The Persecution Of Christians In Pakistan Under The Blasphemy Law

The Christian minority in Pakistan has remained on the margins of Pakistani society since its creation, resulting in a process of systematic discrimination that realistically cannot be contested. The country’s Christian population is under constant threat of mob violence, often instigated by the Muslim clerics in their vicinity. One such case occurred on November 4th 2014, in Kot Radha Kishan, a city based in the Punjab province of Pakistan.

After news broke out that Shama Masih had allegedly desecrated pages of the Quran, an act considered illegal under the blasphemy law, mosques in the area made announcements for villagers to congregate at the Yousaf brick kiln where Shama and her husband were bonded labourers. As per the demand, people from several villages found, tortured and ultimately threw the couple into a kiln, incinerating them immediately.

Importantly, this is not a one-off incident. Similarly, in June 2015 a Christian family was beaten by a mob after a man in the local mosque announced that Qamar, a Christian member of the community, had desecrated the Qur’an. In this case however, the police had managed to rescue the family and did not charge them under the blasphemy law.

The mob violence, or ‘justice’, which Christians face, despite the extreme consequences, is in part propagated by the legal system in Pakistan, which enforces the law on blasphemy. Interestingly, the decree is a remnant of the British Empire, and as such its core is the same as India’s law on blasphemy:

“Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of the citizens of Pakistan, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations insults the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both.”

Regardless of how this law is applied in reality, the text is in and of itself is secular and thus theoretically applies equally to all faiths. Thomas Macaulay, who believed insults to religion could “give a peculiar ferocity to theological dissension”, drafted the Indian Penal Code during the rule of the British Empire. Furthermore, he was aware of the hostility between religions as well as the asymmetrical power structure between Christians, Muslims and Hindus. This was evident by a Christian minority being in possession of the highest posts in a country ruling over millions of Hindus and Muslims. However, his fear of communal violence, together with the British policy of divide and rule, led him to believe that a code had to be put in place to prevent any speech which could hurt the sentiments of religious groups and castes.

This elucidates the fact that the criminalising of blasphemy was based on a specific context and its power relations. Thus it follows that a drastic change of this context and prevailing power structures would have an effect on the implementation of such laws.  The partition of India and independence of Pakistan inevitably created such a change, with the blasphemy law now being applied in a country where the Muslim population stood at a very large majority and the ruling structure of the Christian minority had disintegrated.

However, the penal code remained the same as that of India’s until in 1982, when Zia-ul-Haq, a military dictator and defacto President of Pakistan, introduced an ordinance that added a section to this law. Section 295-B reads: “Whoever wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy Qur’an or of an extract therefrom or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose shall be punishable with imprisonment for life.” Thus there has been a dramatic shift not only in the context in which the law is applied, but also an amendment, which in essence institutionalises the discrimination of minorities due to Section 295-B specifically protecting Muslim sensibility.

As is evident in the cases above, the burden of proof needed for mobs to incite violence is remarkably low, and thus its misuse is rife. This exploitation of the law for personal vendettas and intolerance is not one that the Pakistani government denies.  The Governor of Pakistan’s Punjab province, Salman Taseer (a Muslim) was vocal in his opposition to the blasphemy law during his outspoken defence of Asia Bibi, a highly publicised case of a Christian woman who was being handed the death sentence for committing blasphemy. This resulted in Taseer’s assassination by one of his own bodyguards, who had informed the police that his reason for doing so was the governor’s opposition to Pakistan’s blasphemy law. Soon after came the Taliban’s assassination of Shahbaz Bhatti, the only Christian in Pakistan’s cabinet, and an advocate for the reform of the country’s blasphemy laws.

Both Taseer and Bhatti were high profile assassinations and related to the Asia Bibi case. Thus, this reflects the very real danger of speaking out against the blasphemy laws in Pakistan. Significantly, the advocacy for change did not involve repealing the law altogether, but to amend it. Before his death, Bhatti spoke of “consulting with the religious parties to make a legislation to stop the misuse of blasphemy law…we want to stop those people who are using a shelter of this law to settle their own personal vendettas”. Notably, he stated that the repeal of the law was not to be considered:  “We have to analyse what the reaction of those having intolerant attitudes will be…at this point our aim is to stop its misuse.”

This ultimately shines a light on the power held by religious fundamentalists in Pakistan, as has already been evidenced by the Taliban’s involvement in Bhatti’s assassination. In fact their influence penetrates the legal system itself with reports of magistrates, judges and attorney’s having their lives and the lives of their families threatened. This inherently limits any investigative capability, with police officers giving into the demands of ‘justice’ of the violent mobs in the name of ‘preserving public order’. In particular, Muslim clerics of two largely differing schools of thought, Barelvi and Deobandi, joined forces to advise President Zardari not to grant Asia Bibi a discretionary pardon for her death sentence, warning him of ‘untoward repercussions’.

The situation seems to be an ominous one. The authority held by religious fundamentalists is overwhelming, with MP Sherry Rehman abandoning her attempts to amend the law due to what she believed was the inability of her party  (Pakistan People’s Party) to stand up to religious clerics. What on a superficial level may seem like a series of violent mob attacks against a minority is in fact the result of an unnerving amount of power held by extremist Muslim clerics over the Pakistani government. The government has seemingly made the judgment that it would be better to preserve the blasphemy law in its current state than to face the wrath of extremists in the country. It is difficult to say whether repealing the law completely may in fact be worse for the Christian minority due to the promised violence it would incite.

Nevertheless the inability or refusal of the government to form a strategy to get this under control is an essential part of the problem.  One must question whether appeasing radical Muslim clerics is out of genuine fear of what a backlash would result in, or a utilitarian balancing act where it is deemed easier for the government and the majority to admit defeat to such people. In any case, the current state of affairs simply allows the continuation of extreme persecution of the Christian minority, for whom being arrested by the police for committing blasphemy would be considered a ‘rescue’ from the imminent violent mobs sent on the demands of clerics.

Yet theoretically, if the blasphemy law was amended today, or even repealed, it is unlikely this would eradicate the deeply ingrained discrimination against Christians. As has been demonstrated, the discrimination goes far beyond the written law itself, with the power of the vindictive majority and clerics reflected by their ability to influence magistrate and lower courts. Thus the system must be improved at the grassroots. A power shift needs to occur so that threats cannot deter magistrates and courts. This requires a fundamental change in Pakistan’s police force so that it is adequately able to monitor and protect those who are threatened; be that the victims of the blasphemy law or the politicians and lawyers attempting to intervene.

Though this would increase the protection of Christians, it would not eliminate their constant threat of persecution. Perhaps a large part of this will only be achieved when the perception of the ‘divinity’ of the blasphemy law can be reassembled to realize it is not only a man made creation, but a colonial one. Only with this change in societal observation can there be a possibility of pressuring Pakistani clerical experts to reopen the debate on the law, aiming for its eventual repeal.

About the Author

Maryam Siddiqui is a Law Graduate of the London School of Economics and an LLM Master of Laws Graduate of University College London. Her current interests include international law, civil liberties & human rights and national security with a particular focus on South Asia and the UK.

On the Front Lines of the Fight Against Isis

An inside look at the archetypes and personalities of individuals who risk it all to travel to Iraq and Syria to fight ISIS

Why volunteer to Fight the Islamic State? Over the past year I have been following the lives of western men who leave their native countries, and travel thousands of miles to take up arms against Islamic State (IS). Looking into their backgrounds, it comes as no surprise that many have served in the armed forces with varying degrees of experience. What is surprising is the number of these men that have no previous military training. With the consequences that could be expected if captured by ISIS forces well documented, it is clear that whatever their reasons, they are prepared to risk life and limb for their ideals.

So what motivates these individuals to leave their families, jobs and the relative safety of their homelands to fight for a cause which many would argue is not theirs? When asked why, these men all provide a similar answer despite their nationality or background: “I could no longer sit back and watch IS rape and murder any more women and children.”

The collective feeling among these irregular fighters seems to be that their own countries’ governments, be it the USA, Great Britain, Canada, or Australia, are not doing enough to tackle extremism. Universally, these volunteers state they have felt it their moral responsibility to take up arms and fight. A noble reason, many would agree, considering the images and stories of be-headings, rape, and staged executions that have been reported to be carried out by IS since the groups rise to infamy over the last few years.

However, I found myself wondering, could this be the sole defining reason for these men to risk it all? The time I have spent with these modern day paladins suggests to me there is far more than a selfless desire to do the right thing driving these men, and to that end I’ve categorised them into 6 distinct “identities”.

The Lonely Volunteer

The lonely volunteer is by and large from an armed forces background, ranging in age from 40-50. When those I interviewed on the front line describe their domestic situation, it is clear they have been living a somewhat isolated and lonely existence since leaving the forces. They have struggled integrating back into civilian life, often referred to as “Civvy Street” in the UK. They tend to live alone and have limited interaction with people outside of their work place. Family is often non existent or they no longer remain in touch.

It is clear they miss the sense of belonging they once had in the military; the banter, cohesion and brotherhood they enjoyed as soldiers. No longer part of an organisation or a system they spent their early lives within, they can feel secluded from civilian society. They crave the comradeship they knew and cannot find it within a civilian setting. It is a desire to belong again that compels The Lonely Volunteer to join these foreign units in the hope of regaining a sense of self, belonging and purpose that they once had in the armed forces.

Seen No Action Volunteer

“I missed out going to Afghanistan with my unit due to an injury. Hearing everyone’s war stories was too much to handle, I instantly became an outsider. When it was announced we were pulling out of Afghanistan, I knew I had missed my chance for getting some action.”

— Jeff, 26.

Imagine training to be a doctor, but never having the opportunity to treat a patient. To be a fire fighter yet never tackle a blaze. The ‘seen no action volunteer’ is the soldier who never went on operations, the Marine who was never in contact with the enemy. From personal experience, and to quote Tim O’Brien, “You’re never more alive, than when you’re almost dead.”

Every soldier spends his career training to fight, but not every soldier or Marine gets the chance to engage with the enemy. Not experiencing the ‘two way range’ yet being in an environment hearing of others’ tales of fighting Al Qaeda or the Taliban can leave the soldier who never had the opportunity feeling outside his peer group, not part of the club. As a result, many such men leave the military and see the war against ISIS as their opportunity to prove themselves in combat to get that much needed ‘trigger time’.

The Crusader Volunteer

“This is the new crusade and I have been sent to fight, and destroy the evil of Islam.”

— Jake, 31

I’ve met many Christian fighters that are in Iraq and Syria fighting their own holy war. They wear a cross around their neck, a Christian patch stuck to their body armour and talk of Jesus and God. Despite them fighting shoulder to shoulder with YPG (People’s Protection Units) and Peshmerga, who are predominately Muslim, they see the fight against ISIS as a modern day battle of ideologies. One fighter told me God sent him a personal message, via a string of events, to go rage war against ISIS.

Within this bracket also fall the personal crusaders; men who have lost family members in Iraq, Afghanistan or through a terrorist attack and are on a personal mission of revenge against extremism and the racist volunteers that have a deep resentment towards Islam.

The Nobody Volunteer

Most people go through life being a ‘normal Joe’. They go to work, come home and pay their bills; exciting things rarely happen in their lives. They go to the pub and talk with their friends, but don’t feel like they’ve achieved anything. Life is mundane, and they’re insignificant to the world. All western volunteer groups recruit their members through Facebook, and the nobody feels he can soon become a somebody through this virtual world. Seeing pictures posted online of volunteers in uniform holding automatic rifles in a war zone, they seize the opportunity to become ‘someone’ and book a one way ticket. Soon the nobody will be the person the whole town will be talking about. No longer will he be your average Joe, he will now be the man who went to fight Islamic State.

The Walter Mitty

Walter Mitty is someone who lies about their military history. Every volunteer will tell you a story about someone who lied about their military credentials, or was using this as a way to scam money of generous donators through a GoFundMe account. Walter Mitty types always become exposed.

The Fame Hungry volunteer

Many volunteers I met will ask not to be filmed, or for their faces to be blanked out for security reasons. However, I have seen a growing number of fame hungry men eager to get some sort of exposure. Some men have even been in touch with production companies, newspapers and news channels about their adventures before they arrive in a country to fight. They’re the men that update their Facebook statuses, constantly sporting a different weapon, in a different firing position, telling the world how hard the day to day, hand to hand fighting is.

I’m not suggesting that every volunteer you see in the media is fame hungry, this isn’t the case. I often have to persuade them to talk to me as there is a portion of the media that cannot wait for a story like “father fights ISIS”, “white van man fights terrorist”, “father and sons take on jihadis”. They know their readers love such a story, and it sells well.

Some volunteers have better home and life stories than others so they will naturally get more attention, and it’s not always wanted attention. For example, when you meet a man who tells you he is on his 12th chapter of his book, has a career in TV lined up, and is also trying to put the script to a film together on his return, you have to question his motives.

The Adventurer Volunteer

The world has undoubtedly shrunk as technology has evolved. The days of exploring uncharted lands, discovering new peoples and cultures, conquering in the name of Empire have gone. No more do we see the likes of Shackleton, Scott, Mallory; the thrill seekers and adventurers of a bygone age. For today’s modern adventurer, where better to find the excitement, the danger, the challenge they crave than on the battlefield. This is the rarest motivator for the would-be foreign fighter, but a surprising number are there for these reasons. When asked why they are fighting ISIS, their answer is simply “for the adventure”. They care little for fame, for political reasons or moral responsibility. They are there for the experience, to test themselves. Until they develop itchy feet and seek their next challenge.

None of the volunteers I have followed receive a wage. If anything they are all out of pocket paying for their own flights and equipment. Most have a GoFundMe account to raise donations to buy new weapons, night vision and, more often than not, to raise the money to buy a return ticket home.

The ultimate question is will these men be the deciding factor in the war against ISIS? The answer, in my view, is no. Whatever an individual’s reason for wanting to volunteer in Iraq & Syria, all such volunteers do is to provide the Peshmerga and YPG groups morale, some basic training, and a sense that the West hasn’t forgotten about them, as the Kurdish forces continue to lead the real fight against Islamic State.

About the Author

Emile Ghessen is a former British Royal Marine who served for 12 years. He is now currently a freelance documentary maker who has been following western volunteers who have travelled to Iraq, Syria and Iran fighting against Islamic State. Emile who is half Syrian started his mission on the frontline on his own moving around the war-zone in taxis. Emile wanted to find out the real reason these men pick up arms to fight against the worlds most dangerous terrorist group.

Follow Emile on his Facebook page www.facebook.com/Emile.ghessen and his webpage www.emileghessen.com

Cover image ‘Kurdish YPG Fighter‘ by Kurdishstruggle

Jacob Zuma and South Africa: a Sinking Presidency

In 2008, the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, was ushered out of power after a highly publicised struggle with his former Deputy President Jacob Zuma, the leader of the African National Congress (ANC). The ANC, the dominant South African party since the election of Nelson Mandela in 1994, quickly propelled the controversial figure to executive power after its anticipated general election victory in 2009. Now in his second term, with the next elections scheduled for 2019, President Jacob Zuma is in a position very reminiscent of that of his predecessor. Jacob Zuma’s contentious administration of the country has also highlighted the growing difficulties faced by Mandela’s Rainbow nation and the growing factionalism of the ANC.

Jacob Zuma has always been a highly divisive and provocative figure. The President has often been belittled for his lack of formal education and his rural background. But he has however formed a reputation as a “seasoned political street fighter” and a “ruthless politician blessed with charisma and a thick skin that has helped him shrug off numerous scandals”. As deputy president under the administration of Thabo Mbeki, he was un-ceremoniously sacked in 2005 after his former financial adviser, Schabir Shaik, was found guilty of soliciting bribes for the benefit of the ANC politician.

In 2006, Jacob Zuma himself faced charges relating to corruption allegations and was put on trial accused of raping a young female family friend. He was acquitted of the rape charge but drew scorn from health advocates accusing him of undermining years of HIV prevention campaigning after it was revealed that the woman was HIV positive, and he declared that a shower after intercourse minimized the risk of contraction. The statement was even more damning as Jacob Zuma had served as the head of the national South African Aids council, and as the country faces “the biggest and most high profile HIV epidemic in the world, with an estimated 6.3 million people living with HIV in 2013”.

His political knack was however evident when still dogged by allegations of corruption he succeeded in orchestrating a major political comeback by trouncing President Mbeki for the ANC presidency in 2007. Riding on a wave of disaffection towards Mbeki, deemed at the time aloof to the problems of South Africans and drifting towards authoritarianism, he combined forces with the powerful trade unions and was able to galvanise his traditional rural powerbase creating a major political upset. In 2007, he was however again indicted on charges of fraud and corruption centred on a 1999 arms deal. The prosecution dropped these charges only weeks before the 2009 general elections while ironically facing accusations, as did former President Mbeki, of abusing its power to discredit the ANC leader. Jacob Zuma’s Presidency has continued the trends of old, as accusations of corruption, cronyism and more recently authoritarianism have plagued his administration. However, recent events have drastically weakened his position and highlighted his political vulnerability, the same political vulnerability that out-did his predecessor.

Jacob Zuma’s second term has been marred by a quick succession of scandals and accusations of ineptitude. At the end of his first term in 2014, the President first faced serious allegations of miss-appropriation of funds, when it was revealed that the public purse has been used to upgrade the president’s rural residence in Nkandla, KwaZulu – Natal, to the tune of $23 million. This figure seems excessive when compared to the $4 million spent on private residences for the two previous Presidents: Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki. The highly regarded Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela, even went as far as accusing the president of “un-ethical conduct”.

However Jacob Zuma’s vows on Nkandla are paltry compared to the blunders committed in the last few months. Indeed, since October the administration has seen its credibility plummet and opposition towards it take ever more important proportions. The president faced the largest student demonstrations since the end of Apartheid, as students rallied against planned increases of between 10% – 12% in tuition fees. Highly-publicised protests spread throughout the major campuses, and violent confrontation with police was reported in front of the parliament building in Cape Town and on the steps of the Union building in Pretoria. Faced with such virulent opposition, the administration was forced to backtrack and cancel the tuition fee increase.

However, these protests have much more serious ramifications for Jacob Zuma and the ANC especially. The protesters are of a generation born mostly into a post-apartheid South Africa and have grown disillusioned with the old guard of the ANC, dismissing their liberation credentials as irrelevant. The so-called “Born Free” generation also represents 40% of the population and a sizable chunk of the electorate.

This young demographic failed to make a lasting impact in the last elections in 2014, as only 1 in 3 of the 1.9 million voters aged 18-19 were registered to vote. However, taking into account the un-popularity of Zuma, this growing segment of the electorate will most certainly become the kingmakers in any subsequent general election. This should worry the ANC, as the student protests highlighted the extent to which the party and the current administration are associated with corruption and in-efficiency. More troubling is the extent to which the notion of Mandela’s Rainbow-Nation is beginning to appear as a discredited idea, especially within the younger segments of the growing black South African middle class.

Under such a tense and fragile political setting, the recent blunders of Jacob Zuma seem even more dangerous and aggravating. At the time where the South African GDP is expected to only increase by 1.4% and the official un-employment rate stands at a staggering 25%, but could be as high as 35%, Jacob Zuma’s musical chairs with the respected ministry of finance have had dangerous consequences. In December, the president shocked the country and its financial backers by sacking the highly respected minister of Finance, Nhlanhla Nene, who had been credited with pushing back gross government over-spending.

Nene had opposed the president on different counts, such as a $66 Billion nuclear deal with Russia brokered personally by the president, and by attempting to control the disastrous finances of the state owned South African Airways, whose board is chaired by a close personal friend of the president. The veteran minister was replaced by an un-known back-bencher, a move that stunned the markets as the Rand nose-dived against the dollar, shaking investor confidence in the South African economy. The situation was only resolved when Zuma was forced to dismiss his second finance minister and install Pravin Gordhan, a highly respected former Finance Minister. Indeed, Zuma’s abrupt decision to dismiss Nene had led him on a collision course with the top brass of the ANC, which was forced to intervene with the Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa rumoured to have threatened to resign if the decision was not reversed. 

These successions of crises have endangered Jacob Zuma’s position. A number of prominent ANC members, including former Health Minister Barbara Hogan, have publicly criticized Zuma in recent weeks. It would seem that the threshold of tolerance for Zuma’s excesses was crossed with the dismissal of Nene. Indeed, the President has increasingly been viewed inside his own party as reckless and authoritarian. Others, such as Zwelinzima Vavi, a former general secretary of Cosatu, the powerful trade union federation allied with the ANC, argues that “corrupt hyenas” within the ANC and close to Jacob Zuma are the likely culprits of his disastrous policies.

His policy reversals have also not gone un-noticed by the South African electorate. A recent survey by Afrobarometer found that Zuma’s public approval has dropped from 64% in 2011 to just 36 % in November 2015. The report stipulated that “a majority of citizens of all race groups disapprove of his performance in the past year”. Protests in most major cities of the country have also called for his removal from office. Even though his position seems secure for the moment, as the ANC still begrudgingly supports the President, the crisis of confidence cannot come at a worse moment for the president or for the ANC.

Zuma is in his last term of office and will not be able to stand again. The ANC is thus beginning to debate his potential successor. The President has been promoting his ex-wife Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as his successor, a former minister and the current Chairwoman of the African Union. The move is widely seen as a means for Zuma to extend his influence and guarantee that he will not face charges of corruption at the end of his term. The main contender is his Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa, a former trade unionist, who enjoys the tacit support of Cosatu and good relations with the private sector. The recent blunders have weakened the Zuma camp and have given a potent advantage to his deputy who has started to position himself as the counter-Zuma candidate. Such a strategy could be a winning formula taking into account the un-popularity of the President, and by association the growing discontent towards the ANC.

The decision to appoint a successor to Zuma will be taken during the next ANC national conference in 2017, shortly after this year’s municipal elections. The municipal elections is a worrying back-drop for the President and will probably determine his future. The official opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), which currently only controls Cape Town and the Western Cape Province, has an opportunity to make major inroads in key cities. The party, often associated as a party of white interests, has attempted to shrug off the image under the leadership of its first black leader Mmusi Maimane. The ANC will face a tight race to retain its majority in the key cities of Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Tshwane (Pretoria).

The results will be capital for Zuma. If the elections are a success for the DA, as it attempts to capitalise on popular disenchantment towards the administration, the president could see his favoured successor defeated for the leadership. Such an outcome would turn him into a lame duck for the rest of his term. After having deposed his predecessor, a defeat at the ANC conference could maybe see history un-ravel itself with Zuma the likely victim.

Author Biography

Alexandre Raymakers is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Political Science holding a degree in International History and International Relations. He has extensive personal experience on the African continent having been born in Zimbabwe and lived in 4 different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. He has previously worked for the Swiss Embassy in Kenya and has been working in Strategic Communications in London for the past year. His interests include International Security, African politics and European Affairs.

Cover image ‘President Jacob Zuma unveils Nelson Mandela sculpture, 4 Aug 2012‘ by GovernmentZA

Blessing in Disguise? Why Pro-Europeans Might Welcome a Brexit.

The United Kingdom is edging ever closer to the exit door of the European Union. All the signs indicate that Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron will hold the promised EU referendum in the coming year, and with both polling data and the political mood in the UK suggesting that a British exit (a ‘Brexit’) is a very real possibility, supporters of the ‘European Project’ both inside the UK and on the continent should prepare themselves for what seemed unthinkable a few years ago: a UK exit from the European Union.

While a Brexit would certainly cause short term political and economic instability for both the UK and its European partners, it should by no means be regarded as a death-knell for the European Project. Indeed, the case for supporters of the European Union, both in Britain and on the continent, to actively support and (if eligible) vote for the UK’s departure from the EU is not as absurd as it might sound. A Brexit might in fact provide the EU with an opportunity both to rid itself of its most awkward member and to embark on a programme of fundamental reform and further integration.

Perils of Britain’s Renegotiation

As a precursor to the referendum, Prime Minister David Cameron has over the past three years been seeking to win a number of concessions from the other 27 EU leaders. It was revealed in November 2015 that Cameron hopes to secure guarantees of change in four key areas of EU policy: competitiveness, sovereignty, economic parity between those inside and outside the Eurozone and immigration. The final of these four areas, that of immigration, is proving particularly difficult for Cameron, with Poland’s Prime Minister Beata Szydło leading the objections to the UK’s desire ‘to ban EU migrants from claiming in-work benefits for four years’. Martin Schulz, President of the European Parliament, has rejected outright the notion of such a change being implemented.

Mr Cameron’s renegotiation places supporters of the EU in a difficult position. If the renegotiation is successful then the EU will be radically changed. The UK’s proposed changes to rules on immigration, for example, challenge fundamentally the EU’s commitment to free movement and the notion of a common European citizenship. In exchange for a successful renegotiation, Prime Minister Cameron will lend his support to the pro-EU campaign and recommend that the UK vote to stay in the EU. If the renegotiation is unsuccessful, however, there is a very strong chance that David Cameron will come out for a vote to leave.

‘Awkward’ UK

The fact remains that the UK as a whole is opposed to further integration for a number of historical and cultural reasons, and has been remarkably Eurosceptic for some time. The current Conservative Government and the wider British public are resolutely opposed to any advances to the European project which strengthen the EU at the cost of national sovereignty. And in the present moment, the EU desperately needs strengthening. Closer political union is required to enable the EU to demonstrate that it has sufficient control to tackle the various challenges it faces. A stronger union would also assist the EU to deal with some of the problems it has seen in the failure of member states’ intelligence agencies to share information, or the exploitation of the EU policy of free movement by terrorist suspects, not to mention further integration being a solution to the economic troubles that still threaten the Eurozone.

David Cameron’s renegotiation is not based around a desire to see the EU strengthened: instead it is based on his own domestic political interests. Chief of these is his desire to appease the majority of his own Conservative Party, where an attitude of hostility towards Britain’s membership of the EU is prevalent. This is the case both among the Conservative Party’s Members of Parliament and its wider supporters.

Should the other 27 leaders accept Cameron’s demands the result will be a two tier European Union – a Europe split between states that move closer together, based primarily around the single currency, and those states, like the UK, that wish to remain stationary. This sort of division is precisely what the EU has worked so hard to prevent over the past decades.

Europhiles, then, when faced with a UK renegotiation which stymies any chance of further European integration must embrace the prospect of refusing concessions to David Cameron. A UK exit would enable France and Germany, as the two major powers at the heart of the EU, to forge a Europe that comes closer together, both politically and economically, possibly even with the goal of a federalised European Union at some point in this century.

So for non-UK supporters of the EU a UK vote to leave could bring some real opportunities, including the chance to make the EU function better as a union. At the same time a Brexit would avoid the potential disadvantages of permitting David Cameron to secure a deal for Britain which rends the fabric of the European Union in two.

Disunited Kingdom

But what about supporters of the EU who live in the UK? The prospect of being outside a European Union which by pursuing a programme of closer integration grows ever stronger might not provide much comfort.

Some hope might be gleamed from the consequences on British politics of a vote to leave. The Scottish National Party (SNP), which has gone from strength to strength since the closely fought 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum, has publicly stated that a UK exit from the EU could trigger a second referendum on Scottish independence. Opinion in Scotland, according to the polls, is heavily pro-EU, and the SNP sees a scenario where Scotland is dragged out of the EU against its will by the other Eurosceptic members of the UK as a potential game-changer. This would give the Scottish Government grounds to hold another referendum, and would in all likelihood increase the Nationalists’ chances of winning independence.

The prospect of an independent Scotland might make the remainder of the UK reconsider whether a United Kingdom of England, Wales and Northern Ireland can retain any sort of status on the world stage without being part of the EU. At present a false dichotomy drives debate in the UK between those who want to see Britain defined by its relationship with the United States and those who think that the UK’s future lies with the European continent. The answer, of course, is that the UK’s future lies in maintaining good relationships with both the EU and the USA (and indeed there are signs that the UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the US would become remarkably less ‘special’ if it chose to leave the EU). But a future which sees the UK lose Scotland could decisively push whatever is left of the UK back towards Europe.

European Future, In or Out

For supporters of the European Union, then, both inside and outside the UK, there are reasons to see a potential Brexit as a possible benefit to the EU, rather than something that should be feared. For EU member states, a UK exit would avoid the messy and counter-productive consequences offered by some of David Cameron’s aims of renegotiation. And for supporters of the EU in the UK, a Brexit might just unleash a chain of political events which sees a radically changed and reshaped UK become more accommodating to the European Project. A vote for Brexit might, paradoxically, be exactly what the United Kingdom and the European Union both need to ensure a more European Britain and a more united Europe.

Author Bio

Thomas Cowie is currently an undergraduate at the University of Cambridge studying Classics. His particular interests include Chinese foreign and domestic policy and China’s relations with the West. Other interests include the United Kingdom’s relationship with the EU.

Email at [email protected]

Cover image by GPPW

Children of the Revolution

BEIRUT: Half-falling, half-running. Every day in Beirut’s central Hamra district they play and beg, little balls of matted hair, not speaking but already fluent in the language of poverty; the outstretched hand and averted gazes from passersby. Some of these children may have never seen Syria, although their lives have been forever changed by the Syrian revolution five years ago.

About 70% of Syrians in Lebanon are living below the Lebanese extreme poverty line. The effect on children here is huge and will have significant long-term consequences. Behind the headlines and statistics of an ever worsening refugee situation, there are families and children with their own stories living in extreme poverty.

On the buzzing Mar-Mikhael road, weaving in and out of the Friday night revellers, children who are perhaps eight or nine years old, try to sell chewing gum. One boy, Ahmed, works his way through the crowds, dismissed with a hand gesture or just ignored. He has a calm smile and articulate manner that makes him appear much older than his appearance would belie.

“I am from Homs and my family now live in Tripoli, but I come and spend five days here” He pauses briefly to offer chewing gum to a group of Lebanese teenagers, unsuccessfully.

“We are taken from Tripoli and sleep on the street when we are in Beirut. My mother needs medicine so I have to come here to work.” He doesn’t attend school.

Since the Syrian revolution in 2011, Lebanon’s economic situation has deteriorated significantly. Public services, already over-stretched before the Syrian crisis, are overwhelmed due to the number of refugees who now account for a quarter of the population. Medical services are barely provided to anyone without money. There have been cases of people dying outside of hospitals in Lebanon because they did not have the money upfront to pay for surgery.

Medical issues are one of many reasons pushing families to take their children out of school and send them to work on the street. There are estimated to be between 1500 and 4500 children working and living on the street in Lebanon, 25% of them are under 9 years old. They are not all Syrian either; about a quarter are Palestinian or Lebanese.

Although many Lebanese citizens are working to try and help alleviate the poverty in their country, others are skeptical. Mohamed, a Lebanese-American from West Beirut, confidently tells me: “some of the ones you see here on the street earn more money from begging than most people do from working”. I wondered how much the eleven year-old boy I saw asleep by the side of the road earned.

According to UNHCR, half of the refugees in Lebanon are children, and in the 15-17 year-old bracket only 5% attend school. This situation is not getting better and it is ensnaring a generation of children living on the edge. The valuable time they should be spending learning and developing themselves is instead used up on the street. If they cannot equip themselves with the skills they need to rebuild their lives when the war eventually ends, then the future for Syria, and the region looks bleak.

Two weeks after talking with Ahmed I saw him again. No calm smile, just a vague look with intoxicated eyes. Repeating himself, he sold me some chewing gum and then wondered off down an alley. Another childhood stolen by a war he has nothing to do with.

Author Bio

Oliver Berthoud is a contributor for Global Public Policy Watch on Middle Eastern Issues. As an expert on the Middle East, he has spent a considerable amount of time in Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Afghanistan. His academic speciality is in Minority Muslim Communities and he is a University of Exeter alumnus. He is an Arabic speaker and currently resides in Beirut, Lebanon.

Cover image ‘Syrian refugee children in the Ketermaya refugee camp‘ by World Bank Photo Collection

Why What Happens In South Africa Matters

It is undeniable that South Africa is a power house in Africa. However, the ‘Rainbow nation’s’ natural lustre has begun to fade. South Africa has not had it easy over the last few years, with real GDP growth declining from 3.2% in 2011, 2.2% in 2012, 2.2% in 2013 and 1.5% in 2014. The general economic slowdown can be attributed to low commodity prices, issues regarding energy security resulting in ‘load shedding,’ reduced investor confidence and labour unrest resulting furthermore in the depreciation of the South African currency, the Rand. On the social front, the country has been faced with public relations nightmare scenarios from the xenophobic attacks in 2015 on predominately African migrants and university students protesting against tuition increases and high youth unemployment.

In the twenty-one years since the first fully democratic elections in the Republic of South Africa, the current woes of the country have seldom been expressed beyond its borders and there is a fundamental problem with this lack of articulation. South Africa is undoubtedly the economic hegemon in the region, and its economic prowess cannot be understated in relation to other Southern African states. Indeed, the Republic of South Africa was structured historically to be the economic power house of Southern Africa. It founded the oldest customs union in the world, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) in 1910 and its economy accounts for 70% of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) economy. So how does a South African economic slowdown potentially spell trouble for its neighbours?

South Africa is surrounds, and is surrounded by, states that have comparatively smaller economies by GDP: NamibiaSwazilandLesothoBotswanaMozambique and Zimbabwe. The purpose of SACU has been for the establishment and agreement of tariffs and revenue sharing between Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho. The resulting effect of this community has been to tie the macroeconomic policies of these countries, all of which have currencies pegged to the Rand, excepting Botswana, closely to those of South Africa.

Swaziland, a nation surrounded by South Africa, imports over 90% from, and exports 60%, to South Africa. The duties received from the revenue sharing agreement of SACU further constitutes a large proportion of the government budget, and worker remittances from South Africa supplement domestically earned income. With 70% of the population employed in subsistence agriculture, and the loss of the nation’s eligibility for the benefits under the African Growth and Opportunity Act with the United States of America on January 1 2015, Swaziland’s economic reliance on South Africa has therefore caused a slower economic recovery from 3% in 2013, to 2.5% in 2014.

Namibia to the north west of South Africa, and a member of SACU, receives between 30-40% of its government revenue from the sharing agreement. Its currency is pegged to the South African Rand and has experienced depreciation making exports cheaper. The mining sector accounts for 11.5% of the country’s GDP but provides more than 50% of its foreign exchange earnings, making the economy highly vulnerable to world commodity price fluctuations.

Lesotho, another state surrounded by South Africa, produces less than 20% of the nation’s demand for food. Similar to Swaziland, Lesotho imports 90% of its consumer goods from South Africa. Lesotho government revenues from SACU account for roughly 44% of government revenue in 2014. Its government receives further royalties from the South African government for water transferred from a dam and reservoir. Its currency, the Loti, is also tied to the Rand.

South Africa is bordered by two other countries that are not part of SACU: Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Zimbabwe, South Africa’s northern neighbour, has been in the grip of political and economic instability for over a decade.

Between the years 2009-2012, a multiple currency system was implemented spurring economic growth of an average 11%. However, from 2012 the economy has been severely hampered, with growth falling from 10.6% in 2012 to 4.5% in 2013 and 3.5% in 2014. The multiple currency system brought relative stability to the economy, and the South African Rand was one of the major currencies used. The appreciation of the United States Dollar against the Rand has made imports cheaper in relation to locally produced goods and exports more expensive reducing Zimbabwe’s competitiveness internationally. Zimbabwe and South Africa have a Preferential Trade Agreement, which undoubtedly benefits South African exports in such a scenario, as they appear cheaper than locally manufactured goods under the multiple currency system, further slowing the down domestic economic growth.

Finally, Mozambique to the east of South Africa, has grown at an average rate of 6%-8% in the decade up to 2014, one of the strongest performances in Africa. To a large extent however, this growth is predicated on the large investment projects in mining and infrastructure development. The predominant markets for such goods are China followed by South Africa. Imports into Mozambique are, in turn, proportionally coming from South Africa, making it a highly valuable trading partner.

The economic prowess of South Africa has long been noted, however such success comes with an economic reliance from its smaller neighbours. Being economically linked to South Africa has generally favoured its neighbours as a source country for relatively well-manufactured, cost effective goods. This reality creates an overall environment where costs of business are comparatively lower than importing goods from further afield. The benefit for South Africa is having comparatively advantageous export market access for goods and sustaining employment opportunities within the Republic.

The negative consequences however have been that through a heavy reliance on South Africa, its neighbouring states have been incapable, or unwilling, to diversify such heavy economic linkages. This leads us to the current predicament.

As South Africa’s economy begins to slow down, so too will the economies of its neighbours. The effects of such a slow will be numerous. With no reliable statistics on immigration of nationals from its neighbouring countries, it is important not to underestimate the remittances sent from nationals working in South Africa to their home states and with business interests in South Africa. The economic slowdown therefore jeopardizes the remittances sent to neighbouring states and business sentiment. This could, in effect, increase the numbers of un-skilled African migrants seeking employment in South Africa as small scale economic opportunities dwindle in neighbouring states, as well as forcing the African business elite to relocate to more amenable countries.

Such a scenario would increase the probability and likelihood of further xenophobic attacks, further isolating South Africa within Southern Africa as a country that stands on its own and not as an ‘African’, country, an ideological remnant from the Apartheid era. Furthermore, the effects on South Africa’s economy would be an increasing need to trade further afield inevitably leading to increased business costs in areas such as logistics hampering the integration ambitions of the Southern African Development Community and, broadly speaking, the African Union.

The socio economics of South Africa are vital to its neighbours, and its neighbours are vital to South Africa. A long-term economic slowdown and/or increased xenophobic sentiment in South Africa will inevitably trigger massive economic uncertainties. How South Africa aims to strengthen its economy and create a more cohesive civil society over the coming years will be both crucial, and testament to its already phenomenal progress thus far.

Author Bio

Chiziwiso Pswarayi is currently a Masters in International Relations candidate at the University of Cardiff. Chizi’s interests include Southern African politics and migration issues.

Cover image ‘South African flag, Port Elizabeth, Eastern Cape, South Africa‘ by flowcomm

Life on the Edge

“How can you help us?” The girl’s eyes were unwavering. The wind bit at our faces as we stood on the exposed farmland, home to a small refugee camp on the edge of Syria’s border. It would have been a beautiful setting; snow capped mountains with blue skies beyond them, but the tarpaulins flapped violently in the wind, and the cold pierced through to the bone.

We couldn’t help, not enough, and not for enough people.

There are currently over one million Syrian refugees living in Lebanon, making up a quarter of the population. About half of them live in rented accommodation; the others live in little camps dotted around the countryside. These white tents blur past the bus window through the Bekaa Valley, often set up on rented farmland and in places where there is little work or infrastructure.

In December 2014, the United Nations (U.N.) issued its largest ever appeal for a single crisis. $8.4 billion is necessary to meet the needs of all those affected by the Syrian refugee crisis, both inside and outside Syria. Yet only 50% of this amount has materialized thus far, meaning Syrian refugees in Lebanon receive only around $13.50 per month,orless than half a dollar a day, for food assistance.

Security in some of the camps is a concern. Around the town of Arsal, close to the Syrian border, there has been sporadic violence. Members of ISIS and the Al Qaeda affiliated group Jabhat al Nusra have been fighting the Lebanese army for over two years. Importantly however, while most of the other camps in Lebanon are impoverished, they are secure.

In the camp, Mohammed sat and drank sweet tea whilst trying to warm up by a small oil heater. He showed me pictures of him with over a hundred dead chickens, he grinned with pride: “This is the chicken for Shawarma!” – My appetite momentarily vanishing at the sight. The situations of people who live in the camps differ, some were lucky enough to find work in a local chicken farm. This gave them and their families enough money to be able to eat properly, although they could not afford to buy much else.

Others were less lucky. They had to rely on what aid agencies or local people could afford to give them. Another Syrian, Ahmad, had a small baby and couldn’t afford to buy milk for her. In his empty tent the child was crying in a cot in the corner, the sound pierced only by momentary silences that seemed to suck the air out of the room. The mother was not present; he didn’t offer an explanation.

Many of the people in this camp have been in Lebanon since the beginning of the conflict, others have only just arrived. Most of the Syrians we spoke to had left because of the Assad regime’s bombs.

Sitting in Mohammed’s little tent, hiding from the quiet frozen ground outside, it seemed a thousand miles away from the bombs and fighting we see on TV; in reality it was just over 10 miles. There wasn’t much talk of the conflict, although his father joked that Syria was now both an airport and a shooting range for the world’s military aircraft to practice on.

According to the Moscow Times, Russian strikes on Syria cost over $4 million a day, roughly $1.5 billion over the course of a year. To put this into perspective, it is about 2000 times the amount Russia contributed to UNHCR this year to help Syrian refugees in the region. The U.S. is spending over double on its military operations, at $9 million a day, which is still roughly 10 times what it spends on helping the victims of the conflict.

One of the women, Fatima, explained about her five year old son, Mohanad. He couldn’t sleep for more than a few minutes at night before waking up, shouting, and scratching his head in a scared fever. The bombs gave him this.

There has been a renewed effort to combat radical violent groups in the region. Yet amongst the talk of heroically fighting and defeating terrorism, there has not been enough support for the civilian refugees displaced by the conflict. Lebanon is a small and not particularly wealthy country; its own factionalized society is struggling to support the Syrians who have sought refuge there.

Without proper and meaningful help, the countries in the region who are hosting the Syrian refugees will become less stable. These little camps on the edge of the mountains are fertile ground for violent and extreme ideologies which feed on poverty. If governments want to both protect the welfare of refugees as well as guard against the spread of terrorism, they need to do more to help.

About the Author

Oliver Berthoud is a contributor for Global Public Policy Watch on Middle Eastern Issues. As an expert on the Middle East, he has spent a considerable amount of time in Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Afghanistan. His academic speciality is in Minority Muslim Communities and he is a University of Exeter alumnus. He is an Arabic speaker and currently resides in Beirut, Lebanon.

twitter: @BerthoudOliver

Cover image by author.

When Human Rights and National Interest Collide

On the Obama Administration’s Inaction in Syria

Human Rights have become an increasingly publicized issue in Western media. Given the advancement of global communication technologies in recent decades, images of human rights abuses have been propelled globally with a reach and speed unmatched in the pre-globalisation era. Images of the Syrian crisis are no exception. The globally viewed image of three year old Aylan Kurdi whose family were trying to reach the safety of Canada has proven to evocatively demonstrate to the Western world the ramifications of the Syrian conflict with a profundity unachievable through language alone. Sparking sympathy globally, Human Rights issues stemming from the conflict in Syria has undoubtedly grabbed the attention of the world. What about at the level of policy though? How does the world’s remaining superpower balance its commitment to Human Rights with its pursuit of securing what is perceived to be in the national interest?

National interest, whilst a debated term, can largely be understood as the perceived “conditions that are strictly necessary to safeguard and enhance the wellbeing” of the citizens of a nation. As such, the national interest is arguably a vital guiding principle of each nation’s domestic and foreign policy. Undoubtedly, the American national interest has been defined and pursued differently by each administration. From President Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’ forbidding European involvement in North or South America, to President Nixon’s ‘Nixon Doctrine’ aimed at “Vietnamizing” the Vietnam War; the core of US foreign policy has changed throughout the ages in reflection of the changing global landscape. However, whilst the global issues America has faced have changed, what has remained consistent throughout US foreign policy is the desire to keep the United States powerful, secure and prosperous. Evident in the contemporary era through the  proliferation of US style capitalism, intervention in resource rich regions and the continued economic, military and diplomatic might of the U.S.; it is clear that the continued power, stability and prosperity of the United States forms the heart of its national interests.

Nevertheless, nations are not always free to only follow what is in their national interest. Following the Cold War, the U.S. like many other nations pledged to take on a greater role in upholding Human Rights across the globe. Following the genocide’s in Rwanda and the Balkans, there has been a significant shift towards intervention abroad for humanitarian purposes. Following the debate that these tragedies induced, the UN’s International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the resulting concept of a ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), significantly redefined state sovereignty. R2P dictated that states are no longer free to simply pursue its interests, a nation also has a ‘responsibility’ to protect the citizens within its borders. Failing to do so, this responsibility of protection then falls to the international community. Formally accepted by all UN member states in 2005, the United States like most other states therefore pledged to protect and uphold Human Rights to a previously unprecedented level.

Despite this, observers of US policy in Syria may argue that the importance of Human Rights has been subsumed by the significance of national interest. As this article will argue, President Barak Obama’s limited action in Syria largely stems from the necessity of preserving what is in The United States’s national interest. Pursuing a policy of caution, it is arguable that he has played it safe in Syria in order to quell domestic anti-intervention sentiment and avoid neo-Cold War entanglements. As a result, it could be said that the President has largely ignored the Human Rights issues plaguing the region, in order to preserve the American national interest.

Currently, his approach to the Syrian Civil War and the “scourge” of ISIS has been one of small scale action from afar. The US’s most notable military actions have been to provide Sunni allies with military aid, deploy small units of Special Operations troops to organise those fighting militants, and of course, launch airstrikes.  However, much of this military aid is likely to have fallen into the hands of ISIS and these airstrikes have been on-going for more than a year with little decline in ISIS power or increased stability in Syria. Given the significant limits of these actions, it would appear that the world’s global policeman has largely taken a step back from the policing of the Syrian crisis.

Repeatedly criticized for being too cautious in his approach to ISIS by foreign policy hawks, those who favour a strong foreign policy based largely on the use of military force, Obama has nonetheless determined to stick to his policy in Syria. His focus in this region continues to be to address the Syrian civil war and insist on the step down of Syrian President Assad as a means of securing stability and battling ISIS. Meeting with French President François Hollande following the events in Paris, the President reaffirmed his belief that in order to tackle ISIS, the Syrian Civil War must be brought to an end.

How this is to be done however, is perhaps less clear. Repeatedly rejecting a large scale deployment of troops and resisting pressures for a no-fly zone, the US administration’s attempts to bring peace in the region are less tangible than the use of military force. Spearheading a US-led coalition targeted at fighting ISIL, it has largely turned to a mix of international diplomacy coupled with limited military action to address the crisis in the region. And yet, given the clamour of state and non-state actors vying for control of the region, it would seem that Obama’s limited military action and cautious diplomatic efforts seem to have little impact in such an unstable region. Given the continuation of the Syrian Civil War and the recent Paris attacks mounted by ISIS, it appears that stability and the decline of ISIS power has yet to occur. 

So why has Barak Obama taken this reserved approach to Syria? Primarily, it could be argued, because a large scale involvement would not serve the United States’ national interests. When discussing his role in Syria, Obama has stated that “My only interest is to end suffering and to keep the American people safe…what I do not do, is to take actions either because it is going to work politically or it is somehow, in the abstract, make America look tough or make me look tough.” By his own words then, it appears that whilst Obama may wish to ‘end suffering’ he is unwilling to take actions which will compromise this second interest of keeping the American people safe. Committing to greater military action would likely result in American casualties, a fate which the American people have largely denounced following President George W. Bush’s infamous War on Terror.  In 2013, 55% of respondents polled said that the US should “do nothing and stay out of the Syrian civil war” despite being told that the administration had concluded that Assad’s government had used chemical weapons to kill over 1,400 civilians in the previous month. Furthermore, only 6% supported aggressive action. Weary from war in Iraq and Afghanistan, it seems Obama has recognised that to commit to full frontal involvement in Syria and the resulting loss of American life would not be welcomed at home.

Secondly, to commit to greater action in Syria perhaps may be too complicated to partake too directly in. As Obama himself has said, to commit US troops to Syria would be making a “mistake” and serve little “unless we’re prepared to have a permanent occupation of these countries.” Well aware of the difficulties this region faces, he has repeatedly highlighted how trying the process of maintaining a stable Syrian state will be. It seems that perhaps the “difficult, long, methodical process to bring back together various factions within Syria to maintain a Syrian state” is one which Obama recognises does little to benefit the U.S.

This hesitance to play a greater role in Syria could also be viewed as a sensible recognition of the complexities of Syrian crisis. As Obama’s statement makes clear, he has commendably given much consideration to the long term process of maintaining peace and stability in Syria. However, given Russia’s involvement in the region, one may also conclude that Obama is reluctant to entangle the United States in situation made even more fraught for America by Putin’s pro-Assad stance. Openly supportive of Assad, Obama had referred to Russia’s actions in Syria as heading towards a “quagmire”, it seems that the President’s policy rests on not heading into that quagmire himself, and furthermore, steering well clear of Russia as it heads for it. With the proxy wars of the Cold War still within living memory, it could be said that the Obama administration has little wish to drag the United States into a war which pits it alongside other anti-Assad actors directly against the pro-Assad coalition of Iran and Russia. As numerous observers have commented, action (or inaction) in Syria is uncomfortably reminiscent of the Cold War. Arguably, a desire to avoid flaring up old confrontations has formed at least a partial role in forming American policy in Syria; it seems implausible that the possible ramifications of pursuing action hostile to Russia’s interests in Syria has not occurred to the President of the United States.

 So, how much has Obama’s policy been driven by the necessity of committing to Human Rights? As this article has argued, very little. The world has unhappily seen what a President’s lack of caution can cause in the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, Obama’s caution in Syria can be viewed as stemming from a similar desire to protect US national interests. Shouting down Republicans calling to only accept Christian refugees aside, Obama has done little to actually help the situation or to champion those that are suffering as a result. While avoiding needlessly committing troops to the region is commendable, it does seem that the world’s biggest power could be doing more to encourage peace in the region.

Simply avoiding escalating a conflict is no longer enough when already 11.6 million people have been displaced in less than five years as a result of the Syrian conflict. Stating that his only interest in Syria is to “…end suffering and to keep the American people safe” it seems that the only component of this statement that President Obama is upholding is the latter. Simply creating a coalition is not enough, that coalition needs to commit to greater humanitarian action. Once again it would seem that Human Rights on foreign shores have failed to be as important as what is in the United States’s national interest. This begs the question, how useful is a superpower if it fails to fully engage with one of the most pressing Human Rights issues of our generation?

Author Biography

Scarlett Gurnham is a recent graduate from the University of Nottingham in American and Canadian History, Literature and Culture. As part of her undergraduate degree, Scarlett also studied at the University of Western Ontario in Canada, where she studied International Relations and American and Canadian History. Scarlett is interested in issues of political activism and protest, foreign policy, class, gender and social justice and hopes to pursue these interests through a masters in International Relations next year.

Cover image ‘Syria, Taftanaz‘ by the IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation

Nicaragua Sold its Sovereignty to a Chinese Man in a Suit

China’s ever-growing presence in Latin America, specifically in Nicaragua, has made the Central American country a playground for the Asian superpower. On July 2014, the National Assembly, composed mainly of Sandinistas, Nicaragua’s ruling party, rubber stamped a law granting a 50-year concession, renewable up to 100 years to the HKND Chinese Group with rights to build an interoceanic canal.  They specifically granted, “The sole rights to the Hong Kong Nicaraguan Canal Development Group (HKND) to plan, design, construct and thereafter to operate and manage the Nicaraguan Grand Canal and other related projects.” In other words, the former “revolutionaries” of Nicaragua sold their country to a Chinese man in a business suit.

It seems that the Sandinistas never learned about the East India Company, since they had no problem granting the Chinese firm unrestricted rights of natural resources exploitation and ownership for 116 years, which is in itself a violation of Nicaragua’s sovereignty and constitution. So much for the revolutionary cries against imperialism, since according to contemporary Sandinista logic, foreign control is okay as long as it is a company doing the deed.

Earlier this year, at a hearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, activists were given a platform to officiate complaints about the serious human rights infringements the inter-oceanic canal is having in Nicaragua. The Commission recommended a national referendum on the construction of the canal, yet there has been no transparency or national consensus on the project. More disturbing is the fact that, as a blatant disregard to the project, the operation rests on shaky legal ground and lawyers have produced 32 charges of unconstitutionality against it.

Many have argued the supposed economic benefits of the canal. The Nicaraguan Canal is believed to be significantly beneficial to international trade, and the Nicaraguan government has stated it considers the canal a game charger that will transform Nicaragua from the poorest country in the region into the third-fastest growing economy in the world over. However, the potential economic benefits are upstaged by the negative social, environmental and humanitarian impact the building of the canal is also generating. To the alarm of many economists the building of the canal requires the Central Bank of Nicaragua to waive its right to sovereign immunity by giving the HKND group unfettered and tax-free rights over the Managua Lake and surrounding lands. Additionally, the government is expropriating land along the route of the canal with little to zero remunerations, which has led to the forced displacement of more than 100,000 people, setting the stage for widespread homelessness and extreme poverty.

The Managua Lake through which the canal will cut through is a public good and through this they have illegally privatized a national heritage. The huge environmental consequences and the lack of access to the lake (which is a source of livelihood to many) that the canal will cause were not taken into consideration. In fact, the construction of the canal was approved without having done any prior feasibility and environmental studies. The canal concession is thus an assault on territorial rights, and the indigenous population in Nicaragua are seeing their source of clean drinking water threatened and their lands expropriated. This in itself is a violation of Article 26 (3) of The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which requires the State to give legal recognition and protection of land, territories and resources as well as Article 27, requiring States to establish and implement a process recognizing and adjudicating indigenous peoples’ rights in relation to their lands, territories and resources.

The project has also generated acts of police intimidation and government reprehension. Throughout the month of March, there were a total of 40 demonstrations against the canal. In an attempt to silence the opposition the government sentenced a military official,  Yader Montiel Meza, to three months in prison for making a comment against the forced displacement of the population.  Montiel “ the canal was stained with the blood of our brothers who are fighting for their rights” and that it reminded him of the red Christmas” and “…it seemed like Nicaragua had gone back in time to the 80’s.”  Furthermore, businessman Milton Arcia, who opposes the government, was beaten and had his hotel demolished by the government during Easter Friday. Bishop Abelardo of the Episcopal Conference of Nicaragua spoke out stating the case was an obvious case of expropriation and physical aggression and that the government is seeking to instill a state of terror. “ We have said it before. The government is trying to instill a state of terror, where one man has all the power in his hands. It is a shame that in a country that calls itself democratic we have to endure situations like these.  This is a pseudo reign where one man decides and has all the power.” Many Nicaraguan bishops and clergy have expressed their concern about the future of those who have been displaced and are weary of the tensions inside the country.

On October 2015 massive protests were staged against the Interoceanic canal, with posters deeming Nicaragua’s President Ortega a “vende patria” (a sellout) a traitor to his country. The protestors kept denouncing that the dictatorial government is imposing the canal on the country.  These protestors see their source of clean drinking water threatened and their lands expropriated.  In an attempt to crack down on the protest, the government cut down all communication lines and denied public transportation to mobilize the protestors.  However, inhabitants of many communities affected by the Mega Canal Project walked over 3 hours to arrive to the capital city and protest. They overcame threats and obstacles set by the Sandinista police in order to be able to voice their complaints against the expropriation of their lands by a foreign company. What is at stake is not only the land of these communities but their economic, human and environmental resources. By not allowing protestors to manifest, Ortega is repressing not only the right to freedom of speech but the right of many communities to a dignified life.

It is important to note that protestors are not necessarily entirely against the canal but against how the construction is being handled. The construction of the canal would be more favorable if the canal were to remain under Nicaraguan authority, proper environmental studies were conducted, that would lessen the negative impact to the environment, Nicaragua had the proper infrastructure to build it and if proper compensation and remuneration were given to those displaced. However, given that that is not the case; the economic benefits of the canal are not enough to overlook the considerable amount of variables such as the destruction of the environment, the displacement of the population, the human rights violations and the lack of feasibility of the project.

The negative impact on Nicaragua’s ecosystems and rich natural resources the canal will create will be catastrophic, therefore Nicaragua has a case to plea article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of the World Trade Organization stating that environmental rights can sometimes supersede economic gains when the environment is threatened. Additionally in regards to the displacement of the indigenous population the Nicaraguan government should adhere to the United Nations declaration on the rights of the indigenous people as well as Nicaraguan law 445 which demands the demarcation and titling of all indigenous land as well as guarantees the full recognition of communal property ownership rights, recognizing the rights of such communities to use, administer and manage their traditional land.

The increase in protest in Nicaragua this year demonstrate the uneasiness and displeasure of Nicaraguan towards Ortega. Nicaraguans are no longer apathetic to Ortega; the growing acceptance of Ortega’s demands by the populace that once allowed the President to tighten his grip on the country no longer exist.  The catalyst of such an event has been the systematic increase in nationalism and patriotism, with Nicaraguans adamant that the judicial, fiscal, financial rights and sovereignty of Nicaragua are being given to the HKND by a president deemed unconstitutional, a president whose illegality is persistent. A president who places a price tag on his country.

Author Biography

Valeria Gomez Palacios is a native of Nicaragua with a Bachelors degree in Diplomacy and International Relations and Modern Languages from Seton Hall University. Fluent in German, French, Spanish and Italian, Valeria volunteers as an independent translator for various NGOs and has experience serving in nonprofit and governmental organizations including: the United Nations offices in Vienna, the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry and the European Union Delegation to Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama where she contributed to the efforts of the E.U to promote rule of law and sustainable development. Her current research interests lie in human rights law, conflict resolution and peace and security.

Cover image ‘IMG_2089‘ by Jorge Mejía peralta

Change in Africa’s Biggest Economy

The biggest economy in Africa, Nigeria has recently come to the fore as a potential ‘New African’ beacon of long term growth and prosperity. With a rebased gross domestic product in excess of $500 billion, far outstripping South Africa’s $350 billion it’s easy to see how Nigeria may become a new economic powerhouse. From being acknowledged as Africa’s biggest economy to fair, transparent and peaceful elections, the nation is moving progressively as a nascent democracy.

In November 2015 however the firing of Ibrahim Lamorde from his role of Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in Nigeria could be interpreted as being indicative of fragility of Nigeria politics particularly in regards to corruption in the oil industry. Nigeria’s claim to be Africa’s biggest economy is seemingly thwarted by daily realities.

In August 2015, Lamorde faced allegations that amount of $5 bn had gone missing at the commission under his stead. Following the allegations, Lamorde when speaking to the BBC noted that the allegations were part of a smear campaign. Smear or not, the allegations naturally have consequences in a country notorious for corruption in the oil industry.

President Buhari elected in March 2015 has promised to clean up Nigerian politics as part of his political platform. President Buhari’s firing of Lamorde therefore can be seen as a means to clean up Nigerian politics or the consolidation of political power. What is apparent about Lamorde’s departure, is its particular familiarity to the firing of his predecessor, Farida Waziri under Former President Jonathan in 2011.

The terms of her dismissal similarly, were amongst allegations of misconduct. Accordingly the Presidential spokesman at the time, Reuden Abiti commented, “The removal of the EFCC chair is part of President Jonathan’s determination to revitalise the fight against corruption.” Due to the relatively short tenures of the Head of the EFCC, rights groups have suggested that the agency has been under the undue influence of politicians.

This brings to question the extent of corruption within the political elite. A report written by Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, a former Executive Chairman of the EFCC in 2012 cited that in a decade approximately $35 bn had been siphoned from inefficiencies and mismanagement within the oil industry. The equivalency in 2012 would have equated to being 10% of the Nigerian government’s annual budget.

When talking about corruption, it is not adequate to stop the discussion at evidence of corruption, rather what is most damning, is the perception of corruption within civic society. As such, there no country according to Transparency International that is immune from some form of corruption within the Corruption perception index.

Nigeria however is ranked 136 out 176 (1 being the least corrupt and 176 the most) in the index. The perception therefore of corruption in the Nigerian state is relatively endemic. This can be seen to more worrisome than actual proven corruption. After spending in a decade in Nigeria, David Jordan Smith argues that the acts of corruption are culturally acceptable if they benefit family and kin. Smith argues that corruption has seeped into every facet of everyday life in a country of extreme inequality.

Here, Smith and Transparency International focus on the destructive power of corruption. Another perception of corruption that is perhaps more pervasive to civic life is the reality of the Nigerian population having to find a way to cope with the new reality and secondly such reality as Smith argues becomes part of everyday life. This was best exemplified by the song ‘I go chop your dollar’ by Kwem Omoh, about advance fee fraud. The comedic nature of the song coupled with its commercial appeal highlight the proposed normalization of corruption as a game to be won by individuals or along lines of family and friends. This idea of practicing acts of corruption for kin and family may seem like an attractive proposition though it inevitably leads to the erosion of the country’s civic spirit and fundamentally weakens State institutions and the state itself.

The dismissal of Ibrahim Lamorde, is testament to this. It can ultimately hold sway and be of symbolic importance if he actually is convicted of behaving in a way not in line with his position. The new President must be able to prove such inconsistencies to increase the perception that corruption was found and the firing was not as such a matter of political manoeuvring, or itself an act of corruption.

As Nigeria has undoubtedly taken the lead in being recognized as the biggest economy on the African continent, the perception of the State is inevitably, at least partially, tied to that of the continent in the international arena. President Buhari now faces his first big challenge, to show Nigerians and the world that corrupt acts shall not be tolerated at any level within the country.

Author Bio

Chiziwiso Pswarayi is currently a Masters in International Relations candidate at the University of Cardiff. Chizi’s interests include Southern African politics and migration issues.

Cover image ‘Nigeria: A Conversation with President Muhannadu Buhari‘ by U.S. Institute of Peace