in most of the writing about the Russian bombing campaign that has appeared in the past few weeks, about Russian expansionist ambitions.

Russia sees the maintenance of the Assad regime as a key element in its broader goal of widening its influence in the Middle East. It also sees the turbulence in the region as a major threat domestically in the form of exported Islamic extremism. Refusing to join with the West’s continued championing of the supposed moderate rebels in Syria (although Russia has been advocating for cooperation with the West to combat ISIS), Putin sees Assad not only as the best chance for Russia to establish an influence in the region, but also, more simply, as the best chance for quelling the rising power of extremist groups.

That the threat posed to Russia’s shores by Islamic extremism plays a key role in the Kremlin’s Syrian strategy is clear from the noises that have been coming from Russian media in the months leading up to, and following, the start of the bombing campaign. One radio talk-show hosted a discussion entitled “Syria is our border, which we must not surrender”, while another featured a map of the world as Isis would like to see it in five years’ time, depicting large areas of Russia in black, renamed “Qoqzaz” and “Khurasan.” This fear is borne neither from the paranoia of a leader fearing that his main ally in the region was losing his grip on power, nor from a cynical propaganda machine determined to keep its populace in a state of fear, but a genuine belief that Islamic extremism poses a threat to Russia. ISIS is home to thousands of Russian-speakers, such as Abu Omar al-Shishani, who fought in the Russia-Georgia war in 2008 before joining the extremist group. The fear in Russia, like in many European nations, is that these members will soon return, bringing a rhetoric of extremism with them.

Al-Shishani’s links to the Georgian rebels is, for the Russian authorities, a dangerous example of how continued instability in Syria could bolster Islamic terrorists in the Chechyan region. Deputy Defence Minister Anatoly Antonov claimed in October that “we received confirmation the Islamic State is making contacts with terrorists in Russia’s North Caucasus,” stating that “we will bear this in mind when we make decisions aimed at strengthening Russia’s security and protection of its borders.” Similarly, the president of Russia’s Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, declared that “if we think that the Syrian issue will be resolved quickly and will not affect the security of our country, it is not true”, calling for the reinstatement of the death penalty for terrorists as “a supreme measure of social protection.”

Such rhetoric finds weight in the ISIS video message to Putin announcing its plan to invade the Caucasus and southern Russia, and the arrest, at the beginning of October, of a jihadist cell in Moscow for allegedly plotting terror attacks. Revealing the foiled plot, the press office of Russia’s Federal Security Service told Russian news agencies that some of those arrested “had undergone military training in camps of Islamic State terrorists on Syrian territory and arrived in Russia long before the start of Russian military operation in that country,” further feeding Russian fears.

Such fears are not new. Russia is home to at least sixteen million Muslims, and, having stepped up its “anti-extremist” operations before the Sochi Winter Olympics, it has not let up since, while Central Asia plays a far larger role in Russian thinking than many western commentators appreciate. Russia does not require visas from Central Asia, so some experts fear radicalised Muslims from there could come into Russia. Russia had a special unit of border guards at the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border from 1992 until they were removed in 2005, but the recent unrest in Syria has increased concerns about extremist action in Afghanistan as well, leading to intensified Russo-Taijk relations. Earlier this year Russia announced it would supply about $1.2 billion worth of weapons and military equipment to help Tajikistan fend off the Islamist threat, and in October Putin held talks with Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon at which he articulated Russian concerns about situation in Tajikistan in particular, and in the Central Asian region as a whole: “the situation [in Afghanistan] is becoming critical. Terrorists of all flavours are gaining influence there and don’t hide their plans to expand … one of their targets is Central Asia.” In response, he declared that Russia has “to be prepared to respond to this contingency.”

All this provides the background for Russia frustration with what they see as a western insistence on the existence of moderate Syrian rebels. Claims that Britain and the US deliberately allowed World War Two to drag on so that Hitler’s Germany could weaken Stalinist Russia still loom large in the Russian narrative, and many see history as repeating itself in the Syrian conflict. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed the moderate Free Syrian Army as a “phantom”, quipping that “if it looks like a terrorist, walks like a terrorist, if it fights like a terrorist, it’s a terrorist, right?” Such views are finding increased traction outside of Russia as well. Lew Rockwell, President of the Ludwig von Mises Institute in the US, told RT that “there is a lot of evidence that the US had something to do with stimulating [ISIS]” and that it is the purpose of “whatever group of horrible people the US is funding at the moment … to bring about regime change, to totally destroy Syria.” Similarly Peter Ford, Britain’s former ambassador to Syria, told the same station that “virtually all the opposition armed groups in Syrian are Islamist radicals, either ISIS [Islamic State] or interchangeable with ISIS,” and that “the British government has gotten themselves into a situation where they are effectively supporting some groups of jihadists while they are trying to strike other groups of jihadists.”

It is this that has proven to be the sticking point in negotiations between Russia and the West. Whereas the Kremlin sees Assad as the only figure in the region who can ensure stability, and therefore stem the tide of Islamic extremism, the West, and the US and Britain in particular, believe that it was Assad’s actions against his own people that drove people into the hands of ISIS and other extremist groups in the first place, and that any resolution that leaves the Assad regime in power is no resolution at all. However, there is a growing body of opinion, especially amongst European nations, that agrees with Ford when he says that “there is a difficult choice between wishing for the survival of the present government or the deluge or the disaster of the complete Islamist takeover in Syria.” They, like Russia, have watched on as US weaponry has reached groups such as al-Nusra and ISIS, and they have heard those such as Rami Jarrah, a prominent Syrian activist and co-founder of ANA Press, a Syrian news outlet, declare that “there is no such thing as the Free Syrian Army … People still use the term in Syria to make it seem like the rebels have some sort of structure. But there really isn’t.” This meant that Putin’s recent declaration to the UN General Assembly – “do you, at least, realise what you’ve done?” – met with not a few sympathetic ears.

There is no doubt that Russia stepped up its involvement in Syria in order to prop up the Assad regime. But understanding this is only the beginning of understanding Russian interest in the Syrian conflict, and in the wider region. What needs to be understood is why Russia has invested so much in supporting what it insists in calling the legitimate government in Syria. Yes, much of it has to do with a desire to ensure Russian influence in the Middle East; and a crude division of Russian interests into geopolitical on the one hand, and domestic on the other, is clearly unsustainable. Nevertheless, a recognition that domestic concerns do exist, that in supporting Assad the Kremlin is partially expressing its belief that the President is the most realistic means of ensuring stability in the region, would mean that the scope for cooperation with Russia widens. On 16th October, Putin declared that Russia stands for the creation of “as big a coalition to fight the extremists and terrorists as possible,” including “regional partners” like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan and Israel as well as the EU and the US. In the light of over four years of failed attempts to establish peace in Syria, maybe it is time the West took him up on his claims.

Author Biography

Joe Mansour is a history graduate from the north of England. He loves travelling and experiencing different cultures, and it is this that informs most of his work. He is interested in British and US politics, global inequality, and structural barriers to social mobility, and seeks to use his knowledge of history to inform his understanding of current affairs and events. In the future, he wants to go into journalism or public policy, using his writing raise awareness of the problems of inequality societies around the world face.

*Cover image ‘Syrians hold photos of Assad and Putin during a pro-regime protest in front of the Russian embassy in Damascus, Syria‘ by Freedom House

Below you find the description of an accidental run-in with refugees that I had recently and the text I wrote about it on a personal account. It genuinely was a feat of luck that I ran into those people, the joy and welcome I received from them wonderful and humbling and I hope to meet them again, some day, somewhere. – M.B.

Encounters

On my way north today, I met Farhad, a former English teacher from Syria who is leading a group of 20-30 friends and family from Iran, Iraq and Syria through Turkey, the Balkans and Germany to their eventual destination of Sweden (he says his wife makes him go there, personally he would prefer to stay in Germany).

Never have I been more quickly adopted into a wonderful group of people of all ages and a language I dont understand in the least, never have I been more impressed by the kindness of such complete strangers and never has my head rung more loudly than from Farhads attempt to teach me Arabic between Magdeburg and Hamburg (4 pages of vocabulary are probably the highpoint of my Arabic skills). Also he had the habit of introducing me with “Hello, this is my ticket and this is my friend Moritz, he’s handicapped!” everytime our tickets got checked and my disability ID was used.

When we finally arrived in Hamburg and said our farewells, that were so much harder than they should have been, Farhad and his group were greeted by a local welcoming group that would take care of them and see to it that they will safely make the remainder of their journey and that all that was left for me was to stay back and wave to this wonderful and welcoming group that I got to be part of for just a blink of an eye.

This is a picture of Farhad, his youngest son and myself. With all the weird storys and dramas out there about refugees and the ‘refugee crisis’, I just wanted to share this chance encounter that was anything but dramatic, but genuinely sweet and lovely – and one that I will not soon forget.

Moritz Borchardt is a Director of GPPW.

Cover image: Franz Ferdinand Photography under a CC BY-NC 2.0 Generic Creative Commons license

In light of looming climate change, the need to switch to renewable sources of energy that emit far less CO2 and methane greenhouse gases (GHG) into the atmosphere is crucial. Even among the leading low-carbon alternatives – wind, hydro, solar – nuclear power presents the most compelling case for energy intense, GHG-emission free power.

The impact of worldwide global warming extends to include extreme weather conditions, geographical shifting of biomes, melting of glaciers and rising sea levels. All due to the heating of the earth’s surface from excess greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the excess CO2 and GHG is due to human activities, principally from the use of burning fossil fuels for energy. Nuclear power, however, is a sustainable source of energy similar to wind, solar and hydro power that supports global human activity – except that while it produces 11% of the world’s electricity, it does so without contributing to global warming.

Despite the viability of nuclear power, it doesn’t have the same visibility in the public eye as solar power and other forms of electricity generation partly due to public hesitation in light of the Fukushima incident and other nuclear disasters. However, nuclear power is the safest energy production today with no fatalities from radiation in the operation of a commercial nuclear power plant, and new, advanced nuclear plants are designed to be even safer and cleaner. Compare this to the estimated 1 million deaths caused annually by pollution from burning coal, not to mention the thousands who die in coal mining accidents worldwide each year.

Nuclear power facilities are currently the most reliable source of power in the US, operating at a 90 percent capacity with electricity available at any time of day or night. Wind and solar require large swathes of open land to generate the same amount of power as their nuclear counterparts, and are also highly susceptible to variances in weather patterns. Moreover, nuclear generates only tiny quantities of waste material, which can be easily monitored and managed, and has been reported to have the least environmental impact overall.  Contrast the impact of coal and oil shale strip mining and the disastrous consequences of yearly oil spills, and the differences are astounding. Fossil fuel burning emits massive amounts of controlled pollutants into the atmosphere, none of which are released by nuclear power plants. Additionally, Direct Energy has reported that for the same amount of electricity generated, burning coal produces 100 times the amount of radioactive material than nuclear power. Continuing our ties with carbon-intensive power sources (such as coal and oil) simply isn’t sustainable.

A number of efforts to reawaken interest in nuclear power among the public are continuing with Nuclear Science Week (October 19-24, 2015).  Beginning in 2010, the week continues as a national celebration to focus national, regional and local interest on all aspects of nuclear science featuring nuclear power workers, defense personnel, teachers and others involved in the industry. Likewise, the business-focused Nuclear Energy Business Opportunities Conference was recently held in the UK, and in about a month, the signatories to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change will be meeting in France for the COP21 meeting.

Two timely results of Nuclear Science Week this year could be emphasis on the continuing use of nuclear energy as a valuable and irreplaceable component of the US Clean Power Plan, and the generation of enthusiasm in support of advanced nuclear power as a renewable and sustainable contributor to combating climate change. COP21 is the 21st session of the conference in which they will debate and make decisions regarding efforts to combat climate change on an international level, with the aim of keeping global warming below 2°C. Nuclear power, as a concentrated energy source with ultra-low GHG emissions, should be part of the worldwide effort to limit global warming, and will expectantly have light shed upon in these deliberations.

While it’s undeniable that great strides have been made in regards to solar, wind, hydroelectric and other types of renewable energy, they can’t do it by themselves. Though the amount they contribute to the global energy landscape has risen in the past decade, renewables are still not expected to completely eliminate the use of fossil-fuel-burning power plants anytime in the near future. When climate change is acknowledged as the most pressing concern facing the world today, all measures that combat increasing CO2 and other greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere merit utmost consideration. Nuclear power, being nearly carbon-free in its operations as well as cost-efficient, is ready and here to play a crucial role in solving the climate change crisis.

Author Biography

Beth Kelly is a freelance writer and blogger from the Windy City, Chicago, IL. After graduating from DePaul University in 2011 she went on to teach English abroad for several years, returning to the United States in 2013. Her personal interests lie at the intersection of art and ecology; in the future she hopes to continue to focus on ways in which young people can utilize their creativity to confront climate change. She has a rabbit named Anthony Hopkins. Find her on Twitter @bkelly_88

*Cover image ‘nuclear power thriving in England‘ by redjar

On September 24, a deadly stampede occurred at the biggest Muslim gathering in the world, the holy pilgrimage of the Hajj. Multiple narratives persist as a result of the huge number of MENA states affected and it is interesting to analyse the reasons behind these discrepancies.

According to an AP (Associated Press) report, published on October 9 and constantly updated since then, the death toll of the stampede amounts to at least 2,177 people and a still undetermined number of missing. That makes this accident the deadliest one in the history of the holy pilgrimage; the previous deadliest tragedy was the 1990 stamped that killed 1,426 people. Official statements from the 19 affected countries reveal the death toll, including 465 Iranians, 165 Egyptians and 120 Indonesians, the countries most affected by the disaster.

However, the Iranian media reported that there were at least 4,173 victims, while the official death toll according to Saudi authorities is 769 victims, a number that has not been updated since September the 26th.

In order to understand why there are deep dissimilarities in media coverage and, above all, how these incongruities actually talk about the bigger picture of the ongoing geopolitical conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, it is important to understand what the Hajj is and what it represents for Muslims.

The Hajj is one of the five pillars of Islam and is a ritual pilgrimage to the Grand Mosque of Mecca. The pilgrimage is mandatory at least once in a lifetime for whomever has the means to do so.

As part of the Hajj many ceremonies are carried out, and it was during one of these ceremonies involving stone-throwing, that the latest deadly stampede occurred.

The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are the two major powers competing for regional dominance. These two nations are fighting wars by proxy across the Middle-East of which Syria, Yemen and Iraq are just the most emblematic examples, and the Hajj tragedy is just the latest battle.

Russian intervention in Syria, the Iran Deal, the war in Yemen, disorders in the south of Saudi Arabia with its Shia minority are just a few of the problems affecting the Saudi royal family. In this atmosphere, the Hajj disaster, in conjunction with the previous  tragic crane collapse on the Grand Mosque that killed 111 people, could represent devastating hits for Riyadh with both tragic events  being used by Iran to attack Saudi Arabia.

The Iranian authorities blame Saudi Arabia’s mismanagement,  asserting it is the only cause of the tragedy. From the Iranian perspective, this is the definitive proof of Saudi Royal family’s inability to properly control the Hajj, and Iran has called for an independent authority to take over its management.

However, it is clear that this is not going to happen: the Saudi legitimacy in Saudi Arabia, and all over the Muslim world, is anchored to the role of protector of the holy places of Islam. If they gave up management of the Hajj, the role as protector could eventually fall too, and this would lead to uncontrolled riots in one of the United States’ closest allies in the Middle East: losing control of people would mean losing control of oil reserves and that it is not an admissible option (at least from an American point of view). The Iranian state is aware of the unlikeliness of the Saudi royal family giving up its managerial role in the Hajj, but nevertheless its rhetoric seems to be quite effective with the Iranian, Yemeni and Iraqi masses.

On the opposite side there are many Arabic countries which have been very hesitant criticising Saudi Arabia, and have showed no other reports about this event than the official figures quoted by Saudi authorities. This attitude is most likely linked to the Kingdom’s patronage of oil supplies and the fact that Riyadh controls the quota of pilgrims each Country can send every year to Mecca. One clear example of that is Pakistan: Pakistan’s Electronic Media Regulatory Authority warned independent national media that criticism towards Saudi Arabia could be considered illegal under constitutional prohibition on affecting relation with “friendly countries”.

Both the Iranian media and Saudi media have fuelled the debate around the Hajj, not only in the context of human tragedy, but of  geostrategic rivalry. Their actions distort media reports about one of the most important aspects of Islamic religion in the pursuit of geopolitical goals. It is important to keep this in mind while reading or listening to news of any kind involving the Middle-East; if such states are willing to use a tragic event, especially one occurring at the holiest of Muslim festivities, as a political tool, then one must question any facts or figures that are presented without independent verification.

Author Biography

Gianluca Aquino holds a law degree from the University of Naples Federico II and is currently doing a Master’s Degree in Economy and the Institutions of Islamic Countries (MISLAM) at LUISS University in Rome. He is particularly interested in geopolitics and analysing national public policies, foreign policy towards regional and global actors and geopolitical dynamics. He believes that the Middle East and the southern bank of Mediterranean Sea represent crucial elements in the global theatre and his post-graduate studies focus on Islamic countries with an aim to contribute to national or supranational institution, a think tank or an NGO as a political analyst.

*Cover image ‘Mecca, Saudi Arabia‘ by Mohd Azli Abdul Malek

“We want to change everything” announced one of the few demonstrators still camping by the road. Squabbling beside them, the soldiers made the protest seem like it had twice the numbers. “We want to change the whole system”. I didn’t doubt her sincerity, just the scale of the task she and others like her had set themselves.

The protesters had been camping by the road for some days now, hoping that the authorities would release their comrades from prison. The demonstration the week before had turned violent and as a result, 33 of them had been arrested – 5 still remained in custody. Both the security services and the protestors blamed each other for the clashes; there were accusations of brutality and vandalism from  both sides.

Lebanon has been experiencing a series of protests since the ‘trash crisis’ in July that left Beirut’s streets overflowing with rotting trash. The trash has since been moved from most neighbourhoods but it has not disappeared altogether. People are worried that the remaining piles of trash will become disease-ridden if the crisis is not solved soon, and the rains that arrive in the autumn are likely to make matters worse.

But these protests weren’t just about the trash, as one activist told me: “the rubbish crisis is only the surface. There are so many problems in Lebanon, but the main problem is corruption”.

This frustration is felt throughout the country. Daily power and water cuts affect people from all walks of life, but it is the lack of social security which is pushing the the poorest into desperation. Many of them are refugees from Syria and Palestine, but these protests claim to be for everybody living in Lebanon.

Lebanon’s democracy has an unusual political system where the allocation of parliamentary seats is decided by a quota from the different Lebanese communities. This is often described by anti-sectarian activists as “the tyranny of the eighteen” (in reference to the eighteen communities). Since the Taif agreement in 1989, half of all seats must go to Christians and the other half to Muslims, but within those distinctions are 18 official communities that each have a quota themselves. In addition to this, the President must be a Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shia. 

Many agree that this system is broken. Lebanon has once again been unable to decide on a president, this time since May 2014. Deadlock has made corruption endemic and, as a result, basic services are not provided effectively. This has meant that even small decisions are hard to make; the inability to decide on a new landfill site caused what is just the latest in a run of national crises.

In talking to the protestors, it is clear what they are demanding in the short term: First and foremost, a solution to the rubbish crisis followed by the resignation of Environment Minister Mohammad Machnouk. They are also demanding the writing-off of municipalities’ debts and the prosecution of the security forces who attacked and arrested their fellow-protesters. However at the heart of these issues is the lack of accountability and the current political system.

But what is less clear are the long term solutions. For the demonstrations to be more than just pressure on the government they need an alternative to the current political system. This is a challenge given the sectarian nature of Lebanese politics and a change in the quota system would have some clear losers. The population has changed greatly since the Taif agreement and a more proportionate democracy would disenfranchise some communities.

For now, the groups organising the protests have said they will continue their the struggle, as one activist put it, to “change the whole political system”. As I walked back to the city centre from the camped protesters, I caught sight of a young boy by the side of the road, his silhouette momentarily illuminated in the headlights of the traffic speeding by. He was asleep, clutching a bunch of roses he had been selling to the passing motorists. A change to the whole political system? I hope for his sake they succeed.

Author Bio

Oliver Berthoud is a contributor for Global Public Policy Watch on Middle Eastern Issues. As an expert on the Middle East and he has spent a considerable amount of time in Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Afghanistan. His academic speciality is in Minority Muslim Communities and he is a University of Exeter alumnus. He is an Arabic speaker and currently resides in Beirut, Lebanon.

Cover image ‘#YouStink Protest-August 29, 2015‘ by Joelle Hatem

Syria is now well into its fourth year of civil war, and the resulting devastation is clear to all. The United Nations (UN) estimate that 250,000 people have died, 12.2 million are in need of urgent humanitarian assistance and over 4 million have sought refuge in other countries within the region and in Europe.

UN Secretary General has described the overall situation as the “the largest humanitarian emergency in the world today”

At the same time, Syria has become a safe haven for terrorist groups, with ISIL and the Al Nusra Front controlling nearly half of the country. The Assad regime and the moderate opposition and ISIL forces are all accused of major human rights violations and war crimes, with chemical weapons, barrel bombs, beheadings, torture, mass executions and starvation used as weapons of war. Increasingly, the view of much of the international community is that Syria is a failed state in urgent need of a comprehensive political transition.

The Crisis Facing the Assad Regime

Despite Assad being re-elected in 2014 with 88.7% of the vote, the opposition and the majority of the international community denounced the election as illegitimate, because voting had only taken place in government held areas.

On top of this, 2015 has been a bad year for Assad, with the regime losing control of the ancient city of Palmyra as well as being ejected from much of Northern and Eastern Syria. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimates that Assad now holds just 25% of the country’s territory.

Overall, it seemed that the tables were turning against the regime, which could have forced Assad to reach a political deal to prevent his remaining power-base from being overwhelmed. In July 2015, by his own admission, hewas facing a manpower shortage with over 50,000 dead as well as many military defections. His once 300,000 strong military force had been cut in half, and its performance and capabilities severely weakened.

Despite this, it is still too soon to talk about the prospect of an end game, as Assad maintains control over Syria’s strategically most significant areas such as Damascus, Homs, Latakia, Tartus and half of war-torn Aleppo.

His Government continues to accuse the West of supporting terrorists, painting a picture to the Alawites and other minority communities within Syria, that it is either Assad or the Terrorists. However, the one fact that he cannot ignore, is that between January and July, his regime has been responsible for 7,894 civilian deaths, compared to 1,131 by ISIL. Despite ISIL’s atrocities, it is Assad, mainly through the indiscriminate use of aerial bombardment, who remains the greatest source of the country’s many fatalities.

No post-Assad Syria can emergewithout the agreement of the Syrian people and the international community, including that of nearby countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is also becoming increasingly clear that regime members, alongside the moderate opposition, must play a significant role in any post-Assad administration. Indeed, the state institutions and armed forces will need to maintain law and order, provide stable governance, and act as a legitimate national force to help drive ISIL out of Syria.

In the spirit of the old adage that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my Friend’, the Assad regime could be a potential ally in the fight against ISIL, but this idea has been rejected by the West and some regional nations, as Assad’s barbaric behavior against his own people has totally alienated them.

Are the ‘Moderate Opposition’ Forces Fit to Govern?

It was in 2012 that the US, UK and other western nations recognised the Syrian opposition as the sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people. Despite this support and that of regional actors, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, the moderate opposition, because of its fractious state and bitter divisions, has struggled to form a compelling alternative to Assad’s government.

The two leading groups within over 1,000 separate rebel groups, are the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front. These groups are seen as the moderate opposition fighting both Assad and ISIL forces. Both state categorically that there can be no place for Assad in a post-war Syria, however, the moderate opposition has been infiltrated in certain areas, by terror groups such as the Al-Nusra (an Al-Qaeda affiliate) and the Army of Conquest coalition. Such groups themselves face accusations of war crimes, hindering domestic and international confidence in all Syrian rebel forces.

To form a post-Assad Syria, groups like the Syrian Free Army and Islamic Front must be recognised as legitimate actors by the regime, while the opposition must treat members of the regime in a similar fashion. Both need to be willing to compromise and form an alliance that reflects the will of the people and combats the extremism of the ISIL insurgency.

The Positions of the International Community

The So-Called Western ‘Consensus’ 

The West faces a dilemma in its desire, after the Arab Spring, to see the emergence of a peaceful and democratic Syria. The dilemma is with the two main actors of the conflict, Assad and ISIL, who have long been seen by the West as a part of the problem and not part of the ultimate solution. In recent weeks, however, there has been a notable softening of the West’s position that Assad should resign immediately for progress to occur.

The US, UK, and France still demand his departure, but no longer see this as a pre-condition for an eventual diplomatic solution. In September 2015, the UK presented a proposal for Assad to lead a transitional government for up to six months before stepping down. This, however, along with any other notion proposing that Assad leaves the presidency has been decisively rejected by the Syrian regime.

Unfortunately, the credibility of Western intervention has been significantly weakened by its historical involvement in the region, most recently with Iraq. Furthermore, divisions within the coalition itself over the poor military performance on the ground by the Western backed rebels and the partial success of the coalition’s airstrikes continue.

Overall, the West’s ever-evolving stance on the conflict can be characterized as one of reacting to events, rather than providing sustained and consistent leadership.

The Pro-Assad Perspective

Since the inception of the conflict, Russia alongside China at the UN Security Council have vetoed resolutions aimed at holding Assad accountable for his regime’s atrocities, resulting in a deadlock regarding a resolution to the crisis at the UN.

In 2013, with Western airstrikes on regime positions imminent, in the light of a major chemical weapon attack in Damascus, Russia led the international community by negotiating the regime’s removal of chemical weapons. The UK Parliament’s rejection of military intervention further strengthened Russia’s diplomatic stance, and as a consequence, the intended airstrikes never occurred.

In recent weeks, despite Western concerns, Russia, with the deployment of 2,000 military personal to its air base in the Assad stronghold of Latakia, is making its presence felt again . Russian airstrikes have followed against anti-Assad forces, whether focused on ISIL or on all anti-Assad forces including US supported rebels, remains to be seen at the time of writing. President Putin recently stated: “Our main goal is to defend the Syrian state”, illustrating the extent of support Russia is willing to provide to prop up the Assad regime.

Overall, it seems likely that Russia is adopting this position as a long-term strategic goal to maintain, if not increase, its influence within the Middle-East, while also deflecting attention away from the crisis in the Ukraine. President Putin has built a decade long relationship with Syria, and as far as his position in the Middle East and the Mediterranean is concerned,the fall of Assad would be, therefore, a diplomatic disaster.

The role of Iran is also significant, as it is the Assad regime’s major regional ally. Iran sees the collapse of the regime as a major threat to its geopolitical interests, and, as Assad himself stated, ‘a victory for Syria is a victory for Iran, we are on the same axis of resistance’. This explainswhy Iran has sent military experts and financial support to Assad as well as sponsoring his Hezbollah allies.

Has the Russian Intervention Acted as a ‘Game-Changer’

To create a post-Assad Syria, it is clear that members of the regime and the moderate opposition must come together with international support from all nations to fight Syria’s greatest threat – the extremism of ISIL.

In this phase of the conflict, the two actors who offer the greatest chance of creating a sustainable post-Assad Syria are elements of the regime and the moderate opposition, in the form of the Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front primarily. President Assad’s refusal to resign, as well as the deadlock within the international community, are the two greatest obstacles to the political transition that has been desired by the Syrian people since the Arab Spring. And it is this that has contributed to the large influx of Syrian refugees into Europe.

In recent days, however, the nature of Russia’s intervention has pushed back any prospect of a post-Assad Syria further into the future. As long as Russia’s military intervention continues to target the moderate opposition, not just ISIL, and Putin maintains his support for Assad personally, any chance of a diplomatic consensus appears extremely unlikely.

Sadly, Syria has just become a yet more dangerous place in an already unstable Middle East.

Author Biography

Christopher Bowerin is currently an undergraduate studying Politics and Business Management at Oxford Brookes University. Christopher has a strong interest in European and American politics, Middle Eastern Affairs, international conflicts and post-war reconstruction.

Twitter: @KBowerin

Cover image ‘SYRIA-CRISIS/GORAN TOMASEVIC/REUTERS‘ by a.anis

Many may not have heard of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Pact (TTIP), yet it has managed to unite both ends of the British political spectrum. Earning the label of a “shady” backroom deal from the UKIP MEP, Paul Nuttal, and the voice of the people that is the Morning Star. The deal has also stirred up the passions of almost 3 million internet activists throughout Europe. So, what is it that’s got so many Europeans angry?

TTIP is the largest bi-lateral trade agreement in history and, if passed, will cover over 40% of global GDP. Negotiated between the US and the EU, the deal is designed to remove tariffs and barriers which restrict trade therefore increase profitability and employment levels on both side of the Atlantic. At least that’s how it is sold by its supporters. Doesn’t sound too bad, right? When we look closer at the “barriers” which TTIP aims to remove however, the reasons for the anger become clear.

The agreement aims to achieve “regulatory coherence”, or “harmonisation” in lay-mans terms. Leading economists, such as Joseph Stiglitz, argue this will lead to a race to the bottom in terms of standards, maximising profit-margins for business whilst ultimately punishing the consumer. The regulatory barriers TTIP is attempting to undermine are some of the most valued and hard-fought social standards in Europe, including workers rights won through the labour movement, food regulation standards (including restrictions on GMO and chemical content), privacy laws, banking regulations, and regulations on the use of toxic chemicals.

According to the main proponents of the deal these claims amount to no more than left-wing scaremongering, with many arguing that TTIP could raise standards as manufacturers seek to harmonise their products in order to remain competitive in both markets. For example, as US regulatory standards for car safety are lower than their European equivalent, those espousing this theory believe that US manufacturers would be forced to meet EU standards to compete in the European market, and create a race to the top. As profit is the driving-force behind corporatism however, is it not more likely that European manufacturers would forgo the expenses of meeting high regulatory standards, opting to lower standards to US levels and initiating a race to the bottom?

The US has a history of enforcing their economic agenda on non-compliant markets. Luckily, however, as a long-term strategic ally the EU will likely escape the tactics used to enforce such conditions on Chile, for example. Though, as was the case in Chile, we are likely to suffer an assault on our democratic processes and, by extension, our sovereignty. TTIP’s major threat to national sovereignty and democratic process comes in the form of the “Investor state dispute settlement” clause. ISDS has encouraged widespread protest against the proposed deal as many believe it puts corporate profits above the rights of workers and consumers.

The ISDS clause ensures the rights of corporations to sue national governments in the event that governments pass law/policy which is detrimental to corporate profits. ISDS will give corporations the right to sue governments, at both national and local level, through arbitration tribunals, for the loss of current profit, or “expropriation” of future profit. In basic terms, social interests and the welfare of the public would become subject to corporate whims.

Such clauses have become increasingly popular in recent years. In 2012, 58 cases were filed against national governments around the world as corporate lawyers become more and more creative in how they claim profits are affected. Swedish energy giant Vattenfall, for example, are in the process of suing the German government for potential losses of $6 billion due to the democratic decision to phase out nuclear energy after the disaster in Fukoshima.

Even if the case were to be thrown out by the German Constitutional court, the Energy Charter Treaty, which Germany and Vattenfall are both a party to, includes the formation of arbitrary courts to settle such disputes. Such arbitrary courts are formed under the guidelines included in ISDS clauses and essentially create a new realm of international law in which investor-state disputes can be settled. Vattenfall would still have the right to take the case to the arbitrators, who would then have an economic incentive to rule in favour of the corporation in order to encourage further cases. If TTIP were to be implemented, what’s to stop Monsanto suing the French government for its recent decision to ban genetically-modified food?

This process is clearly unaccountable, biased and an affront on democracy.  The threat of being sued alone is enough to worry lawmakers and policy advocates, especially in times of economic uncertainty as most of Europe is today. This can only have a negative effect on policy and stifle the democratic process as governments must concern themselves as much, if not more, with corporate interests than that of the public. Furthermore, if governments are sued, it will be the public who will pay the bill, meaning less money for education, health and infrastructure.

In addition to the undemocratic nature of the agreement itself, the way in which it has been negotiated until this point has shown little-to-no-regard for the democratic process of the EU. Negotiated between US representatives and an un-elected EU commission, elected representatives in the EU parliament are given extremely restricted access to Commission members or documentation related to TTIP,  whilst privileged access is granted to business leaders. During the EU Commissions preparations for the negotiations, 90% of the meeting they held were with corporate lobby groups. The Commission did not seek, or agree to, meetings with any environmental groups, trade unions or representatives of consumer rights initiatives before negotiations began in 2013. This move sends a clear message as to whose interests truly concern them.

TTIP was given the green light in the US when the Senate voted 60 to 38 in favour of the trade agreement but was stifled when it came to a vote in the EU parliament. Originally scheduled for June 2015, the vote in the EU was delayed until July at the last minute due to such a high number of amendments to be made, according to President Schulz. This provided the corporate lobby machine enough time to counter fears over the ISDS clause and make the illusive claim that an alternate system could be agreed upon. With the promise of an alternative in place, the EU parliament voted in favour of adopting a “common position” on TTIP by 436 to 241.

As the largest single market in the world, if the EU were to merge with the transatlantic market, the move could also be seen as a major geopolitical strategy to ensure the western economic structure of the next generation and combat the rise of alternate and competing markets; namely Russian and Chinese initiatives in BRICS. However, with many citing the failures of past trade agreements to fulfil similar promises, huge levels of public opposition and many raising questions surrounding the relationship between democracy and corporate power, it is time to seriously question the neoliberal economic status quo. 

Author Bio

Ben Hogg is a graduate in International Relations and Politics and is currently in application for a Masters Research programme. Aspiring researcher and author who’s academic and research interests include: global finance, EU-US relations, Middle Eastern relations, corporatism and democracy, global resistance movements, open-source information/education.

Cover image ‘TTIP und CETA: Der Widerstand wächst!‘ by Mehr Demokratie

The fear humans and states are experiencing as a result of the growth of the Islamic State (ISIS) is not a phenomenon unique to the United States or the European Union. In a recent report, conducted by the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS), it was concluded that the Republic of Kosovo has the highest number of ISIS recruits per capita (Kursani, 2015). Kosovo has responded to its ISIS problem by adopting in April 2015 which determines criminal offense for joining or participating in any foreign army or foreign police outside the borders of Kosovo.

One of its  provisions includes authorizing the Kosovo Police (KP) to use covert and technical measures of surveillance in order to conduct relevant investigations (Hajdari, 2014). Nevertheless, using surveillance mechanisms to investigate potential ISIS fighters poses a danger to human rights in developing countries, such as Kosovo, because these countries are still in the process of determining their digital privacy rights and implementing good governance practices.

Discussing the use of surveillance mechanisms in Kosovo as a potential human rights violation is a unique conversation for policy analysts, because many UN members are currently reducing their personal data protection in order to reduce the threat of terrorism. In 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2178. This resolution enables all member countries to “prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and the financing of their travel and of their activities.” This resolution has been criticized for violating the right to privacy, Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, because it enables and encourages UN country members to obtain and analyze personal data as a means to prevent terrorist activities.

The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2178 depicts the obvious and ongoing battle between the  right to privacy and the right to security of  an individual. Western states are responding to the emergence and growth of ISIS. For example, in July 2015, France’s constitutional court introduced a new law: the Surveillance Act. This law increased the state’s surveillance powers in order to reduce terrorism . As a superpower, a UN member, and an EU member the actions taken by a country like France have a substantial influence on Kosovo. Since Kosovo’s independence in 2008, their government has tried to align itself with the privacy rights of the UN and of the EU. The danger with promoting such policies is that they hinder the right to personal data protection. Since, Kosovo lags behind in adhering to its new personal data protection laws following western countries, by introducing surveillance practices, has the potential to increase corruption and undermine transparency in governance (Nielsen, 2015).  

Kosovo’s internet penetration is among the highest in the Balkan region. In addition, the number of internet users in Kosovo is comparable to numerous EU member states. Specifically, the internet penetration rate, or number of people claiming to use the internet, is 76.62 percent. Of this figure, 94.21 percent of users claim to use the internet from home. Of these users, 83.29 percent of Kosovarians claim to use the internet for approximately three hours on a daily basis. Kosovo’s high level of internet penetration has generated the idea of personal data protection as a human right (Kursani, 2015).

The resulting increased awareness of data protection led Kosovo to adopt personal data protection legislation in 2010. This momentum was followed by the government’s establishment of the National Agency for Personal Data Protection (NAPDP) in 2011. The NAPDP has legal independent status from other public departments and is funded by the EU. Their job is to ensure that the privacy rights of every individual are protected by overseeing that processing of personal data adheres to national and international regulations. In the past four years, the NAPDP has performed over 170 inspections of public institutions. In addition, they have empowered Kosovarians by informing them of their data rights and having equipped over 4,000 institutions with warning signs that the premise is under video surveillance (NAPDP, 2015).

The emergence and growth of data protection as a human right in Kosovo has generated skepticism of the Kosovo Police (KP), who hold the majority of personal data . Under the Law No. 05/L -002 and the Kosovo Criminal and Procedural Code, the Kosovo Police has the right to monitor private conversations, search and control the delivery of postal items, and intercept telecommunications or communications by a computer network. It is not unusual for a national police to hold and exercise these powers when conducting an investigation against a criminal offense.

The concern in this case is that  approximately 33.7 percent of Kosovarians have expressed a significant level of fear of the KP misusing personal data. In addition to this figure, 20.9 percent of Kosovo’s citizens have some concern of KP misconduct in regards to personal data. Collectively, middle aged citizens are the most concerned of the KP unlawfully using their information. This finding is correlated with the fact that the middle aged respondents have had the most contact with the KP (Kryeziu, 2015). This conclusion raises questions regarding the ability of the KP to handle personal data while maintaining its citizens right to privacy.

Concerns of the KP misusing personal data is not an argument based solely on government skepticism. In August 2014, the KP arrested 43 citizens for inciting terrorism and challenging the security and constitutional order of Kosovo. However, after the arrests were made none of the individuals were charged with the alleged crimes. This event raises questions of corruption within the KP. In 2015, the international organization Freedom House reported that corruption remains a serious problem in Kosovo (Freedom House, 2015). Another prominent organization, Transparency International, has ranked Kosovo 110 out of 175 in its Corruption Perceptions Index (Martini, 2014). Nevertheless, the KP are rated as the most trusted public institution in Kosovo. In 2014, an EU Progress Report found that accountability mechanisms, implemented to punish police misconduct, had been successful (Freedom House, 2015). Consequently, the capabilities and integrity of the KP in handling the threat of terrorist organizations such as ISIS remains inconclusive.

It is still unknown whether or not using surveillance mechanisms to reduce the threat posed by ISIS in countries still developing their digital privacy rights, such as Kosovo, will promote good governance practices. It can be argued that giving the KP more power at this time, while their integrity and capabilities are still inconclusive, will only further induce corruption. On the flip side, if one does not give the KP more capabilities to deter terrorist activities, then ISIS could decrease the legitimacy of the KP and in turn the legitimacy of a still very new state. Also,  it is debatable how effective government surveillance is in reducing the threat of terrorism. However, until this question is answered, it is assumed that national governments, like Kosovo, will continue to use surveillance mechanisms in order to reduce the threat of terrorist activities. Policy analysts cannot neglect that personal data protection has only recently been considered a human right in Kosovo, that there is citizen skepticism of the Kosovo Police handling personal data, and that that skepticism does not go without merit. Recommendations on how to promote good governance practices in the KP Force are mixed: one recommendation would advocate for increased presence of an international actor, such as the EU, who could monitor the KP’s use of  surveillance in deterring terrorist activities.  

Another, and arguably the better recommendation, would call upon the NAPDP to launch a campaign informing citizens of what the KP has the right to monitor and intercept during an investigation. In addition, the NAPDP should increase the number of citizens it reaches. It could do so by providing materials that inform citizens what their rights are and dispensing such materials at telecommunication companies, schools, universities, and public institutions – upon having received permission to do so. This is the more logical option because it puts Kosovo on the fast track to promoting personal data protection while promoting transparency in governance. The security threats posed by the Islamic State is not going to go away over night, not in Kosovo nor anywhere else.

Consequently, the Republic of Kosovo is left with the difficult task of responding to an international threat all while it is still building its government. All the same, the Republic of Kosovo is as Pristina’s monument says “Newborn” and a newborn state can use transparent practices to reduce the threat of terrorism while maintaining its new right to personal data protection.

About the Author

Bonnie Bethea is currently a Master in Public Policy (MPP) Candidate at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt. Bethea’s research,writing, and academic interests include Eastern European politics, regulatory affairs, and Transatlantism.

Cover image ‘Computer Security – Protect Data – Computers‘ by Perspecsys Photos

Bibliography
Freedom House. (2015). Freedom in the World – Kosovo. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/kosovo#.VbxGsjGUeNI

Hajdari, U. (2014, March 1). Kosovo to Jail Fighters in Foreign Conflicts. Retrieved September 21, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-law-to-punish-fighting-in- foreign-conflicts

Kryeziu, S. (2015). Kosovo Security Barometer – Special Edition Public Perceptions on Personal Data Protection. Kosovar Center for Security Studies. Retrieved from http://www.qkss.org/en/Reports/Special-Edition-of-KSB-Citizens-Perception-on-Personal-Data-Protection-341

Kursani, S. (2015). Report Inquiring into the Causes and Consequences of Kosovo Citizens’ Involvement as Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq. Kosovar Center for Security Studies. Retrieved from http://www.qkss.org/en/Occasional-Papers/Report-inquiring-into-the-causes-and-consequences-of-Kosovo-citizens-involvement-as-foreign-fighters-in-Syria-and-Iraq-408

Martini, M. (2014). Kosovo: Overview of Political Corruption. Transparency International. Retrieved from http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/kosovo_overview_of_political_corruption

National Agency for Personal Data Protection. (2014). Mission – National Agency for Personal Date Protection. Retrieved from http://www.amdp-rks.org/web/?page=2,44#.Vbw_LDGUeNJ

Nielsen, N. (2015). French Court Backs Mass Surveillance. EU Observer. Retrieved from https://euobserver.com/justice/129760

The Republic of Kosovo. (2012). Criminal No. 04/L-123 Procedure Code. Retrieved from http://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/17771 kosovo criminal procedural code

The Republic of Kosovo. (2015). Law 05/L-002 on Prohibition of Joining the Armed Conflicts outside State Territory. Retrieved from http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/ligjet/05-L-002%20a.pdf

United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). (2015). Promoting Security, Stability, and Respect for Human Rights in Kosovo. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmik/

United Nation Security Council Resolution 2178. (2014). Retrieved from http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_res_2178.pdf

United States Department of State. (2014). Country Reports on Terrorism 2013 – Kosovo. Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/docid/536229df4a.html

The Rohingya people of Burma are descendants of immigrants from East Bengal and settled on the Burmese-Bangladesh border, forming the Muslim enclave of Arakan. This enclave was created following the ceding of the province to British India after the Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826).  This enclave is part of the official administration of the western Rakhine state, and hence, its Rohingyan people ought to be legally recognised as citizens.

The Burmese government refuses to recognise the 1.1.million Rohingyas’ as citizens. Aside from leaving them effectively stateless, the government carries out systematic relocation, abuse, torture, persecution and killing of the Rohingyan people. Tun Khin, president of the Burmese Rohingya Organisation in the UK notes: “They were a recognised ethnic group [during] Burma’s democratic period of time, 1948 to 1962. At that time, the Rohingya language was broadcast from Burma radio broadcasting programme. Unfortunately today, Burma’s government denies that the Rohingya exist”. Democracy in Burma ended with a military coup in 1962, and so did the official recognition of the Rohingyas.

Is it genocide?

State sponsored violence on this systematic level, ought to lead us to question whether or not the Rohingyan people are enduring an incremental genocide. Or indeed whether or not this could be a sign of an impending genocide?

The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) provides a widely accepted definition of the term, stating that genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group. As such it proceeds to outline the eight stages of genocide. The systematic targeting of this particular group, as well as their forcible relocation into concentration-camps, provides evidence of what appears to be a precursor to genocide.

The difficulty with applying the label of genocide to the Burmese case is the issues that come with proving intent, a key component of defining a particular act as an act of genocide. Government records deny the very term ‘Rohingya’ people, hence proving that they are specifically being targeted is met with problems. Nonetheless, actions are notably systematic in nature and high-level UN officials and human rights groups continue to report on systemic state sponsored ethnic cleansing. Regardless, Genocide Watch notes ‘A pattern of acts of genocide is frequently called ‘genocide’ and evidence of such a pattern of ethnic, racial, or religious massacres is strong evidence of genocidal intent.’

The Media

There is a persistent lack of media attention and international political action against the situation in Burma and the Burmese government has faced little pressure to put an end to the crisis. Perhaps the most salient issue at hand, and the one allowing the perpetuation of violence and persecution to continue, is precisely this lack of media attention and thus the lack of acknowledging the precarious and dangerous situation this group of people is facing.

The Rohingya people of Burma have undoubtedly been forgotten; their turmoil unrecognised by international media and the general public. The power of media must be noted on this occasion, and with it, the significant responsibility of shedding light on the situation the Rohingyas.

It is important to constantly note the persisting crisis and to ensure that all humanitarian crisis are given due attention. The on-going refugee crisis, which has gained substantial media attention, is of course important to address, but so is the case of the Burmese Rohingyan people who are still suffering in silence. Social activism can perhaps fill the media void by constantly keeping the voices of these oppressed people heard and by acting as a point of communication between the Rohingyan people and the outside world, speaking on their behalf and providing information to the public on their plight.

One need only examine the recent case of Aylan Kurdi, the Syrian boy whose body was found washed on a Turkish shore. The photograph of his body evoked an emotional outpouring from people around the world. Despite the fact that thousands of refugees have been drowning as they attempt to flee from war and poverty, the public has never reacted in such a way as it did recently. It took just one photo to create such an impact, and for this reason it is important to acknowledge that the media has the capacity to place pressure on governments to take more decisive action and prevent genocide from happening.

About the Author

Bulkies Abeidah is currently a student of Politics and International Relations, at Royal Holloway University of London, with an interest in Middle Eastern Politics, Human Rights, Foreign Policy and Counter-terrorism. You can find her on Linkedin.

Cover image ‘Myanmar/Burma: Little hope for Rohingya IDPs‘ by European Commission DG ECHO

States without Diplomacy

There has been a tendency, before now, to characterise the rise of the Islamic State (IS) across territory in both Syria and Iraq as, first and foremost, a ‘terrorist’ threat. IS, after all, has its roots in the branch of al-Qaeda that operated in Iraq during the war and the two organisations were once formally allied, though relations have since become critical and estranged. Combined with this, in the wake of 9/11 states all around the world expended vast resources on reorientating their militaries and police forces towards detecting, confronting and ultimately eliminating the ‘new’ terrorist threat that had been so effectively promulgated by the War on Terror as the gravest security concern we would face in the twenty-first century. From the moment it declared its Caliphate in June 2014, IS was incorporated into the paradigm of global terror and its actions dissected through the related narrative.

However, following unprecedented territorial advances and the fall of the strategic Iraqi cities of Mosul and Ramadi, some analysts are beginning to argue that IS represents a new type of threat. IS, they claim, can be more accurately described as a ‘quasi-state’ entity commanding territory, economic assets and a conventional military. Moreover, these features differentiate it from other jihadist terrorist groups that are noted for their transnationalism, lack of territory and exploitation of sovereign borders and inhospitable terrain to evade conventional military confrontations where, it is commonly thought, they would be quickly overwhelmed by superior airpower and professional ground troops.

To consider Islamic State as a ‘quasi-state’ gives rise to a secondary consideration; what a state actor would look like if it completely lacked any capacity for, or willingness to engage in, modern interstate diplomacy. The brutality of the IS regime towards the Yazidi people in Northern Iraq, in which women are routinely abducted and coerced into sexual slavery, demonstrates a complete transgression of the international norms governing human rights. The capture of large swathes of land from Iraq and Syria demonstrates a violation of the structuring, geopolitical principle of Westphalian state sovereignty. The series of negotiations between the Jordanian authorities and IS that culminated in the barbaric murder of a young Jordanian pilot demonstrates the degree to which IS cannot be relied upon as a party to discussions that seek to de-escalate exigent situations. The suspected use of mustard gas on civilians near the Syrian city of Aleppo in August demonstrates a gross disregard for the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons in warfare.

Islamic State is thus a stark and horrifying example of what happens when diplomacy is absent; when an actor on the international stage violently and intransigently contravenes the use of diplomatic tools so that other states, by extension, see their own capacity for a diplomatic response to be precluded. Mutual forbearance, rational deterrence and cooperation in the interests of common peace goals appear to become utterly impossible pursuits.

Despite this, diplomacy all too often seems to be the only means by which the belligerent excesses of states can be curbed, or at the very least condemned, allowing us to avoid the discursive normalisation of conflict even if conflict itself is not always prevented. Why, then, do some states seem to be increasingly sceptical of the ability of diplomatic solutions to promote international stability?

Diplomacy in the Twenty-First Century     

Of course, the Islamic State is by no means the first actor on the international stage that has been deemed to fall outside the reach of normal diplomatic relations. Most democratic states are stringently devoted to an absolutist policy of not negotiating with terrorists, though arguably they are galvanised by a desire to obscure the murkier reality wherein negotiations can and have been frequent.

This diplomatic prohibition became an area of renewed interest and contention throughout the War on Terror, particularly in relation to, al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Many now view the prospect of peace negotiations with the Taliban more favourably than they once did. When the United States successfully negotiated the release of Sgt. Bergdahl in exchange for five Taliban detainees in early 2014, it provided the connection and momentum needed for further negotiations between the Taliban and Afghan officials a year later in Qatar. 

In Palestine, Hamas continued to be designated a terrorist organisation even after it beat Fatah to win the 2006 parliamentary election. Many criticised this hard-line approach on the part of Western states as a missed diplomatic opportunity that impeded the broader Israel-Palestine peace process. Hamas, they argued, in addition to being a military faction, was a political entity that should rightly be considered a legitimate party to the peace talks. Earlier this year, the EU took steps to appeal a court ruling that Hamas be removed from its terrorist list.

Even more tellingly, there are those nation states that are considered exceptions to the diplomatic process on account of their disregard for international stability and their unconcern for the general wellbeing of the international community. North Korea’s instrumental foreign policy, persistence in missile testing, and sporadic skirmishes with South Korea along the demilitarised zone, from exchanges of artillery fire earlier this year to the alleged sinking of the Cheonan warship in 2010, have ensured that Kim Jung-un’s regime is, to a large degree, ostracised. And the US has long abstained from normal diplomatic relations with Iran, culminating in the highly-publicised and hugely divisive breakthrough nuclear deal that the P5+1 (United States, the UK, France, China, Russia and Germany, plus the EU) brokered with Iran earlier this year.

Elsewhere, ongoing events in the Ukraine have greatly problematised diplomatic relations between the United States, the EU and Russia. Following the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Russia was suspended indefinitely from the G8 and the security environment in eastern Ukraine remains fractious. This has made it all the more difficult for an adequate international response to be mustered towards the Syrian crisis; although the US and Russia have primarily been in disagreement over how best to resolve the Syrian civil war that has since erupted into the evolving threat from IS, still it is thought that US-Russian coordination will be crucial to any future proposals for conflict resolution, and in the interim will be necessary to deconflict Syrian airspace.                

The complex, fragile security environment we face today therefore points to several important points regarding diplomacy in the twenty-first century. Firstly, there is a recurrent, underlying scepticism, vocalised by certain strategic policy-makers and think tanks, regarding the efficacy of diplomacy of and by itself to achieve progress towards stability. Unless backed up by a credible deterrent and the political will to punish violations, most likely through a declaration of war, diplomacy will be the purview of naivety and weakness, prone to abuse externally while internally, both time and competitive advantages are squandered.

In other words, diplomacy is in this view seen to be useful to the degree that it clarifies the conditions of war to the enemy and brings legitimacy to the war effort should it eventually become necessary. Such thinking can be traced back to the Bush-era perception that international agreements and multilateral organisations should only be relied upon to the extent that they coincide with the national interest, but should not be considered as ends in themselves.

American unilateralism in the early millennium has had an immense impact on the way that states approach the security environment; the terms and justifications for war have become broad and ambiguous, and subsequently war seems to frequently be the closer policy option, often closer than diplomacy. Iran sceptics, for example, have argued that Iran will not feel compelled to comply in the nuclear deal unless they are fully convinced that the United States will follow through with its deterring threats, even so far as going to war, in the case of non-compliance.

Secondly, states will likely cling to the idea that certain other states are not to be trusted, even if successful diplomatic agreements appear to prove the contrary in the medium-term. For all that the dominant theories of foreign policy teach us that all states are rational calculators and that their interests will therefore fall within a knowable spectrum of behaviour – power maximisation, balancing, counter-balancing, revisionism, resource diplomacy and so on – few states, if any, feel more secure now than they did at the end of the Cold War. This has to be at least partly due to the fact that the War on Terror introduced the rhetoric of ‘evilness’, ‘volatility’ and ‘unknown quantities’ into our assessment of the strategic environment; we are now led to believe that we contend with states, failed states and quasi-states that cannot be relied upon to play by the rules of the game and that will, moreover, be guided by interests and goals which will remain obscure to us.

Thirdly, there is the issue of legitimacy; by pursuing a diplomatic solution with an actor as reprehensible as IS, there would appear to be the danger of unwittingly confirming its status as a sovereign state, consolidating its territorial gains by lending them a permanency and a reality they would not otherwise have and, worst of all, prolonging its human rights violations by not seeking to wholly prevent them in the way that, for example, an armed presence on the ground would.         

Diplomatic Solutions

The other side of the story is that, from Cuba to Iran, President Obama has successfully revived diplomacy within the sphere of foreign affairs and recast the mould of American global leadership. Others argue that a diplomatic response must be adopted towards IS; that harnessing the abandoned tools of nuanced statecraft in order to align interests with regional stakeholders presents the best means by which further advances by the group can be curtailed.

Although the utility and efficacy of diplomacy may not always be immediately apparent, it is absolutely vital that we desist in seeing diplomacy as a losing strategy. It helps to consider diplomacy as the art of shaping likelihoods rather than the art of preventing war at all costs. In this view, when diplomacy does fail to prevent war, it is not proof that diplomacy itself does not work, but rather proof that an insufficient volume of diplomacy has been built into the system as a whole, that diplomacy has not reached critical mass, that what is required is more diplomacy in more places and among more actors. Diplomacy is, after all, a series of interconnected, negotiated activities out of which a strong, conscionable international community can be built; and once it is built, once it is inclusive, equitable and norm-governed, it will be worth protecting. Besides, the alternative to diplomacy too often looks to be like no alternative at all, and if only for this reason, we should stop focusing on how to discredit diplomatic solutions and start figuring out how we can we shape the likelihood that they will succeed.                  

About the Author

Heather Emond is an MSc graduate in International Relations from the London School of Economics, with a focus in advanced international security, European security and defence policy and Arab-Israeli Relations. Upon graduation, she worked in the fields of economic development and external affairs for local government in Edinburgh, assisting with a number of EU, international and telecommunications projects. More recently, Heather has collaborated with the United Nations Association of Edinburgh and is currently based in Northern Chile volunteering for a teaching programme co-delivered by the Chilean Ministry of Education and UN Development Programme.

Twitter: @HGEmond

Cover image ‘Diplomacy‘ by Maxime Bonzi