Author: kasmir

The Use of Coercive Chemical Castration and Its Impacts on Human Rights

Prevailing medical ethics and human rights have ruled that human dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms are to be fully respected. From this perspective, individuals are required to give informed consent prior to any medical procedure that they undergo. Various international laws  protect the right to informed consent, including the UNESCO’S Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights and the WMA Declaration of Helsinki. Consequently, forced or involuntary use of anti-androgenic hormone treatment, commonly referred as chemical castration, raises serious human rights concerns, particularly in regards to the protection of the rights to physical  integrity, health, and privacy. However, this practice has been implemented in several countries, such as Poland, Russia, and Estonia. Laws in eight states across the United States, including Texas, Florida, and California also allow compulsory medical treatment for sexual offenders,. The process can be done at a request of someone who wishes to control their libido, while also being used as a punitive measure to impair the sexual function of sexual offenders. Poland was the first nation of the European Union who allowed judges to impose chemical castration on some convicted paedophiles.

The process of chemical castration involves the administration of anti-androgenic hormone treatment that would reduce testosterone levels in the hope to reduce deviant sexual urges and the capacity for sexual arousal. The main drugs used are cyproterone acetate, medroxyprogresterone, and gonadotrophin. However, these drugs have negative adverse effects, including a metabolic syndrome and decreases in bone density. In addition to these risks, there has been no consensus opinion on the effectiveness of the treatment, as argued by Heim and Hursh. Rice and Harris, also  reported that there has not been enough scientific or ethical debate for castration to be a fundamental aspect in the treatment of sexual offenders. Furthermore, chemical castration by itself is not capable to control sexual urges that are influenced by psychological problems. For instance, Berlin noted that chemical castration is ineffective in antisocial or psychopathic sexual offenders.

Several human rights organisation,  such as Amnesty International, have  been campaigning for the abolishment of chemical castration as a method of punishment. Chemical castration has over the years been  criticised as a method of inhuman punishment. The treatment  often does not have the consent of the patient and thus contradicts international human rights law. It is also a violation of human rights as ruled in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment. Moreover, there is a lack of correlational relationship between chemical castration and the elimination of child sexual abuse as there has been no evidence that the use of chemical castration would reduce the number of cases of violence against children. Unfortunately, despite many arguments to end this practice, in October 2015, the Government of Indonesia announced its plan to legalise chemical castration as a punitive measure for sexual offenders.

The Case of Indonesia

In  recent years, Indonesia has seen an increasing number of cases of child abuses. Some of these cases have received wide spread attention,  such as the case of the sexual assault committed towards a 5-year-old student at the Jakarta International School. The National Commission for Child Protection reported that in 2015, there were 2,898 cases of violence against children, 59.3 per cent of which were sexual offences. We should note, however, that the Indonesian Commission of Child Protection has not enough data nationwide to claim that there is an emergency situation in regards to child sexual abuse. It also lacks data on sexual recidivism of sexual offenders.

Despite the lack of data, the Government of Indonesia has initiated a draft of Government Regulation in lieu of Law on the Second Amendment of Law Number 23 Year 2002 on Child Protection. The Government is planning to amend Article 81 and Article 82 of the Child Protection Law by increasing the minimum imprisonment length from 5 to 10 years and legalising the use of chemical castration as an additional punitive measure. The Secretary-General of the Indonesian Child Protection Commission stated that the draft regulation is currently awaiting approval from President Joko Widodo. Some parties, including The Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights and the human rights coalition called Aliansi 99 have strongly opposed this plan.

There are various problems that would stem from the legalisation of chemical castration for sexual offenders. In the context of Indonesia, for instance, Aliansi 99 argued that since most sexual offenders are close to the victim many cases go unreported. The practice would thus not eliminate child sexual abuse. In cases where the sexual offenders are children, the problem is more complicated. Since even adults who volunteer to undergo the treatment cannot give a free consent as they face the pressure of incarceration, it is inappropriate to let children undergo such a treatment when they are not yet mature enough to give consent to any kind of medical treatment.

Furthermore, the problem of chemical castration in Indonesia also faces important technical issues, since the proposed law gives no clarity on how the chemical castration should be administered. Indeed, the entity responsible for authorising the treatment remains unspecified. The structure responsible for supervising the treatment, in order to insure that no adverse secondary health effects come about, is also unclear. Indonesia has a severe lack of mental health professionals, thus putting offenders at much higher risk as there are not enough people to monitor their medical conditions. Consequently, this further endangers offenders’ human rights. These issues demonstrate how the Government has not comprehensively researched nor has sufficiently planned the legalisation in regards to chemical castration.

The increasing cases of child sexual offences should not be a mere reason for the Government to justify inhuman punishment. In tackling the issue of child sexual abuse, it is highly important to consider careful steps and implement evidence-based legislation and policy that are proven effective to reduce the number of cases.  The use of punishment alone is an inadequate deterrent for sexual offences. The policy should be based on a human rights perspective especially since Indonesia has ratified the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment through Law Number 5 Year 1998. Failure to uphold human rights by enacting discriminatory laws and practices has a negative impact towards the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals.

Given the significant risk of human rights abuses, Indonesia should not legalise the use of inhuman punishment and should instead start applying a restorative practices as a more effective means to reduce sexual offences. As a country that has theoretically been reinforcing its commitments to human rights, Indonesia should start allocating available resources to increase the use of alternative solutions to criminal justice. This should include prioritising rehabilitation process for sexual offenders and implementing counselling and other support mechanisms. Apart from applying restorative justice approaches for the offenders, rehabilitation and psychological treatment for victims of sexual abuse should also be provided as many sexual offenders themselves have a history of being victims in the past. The government should commit to implement a restorative justice principle in order to tackle issues of sexual offences at its roots.

Author Bio

Citta Widagdo is an LL.M. Graduate of University College London. She has previously interned in various charities and legal clinics, including work shadowing the Chief Medical Officer of England. Having lived with fibromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome, her research interests are health care law, public health policy, health and human rights, and bioethics governance with a particular focus on the European Union and Southeast Asia. She can be contacted at [email protected].

Building on the prior discussion of the characteristics of TPA and the dilemma of the separation of politics and administration, this part of the series continues the analysis by highlighting the role of social media in promoting public accountability and establishing a linkage with other types of accountability. In doing so, this part relates social media, web 2.0 to the previous discussion of various types of accountability exercised on public officials internally and externally in TPA systems, and critically analyses these concepts in relevance to the Egyptian case.

Social Media, Web 2.0 and public accountability

The Web 2.0 refers to the new online platforms created for people to interact with information presented on the web through a multi to multi communication system. Social media is one type of platforms that uses web 2.0 technologies. These platforms had a staggering amount of users and reach to different citizens across the globe regardless of their class, gender, ethnicity or location. They give the chance for everyone to express their own opinion, interact with existing information, mobilize others and gain support for their causes and initiatives (Kietzmann et al., 2011, p. 241). This ability of mobilization had an effect on politics as well as accountability and resulted in various political movements across the globe including the 2011 Egyptian revolution.

Although a TPA system ideally exhibits a separation between politics and administration in terms of accountability, citizens on social media had interfered with the process of administration in Egypt in various cases. According to Mulgan (p. 559), public officials in TPA are only accountable to their managers and external professional institutions, while politicians are the ones accountable to public. However, some professionals are often questioned by the public, pressured and held accountable for their actions through social media. One example for this is the recent bribery incident with a police officer where a citizen was able to film the officer through his cell phone while receiving the bribe and uploading this video on Social Media (MBC, 2015). The video soon went viral and the public started questioning the values of the police institution and the way they handle their operations. This has led to massive political pressure that resulted in penalising this officer and implementing new policies for fighting corruption (ONA, 2015). Moreover, social media has not only made public able to question the professionalism of TPA officials but also their personal values and belief system, which often relied on their conscience. Recently, the Minister of Justice in Egypt has been forced to resign after a public outrage through social media that came as a result of his social classist remarks in one of his interviews where he mentioned that “the sons of rubbish collectors should not become judges” (BBC, 2015). Such pressure was always believed to be impractical in TPA systems where accountability is vertical and follows the government and politicians are the only public officials subjected to sanctions and questioning by external organisations and can be held accountable through direct elections.

Dialogue is a major channel of public accountability; this dialogue is often conducted through debates of criticism for the government actions. Dialogue is becoming more effective with the spread of media and new technologies that facilitated public debates and created a space where citizens can share their agreement or criticism for government policies and actions, question officials, and request justifications for their actions. In the modern times, officials often have their own twitter and Facebook accounts where they deal directly with the public and answer to their questions. This has surpassed the regular mediatory channels that have always existed between the public and civil servants such as media, ombudsman and the parliament. However, these virtual channels have not been treated similarly by all officials and there is still a lot of improvement to be made in this regard to provide more space for people to interact. The responsiveness of the Muslim Brotherhood government to the public questioning was at a higher rate than the current military government who deals with social media as a one-way communication platform where they can spread their justification for various actions but uphold any questioning process that may occur. During the ex-president Morsi’s ruling, many activists and social media pressure was directed towards the politically elected officials. MorsiMeter (2012) was one of the online projects that was established during the first 100 days of Morsi’s ruling by activists. This initiative is classified as a fact-checking online platform. These types of platforms initially started in the United States to reduce the level of deception and confusion in politics through providing the public with accurate information that emerges from the crowd (Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2015). Morsimeter initiative aimed at tracking the promises of the president provided in his political campaign. According to the creators of the initiative, the presidential office had often communicated with them directly on the cyber space to highlight progress related to the promises and get involved in public dialogue about them. The failure of administration to achieve Morsi’s promises has been accounted for Morsi’s failure and not the administration’s. Such online initiatives have led to public outrage and massive petitions to organise early presidential elections.

Civil servants who are supposed to work on the implementation of such promises have shared in signing those petitions and participated in the distribution (Alsharif & Saleh, 2013). Later on, the government had sensed the outrage and in response they used social media to re-gain public support and open a space of public dialogue on their first year’s progress by launching an interactive website called Morsi First Year (2013).

However, responsiveness of the government came quite late as the public outrage had already boomed and massive public demonstrations were organised to overthrow the regime three days after this new website was released. Thus, social media provides a space for dialogue between government and citizens and required higher pace of responsiveness of the government towards public interest and the failure to do so, can result in public outrage.

Public accountability is not often perceived by public across social media platforms in the same way. Politicians can be questioned and held accountable for their actions only when citizens do not fear the consequences of criticising them on the virtual space. Although the government has less control over social media, some activists have been tracked down through these platforms and prosecuted for questioning military leaders or current political leaders.

Alaa AbdelFattah is an example of these activists. He was sentenced for five years in prison due to his calls on social media to protest against a clause in the new constitution that permits military trials for civilians (Associated Press, 2015). In fears of being prosecuted or detained, many citizens on social media have blamed administrative officials instead of political leaders on the failures in the government. Thus, the perception of public accountability, whether it is towards politicians or administrative officials in the age of social media depends mainly on where power is concentrated and what degree of freedom is given to  the public to express their concerns, question government actions and mobilize pressure groups.

Besides presenting themselves as a new channel for public accountability, social media have become a platform that promotes other channels of accountability. It enhances access to information and eases the process of reporting concerns to the official online accounts of organisations such as the Ombudsman, the administrative tribunal, non-governmental organisations that in their turn can hold politicians accountable for their actions. Since transparency is a cornerstone of accountability, social media has contributed to accountability through disseminating important information by politicians through its platforms.

It offered a space for officials to interact with citizens through their official online accounts. All presidents who ruled Egypt post revolution had official Facebook and twitter accounts that interacted with citizens on daily bases, responded to their concerns and disseminated important information. In addition, some organisations find it easier to avoid sanctions on their operations as a result of disseminating printed information on public officials’ performance by offering the same information online, where the government has less control on shared data. Moreover, individuals contribute to the shared information online regarding actions of civil servants or elected officials. They share photos and streams of videos that are often used by control organisations to pressure, question politicians or hold them accountable in court.

In spite that some control organisations such as the opposition political parties or NGOs have been banned under the current ruling regime, they have transformed their mode of operation into a virtual existence that often takes place on Social Media. For example, currently both the Freedom and Justice Party and Al Wasat Party have a strong presence on social media despite their dissimilation. They organise demonstrations, promote their ideas and question the government’s actions on their social media accounts. Even media organisations have started to become present only in the virtual spaces such as Rasd News Network who have assembled online to avoid government hegemony and use crowdsourcing to generate news that originates from the public and which hold government accountable (R.N.N., 2011).

Discussion and Conclusion

To conclude, various channels and types of accountability persist in our modern times in TPA systems through social media in interconnected ways. Internal and external accountability had become interwoven through social media platforms where values and professional standards of civil servants have been questioned through public dialogue and regular external accountability channels that are fostered by social media.  The new era of Social media has brought public accountability into a new level by fostering pressure on public officials. The separation of politics from administration in accountability has become difficult in the online arena with the increase of public awareness created through transparency and sharing of knowledge about government actions and formulated policies.

In addition, traditional media started to retreat in influencing public accountability since information has found its way through social media to propagate from public officials and directly to citizens. Different individual interpretations for government actions on social media have led to both mobilization of pressure groups and diffusion of public accountability in separate occasions.

Looking forward, social media may become a pertinent tool to promote different channels of public accountability if the government understands the underlying concepts of dialogue offered on its platforms and used them to become more responsive to public interest. In addition, social media can become a good tool for transparency and dialogue between citizens and the government, where mediatory channels disappear and public accountability is fostered.

In Egypt, the role played recently by public officials on social media can facilitate responsiveness of officials to public interest and can help them understand the dynamics of social change if they used it as a two-way communication system. Finally, social media can facilitate the interaction among citizens to create uncontrolled public opinion and organise pressure groups that results in pressure on policy makers and civil servants.

Petition tools and visualisation of information on social media alongside the powerful and fast tools that are used to spread information online can help reduce time, effort and resources used in mobilizing pressure groups to exercise control, which is an important aspect of public and external accountability. Visualisation of complex data through infographics (transformation of data and numbers into graphics) and pictures has made it easier for public to comprehend and increased public awareness that results in more accountability (Bekkers & Moody, 2014, p. 155).

In addition, social media can overcome the state’s hegemony in constraining external control channels that are often used by the public to hold politicians accountable such as courts or ombudsman. Therefore, the public can use it in reaching out to politicians and civil servants without state’s control of their criticism.

Author Biography

Haytham Atef is currently a postgraduate student at the Willy Brandt School – University of Erfurt. He graduated in 2014 with an MA in Global Citizenship, Identities and Human Rights from the University of Nottingham in the UK. Formerly, he worked as a researcher in the cabinet of the ministry of planning and international cooperation in Egypt, Haytham Mones has been working on developing strategies for transparency and access to information in the ministry.

Through his 12 years of involvement with civil society in Egypt, working on various projects and initiatives, Haytham has cofounded Qestas NGO for peace, development and Human Rights in Egypt. He has also co-founded other initiatives, such as Sinai Development Project and Nation without Borders and currently RefUlink in Germany. He also worked as the deputy director of Tahrir Lounge project at the Goethe Institut and the Program Coordinator of Lazord Academy at the American University in Cairo.

References:

Alsharif, A., & Saleh, Y. (2013, October 10). Special Report – The real force behind Egypt’s “revolution of the state.” Retrieved May 15, 2015, from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/10/uk-egypt-interior-special-report-idUKBRE99908720131010

Annenberg Public Policy Center. (2015). Fact Check. Retrieved May 15, 2015, from http://www.factcheck.org/

Associated Press. (2015, February 23). Court gives Egyptian activist 5 years in prison for organizing 2013 protest. Retrieved May 15, 2015, from http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/02/23/court-sentences-prominent-egyptian-activist-to-5-years-in-prison-after-retrial/

BBC. (2015, May 11). Egypt’s justice minister sacked over social class remarks. Retrieved May 15, 2015, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32688825

Bekkers, V., & Moody, R. (2014). Accountability and the Framing Power of Visual Technologies: How Do Visualized Reconstructions of Incidents Influence Public and Political Accountability Discussions? The Information Society, 30(2), 144–158. doi:10.1080/01972243.2013.873749

Kietzmann, J. H., Hermkens, K., McCarthy, I. P., & Silvestre, B. S. (2011). Social media? Get serious! Understanding the functional building blocks of social media. Business Horizons, 54(3), 241–251. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2011.01.005

MBC. (2015, March 17). In Video: A police officer is caught on camera receiving a bribe [Bel Video: kamera Tazbot Amen Shorta Yatalaqa Rashwa Leadam Tahrir Mokhalafat]. Retrieved May 15, 2015, from http://www.mbc.net/ar/programs/yahdoth-fe-masr/articles/بالفيديو–كاميرا-تضبط-أمين-شرطة-يتلقى-ر

MorsiFirstYear. (2013). A Year of Egyptian Presidency: Steps and Challenges. Retrieved May 15, 2015, from http://www.morsifirstyear.com/en/

MorsiMeter.com. (2012). Morsi Meter. Retrieved May 15, 2015, from http://www.morsimeter.com/en

Mulgan, R. (2000). “Accountability”: An Ever‐Expanding Concept? Public Administration, 78(3), 555–573.

ONA. (2015, March 16). Imprisonment of the Police officer who received a Bribe [Habs Amen Shortet Almaadi Betohmet Taqadeh Rashwa]. Retrieved May 17, 2015, from http://onaeg.com/?p=2209625

R.N.N. (2011). Rassd News Network. Retrieved May 15, 2015, from https://www.facebook.com/RassdNewsN

Cover Image: Anna Lena Schiller under a CC BY-NC 2.0 creative commons license

This second part of the series takes a look at the different kinds of accountability in the Egyptian context and beyond.

Types of Accountability

In traditional views on accountability a person’s actions are accounted for by whether an external person, organisation or by an internal higher rank official. Accountability is often referred to as the responsibility of civil servants towards values, and professional standards of their organisation, or towards others outside of the organisation (Mulgan, 2000, p. 557). In these views, there is a degree of interaction between public officials and those who hold them accountable. This interaction involves questioning or imposing sanctions. In a state of traditional public administration and democratic governance, accountability starts with the elected officials then the bureaucrats down the pyramid shaped hierarchy, who are held accountable to their actions by various external and internal parties (Mulgan, 2000, p. 555).

Channels of accountability are those mediums through which accountability is being practiced, whether these channels are ethical, contractual, legal or democratic. Some channels may not be tangible, such as public opinion or the responsibility of the person towards the public and his own values and belief system. Often people hold politicians accountable directly through elections and by deciding whether to vote for them or not. Elections are the time where voters can get into a dialogue with the politicians, exchange questions, evaluate the past and hold them accountable for their actions and requesting answers. If politicians were not able to justify their actions, they may not become re-elected. Post elections, politicians can still be held accountable by the public through questioning in the parliament for example, which is often conducted towards ministers and is named as ministerial responsibility.

According to Considine (2002) there are two types of accountability, vertical and horizontal. The vertical type follows the line of authority within the government where each official is accounted to his/her superior and in the end of the line all accountable to the public (ibid., p. 25). The horizontal type is the form of accountability that occurs between networks of control outside the government’s organisation (ibid., p. 27). In contrast, Mulgan (2000, p. 562) identified five detailed forms of accountability which are personal, professional, political, managerial and public. Combining both views, accountability can be classified into two major categories: internal and external accountability. In addition, it can be explained in terms of the relationship between two parties: civil servants and those who hold them accountable, which can be oneself, values, professional codes, line managers, legislations, external individuals, organisations or public pressure.

Internal Accountability

Internal accountability can be defined in relevance to professionalism and responsiveness of public officials. Professionalism is often based on experts who are handled the jobs and no appropriate external control is exercised. If they fail to meet the targets then their service can be ended. In this type everyone in a TPA is controlled by someone in the same organisation, thus accountability is distributed across the hierarchy (Mulgan, 2000, p. 559)

Professionalism is a cornerstone of internal accountability in TPA where boards are created from professionals who can conduct peer review on civil servants and they are held accountable to them. Professionalism sometimes intersects with public accountability where civil servants have different external channels that they have to answer. In addition, it entails the adherence of the civil servant or politicians to the set of values and internal standards that are set for them and upon which they can be held accountable personally (ibid., p. 560). This can be illustrated in terms of the oath of office for the president, or doctors that they adhere to after being elected or appointed for office. It can be represented as well in the set of personal values held by a political party or professional union upon which they are held accountable.

There are two aspects of professionalism, which constitutes internal accountability. First, the preservation of organisational values and codes within government institutions can be achieved by separating politics from administration. However, this separation is an ideal case scenario in a TPA system. When a government with a certain political ideology holds office for extended periods, politics and administration become interwoven and generally, appointed civil servants can adhere more to the values promoted by the ruling party rather than the professional values of their institution. In addition, accountability of officials can be more towards the political party than it is towards the public. In Egypt, and particularly in Mubarak’s regime, the appointed officials often belonged to the National Democratic Party (NDP) (Blaydes, 2008, p. 1).

The political scene was dominated by one political ideology for long time. For more than 30 years since its establishment, the NDP in 1978, the party has held no less than three-quarters of the seats in the People’s Assembly and has been controlling the political and administrative scene (Brownlee, 2002, p. 7). Later on and particularly in Morsi’s regime, many administrative officials refused to cooperate with the government and expressed that in public due to the conflicts in political ideologies and interests. In spite of the efforts exerted by the Morsi’s regime to appoint officials that belong to their ideology, it was considered by many Egyptians as a repetition of a similar mistake of Mubarak mixing politics with administration and a diffusion of accountability.

Second, The difference in urgency, competency between politically elected officials and appointed civil servants can create many challenges of internal accountability in TPA (Behn, 2000, p. 45). Politicians are often affected by external factors that push them to act accordingly and to take certain decision, while the administration is mainly concerned with doing the job right. Thus, some policies may fail to meet public expectations but still politicians are held accountable for it. In addition, politicians may see urgency in certain tasks that the administration cannot cope with. In 2014, the Egyptian President General Abdelfatah Alsisi in the inauguration speech of the project has ordered the administration bodies to finish the new Suez Canal project in one year instead of three years due to public and political pressure (Farid, 2014).

Specialists had identified potential problems with this tightened deadlines, and as soon as the digging started some of these problems started to appear and is sought to affect future operation and increase the costs of implementation (AlMonitor, 2014). Although, the president will not be held accountable for this decision and the resulting increase in a project’s budget or potential problems due to the absence of channels of accountability under his government, the public still hold direct accountability and virtual public accountability channels as a last resort to display their dismay about such decisions.

Responsiveness is another aspect of internal accountability. Government officials are required to be responsive to events and changes in the circumstances and reflect public interest. Any occasions of events that may emerge can hold government officials accountable (Mulgan, 2000, p. 556). When the Egyptian revolution sparked in 2011, Mubarak system’s responsiveness to the situation did not meet public demand, and thus the whole regime had failed to contain the situation and outrage became overwhelming. Mulgan argues that government officials are responsible directly to the public without the need of politicians even to be involved. However, the compliance of civil servants to their superiors is always debatable and is subject to various different reasons.

External Accountability

External accountability is defined in terms of the external entity that can hold officials accountable. This entity can be the public, external organisations or even legislations. Without the control exercised by external entities, accountability would not have existed and it will only depend on the conscience of public servants, which varies from a person to another. In democracies, control is needed to make sure that civil servants are working for the interest of the public and not for personal gains (Mulgan, 2000, p. 563). This control keeps every part of the government constrained and held to account. Courts are one example of these organisations; another example is civil society, markets, interest groups, regular media or even social media.

Some organisations are solely responsible for holding civil servants accountable to their actions such as the audit offices, Ombudsman and administrative tribunals. The constitution, federalism, separation of power are some of the notions and political structures that are associated with a diversified control that is exercised over all institutions in the government and holding them all accountable for public interest (ibid., p. 563). The disappearance or dysfunction of such control organisations may lead to a disruption in the accountability process, which can result in public outrage or attempts to exercise this control by the public through demonstrations, strikes or set-ins to hold public officials accountable. These aforementioned control functions are exercised through law and competitive elections, which are illustrated in the following paragraphs.

Here, law is an autonomous form of external accountability and control. Mulgan (2000, p. 564) argues that this form is often unquestionable by politicians who make their policies to fit the legal constraints. Thus, this form of accountability is a good tool to control civil servants behaviour. However, in some cases this is not true especially when the separation of power is not fully exercised and corruption takes over the government institutions. In Egypt, although it was unconstitutional before the revolution in 2011 to nominate ministers who own their own business (Arab Republic of Egypt, 2007, art. 158) ,some of the appointed ministers by the president were the shareholders of a big business companies. Such actions were unable to be questioned by the parliament or any court. The judiciary system was mainly controlled by the ruling party and so was the parliament that was dominated by members of the National Democratic Party (the ruling party) (Brownlee, 2002, p. 1).

Competitive election is another form of external accountability and control exercised on politicians. Elections are believed by most scholars to be the one of the corner stones of democracy that reflects people’s needs through their elected politicians and connects people with the policy process in a way that reflect people’s preferences in public policies (Powell, 2000, p. 251). Although, Public can hold politicians accountable through channels that are created for this purpose such as the ombudsman, administrative tribunal and other organisation, elections stays the most pertinent tool for the public to hold politicians accountable in case of the dysfunction of the above organisations and channels. In Egypt, citizens created their own channels for holding politicians accountable through demonstrations that call for overthrowing the regime or organising early elections.

No forms of external accountability can be possible without a basic amount of transparency. Access to information and transparency can enable citizens to hold officials accountable. In contrast, O’Neill (2002) argued that the increase in transparency undermines professionalism in public administration and destroys trustworthiness. However, this argument may not necessarily be true as transparency helps the public to question and debate the actions of public officials. These public debates make officials more responsible, as their work will be eventually shared with the public. O’Neill’s argument is based on the way information is presented by governments, which is often a one-way communication. This information in his argument is received by the media who manipulates the crowd and especially those who may not have enough knowledge to interpret officials’ information correctly or judge media interpretation of the subject.

However, in the presence of social media, the space of interpretation changed from media organisations to individual interpretation, thus making no space for manipulation. An example of that is a recent issue that occurred in Egypt, where a carrier with 500 tons of phosphate rocks sank into the Nile River. This news went viral on social media and different people had their own interpretations; some held the government accountable while others said it is not an important issue to discuss and finally people had come to a common understanding that this case was not dangerous for public health and that this accident was a human mistake (Aljazeera, 2015). Thus, social media plays an important role to avoid misinterpretation of information or any manipulation exercised by the media and helps reach common understanding among citizens online.

The concluding third part of this series will highlight the role of social media in promoting public accountability and establishing a linkage with other types of accountability.

Author Biography

Haytham Atef is currently a postgraduate student at the Willy Brandt School – University of Erfurt. He graduated in 2014 with an MA in Global Citizenship, Identities and Human Rights from the University of Nottingham in the UK. Formerly, he worked as a researcher in the cabinet of the ministry of planning and international cooperation in Egypt, Haytham Mones has been working on developing strategies for transparency and access to information in the ministry. Through his 12 years of involvement with civil society in Egypt, working on various projects and initiatives, Haytham has cofounded Qestas NGO for peace, development and Human Rights in Egypt. He has also co-founded other initiatives, such as Sinai Development Project and Nation without Borders and currently RefUlink in Germany. He also worked as the deputy director of Tahrir Lounge project at the Goethe Institut and the Program Coordinator of Lazord Academy at the American University in Cairo.

References:

Aljazeera. (2015, April 25). A Phosphate carrier sank in Egypt [Gharaq Naqelet Fosfat Fe Masr]. Aljazeera.net. Cairo. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2015/4/

AlMonitor. (2014, August 12). Questions remain on Egypt’s Suez Canal project. Retrieved May 15, 2015, from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/egypt-sisi-project-new-canal-suez-feasible-economy.html#

Arab Republic of Egypt. (2007). THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 1971 (as Amended to 2007). Retrieved May 15, 2015, from http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Egypt Constitution.pdf

Behn, R. D. (2000). Rethinking Democratic Accountability. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Blaydes, L. (2008). Authoritarian elections and elite management: Theory and evidence from Egypt. Retrieved May 15, 2015, from https://www.princeton.edu/~piirs/Dictatorships042508/Blaydes.pdf

Brownlee, J. (2002). The Decline of Pluralism in Mubarak’s Egypt. Journal of Democracy, 13(4), 6–14.

Considine, M. (2002). The End of the Line? Accountable Governance in the Age of Networks, Partnerships, and Joined-Up Services. Governance, 15(1), 21–40.

Farid, D. (2014, August 5). Al-Sisi kicks off new Suez Canal project, lays down tightened completion deadline. Retrieved May 15, 2015, from http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/08/05/al-sisi-kicks-new-suez-canal-project-lays-tightened-completion-deadline/

Mulgan, R. (2000). “Accountability”: An Ever‐Expanding Concept? Public Administration, 78(3), 555–573.

O’Neill, O. (2002). Reith Lectures. Retrieved May 12, 2015, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00729d9/ broadcasts/2002/04

Powell, G. B. (2000). Elections as instruments of democracy: Majoritarian and proportional visions. Connecticut: Yale University Press.

Cover Image: Gigi Ibrahim under a CC BY 2.0 generic creative commons license

The 26^th Annual Summit of the African Union held in Addis Ababa was dominated by security issues as discussions over the ongoing situation in Burundi and Libya remained inconclusive. The Summit also took a highly symbolic decision when it overwhelmingly backed a proposal tabled by the Kenyan government to prepare a road-map for the withdrawal of African nations from the Rome Statute, the 1998 Treaty that underpins the International Criminal Court (ICC) based in The Hague. The decision is not legally binding but is the most recent development in the strained relationship between African Leaders and the International Criminal Court.

In order to understand the debate and arguments that underpin the tense relationship between African states and the ICC, a concise explanation of the structures of the International Criminal Court is necessary. The International Criminal Court is an independent international organisation that is not dependent of the United Nations. The Court tries individuals accused of crimes of great concern to the international community such as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. The Rome Statute, ratified by 123 countries, is its founding document and clearly stipulates its remit. The court is a legal instance of last resort. It may not act if a case is investigated or prosecuted by a national judicial system unless these proceedings are fraudulent. The court can also only exercise its jurisdiction with states that have ratified the Rome Statute or if the crime was committed by a national of a state party or in the territory of a state party. The court thus does not have jurisdiction in a state that has not ratified the Statute. This exemption can be lifted if a state voluntarily and temporarily recognises the authority of the court or if the matter has been referred to it by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The ICC’s office of the prosecutor also has the authority to conduct a preliminary examination anywhere in the world. However the actual ability of the court to try a non-party national is complex and un-clear. In most circumstances the ICC cannot try a non-party national that has committed crimes in a non-party state without any of these two states recognising the authority of the court. A number of issues relating to the courts remit, such as its role in regards to the crime aggression or the extent of its international jurisdiction, are still debated. The lack of a clear and established position for the ICC has thus at times made it vulnerable to intense criticism often calling into question its legitimacy. 

African states were early proponents of the court, as memories of the atrocities committed during the Rwandan Genocide and the civil wars in Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia were still raw. However relations have frayed in recent times. For many African leaders, the court is biased against the continent. In the words of President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan, himself facing indictments by the ICC for crimes committed in Darfur, the court has become “a tool to terrorize countries that the West thinks are disobedient”. During the 2013 African Union summit, amid calls by African Leaders for the court not to prosecute sitting leaders, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus declared that “the court has transformed itself into a political instrument targeting Africa and Africans“. The core of the evidence boils down to a simple point: All the 10 cases, or situations as they are called by the ICC, with the notable exception of the Georgian situation involve an African state. However these figures can be misleading and misunderstood. Of the 9 situations concerning African states, 5 were brought by the relevant African governments themselves. The situations concerning Darfur and Libya were referred to the court by the United Nations Security Council. In essence, the ICC’s only two situations that have been, at a first glance, independently opened by the Prosecutors office are the cases of Kenya and the Ivory Coast. The case relating to crimes against humanity committed in Kenya during the post-election violence of 2007 – 2008 is at the centre of the confrontation. The reason being simple: the impetus for leaving the Rome Statute is primarily the result of the lobbying undertaken by the Kenyan government.

The reason behind the tremendous lobbying efforts of the Kenyan government are quite simple. The current President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta, and his Vice President William Ruto were both indicted by the ICC for crimes against humanity following the Presidential elections of 2007. The President saw his charges dropped but his deputy had his charges confirmed and is currently on trial in The Hague. The matter of ICC involvement in Kenya is sensitive and has often been fuelled by allegations that ICC intends to destabilise the country or that it is a legal proxy of Imperialist policy. The current position of the Kenyan government in regards to the ICC is however fraught with hypocrisy and the result of a serious political miscalculation by senior Kenyan politicians.

In 2007, following disputed Presidential elections, the country erupted in violence which claimed over a 1000 lives and displaced over 500,000 people. The crisis was brought to an end by a power sharing agreement brokered by the former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. One of the key clauses of the agreement was the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the violence: The Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), better known as the Waki Commission. The commission’s report advised, among other things, that the government establish a special tribunal of national and international judges in order to investigate and prosecute crimes against humanity. The Commission took it upon themselves to warn that if the Kenyan government was unable to set up the stipulated court, the findings of the Commission would be passed to the ICC. Throughout 2009, the Kenyan parliament twice voted against establishing the proposed court.

By refusing the establishment of a Kenyan court, Kenyan MPs willingly ensured that the ICC would thus intervene. Indeed, supporters of the current Vice-President William Ruto notoriously declared “Let’s not be vague, Let’s go to the Hague”. The most probable explanation for the gamble is that most politicians expected the case to be a long protracted battle in The Hague, which turned out to be a serious political miscalculation. Following unwillingness of the Kenyan parliament to establish the court in Kenya, the Waki Commission sent the relevant information to the Office of the Prosecutor. Luis Moreno Ocampo, the Argentinian ICC Prosecutor at the time, thus conducted his preliminary examination with the information provided by the Kenyan judiciary in the form of the Waki Report. The Kenyan situation highlights an interesting point: the ICC can at times be a useful political tool for certain leaders as much as it can be a nuisance further along the line.   

The relationship between the ICC and African states regularly illustrates this dichotomy. As the situations in Uganda, the DRC, the Central African Republic and Mali clearly demonstrate, African leaders have most of the time energetically cooperated with the ICC when it suited their interests. Indeed, a vehement opponent of the ICC, President Yoweri Museveni was silent when Dominic Ongwen, a leader of the murderous Lord’s Resistance Army, was sent to trial at The Hague. The Congolese government has energetically delivered indicted former warlords such as Thomas Lubanga and Germain Katanga or remained silent in the case of political threats such as former vice-president Jean Pierre Bemba. The government of Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara has also closely collaborated with the ICC as his predecessor Laurent Gbagbo became the first former head of state to go on trial.

However, if President Ouattara seems to collaborate with the ICC when it comes to extraditing political opponents, it is doubtful that such cooperation will be forthcoming should close allies of the President be indicted. In essence, the ICC is a welcomed institutions for certain African leaders as long as the court does not impede on the power of the ruling elite. The case of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights clearly highlights this fact. The African Union has recently re-enforced the remit of the court in order to establish a regional counter-weight to the ICC. However, the Malabo Protocol of June 2014, guaranties immunity for serving heads of states or government from the prosecution of the new regional court. The new African regional court could thus not prosecute any of the long-standing African leaders.

Regardless of the nature or reasons for the current predicament the ICC faces on the African continent, an accurate point has been made. The ICC, even if it has conducted itself according to its remit and through proper channels, has overwhelmingly targeted situations in Africa while overlooking other dire situations in other parts of the world. However, this is not the result of a large pro-Western grand strategy or an attempt to discredit African leaders, but the result of flaws in its jurisdiction and the unwillingness of global powers to cooperate.

Currently, 123 states are party to the Rome Statute. The largest geographical segment is overwhelmingly the African continent, with 34 African states having ratified the Rome Statute. The second largest geographical area in terms of states having ratified the Rome Statute is the Asia-Pacific region with only 19 states. This divide highlights the first problem the ICC faces: a vast proportion of states have not ratified or even signed the Rome Statute. The situation in North Africa and the Middle East, a hotspot of international geo-political tension, is striking: only Jordan and Tunisia have ratified the Rome Statute. Key regional actors such as Iran, Saudi Arabia or Israel are thus outside the direct remit of the court with the probability of this status changing becoming slimmer as the regions conflicts intensify. Conflict zones in the region such as Syria, Iraq and Yemen are also not included in the court’s direct jurisdiction.

It could be argued that the question of jurisdiction could be over-ridden by a United Nations Security Council resolution. However it is at the UNSC that the ICC faces some of its most powerful detractors. Certain members of the UNSC’s permanent five, including the United States, China and Russia have been notable critics and at times opponents of the ICC. The United States under the Bush Administration was especially hostile to the ICC by completely disengaging with the court and by securing Bilateral Immunity Agreements with a 100 countries in order to protect Americans from the ICC’s jurisdiction. The US has softened its approach after the policy had un-foreseen but serious ramifications on US interests and with the arrival of the Obama Administration. The American government however has continued to distance itself of the court.  As permanent members with veto powers, any resolution empowering the ICC would most certainly be confronted by the political interests of the Great Powers. In March 2014, Russia and China vetoed a UNSC resolution that would have referred the conflict in Syria to the ICC. Taking into account recent air strikes on civilian targets in Syria by Russian forces, any change of demeanour is highly unlikely. In essence, the ICC has no remit or means by which to conduct any kind of inquiry against the major players of foreign affairs or in areas where their interests are too important. In regards to situations implicating European governments, the ICC faces the argument that it is an instance of last resort when the state party cannot fulfil its legal obligations. Most Western governments could easily argue that their legal systems seriously and adequately handle allegations of crimes against humanity. For example, the current work by the British government’s Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT) demonstrates at least a willingness by the United Kingdom to uphold its human rights obligations. This does infer a certain favouritism for Western legal structures, which seems to automatically imply a certain sense of higher worth.

In essence, the ICC does not attempt to pro-actively undermine African states. The International Criminal Court lacks the institutional power and scope to be a truly impartial legal body, as its abilities are continuously kept in check by Great Power politics and by its muddled legal structure. African leaders are correct to point that the ICC is fundamentally flawed, however their reasoning is still marred in hypocrisy and reflects certain African leader’s intent at self-preservation. In order for the International Criminal Court to effectively counter these accusations it will have to develop into a court able to hold to account Great Powers and clarify its remit in order to impose its position. That however seems for the time unlikely.

Author Biography

Alexandre Raymakers is a graduate of the London School of Economics and Political Science holding a degree in International History and International Relations. He has extensive personal experience on the African continent having been born in Zimbabwe and lived in 4 different countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. He has previously worked for the Swiss Embassy in Kenya and has been working in Strategic Communications in London for the past year. His interests include International Security, African politics and European Affairs.

Cover image ‘International Court of Justice at The Hague‘ by United Nations Photo

This series discusses different concepts of public accountability in the age of social media in Traditional Public administration (TPA) systems by drawing examples from Egypt, one of the countries that exhibit a high degree of interaction between social media and channels of internal and external accountability. Through social media, public accountability may intersect with other types of accountability such as professional and managerial. The series begins by examining the characteristics of TPA and the dilemma of the separation of politics and administration.

It continues discussing different types of accountability exercised by public officials internally and externally in TPA systems and critically analyses these concepts in relevance to the Egyptian case. In its second part, the series focuses on the various kinds of accountability in the Egyptian context while the concluding third part highlights the role of social media in promoting public accountability and establishing a linkage with other types of accountability. Social media not only presents itself as a new channel of public accountability, but it promotes and brings together other forms of accountability through its platforms.

Background of the Case Study

Egypt is one of the countries that are governed by a TPA system. Public administration in Egypt is organised through the civil service law number 47 issued in 1978 (Central Agency for Organisation and Administration, 2015). According to law, administrative officials are often appointed in a pyramid shaped structure institutions. They receive promotions up in the hierarchy of the government institution based on their years of service, which determines their grades and pay. In early 2011, a revolution had sparked in Egypt, inspired by social media calling for bread, freedom, justice (Alsharif & Saleh, 2013). The revolution believed that the system had failed to meet the needs of the people and to satisfy their hopes and thus it needed to be changed. In 2012, Morsi was the first democratically elected president in Egypt. The new president was the former head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s party, the most organised opposition group at the time and one of the oppressed political groups during Mubarak’s regime. In 2013, the military forces organised a coup to overthrow Morsi’s regime in response to the massive outrage against his government (BBC, 2015). The Egyptian military ruled the country in a transition period in order to prepare the country for a new presidential election after which General Abdelfatah Alsisi, the ex-minister of defence was elected.

Three major changes took place after the revolution: First, the political system has changed from a one party system to a multi-party system. In the new system, parties have no observable control over policymaking or administration and are struggling to build their own cadre (Aly, 2014). Second, a new constitution has been written that gives more power to parliament and supresses presidential absolute powers. Third, the relationship between the administration and politics became interwoven. Such reforms post revolution affected accountability in many different ways as explained later.

Accountability in Traditional Public Administration

Understanding Traditional Public Administration (TPA) will pave the way for the analysis of public accountability in Egypt. Scholars highlighted some characteristics of the institutions governed by TPA, some of these characteristics are: the preference of doing over thinking; sticking to routine, roles and responsibilities; considering resources and tasks as the main input and output of the organisation (Barzelay, 1992, pp. 8–9; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992, p. 14). In line with the above scholars Barzelay (1992, p. 179) saw TPA as a form of a bureaucratic system of governance, where substance and administration control the institutions of the government. In contrast, Lynn (2001, p. 147) argues that TPA systems perform better than other systems if it succeeded in creating a state of neutrality that enables its institutions to separate between politics and administration. However, Lynn’s views are not by default valid at all times, as the issue of corruption and self-interest still hinders the progress in TPA systems and especially in Egypt even if the state of neutrality is achieved.

The major debate among TPA scholars such as Wilson, Taylor and Weber is focused on the challenges of both efficiency and the separation of politics and administration in TPA systems (Behn, 2000, p. 40; Lynn Jr., 2001, p. 148). The problem arises from the mix that often occurs between elected and appointed officials in the governmental hierarchy. Politicians are supposed to be setting the policies and the technocrat administrative system should be responsible for the implementation. The separation between politics and administration can result in fair policies and an increase in efficiency. In addition, it can make accountability follow the top-down hierarchy of the government. Behn (2000, p. 41) argues that accountability in TPA is directly related to the politicians and citizens do not have to interfere with the implementation process, thus they can only correct the course of action through elections as a form of direct accountability.

In addition to the separation of politics from administration, a TPA system ideally holds some values such as representativeness, neutrality and leadership (Lynn Jr., 2001, p. 145). The change of regimes often comes with a change of values, ideas and system of operation that in Lynn’s (ibid, p. 145) view construct the notion of democratic governance. However, the embedded values in government institutions and organisational culture that develop throughout years of operation under a single political ideology can hardly be altered even after a major change in the ruling regime. Civil servants are often reluctant to change and prefer to adhere to their old values and beliefs rather than acquiring new ones.

From a managerial perspective, the civil servant duties depend mainly on the task they are required to finish, they should ideally stick to their job description and the tasks distributed by the managers without thinking about them (Behn, 2000, pp. 47–48). In order to do this, rules and regulations have been developed inside institutions to lessen the degree of freedom in judgement for civil servants and keep this as a task for their managers. This should hold the managers accountable for their actions as well as the civil servants. The question of compliance of public officials to their superiors is sometimes dependent on the fear factor of being penalized or the motive of civil servants to advance in their career (Mulgan, 2000, p. 557). In Egypt, the degree of freedom for a change in values or compliance of officials to their superiors is minimal given that the law of civil service promotes lifelong service contracts for civil servants and does not account for their effectiveness and efficiency at the workplace. It cannot result in their dismissal except in the case of committing a criminal offence (Central Agency for Organisation and Administration, 2015).

Part II of this Series will deal with different kinds of accountability in the Egyptian context.

Author Biography:

Haytham Atef is currently a postgraduate student at the Willy Brandt School – University of Erfurt. He graduated in 2014 with an MA in Global Citizenship, Identities and Human Rights from the University of Nottingham in the UK. Formerly, he worked as a researcher in the cabinet of the ministry of planning and international cooperation in Egypt, Haytham Mones has been working on developing strategies for transparency and access to information in the ministry. Through his 12 years of involvement with civil society in Egypt, working on various projects and initiatives, Haytham has cofounded the  Qestas NGO for peace, development and Human Rights in Egypt. He has also co-founded other initiatives, such as Sinai Development Project and Nation without Borders and currently RefUlink in Germany. He also worked as the deputy director of Tahrir Lounge project at the Goethe institut and the Program Coordinator of Lazord Academy at the American University in Cairo.

References:

Alsharif, A., & Saleh, Y. (2013, October 10). Special Report – The real force behind Egypt’s “revolution of the state.” Retrieved May 15, 2015, from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/10/10/uk-egypt-interior-special-report-idUKBRE99908720131010

Aly, B. (2014, April 4). Egypt’s fragile political parties and social movements. Retrieved March 8, 2015, from http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/egypts-fragile-political-parties-and-social-movements_22696

Barzelay, M. (1992). Breaking through Bureaucracy: A new vision for managing in government. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

BBC. (2015). Egypt Profile – Timeline. Retrieved August 1, 2015, from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13315719

Behn, R. D. (2000). Rethinking Democratic Accountability. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Central Agency for Organisation and Administration. (2015). Laws and Legislations Governing National Civil Service Employers [Allawaeh Wa Alqawaneen Allaty Tahkom Nezam Alaameleen Bel Dawla]. Retrieved May 15, 2015, from http://www.caoa.gov.eg/NR/rdonlyres/FA037574-105A-4331-B0F8-65E565BA6E11/3614/القوانينواللوائحالتىتحكمنظاما�

Lynn Jr., L. E. (2001). The myth of the bureaucratic paradigm: What traditional public administration really stood for. Public Administration Review, 61(2), 144–160. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/0033-3352.00016/full

Mulgan, R. (2000). “Accountability”: An Ever‐Expanding Concept? Public Administration, 78(3), 555–573.

Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing Government: How the entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the public sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Cover Image: Gigi Ibrahim under a CC-BY 2.0 creative commons license

This is a special guest post from former GPPW intern Saurav Raj Pant, originally posted on Glocal Khabar.

The day has gone, when herd of adult males are literally forced to be ‘exported’ to join British & Indian Army squad to work as a ‘surrogate’ army, letting them make no other choices of life. But, now adult males have choices to work and so do women. The passport (1960-1990) was kept under the ‘toe of regime’ and media was strictly regulated. Political forces were black-listed and individual political opinion was like a ‘fairy tale’.

Nepal has always been cut off and often under tug of war —–historically perceived ‘legitimate’ power to rule in Nepal & new force of intellectualism unilaterally working to make Nepal, free from family dictatorship to enable her under excellent functioning of democracy. Nepal’s post-1950’s scenario can be described as above.

Nepal’s new IT generation is making the things happen in a newer way—-not a proverb like ‘New wine in old bottle’. For the instance, how the things are working? I have visited one of the cafes in Kathmandu —— (Kathmandu, capital of Nepal) to know how youth are thinking in this entirely new global sphere (growing Asiatic age) and after newly promulgated constitution of Nepal.

I found out — Empowerment, Internationalism and liberal thinking are flourishing in an unprecedented way among Nepalese youth. The clout of an international thinking is growing among youth. During my encounter with 20-25 years of youth, their ‘epicenter’ of thought was — Nepal has long been ruled in a traditional way, utilizing traditional code of conducts, values and acts. Youth thinks that, in an entirely growing international atmosphere, Nepal must sell ‘water melons’ that she thinks appropriate. Meaning, Nepal should immediately build alliances with foreign country, to pave the way for economic boom.  The discussion further went ‘hot’ when one of the participants, Mr. Bidur Dhungana urged, how global economy is guiding global politics since 1970’s. And he further added that, Nepal should follow the path of economic expansion. He even emphasized that, “Empty stomach can’t chant the song of nationalism”.

Supporting Mr. Bidur’s version, yes it is a neo-reality of current world and one’s should think in an economic way, one of my statuses in Facebook, related to Nepal’s economic boom referring to ‘Indian economic embargo to Nepal’ issues was shared fairly (14 times) among colleagues. This sharing shows, how youth are thinking in a current environment (though, it is a very few shares, still it gives some insights).

Do you know why Mr. Modi ignored us during Facebook HQ live chat? He is on the voyage for Digital India Campaign- mammoth campaign to connect rural India’s through Digital Connectivity. And, do you know, why Mr. Zuckerberg, ignored our questions (as he did not public it to Mr. Modi)? He is on the voyage to expand his business in India among 1.25 billion populations through his magnum opus, Internet.org project. So, both are on a business deal. Where is India now? World’s third biggest economy and we are among the Asia’s poorest countries (0.03% GDP shares to the world). India is countering its seat for UNSC and Nepal is still trying hard to get out from LDC list. So, let us brainstorm for economic boom rather to debate on ‘India’s intervention’ in Nepal. If anyway we had thought it before, Kathmanduites would have never been under such ‘oil, food and necessity’ trap. Tweak the tweet ‪#‎BackOffIndia to ‪#‎BoominNepal

The other participant during my debate was—Mr. Samaya Lama 23, studies Political Science who urged the importance of Politics and role of leaders in changing the country.  He adds, “Nepal now cannot ignore the world affairs, primarily Nepal’s foreign policy was based on non-aligned movement. But at current, Nepal needs to rethink her foreign policy”.  He even urged, Nepal’s backwardness is also due to external factors, meaning Nepal should work in an international environment”.

Nepal got its new constitution on Sept, 2015 after 8 years of thundery struggle among various sections.  The newly promulgated constitution brought new hopes and energy but followed by perceived 4 months long ‘Indian economic embargo’ to Nepal—cutting off essential fuel supplies—–not letting everyone be known what had actually happened in New Delhi and in Kathmandu’s leadership circle. It is one of the ‘vacuum’ periods in Nepal-India relationship.

Anti-Indian sentiment (aka, perceived in Nepal as the purest form of Nepalese Nationalism) was the ‘SMARTLY’ planned propaganda by the then Nepalese divine power. Such, misled developed Nepal vulnerable to, 7 RCR’s geopolitical battlegrounds. The situation got even molten and now Nepal’s Haves & Haves-not is alienated into different factions, profoundly out of the access of Nepalese public, Katmandu’s ruling class and even New Delhi; constructed vacuum in Nepal.

This time amusingly, Delhi agitation to Nepal was, what Delhi believes—–Nepal is playing a ‘Chinese Card’.  Some notions suggest, India is continuously observing, current promulgated constitution as the ‘product’ of Chinese growing foreign policy in the region, where Nepalese leftist force were widely used by China to fulfill her vested interest.

Mr. Dipak B.k, who studies Information Management in Nepal was another guy with spectacle, says: “There’s nothing to worry about. It is propaganda penetrated by India to Nepal and does not hold any root to worry to about. In every generation, India tries to dictate her rules to this isolated but always mighty nation to make every new Nepalese generation to fear India. But, Nepal’s public is getting matured day by day. And, traditional leadership who shows some sort of ‘loyalty’ to southward neighbor won’t stand any more in Nepal. The day is not too far, when our Nepalese leadership candidate holds the academic degree, will have served Nepal for years and will be free of corruption. It is a transition phase and we are quickly surpassing it”.

Right! If taking the version of Mr. Dipak, Nepal’s public are getting matured day by day.  How? Nepal’s ultimate death point was—-lack of Nepal’s friendly politics & ideology coated by supreme leadership. But, the situation won’t last for more than 15 years. The thunder has been already started to be felt. One of the prominent examples has been established in 2013. The first constitutional assembly held on April 10, 2008, had put on power to UCPN (Maoist) by winning 229 seats (out of 601), for the purpose to promulgate the new constitution via constituent assembly. But, situation had degraded, and Maoist failed to give new constitution under her leadership. Then, there was a second constituent assembly as an effort to give second chance to political parties to promulgate constitution, which was held on November 9^th, 2013. Unfortunately, UCPN (Maoist) squeezed to 80 seats (out of 601). Such disaster was the outcome of the Maoist, who failed to fulfill promises of Nepalese public, which was made before the election. This is one of the prominent illustrations of how our public voters are ‘filtering’ their representatives in every successive election summoning for strong and qualified leadership in our public office.

These are ‘representative’ characters in Nepalese society, whose thinking and approach are changing towards Nepal in an optimum way. One of my friends proudly says about today’s Nepalese youth, “It has been 5 years, when our Telecom Authority had proudly installed telephone lines in every village communities of Nepal, making Nepal wide 100% coverage of connectivity. We are a part of post-cold war generation youth. This is today’s ‘ism’and ‘religion”. This is the age, where Nepalese is getting senior seat at AT & T (one of the renowned telecommunications in the US), followed by Nepalese who is playing a constructive role on NASA, for hunt to ‘water on mars’.

In a geostrategic sense, Nepal is a country, which lies in between India and China, —probably it is new ‘Geneva’ for sure in future to get negotiations on ground.  The country with 25+ embassies, multilateral organization and fertile land for ‘Game Theory’, it is proudly withstanding, against any anti forces directed to Nepal. This is how she is preparing herself in 21^st century world order. This is total globalization and more than, it is total ‘Nepolization’ (a Nepalese form of Globalization).

Author Bio

Saurav Raj Pant is an undergraduate student of Sociology & Population at Tri-Chandra Multiple Campus of Tribhuvan University, Nepal.  He is also a blogger and Campaigner in Nepal working for international issues that affects commons. His field of interest includes Globalization, European Union, Trans-Atlantic issues, Climate Change, public policies, Social Media, Geopolitics and Geo-economics. He is actively involved in organizing global campaigns and mobilizing youths in Nepal. Saurav was formerly part of GPPW’s internship programme.

Cover image taken from Glocal Khabar.

Guido Westerwelle was one of the defining politicians of the last 20 years in German politics.

Guido Westerwelle’s life was a politician’s life, born and raised in Western Germany to his parents, both lawyers, he joined the liberal democratic party (FDP) early on, made himself a name in the party’s youth organisation, the young liberals, became protégée to one of the party’s leaders and rose to be the head of his party following the downfall of his predecessors. As head of the liberal party he lead it to both its biggest win (2009), that made him Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and its most resounding loss, that saw the party lose all its seats in parliament (2013), within one electoral cycle. As his party imploded, Westerwelle lost his party posts and resigned himself to his role of Foreign Minister. In the aftermath of the 2013 election, he founded an internationally oriented NGO, the Westerwelle Foundation, into which he poured his energies upon leaving office.

Mr Westerwelle, as everyone, had his share of goofs and things that didn’t pan out quite as intended: there was the infamous ‘Guidomobil’ for campaigning in the early 2000s, his boldly proclaimed aim of 18% of the votes for a party that has traditionally been located around 8%, if that and then there was ‘Man spricht hier Deutsch.’ (We speak German here) as a reaction to the question of an international journalist in a press conference. While the latter led to the new genre of ‘westerwave’ (Welle being the German word for wave) jokes and memes, his politics and politicking always far outweighed his involuntary comedy.

Politically, Westerwelle led his party on a neo-liberal course, supporting deregulation and criticizing the status quo and policies especially of the social democrats during Gerhard Schröder’s chancellorship (1998-2005) and the first grand coalition under Angela Merkel (2005-2009). This culminated in the FDPs unheard of 15% result in the 2009 elections due to being the beneficiary of protest votes against the previous coalition. The CDU-FDP coalition now known as Merkel II was a succession of political failures to and fro, especially on the side of Westerwelle’s FDP. As the smoke of the 2009 social democratic debacle cleared, it became painfully obvious that the FDP was exactly that those of us of opposing views had feared from the start: the FDP in fact was a party that had little more than one topic (deregulation), was in the hands of lobby organizations (hotel, pharma, you name it) and had personnel that had little to no idea what it was doing or motivation to do the jobs it was given. With the FDP being a predominantly economically focused party, Guido Westerwelle’s first pick of a post would have been the ministry for the economy, that being said, traditionally in Germany the smaller coalition partner gets the position of foreign minister and the role of vice-chancellor that has been tied to it. So he became foreign minister and vice chancellor and one of his seconds got the job Westerwelle actually wanted to have. Quite ironically, Westerwelle’s successor as vice chancellor, Sigmar Gabriel, now does head the ministry of the economy, as a more seasoned diplomat is foreign minister. Lucky him.

As a foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle had quite an extended ‘getting into it’ period that only really ended when he stepped down as head of the FDP two years into the electoral cycle (in the aftermath of many a lost state election and political debacles too numerous to recount here) and was able to focus on his diplomatic job. As his party imploded, Westerwelle finally did seem to come into his own and to have found a role that fit him better than previous ones. As his party imploded, Westerwelle finally did seem to come into his own and to have found a role that fit him better than previous ones. When his party was voted out of parliament in 2013 and started its process of rebuilding, Westerwelle left the public eye and continued his international work with the establishment the Westerwelle Foundation that was only hampered by his illness.

One aspect of Guido Westerwelle’s life that shouldn’t be worth mentioning but led to some diplomatic issues as a minister is that he had a husband. While his sexuality was public knowledge since the 1990s, Westerwelle was part of a group of high-visibility politicians that confirmed in the early 2000s what everyone already knew (he was technically the 3^rd German politician to come out as gay when he did in 2004) – and the German public could hardly have cared less. As it should be. Needless to say, this led to some issues when planning diplomatic visits to less open countries as a minister, often with his entrepreneurial husband in tow, but even this was of little concern in the end.

Mr Westerwelle to me is a clear case of potential lost. Especially looking at the second part of his tenure as foreign minister and his work for the Westerwelle Foundation, I was genuinely looking forward to his contributions to the public at large as an elder statesman. As it stands, Westerwelle’s legacy will be little to none. He was ‘a politician’ with a biography like so many politicians, with his little successes and failures who only found his international calling late, after the height of his national political career. Too late to have a lasting impact as it turns out.

What is left is to remember not just the career politician he was for most of his life, but also the legacy he didn’t get to build and the contributions he didn’t get to make. We are at a loss for it.

Guido Westerwelle died after a protracted fight against cancer this morning. Our thoughts and well wishes are with his husband, family and friends.

Moritz Borchardt, 18/03/16

Cover image: Marco Fieber under a CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 creative commons license

Since the 2011 overthrow of Muammar Qadhafi, Libya has been in a state of deepening chaos. The country is divided between two rival governments, a UN recognised administration in Tobruk and an Islamist in the capital Tripoli. Recently, this chaos has grown more pronounced with the arrival of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) or Daesh . The militants have established a stronghold in Libya and are working to expand their control. The country has also seen the growth of large scale smuggling of refugees to Europe. (Note on terminology: The people moving from Libya to Europe come from a variety of countries, and many will not technically qualify for asylum seeker status as refugees, however in keeping with al Jazeera and other media outlets, I will refer to all those making the journey from Libya to Europe as refugees.)

In 2011, NATO forces intervened with airstrikes to assist rebel forces fighting against the Qadhafi regime. NATO airstrikes tipped the balance for the rebels, and contributed to the destruction of Qadhafi’s armed forces and regime (see below). After the overthrow of Qadhafi, various militias and armed groups struggled for power, leading to the divided government we see today. In the absence of a central government, armed groups including ISIS have flourished, along with people smuggling gangs, contributing to the twin crises of rising militancy and Europe’s ongoing refugee crisis.

Recently, there has been increasing talk about the possibility of renewed intervention in Libya. Various media outlets and think tanks have been speculating about intervention, on the grounds of combatting the growth of ISIS, and helping to restore peace between the warring factions and militias. Another, often unspoken goal is to help reduce the flow of refugees, outlined in a separate EU plan which has apparently been shelved. These plans share an implicit assumption that military force, which devastated the Libyan state in 2011, can now be used to help rebuild the country.

Neither of the above objectives, containing or destroying ISIS and halting refugee/migrant traffic across the Mediterranean to Italy, can be achieved by military means. The first objective falls into the trap of believing that ISIS is like any other conventional military adversary, which can be targeted and destroyed methodically. As ISIS has proved in Iraq and Syria, its forces are adept at adapting their tactics to airstrikes. By dispersing its fighters and taking shelter among the civilian population, ISIS can nullify the effectiveness of airstrikes or targeted missile attacks.

This leaves Western forces with two options if they wish to defeat or even seriously degrade ISIS’s fighting capability. They can either deploy their own ground forces to fight ISIS directly, or they can try and coordinate with local Libyan forces. Deployment of Western soldiers in meaningful numbers is improbable. After the United States’ experiences in Iraq, and in the middle of an election year any American deployment would be politically toxic. With Europe mired in sluggish economic growth, constant political squabbling and budgets for defence expenditure substantially reduced  any intervention in Libya is doubtful. Ground forces are thus unlikely to be forthcoming from  either side.

This leaves Western powers with no other choice but to coordinate with whatever Libyan forces they can recruit to their cause. As the American experience in Iraq has shown, depending on local forces, even a national army, is costly in terms of time and resources. Despite huge investment by the American government in training and equipping the Iraqi army, not to mention embedding advisors and providing close air support, progress against ISIS has been extremely slow, with the crucial city of Mosul out of reach until next year at least.

In the case of Libya, intervening Western forces are starting from an even lower base. The Libyan National Army is effectively the personal militia of former Qadhafi general Khalifa Haftar. The UN backed government in eastern Libya and its rival in Tripoli both depend on unwieldy coalitions of militias to stay in power and maintain security. Each militia is effectively an independent force operating under its own rules and according to its own specific objectives. Western intervention that does not actively involve the rival Tripoli and Tobruk governments and their allies risks drawing the Western forces deeper into Libya’s internal conflict.

In addition to the danger of becoming a player in the civil war, Western intervention would destroy the legitimacy of the UN backed government, by making it appear to be the West’s pawn. Western airstrikes, with their inevitable civilian casualties and destruction of infrastructure, would act as a massive propaganda coup for ISIS and hence an effective recruiting tool. Instead of defeating ISIS, the Western intervening forces might end up fighting against the Libyan people themselves while simultaneously making ISIS stronger, a disaster even greater than the initial 2011 intervention which helped to create the current crisis.

Intervention to try and halt the flow of refugees would also face great difficulties. The smuggling networks which facilitate the flow of refugees stretch much further than Libya, deep into North and West Africa. Talk about destroying the boats which launch refugees is also futile, as smugglers rarely go out themselves, and source their boats locally from Libyan fishermen, making tracking such boats nearly impossible. Smuggling gangs are often deeply embedded in local towns and social structures, and the lucrative nature of the trade makes it extremely attractive to locals with poor job prospects. Like all highly profitable illicit trades, migrant trafficking often involves multiple local and regional actors. In Libya, trafficking often involves the corruption of local government authority and in some cases the active involvement of local militias..

The EU cannot attempt to militarily police the entire length of the North African smuggling routes, nor can it patrol the entire length of the Libyan coast. Such an operation would be prohibitively expensive and would likely encounter armed resistance from local militias and smuggling gangs, not to mention the rival Libyan government in Tripoli who would see such an intervention as a violation of Libyan sovereignty. As with intervention against ISIS, such a move would likely inflame anti-EU and anti-Western sentiments and destroy the legitimacy of the eastern, UN backed government.

Military intervention in Libya, whether through air power, advisors or even boots on the ground, is likely to exacerbate the problems currently facing Libya, and by extension the West. ISIS has proven in Iraq and Syria that it can survive and thrive in the face of sustained Western pressure. It is thus highly un-likely that such tactics would achieve a different outcome in Libya without the support of ground forces, Libyan or otherwise. In addition, Western bombing can become a powerful recruitment tool for ISIS, meaning such an intervention might actually make the situation worse.

The same rationale applies to migrant trafficking. The lucrative nature of trafficking combined with Libya’s abysmal economic situation means that it will always remain an attractive option. Outright prohibition is impossible, and attempts to pursue smuggling networks will only inflame Libyan opposition while failing to address the problem itself. The EU and US need to rethink their strategy towards Libya and towards the Middle East in general. Until the default response to any crisis, from ISIS to migration stops being airstrikes, Western powers will find themselves stuck in a never ending cycle of policy failure.

Workable policy solutions will be hard to find. The ongoing UN peace process and attempts to form a unity government need to be continued and broadened, while diplomatically removing divisive figures like Haftar to ease tensions. The immediate focus must be on isolating ISIS and creating a broad based coalition of Libyan groups to confront the militants, while also providing non-military aid and financial support to local groups like the “Masked Men” of Zuwara who are working to curtail people smuggling. Supporting home grown Libyan efforts like the Masked Men and the emerging anti-ISIS forces while avoiding military intervention remains the only viable way to defeat militancy and people smuggling, and to restore peace to Libya.

Author Bio

Niall McGlynn is a graduate in history and science from Trinity College Dublin. He is currently studying for a Masters in International Relations at Leiden University. He has written articles on Irish and global affairs for Trinity News and thejournal.ie, and blogged about both subjects with his brothers at http://lazyhermes.blogspot.ie/. Niall tweets at @NiallMcGlynn1.

Cover image ‘Libya crisis 2012, 30 May‘ by European Commission DG ECHO

The end of 2015 saw the Scottish Government announce the first Scottish annual budget before new tax varying powers are given to the Scottish parliament in April.  This represents the first major post referendum event in Scottish politics.  It marks the first time a Scottish Parliament has had any control over the rate of income tax since 1707.  While the long term influence this will have on the Scottish budget remains to be seen, it will have a measurable effect.  With less money coming from the treasury every year, the Scottish government cannot rely on the status quo to fund the mechanisms of government.  The SNP were elected at Westminster in 2015 on a mandate characterised by social justice and economic equality, so the pressure is on the Scottish Government to deliver this with the planned devolved powers.    

Since the 1707 Act of Union, subsequent UK governments in London undertook all budgetary decisions until the creation of a Scottish Parliament in 1999.  Even post devolution, the Scottish Government is restricted in terms of what it can financially control due to the Scotland Act, which outlines the full remit of the Scottish parliament.  Since its creation and arguable success, many have said that parliament should have greater fiscal control, with the SNP advocating independence or full fiscal autonomy. Post referendum, the political landscape is once again transforming, with more tax powers to be devolved over the next two years, such as the devolution of income tax powers with the potential for more in the future.

“The simple fact is this tax power does not enable me to target help to those on the lowest incomes” – John Swinney

The original Scotland act granted the Scottish parliament the ability to vary the rate of tax by up to 3 pence in the pound.  If used it could raise an extra £350 million a year for the Scottish Government.  However as the tax rate was universal it would apply to all aspects of society, richer and poorer alike.  So it is understandable why no government used the Scottish variable rate to raise additional funds.  As the SNP never intended to use the power, they did not maintain the database required to properly implement the tax and as such the power is no longer available to the Scottish Government.  The new tax powers that come into play this year will reduce the current income tax rate by 10 percent, allowing the Scottish Government to make up the difference by setting a Scottish rate of income tax.  However, the government will not yet have the ability to set the income tax bands.  Without a direct link to ability to pay, it is difficult to foresee any economic benefit as a result of raising the income tax rate above the current level.  The new powers lack the ability to be flexible when making policy and fiscal decisions but from April 2017, the ability to control the bands of income tax will be fully devolved to the Scottish parliament, allowing for more accountable and responsible policy making.  The government could potentially use this power to raise the taxable threshold, taking thousands of low earners out of tax while raising the upper rate of tax so that the highest earners pay more into the system.  Up until now, the rhetoric of a fairer society has been just that, rhetoric.  This could represent the start of a massive economic shift as it would give the Scottish government the ability to fulfil promises and intensions made to the electorate.

Scottish Finance Secretary John Swinney’s budget has lasting implications for local councils as council tax has been frozen again for the ninth year in a row.  Once again, local government will need to reduce services or cut budgets to accommodate the rise in costs and reduction in funds.  It was always unlikely in an election budget that the government would push for an increase in council tax, yet it leaves many councils in a position where they will be forced to cut jobs in order to stay within budget.  While it is positive for taxpayers not paying annual increases on council tax, it means a significant reduction in council services, potentially thousands of job losses and damaging the local economy due to lack of investment in services.  The 2016/17 budget in many ways represents a missed opportunity to finally act on council tax reform.  There is already a cross party agreement for a fairer, progressive tax system for local government which will allow for a higher investment in local services.  The decision not to make any changes to the system must surely be a political decision by the SNP, especially this close to an election. 

“Let’s move beyond the rhetoric of a fairer Scotland and agree what needs to be done to achieve that” – Alex Neil MSP, Social justice secretary

In many respects, the gauntlet has been set out for the Scottish Government.  Being in control of raising taxation gives the parliament more accountability, but also a greater amount of responsibility not seen prior to the Act of Union in 1707.  While it remains uncertain what the long term significance of the recent budget will be, the status quo will not be an option for much longer.  New income tax powers devolved in April 2017 will allow the government full control over income tax rates and bands.  The introduction of these powers will require immediate action from the Scottish Government.  If Scotland re-elects an SNP government for a third term, the pressure will be firmly on the government to make good on promises of economic fairness and social justice which could be greatly achieved by the introduction of these powers.  The additional powers are a substantial step forward, but they carry significant risk if not used correctly.  In the near future, hard choices will have to be made to generate income so that spending doesn’t fall far below current levels.  The SNP now have a real opportunity to provide an alternative to increasing taxes or lowering public expenditure.  For the Scottish Government this should be seen as the chance to make good on promises to tax fairer and make social justice a reality in Scotland.

Author Bio

Alistair Hill currently has a Masters in Public Policy from the University of Strathclyde and is also a Social Sciences graduate of Glasgow Caledonian University.  His current research interests include Scottish party politics, Scottish environmental policy, social inequality, and Scottish and UK economic policy.

Cover image ‘fluttering flags‘ by byronv2

There is no denying that the European Union and the European project are not in the best shape these days.

The idea of a shared, open and peaceful Europe was always bound in its success to the European states’ ability to not just create a community of economies, but also a community of nations connected by shared values, cultural empathy and respect for one another. From its first steps in 1958 between two countries with a complicated history throughout earlier centuries, it was an obvious necessity that economic ties and incentives would be the lead-in to co-operations beyond the mere economical, in what was essentially a smaller part of the bigger family of nations represented in the UN.

Creating a sense of community and of belonging takes time, especially on the scale of hundreds of millions, and in a group as diverse as that of the European nations. From the regional differences between northern, eastern, western, southern and central Europe, to the political split of Europe during the Cold War and its piecemeal unification afterwards, from a United Kingdom that had (still has) to face its decline from a once great empire, from the special historical and economic role of Germany to Franco’s Spain, from the Greek economic mismanagement in the early days to Lichtenstein and Luxembourg, the reasons for dissent in the community are numerous to say the least.

If it took France, Western Germany and Italy more than 20 years after the end of World War II to stir and re-invigorate their post-totalitarian societies in the ’68 student revolutions, what timeframes are we to expect in the development of more recently established democracies, and how does this affect the relationship of each country with the rest of Europe? Empathy needs time and shared experiences, with the continuous expansion of the EU well into the 2010s, the idea of keeping the EU functional through difficult times seems optimistic at best.

As the financial crisis of 2008/09 hit, each member state had its hands full with the on-going consequences, both economic and political. Tensions started to rise internally and finally found a welcome external outlet with the arrival of larger numbers of refugees in 2015 that, through no fault of their own, became a pawn in European politics.

So, with rising tensions between those following Viktor Orban’s idea of building a fortress, and those subscribing to a more Human Rights based approach to refugees, with differing takes on dealing with Putin’s Russia, and a UK that threatens to not play with the other kids anymore, what are the options?

A solution of the conflicts underlying the current dissent-based state of the EU seems less and less likely as more and more people in each country are pushed off the political centre, pressuring established governments to take less and less dialogue-based stances. Diplomacy and empathy are in high demand, yet of questionable supply.

The European project always was, and will continue to be, a voluntary one; the economic and geopolitical benefits of being part of EU are there for the taking. Any community and any coalition of states is only as strong as the commitment of its members to the community, so maybe — just maybe — it is time to think about strengthening the community by reducing its size.

If the UK wants to vanish into global obscurity by leaving the EU, fine. If Viktor Orban and his cronies dreaming of homogenising Europe want to build a wall and shoot and everyone coming close to it, state sovereignty reigns supreme. But if the EU takes Human Rights seriously, a split of paths is inevitable and necessary. Good luck big guy.

Above all else, if European politicians want to have even the slightest bit of impact and go back to the good-old ‘leading by example’ in terms of long-term politics and projects, the Europe of the future needs to stay operational internally; it needs to retain and develop its single voice.

The big tasks and challenges determining the course of humanity in the foreseeable future are climate change, the inherent crisis of capitalism and the transition to post-growth economies. In comparison to the scale of these crises, squabbling about taking care of fellow human beings and not being distracted by destabilising efforts like those of Putin’s Russia are petty, insignificant and, quite frankly, laughable.

If keeping Europe afloat means changing it from a flock of those who want to share economic wealth, without the duties of a community, to a coalition of those following shared values and long-term solutions of problems we all face (economic or not), so be it.

Call it the shedding of excess weight, if you must.

Moritz Borchardt is a Director of GPPW – and occasionally frustrated with the current public discourse in mainstream media. Occasionally.

Cover image: Thijs ter Haar under a Attribution Generic 2.0 creative commons license