Author: kasmir

By Peter Russell

In one of his typically ebullient accounts of life in 1950s Greece, Patrick Leigh Fermor recalls how even the most isolated shepherds and villagers would display an acute curiosity about British politics, asking questions like “do you prefer Mr Churchill or Mr Attlee?”

In a similar manner, in the mid-1970s, I found myself with a German friend in a Turkish roadside café being asked whether Willy Brandt or Helmut Schmidt was the better Chancellor of then West Germany.  The German friend replied instantly: “Schmidt will be better for business, Willy Brandt was better for the people.”

The excellent website of the Willy Brandt Foundation shows four photographs of Brandt from different times of his remarkable life.

The first is as young man in exile in Norway in 1937, where he had fled from the Nazis. He worked in the resistance both in Norway and undercover in Germany. During his later political career in post-war West  Germany, he was criticised for doing so  and for taking Norwegian citizenship.

The second picture shows Brandt in 1958 as the transformational Mayor of West Berlin. During his terms of office (to 1966) tens of thousands of homes were built and the entire modern infrastructure of the city was put into place.

He also embodied the spirit of West Berlin as an island of social democracy surrounded by Stalinism. This included not only accompanying John F. Kennedy on his famous visit in 1961, but also demanding of the President that West Berlin needed not just words but also political action to resist the Soviet Union and its East German client state.

The third picture shows Willy Brandt as the first Social Democrat Chancellor of West Germany. His time in office from 1969-74 was marked by a blizzard of legislation which brought about widespread progress and reform in domestic  policy including health, education, social security, housing and infrastructure, planning and urban and rural development. His will and ability to force through such a radical programme also earned him, at least tacitly, the support of much of the Extra Parliamentary Opposition (APO), and further isolated extreme elements like the Rote-Armee-Fraktion (RAF).

As Chancellor , Brandt also stood up to the internal lobby of ethnic Germans displaced from eastern Europe after WW2, making it clear that the future for Germany would be east of the Rhine and west of the Oder-Neiße-Line, with no expansionary ambitions on its neighbours.

With this established, he set out on his mission of the new Ostpolitik, leading the way in blunting the threats of the Cold War, despite his country being under continued partition and partial occupation by the USSR. His achievements in east-west diplomacy earned Willy Brandt the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971.

This same third picture shows Brandt in his truly iconic status:  the German Chancellor kneeling in penance at the Warsaw Ghetto memorial in 1970. The “Warschauer Kniefall” was his spontaneous gesture after which nothing was ever the same again, as the head of the West German government sought atonement for the crimes which his countrymen and women had committed.

Brandt himself was one of those individuals whose exile and resistance had proven that the first victims of the Nazis were Germans, so he bore no personal guilt, but he had the vast personal courage to bear the dreadful weight of his country’s shame if it would help to build a new common future in Europe.

Willy Brandt lost the Chancellorship in 1974 following the discovery of infiltration of his closest circles by the East German Stasi. There had also been persistent rumours of heavy drinking and womanising.

Brandt admitted on stepping down that he was exhausted and had run out of political steam, but on his recovery, he took on a new lease of life as he turned to north-south issues with the same vigour as he had addressed the east-west question.

He headed the Independent Commission for International Developmental Issues, and produced the Brandt Report in 1980, which called for drastic changes in the global attitude towards development in the Third World. His conclusion was:

“Could we not begin to lay the basis for that new community with reasonable relations among all people and nations, and to build a world in which sharing, justice, freedom and peace might prevail?”(1983)

The final photo is of Willy Brandt celebrating the reunification of Berlin (and Germany) in 1989. Elderly, frail and at the same time seemingly indestructible, he lived to see at last the end of totalitarianism in Germany, and his beloved Germany reunited and at peace with itself and its neighbours.  In disagreement with his colleagues in the SPD, he had supported an immediate reunification rather than a gradual assimilation of the former GDR: it is possible that he was impatient for this to happen in his own lifetime.

If so, he was successful. No-one has ever achieved so much for Germany, and or possibly for any country in Europe.

18th December 2013 marked the centenary of Willy Brandt’s birth, which made him only five years older than Nelson Mandela, whom he predeceased by 11 years, having died in October 1992. Since Mandela’s death, there have been various comparisons with his life and achievements,  but it is genuinely worth arguing that in some ways, Willy Brandt was his European equivalent.

Like Mandela, Brandt had been an undercover freedom fighter against racist right-wing oppression. He was a democrat, and a symbol of reconciliation and peace. He fought all of his life for social justice based on unity and solidarity. He was a beacon of progress for his country and his continent.

Very few such men come along in history, who change the world for the better.  One of these in the 20th century was Nelson Mandela, another was Willy Brandt.

Author Biography

Peter Russell is a retired local government officer and policy specialist living in Glasgow. He has previously worked in policy positions for Greater London Council and for Glasgow City Council as a PA to successive Leaders of the Council, subsequently moving to economic policy, social policy and international strategies, ending up as Advisor to the Lord Provost. He has also worked extensively in Europe with EUROCITIES, and in Russia on European Union know-how projects, specialising in urban regeneration. 

You can find him on WordPress & Twitter

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For further accounts of Willy Brandt’s life see the following:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Willy_Brandt (an unusually comprehensive wiki biography)

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/77739/Willy-Brandt

*Cover image ‘Willy Brandt talking at an SPD meeting inDortmund, 1983‘ by Bundesarchiv, B 145 Bild-F064862-0019 / Schaack, Lothar / CC-BY-SA

Where the Black Gold lies beneath the Frozen Route of the Ships

The night is at its high, with the stars lighting the skies and the Northern Lights bringing the darkness a greenish illumination. The travellers came ashore and made a fire in a place where the sea and tall green pines meet, seeking warmth and shelter beneath the trees. They laugh and smile, and tell the stories of the wives and children they will soon see again, after they resume their travel back to the west. Their helmets, shields and swords are kept close by, however. They know the stories told by others about this place, they have heard of the creature that wanders there. A bear, but not just any bear; a huge brown creature with extraordinary force and piercing blue eyes, haunting the travellers that, like them, dare to make ashore. Even those that just pass by in their Drakkars claim to have heard its roar. And though many believe the bear died many years ago, the travellers are a superstitious and cautious group.

Suddenly the laughter and stories are interrupted, the atmosphere broken by a roar, stronger than that of any normal animal. Frightened and fleeing for their lives, the travellers retreat to their ship and push away from the shore, heading for the safety of the open sea. Some of the men claim they saw the beast in amongst the trees, the once powerful creature back from the dead, prone to keeping intruders out of it territory. They only hope that the creature will keep its watch to its own territory.

The same question might be made now by current Western nations bordering Russia. Countries that once had to deal with the strength and movements made by the Soviet Union, then mostly aggressive, and who are now in respite after its collapse, causing  peace and stability to be the predominant situation in the areas that share a border with Russia. And like the travellers from the ship, these countries are also now hearing the roaring of a Russia that wants to return to the Geopolitical stage. And the Arctic is one of those regions where the roar is being heard most strongly. As Cole (2013) points out, the Russian navy itself stated that it would make the Arctic its priority during this current year, and the Russian president also declared the Arctic as an important element for Russia’s economy and security. Following this, Russia is increasing its military presence by deploying aerospace and electronic warfare assets, complementing it with a network of early-warning missile radars¹ (Cole, 2013) .

Such attitude is explained by the Russian objectives on and visions of the Arctic, which are being stated in its Arctic Strategy of 2008. In that document, the Russian interests in the region are explained as follows: first, the utilization of the Russian Arctic as a national strategic resource base aimed at fulfilling economic growth. Second, the preservation of the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation. Third, the protection of the Arctic ecosystem. And fourth, the use of the North Sea passage to connect Russia with the Arctic. Following those interests, the Russian objectives are: First, the expansion of the Russian Arctic resource base. Second – and very much in the frame of national security – the protection and defence of the Russian (Arctic) boundaries, including the provision of an optimal operating environment in the area as well as the preservation of the fighting capabilities of the military units stationed within. Third, the protection and preservation of the Arctic ecosystem and the mitigations of the effect on it by both climate change and economic activities. Fourth, the formation of a unified space in the Russian Arctic². And fifth, the guaranteeing of mutually beneficial cooperation with other Arctic States and Russia.

The priorities established to meet the interests and objectives are: the interaction of Russia with other Arctic states for the delineation of boundaries under the rule of international laws and agreements; to increase efforts on the creation of a SAR and accidents management and prevention system by the Arctic states; the strengthening of Russian relations with the mentioned Arctic States and Organizations; the assistance in the creation and utilization of sea and air routes over the Russian Arctic; the promotion of Russian states and public organizations in international forums and activities on the Arctic; to set a delineation of territory at the Arctic Ocean; improvement of socio-economic development in the Russian Arctic; improvement of indigenous populations’ quality of life; to develop the resource base through technology; and the modernization and development of transportation infrastructure and fishing industry in the Russian Arctic.

When Russia planted a flag on the seabed at the North Pole in August 2007, it marked not only the true expression of the Russian interest in the area and its real intentions, but also the beginning of reactions by different countries, according to Huebert, Exner – Pirot, Lajeneusse, & Gulledge (2012). And it is at a certain point understandable.

There are two economic factors that pushes Russia to adopt the attitude it is taking on the area.

The first is that all along the Russian Artic seashore, another of the shipping routes will be placed: the Northeast Passage or Northern Sea Route, which, according to Sokolov (2012), will provide a shorter alternative to other shipping routes such as the Southerly Route (from Europe to the Far East) and those that make use of the Panama Canal for connecting the US West Coast and Europe³. Russia, according to Zysk (2010), thinks that a profit can be made out of this route, and intends to use the route as a way for Russian strategic industries to move their goods and products to the destination markets. But it will also provide the infrastructure needed for the utilization of that route by Russian owned ships and others from different nationalities. By 2015, for example, Russia aims to have completed the establishment and development of infrastructure, as well as a system of management for communication for such a route, that is predicted to be used by an estimated 6 to 15 million tons of transit. Harbours are also on to be developed along with the construction of new icebreakers capable of carrying helicopters for SAR operations, since the current fleet of that type of vessels are close decommission. However, recent economic conditions have taken their toll, halting even the development and construction of the new vessels (Zysk, 2010).

The second factor is of the aforementioned resources. In a deeper view and according to Zysk (2010), 20% of Russia’s GDP is being produced in the Arctic region of the country – growth that can be boosted by the prospective resources and the previously mentioned shipping passage. But as Zysk (2010) also mentions, the importance of the Arctic for Russia has another element that explains the need to “increase the resource base” as was expressed in its Arctic Strategy. It has to do with regaining relevance in international politics by reaching energy independence, and a considerable quantity of oil and gas resources, amonsgt others, are located in Arctic waters. Baev (2010) mentions that the Arctic reserves of oil, natural gas, coal, gold and diamonds would have a value of near 5 trillion dollars, at least according to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s statement. The problem is that, given certain external economic factors, the development of those resources will not be as significant as it would initially appear to be. The economic downturn, the relative low prices for energy and a drop on export and revenues suffered by the biggest Russian oil company Gazprom led to a delay in the launching of one of the biggest offshore gas fields in the world (Zysk, 2010). And as though things were not bad enough, the lack of basic infrastructure to support the project is also increasing the delay, along with the exerted monopoly on the industry that keeps other companies other than those owned by the Russian state (i.e. Gazprom and Rosneft) away from the areas to be explored and exploited (Baev, 2010).

Given the previous explanations, it is understandable why Russia is setting its eyes on its northern area. Its economy, as well as it political ambitions, simply drives Russia to do so, especially when there are oil reserves that can aid the Russian economy as well as the sole presence of a new shipping route such as the Northeast Passage. And as it can be observed, even today the Russian economy needs urgent aid while the ghost of the crisis left after the collapse of the Soviet Union still haunts the Russian policymakers and the political establishment, along with the ghosts of the promises in both (geo)political and economic areas.

But the strategic importance of the Arctic is not only a matter of economics and nor is it solely a matter of the current times. It is connected to that past when Russia was under Soviet rule and was the second Great Super Power of the world. Since the 1950’s the Arctic has been a key element in Russian defence industries and vital to its infrastructure dedicated to nuclear deterrence, such as the Kola Peninsula installations, as well as its nuclear assets (i.e. the Russian nuclear submarine bases). The most immediate way for Russian vessels to access “warm waters” also happens to be through the Arctic, a factor that became even more important after the loss of several shorelines and ports after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Arctic has also been perceived as a strategic zone that needs to be defended against what Russia perceives as “aggressive exercises” made by NATO in Danish and Norwegian waters and territories in the area. More precisely, Russia perceives NATO and the United States as the main threats for the next 10 or 15 years in the Arctic area (Laruelle, 2011; Zysk, 2010; Perry & Andersen, 2012).

It is also worthwhile to note that, according to Zysk (2008), Svalbard currently has an important place in the Russian rhetoric (and I suspect even in its political-military strategy) regarding the Arctic, where the keeping of a military presence at Spitsbergen is perceived as a strategic importance in order to secure strategic and economic interests in the area. It is also seen as a way to keep the NATO from controlling the entire archipelago and prevent the usage of monitoring and surveillance systems against a Russia that is destined to be driven off the islands and away from the Arctic if the Norwegian High North and Svalbard policies, not to mention NATO, have their way.

However this is not the only source of conflict with a NATO neighbouring member or NATO itself; Zysk (2008) also mentions NATO’s military and technological supremacy, the creation and introduction of new weapons systems, the planned deployments for the Anti-ballistic Missile Defence by the US in Central Europe, the enlargement of NATO to the East and the role of Western nations in countries that were part of Soviet influence during the Cold War (p. 81). As a matter of fact, Zysk (2008) also remarks that the Russian approach to international relations relies on a sort of classical realism where the United States and NATO are effectively labelled as the main sources of threat against Russia. And such a mentality is deeply rooted in large parts of the military, political and academic establishment.

As a consequence, the Russian Navy has just resumed its presence in the Arctic, patrolling near Danish and Norwegian defence zones and even organizing exercises involving cruisers near Svalbard to protect Russian fishermen. Russian submarines are also more active in the area along with Tu-95 nuclear bombers flying over the Arctic and even reaching close to Canadian air space (Laruelle, 2011; Zysk, 2010). Additionally, and according to Laruelle (2011) and Zysk (2010), a spetsnaz unit would be created in the Russian Arctic within a possible new Arctic military district, to be operative by 2016.

The Arctic also plays an important role for the renewed Russian naval ambitions, with Russia aiming to be the second great and powerful navy in the next 20–30 years. Deployments of the nuclear powered cruised Piotr Velikiy (Kirov Class)to the Caribbean, Mediterranean, South Atlantic and Indian Ocean, the seas that were once sailed by the Red Navy at its peak. There are also plans for new nuclear submarines, the Borei class, as well as the modernization of the current fleet, the adoption of modular and flexible ships like 20 Steregushchii class corvettes and 20 Admiral S. Gorshkov class frigates, and six aircraft carriers. (Laruelle, 2011; Zysk, 2010). Modernization of the navy is, in consequence, an important action for the Russian Arctic policies and the exertion of sovereignty in the area, not to mention that it would grant Moscow with the control and “buffer-defence zone” against its perceived threats.

According to Wezeman (2012), currently Russia has 100 Tu-22 supersonic and Tu-142 strategic bombers, along with Il-38 maritime reconnaissance aircraft that are being operated by the navy and whose tasks are to provide it with support (mainly for the Northern Fleet)⁴. As was previously mentioned, since 2007 those aircraft have been resuming their operations near and at the Arctic. A naval infantry and army brigade are stationed at the Kola Peninsula near Scandinavia, and have been reinforced since 2011 by an Arctic special forces brigade on the same peninsula, with two more brigades to follow by 2015 (Wezeman, 2012). These new brigades will have MT-LBV multirole armoured transports and would have a partial air mobility, and will be based at Murmansk (Kola Peninsula) and Arkhangelsk⁵.

On the naval aspect, the Russian navy has its Northern Fleet which has bases and airbases at the Kola Peninsula and the coasts of the Barents and White Sea. Among the vessels that are currently deployed in the area are some nuclear powered ballistic submarines (SSBN) protected in turn by the only aircraft carrier that Russia has, nuclear powered submarines and the aforementioned aircraft. Russian submarines have been active again since 2009 and one has even launched a ballistic missile. The Northern fleet also has one thick-ice capable icebreaker, the 50 Let Pobedy, and four other small ice breaker vessels that operate with the Northern and Pacific fleets. Five armed icebreaking OPVs are currently operated by the Border Guard Service, along with another 20 civilian icebreakers. Power projection capabilities saw an increase with the 4 Mistral class amphibious assault/helicopter carrier ships that were ordered from France in 2010 and 2011. The Russian Pacific Fleet also operates in the eastern areas of the Arctic (Wezeman, 2012).

It is evident then that the Russian interests in the area have a strong basis as far as economic and strategic matters are concerned. Indeed, Russia needs to recover economically from the Soviet disaster and the crash and crisis it faced in the Post-Cold War era, and with its plentiful resources the Arctic logically becomes the economic playground. But it is a playground that needs to be protected in a world where oil is still the most highly valued commodity and one whose prices are making the profits from its exploitation and commercialization a sweet temptation. Furthermore, those prospective resources might provide Russia a renewed geopolitical status where oil would be one of the pillars of its power and the key to gaining influence in the international arena, not to mention that the sole controlling of those resources might provide Russia with political power (Morgenthau, 2006). In addition, the potential new northeast shipping route is another fact in the economy argument that pushes Russia to pay more attention to its Arctic backyard, since the majority of the route is within its territory. Mahan (1987) and Corbett (1988) reminds us that as this new route is a sea line of communication, given its economic value needs to be protected and secured via naval and other kind of military power, to avoid its contesting by other powers such as China or the USA, as well as to secure the own commercial ships and of other nations. And Russian inteds to use the new routefor shipping it’s own explited oil and other resources.

But are the security interests the most problematic issues for Russia and its neighbouring Arctic nations? At a first glance, the excessive concerns regarding NATO and Norway, for example, are triggering attitudes and criticism from many Western countries, ranging from Canada to Norway, which has had the effect of every Russian action now being eyed under suspicion. Even worse, Russian actions are forcing some of those nations to increase their military presence and assets, and others to move increasingly towards a defence cooperation with its neighbours, as is going on now with Finland and Sweden and the Nordic Defence Cooperation. Indeed, Sweden would even move closer to NATO in order to guarantee its security facing a Russia that it is becoming a renewed threat as it was during the days of the Cold War. If anything, the Russian attitudes and actions are the reasons why a conflict might erupt in the Arctic or even in Europe (namely the Scandinavian Peninsula and the eastern parts of Europe). The increased investments on military assets by Russia are just logs that are fuelling a very dangerous fire. In the rush to secure its Arctic area, Russia is simply adopting aggressive attitudes that won’t help in any planned cooperation or any peaceful resolution of any dispute, nor to solve jointly with the Arctic Countries any situation that might take place in the area. And by doing so its paranoia of NATO and other countries might just turn into a reality by its own hand. This is worsened by the fact that the Arctic would be one of the first front-lines if a major dispute erupts between Russia and NATO, and the dreams of a powerful and hegemonic Russia are slowly heading down the path into such an undesirable scenario. The war in Georgia in 2008 is just one proof of aggressive and unpredictable Russian  behaviour.

Russia could simply step down its militarization of the Arctic to some reasonable levels if it really wants to contribute to a stable, cooperative and peaceful Arctic, just as all of the Western Arctic nations reviewed so far desire in their strategies. Put simply, it would be good if the Russian bear kept its watch solely on its territory and does not stray beyond it.

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¹ See: Cole, J. M (2013). Militarization of the Arctic Heats Up, Russian Takes the Lead. The Diplomat, Flashpoints. Retrieved from: http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/militarization-of-the-arctic-heats-up-russia-takes-the-lead/ on 17.01.2014.

² This area of information technology and telecommunications.

³ The Northeast Passage would be about 8.452 miles long, according to Sokolov (2012).

⁴ Also some aircraft belonging to the Pacific Fleet are executing similar operations with the same purpose, according to Wezeman (2012).

⁵ See: Pettersen, T (2012). Russian Arctic brigades put off to 2015. Barents Observer. Retrieved from: http://barentsobserver.com/en/topics/russian-arctic-brigades-put-2015 on 27.01.2014

Sources

Baev, P. K (2010). Russia’s Arctic Policy. Geopolitics, Mercantilism and Identity – building. Briefing Paper 73, December 2010. The Finnish Institute of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, Finland.

Cole, J. M (2013). Militarization of the Arctic Heats Up, Russian Takes the Lead. The Diplomat, Flashpoints. Retrieved from: http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/militarization-of-the-arctic-heats-up-russia-takes-the-lead/ on 17.01.2014

Corbett, J. S (1988). Chapter 1. The Theory of War. Chapter Two. Nature of Wars – Offensive and Defensive. In: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Annapolis, Maryland, US.: United States Naval Institute. (pp. 15 – 30); (pp. 31 – 40).

Huebert, R., Exner – Pirot, H., Lajeneusse, A., & Gulledge, J. (2012). Climate Change and International Security: the Arctic as a Bellwelther. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. Arlington, Virginia, USA.

Laruelle, M (2011). Chapter 3. Russian Military Presence in the High North: Projection of Power and Capacities of Action. In: Blank, S. J (Ed.) Russia in the Arctic (pp. 63 – 89). Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute.

Russia’s New Arctic Strategy (2010). The Journal of International Security Affairs, 18, pp. 97 – 105. Retrieved from: http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2010/18/russia’s_new_arctic_strategy.pdf on 17. 01. 2014

Mahan, A. T (1987). Introductory; and Chapter I. Discussions of the Elements of Sea Power. In: The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660 – 1783. Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications Inc. (p. 1 – 24); (p. 25 – 89).

Morgenthau, J. A (2006). Chapter 9. Elements of National Power (pp. 122 – 162). In: Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (Revised by Thompson K. W, & Clinton D. W. 7^th Edition). New York.: McGraw Hill.

Perry, C. M; & Andersen, B (2012). Chapter 3. The Arctic Five: Priorities, Policies, & Programs. Russia. In: New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and Cooperation (pp. 50 – 68). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

Pettersen, T (2012). Russian Arctic brigades putt off to 2015. Barents Observer. Retrieved from: http://barentsobserver.com/en/topics/russian-arctic-brigades-put-2015 on 27.01.2014

Sokolov, V. A (2012). The Russian Arctic Strategy 2020. [Power Point Presentation]. Washington DC, USA: Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States of America. Retrieved from: http://www.star.nesdis.noaa.gov/star/documents/meetings/Ice2013/dayOne/Sokolov_Russian.pdf on 17.01.2014.

Wezeman, S. T (2012). Military Capabilities in the Arctic. SIPRI Background Paper. SIPRI. Stockholm, Sweden.

Zysk, K (2010). Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Ambitions and Constraints. Joint Force Quarterly, 57, 2nd quarter 2010, pp. 103 – 110. ndupress.ndu.edu.

Zysk, K (2008). Russian Military Power and the Arctic (pp. 80 – 86). EU – Russia Centre. Brussels, Belgium.

*Cover image ‘Navy parad in St. Petersburg, 2012‘ by vitaly.repin

By Moritz Borchardt 

From a western point of view, Belarus, the Belarusian state and its citizenry are not in good shape in the second decade of the 21st century. The country’s leader, Alyaksandr Lukashenka, is widely considered to be Europe’s last tyrant, and the relationship with its long-time partner Russia has been strained and tried on several occasions since the beginning of the millennium and what is left of its civil society is struggling with the state as much as it is with sowing the seeds for future pro-democratic developments. (Silitski, p. 25)

Especially in regard to the development of democratic citizenship – and thus an emotional sense of belonging and ownership of a home country – Belarus is facing challenges unlike most contemporary states. Throughout the history of what is now called Belarus, there scarcely was a political entity that was sovereign from foreign dominance; coming out of the middle ages, the vast majority of the country was part of the Grand-Duchy of Lithuania, later it was union with the Polish Commonwealth and then succeeding that, Russia. Only during two brief windows of time did an independent, democratic Belarus exist. The first of which was the Byelorusian Peoples’ Republic of 1918 that was ‘integrated’ into Bolshevik forces only one year later and then part of the USSR until 1990. The next window of opportunity then revealed itself just after the fall of and independence from the Soviet Union. Only in the four years between the beginning of its independence and Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s success in the 1994 elections, was there a chance for democratic values to freely develop. (Matskevich et al., p. 18f.)

For political change to begin from within any one society, it is a presupposition that a sense of belonging to, ownership of and responsibility for it has been developed in that society. Here, the concept of rights – at the core of it, Human Rights¹ – becomes important as only through a consciousness and awareness of positive and negative rights, independent from the system or government active at any given point in time, societal change can happen. While this change scarcely happens entirely without external influences, no matter how big the resources invested into the solution of any kind of problem, the aspect of a cultural readiness to implement change is still a necessity for its success. This readiness however is usually based in previous experiences with higher degrees of freedom, an education about it and / or the sense of a common cultural identity as a nation, ethnic group or cultural space. As authors such as Matskevich et al. (2009) write, citizenship in the 21st century, especially among young people, is being understood mostly as a socio-political attribute independent from any specific country. (Matskevich et al., p. 14) As such, the repeated creation and re-creation of an independent Belarusian identity outside state-run structures is paramount for a piecemeal opening of its society. However, while there is no evidence to suggest that the Lukashenka regime is following policies actively limiting core Human Rights such as the right to life, ownership or access to public education for its citizens in general, its more conservative approaches towards non-state education and media are known and oft reported on. (Sahm, p. 52)

The argument may be made that Lukashenka’s repressiveness against low-tier activism can be seen as a consequence of his own quick ascension in the Belarusian political field from an outsider to his success in the country’s only truly competitive election of 1994 and a highly personalized authoritarian rule within only a few years. (Gel’man, p. 167 ff.)  Especially with regard to civil society actors and the development of a civil society independent from state ideologies, the current regime has proven a strong hand and keen eye on such developments. Any demonstration of political opinions dissenting from the government’s is followed by repressive actions from the authorities. This was evidenced by the harsh reactions to demonstrations against electoral irregularities in the follow-up to the presidential elections of 2006 and 2010, in the aftermath of which several former presidential candidates who were backed by civil society such as Alyaksandr Milinkevich, Alyaksandr Kazulin and several others were being taken into custody and sentenced to imprisonment. (Council of Europe) The 2006 and 2010 demonstrations were backed by broad civil-society attempts to mobilize a Belarusian public that is aware of and in disagreement with injustice committed by its government. Yet with all their efforts and suffering, the force and decisiveness of the government’s reaction left no doubt about the prospects of further attempts at public civil dissent in the short term. (Melyantsou, p. 48 f) Following 2006, Lukashenka’s rule has remained virtually unchallenged and civil society activism been forced even further into political ineffectiveness and extra-legality.(Silitski, p. 31) Furthermore, official registration of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has come to a halt for the most part and free communication channels have been systematically shut down. (Sahm, p. 52)

With both a governing regime repressing any activism that might potentially lead to a weakening of its position in society and a population lacking both sentiment for and a sense of ownership of their society, it is little surprising that in 2008 Tatsiana Vadalazkaya, the curator of the Flying University, found that a representative sample of the Belarusian population understood and defined its citizenship in a predominantly passive way through ascribed attributes such as ‘territory’ and ‘status’, ‘rights and duties’ toward their home country and feelings such as ‘love’, but considerably less so through attributes indicating a more mutual, two–way relationship such as ‘activism’. (Vadalazhkaya, p. 87)  In addition to this, she also found that while a majority of her sample defined themselves strongly as Belarusian, the socio-political importance and the day-to-day influence between citizen and state are considered to be low. (Vadalazhkaya, p. 74 f)

Consequently, societal change that is induced and fostered from within Belarus seems as far-fetched as it would be for Alyaksandr Lukashenka to lessen his grip on the Belarusian civil society out of the goodness of his heart.

Following this, the development and strengthening of Belarusian civil liberties, society and education today is largely dependent on external actors, be it directly through the provision of grants for bi-and multi-national civil society projects by international actors or through the formulation of conditions for international aid and cooperation with the Belarusian government. One major reaction of the Belarusian government to this has been the creation of government-organized non-governmental organizations (GONGOs) and a pro-state reconstruction of civil society which has led to a considerable rise in the official reach of non-governmental activities, from 4.7% of Belarusian citizens in 1999 to 11% in 2008. (Sahm p. 55)  However, while these state-side efforts to effectively undermine independent civil society and actively compete with it for foreign funding have to be seen as potentially threatening to the sustainability of independent NGOs, authors such as Astrid Sahm point out that in the past, participation of local authorities in EU projects have positively influenced their policy style towards openness, innovation and cooperation with civil society actors, giving rise to hopes for positive future developments on a local level. (Sahm, p. 57)

In conclusion, the situation of civil liberties and independent civil society actors has to be considered grim with a Belarusian leadership not indicating an easing up on them any time soon. However, no matter the chances of broad-scale change in the short-term, the consciousness for civil liberties on a broader scale needs time, especially in societies with a lack of broad-scale exposure to them such as Belarus, but so do most current approaches towards effective change. With phenomena such as the rise of information communication technologies in the last 20 years (with growing access to it in Belarus (Khrapavitski, p. 38)) and its free availability of information, there are more and more internationally funded civic education programs such as the Flying University², or the Belarus-originated European Humanities University in Vilnius. (EHU) This, combined with the chance of originally government-organized NGOs moving towards actual civic education piece by piece, suggests that not all seems lost from a long-term perspective. (Matskevich et al, p. 59 f)  After all, it is always darkest before the dawn.

—

¹ As understood by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights

² Inysheva

Author Biography

Moritz Borchardt is graduate student at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Erfurt, GER. Being a native German from Lower Saxony, Moritz spent his pre-MPP years at the universities of Erfurt, Vilnius and Jena, graduating with a degree in Governmental Studies in 2011. Having a weakness for old school hats and civil society, he is interested in those areas where personal development is positively or negatively affected on a larger scale (i.e. Impacts/challenges of digital media, suppression of civil society) and structural shifts in societies writ large. He is currently writing his master’s thesis on the self-perception of contemporary Belarusian civil society actors.

You can find him on LinkedIn, Facebook & Twitter

Sources

Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly: Recommendation 1745 (2006); 2006; available online under: http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewHTML.asp?FileID=7653&Language=EN (last logged: 06/09/2013) (Council of Europe)

European Humanities University: About, Vilnius 2013, available under: http://www.ehu.lt/en/about (last logged: 06/09/2013) (EHU)

Gel’man, Vladimir: Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire? Post-Soviet regime-changes in comparative perspective; in: International Political Science Review, Vol. 29 No. 2 (Mar. 2008) (Gel’man)

Inysheva, Yulia: Tatsiana Vadalazhkaya: Main Challenge for Flying University is self-organization, available under: http://eurobelarus.info/en/news/society/2012/12/31/tatsiana-vadalazhskaja–main-challenge-for-the- flying-university-is-self-organization.html (last logged: 06/09/2013) (Inysheva)

Khrapavitski, Andrei: The Analysis of Web Campaigning and the Use of Internet by Candidates during the 2008 Parliamentary Elections; in: Kazakevich, Andrei (Ed.): Political Sphere, English Issue #11/2008; Minsk 2008 (Khrapavitski)

Matskevich, Uladzimir; Vadalazhkaya, Tatsiana; Yahorau, Andrei: The Infancy of a Civil Nation in Belarus; Vilnius, 2009 (Matskevich et al.)

Melyantsou, Dzianis: Spontaneous Groups after 2006 elections; in: Kazakevich, Andrei (Ed.): Political Sphere, English Issue #11/2008; Minsk 2008 (Melyantsou)

Sahm, Astrid: Civil society and mass media in Belarus; in: Fischer, Sabine (Ed.): Chaillot Paper n°119 (November 2009); Paris, 2009 (Sahm)

Silitski, Viktor: Belarus – a country in transition? The State, elections and the opposition; in: Fischer, Sabine (Ed.): Chaillot Paper n°119 (November 2009); Paris, 2009 (Silitski)

Vadalazhkaya, Tatsiana: Belarusian inhabitants’ conceptualizations of the notion ‘citizen’; in: Kazakevich, Andrei (Ed.): Political Sphere, English Issue #11/2008; Minsk 2008 (Vadalazhkaya)

Credits

*This Article is based on the original work made for the Lecture “Human Rights”, which is part of the Master’s Curriculum at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Erfurt, Germany

*Cover image ‘Free Belarus now ‘ by English PEN

Even 15 years after the last conflict in Kosovo, North Mitrovica is a “no-mans-land” and remains a divided city along the Ibar River.

The break-up of Yugoslavia brought the Western Balkan region into the center of the world’s attention. Once a well consolidated economic and political union, the Balkans has turned into one of the largest flashpoints of conflict, genocide and humans rights violations. Clearly, the 1990s Balkan conflict received particular attention from the United Nations and European Union.

In the case of Kosovo, the conflict of 1999 has another type of end, one with a severe NATO bombing campaign over the territories of Kosovo and Serbia. Nevertheless, the post-war period required more political investment to bring peace and stability to the region.

The war of 1999, as a part of successive wars in the Balkan region, changed the reality and fate of Kosovo and its inhabitants, especially those living in Mitrovica. Even 15 years after the last conflict, North Mitrovica is still a “no-mans-land” city and remains divided by the Ibar River.

The river divides Mitrovia into north and south: the north comprised mainly of the ethnic Serbian community, with Albanians dwelling in the south. Mitrovica, destroyed during the war, never had the chance to regain its past glory as most of the attention went to solving the conflict, with issues such as its economy being neglected. The biggest employing factory “Trepca” was damaged during the war and remains closed.

Post-independence period – EU entering the scene

It was only Kosovo’s post-independence in February 2008 that brought attention back to the northern part of the region. The status-quo and the frozen conflict have strengthened their roots already, thus the local institutions and international community faced an uncontrolled reality. Organized crime, illegal businesses and trafficking thrived while Kosovo and Serbia struggled to have some sovereignty over the territory. The unresolved puzzle called North Mitrovica became one of the biggest challenges in the region and diplomacy has attempted to break the status-quo.

The European Unionbecame a recent actor by mediating and hosting the Prishtina-Belgrade talks. The carrot and stick approach is being used to reach common ground for both EU-seeking parties. Catherine Ashton’s role as EU mediator has received praise but the latest “historical” agreements did not produce the results expected by all parties. In organizing elections in northern municipalities inhabited by Kosovo, Serbs represented one of the first and great political challenges towards the implementation of the agreements.

In attempting to please both parties the EU faces many challenges. Kosovo institutions are organizing the third round of local elections after constantly failing in the two previous attempts. Integrating parallel structures created in the north is almost impossible while the institutional vacuum created the perfect conditions for organized crime and corruption.

The EU continues to play a crucial role in the region and many questions linger. Arguably, the main question is whether Northern Mitrovica will continue to remain isolated or if it can manage to become part of the EU. This is a crucial question as many believe that the region’s myriad issues will only be solved after the region fully joins the EU family.

*Cover Image ‘Mitrovica Bridge‘ by Dave proffer

All over South America there has been a rise in indigenous feminism with many indigenous women speaking out in favour of increased political and cultural rights and a more equal society within their respective tribes. This appearance of indigenous feminism began in the 1990s with a variety of groups in a number of South American countries campaigning for a variety of issues. (Castillo, 2010, p. 540)*

Indigenous feminism differs from the western idea of the movement; indigenous feminist groups consider equality not just as a gender issue but also as an issue of equality between the human race and nature. Whilst the indigenous feminist groups are fighting their own battles regarding their ethnicity, class and gender, and the perceived exclusion they have experienced as both women and indigenous people, they also work within and for their own groups’ overall struggles against issues such as climate change and deforestation. (Castillo, 2010, p. 542)*

In order for indigenous women to fully enjoy their rights they have to deal with several challenges such as domestic violence and sexual abuse, discrimination, poor education, poverty and the lack of access to healthcare services. The United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) mentioned that the wave of globalization brings new challenges into the world. Due to several factors such as the loss of biodiversity and the shifting of local economic systems to capitalism, political and social structures have changed, and subsequently so has the role of indigenous women in their societies which are also undergoing change. (United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues (OSAGI), n.d)

Against this background, Indigenous women have been organizing themselves on a local, domestic, and global level to deal with the challenges mentioned above. These women have been working in cooperation with the UN on the Working Group on Indigenous Populations project since 1982. They have been contributing and participating in negotiations concerning their future for over 20 years to create the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was approved in 2007 by the General Assembly. (UN – OSAGI, n.d.)

Indigenous women’s rights groups in Central and South America began to form in the early 1990s, inspired by the Zapatista National Liberation Army in Mexico, widely regarded as one of the most influential group of supporters of Indigenous women’s rights. In 1994, the group, in collaboration with women from other indigenous groups such as the Tojobal, Chol, Tzotzil, and Tzeltal, drew up a law that would become an important icon for the many thousands of indigenous women all over Latin America, called the Women’s Revolutionary Law. (Castillo, 2010, p. 541)*

The bill contains ten main points that list the rights of indigenous women, including:

“Rights to political participation and to hold leadership posts within the political system, to a life free of sexual and domestic violence, to decide how many children they want to have, to a fair wage, to choose a spouse, to an education, and to quality health services.” (Castillo, 2010, p. 542)*

The Zapatista movement represented a decisive moment for the inclusion of women in indigenous organizations that were mainly dominated by men. These women started to promote the notion of equality for indigenous women. (Rousseau, 2011)

During the 1990’s these movements started to spread through Latin America and became a space for indigenous women to organize politically. This enabled indigenous women from several regions to have an opportunity to act together in meetings, workshops and discussions. (Castillo, 2010, p. 542)*

In 2005, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) organized a forum in New York to discuss the situation of indigenous women and to find plausible solutions for their problems.

The forum heard that many of these women feel that their governments and societies are discriminating against them by limiting their political participation and not giving them the opportunity to conserve their environment, traditions, language and identity. As a Guatemalan Indian stated: “Because of free trade agreements, multinational companies are exploiting our mines, decimating our rivers, our animals, and our environment”. Many of these women also had to deal with the discrimination of race and culture, the abuse of human rights, land invasion, waves of migration, government neglect and the loss of their identity. (UNICEF, 2012)

It is interesting to note that diverse indigenous groups all over the world are dealing with the same problems, even though they live in different countries and societies. As a Peruvian Indian pointed out: “Our governments are too far removed from the reality of our indigenous communities,” and “Grade teachers are raping our children and they are allowed to go unpunished”.  (UNICEF, 2012)

Feminism and Indigenous women in Brazil

Feminism and gender equality concepts started to emerge during the mid-1970’s in Brazil due to external influence from Europe and the US. After military dictatorship ended in the 1980’s, feminism in Brazil was characterized by a new wave of social movements that brought up several political issues. During this time, the National Woman’s Rights Council was created in 1985, and the role of women and feminist organizations played an important part in the creation of the current Brazilian Constitution of 1988. (Maluf, 2009)

The Women’s Council for the Rights of Women’s main priority is to stop violence against women but it also play a vital role in Brazilian politics, being responsible for ensuring government policy in Brazil takes gender perspectives into consideration. It also runs initiatives to help women, from enabling them to broaden their horizons through capacity building or protecting and offering refuge for those vulnerable to violence. (Corral, n.d)

For indigenous women, feminist groups and movements that center exclusively around gender issues do not hold much interest, instead preferring to engage with groups that focus on issues that affect males and females alike, such as racism and colonialism. As Kambel (2004) states, this is likely because of their inability to exercise their human rights and this is perceived to be due being labeled as indigenous, rather than being female. (Kambel, 2004, p.3)

Indigenous women in Brazil still have a long struggle ahead in order to have their rights fully recognized and respected by the government, businesses and people. They need to continue to raise their voice even more to make their opinion heard and participate in politics.

* Castillo, R. A. (2010). The Emergence of Indigenous Feminism in Latin America. Chicago Journals, Vol. 35,(No. 3), 539-545.

*This Article is adapted from my master’s thesis: ‘Sustainable Development & Green Economy: the planet’s future or greening indigenous communities into oblivion?’ which was completed as part of the Master’s Curriculum at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Erfurt, Germany.

*Cover image ‘Michelle Bachelet con mujeres índigenas y afrodescendientes’ by  UN

The Viking Saga IV: The Viking Realm and the Frozen Gates between the West and the East

On a cold night in the year 1194, a group of Drakkars reach a group of islands known to the ships’ crews as the ‘Svalbarði’. As they approach the snow covered land, illuminated by the Northern Lights and stars in the northern skies above, they can see that theirs are not the only ships sailing towards the islands. A Lodje, a ship used by the Pomors, people from the frozen north lands, is sighted. And then another, and another. The Vikings land ashore, with the Pomors following closely behind. Driven by curiosity, the two groups decide to approach each other on the frozen shore. They meet, and as a meteor streaks across the northern skies, the Vikings and the Pomors interact for the first time.

Today, those islands are called “Svalbard” and, although it is Norway who claims sovereignty of the archipelago, they are still a meeting place for the East and West, with members from many nations, such as Russia and the US, living there from time to time. Svalbard can also be seen as an Arctic boundary between the East and West, being a gateway through which Russia can access the Atlantic Ocean. These gateways, and the countries they belonged to, were especially important during WWII and the Cold War and with the growing interest in the Arctic they are once again becoming increasingly important. Nowadays Svalbard is particularly important for Norway as both the islands and their surrounding waters are a cornerstone for the country’s Arctic policy and strategy. Because of Svalbard, Norway is the only Scandinavian country with a direct coastline along the Arctic Ocean and that northern area is a fundamental element for Norwegian actions regarding the area.

Norway denominates this region as the “High North” and has designed a policy for it over the last 20 years which has been developed since the end of the Cold War, taking its current, more defined shape, around 2005. From those days until now the High North policy has had 7 important elements: a deepened and renewed cooperation with Russia[i]; the development of a broad diplomacy, aimed at including countries outside the Arctic region as well as the same institutions created for the area (such as the Arctic Council); the knowledge of the climate change rate and its effects, which are being accounted as an opening for new resources and new trade routes but also as a new obstacle for the livelihoods and traditional way of life of indigenous people; the integrated maritime management of resources, namely fisheries, which has brought a harmonisation between Norway and Russia on the topic; the appearance, and exploitation, of oil and gas fields in the waters to the east of Svalbard; the acceptance of the Rule of Law , or to be more accurate, the Rule of the Sea which in turn provides Norway sovereignty over important resources (and as a basis to solve any dispute); and finally, the establishing of a network through other Arctic countries and Institutions, even the EU, and partnerships like the Nordic Dimension (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). 

The latest High North policy has since added new objectives, based on those previously mentioned. The first objective is to establish the emergence of a new energy source for Europe, which would then provide secured oil and gas for the continent. The second, in close relation with the previous objective, is the forging of a new industrial age in the High North involving the exploitation and sustainable management of gas, oil and fisheries in the Barents Sea as well as cooperation with Russia on the matter[ii]. This drives into the third objective, which is the pioneering work on integrated maritime management, all to be performed in the light of the previously mentioned cooperation with Russia and within the frameworks given by the Arctic Council. The fourth objective is to take measures following the increasing attention towards the Arctic Ocean’s potential as a shipping route, which presents an opportunity and a challenge to both Norway and Russia in terms of provision of services to the ships and the risk that they might encounter respectively. This objective also takes account of the increased interest shown by outsider states, namely China, South Korea, Japan and Singapore (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). The fifth objective is the implementation of measures in order to support and perform research activities in and on the area, since it is being perceived as source of knowledge on climatic and environmental change[iii]. The sixth is the cooperation between academic and research institutes, institutions, Arctic, and Non Arctic countries, and with a focus on environment, native peoples and resources management, along with tourism and SAR operations. The seventh and final objective is the implementation of actions oriented at the increased military presence of Norway in the light of the increased importance that the High North/Arctic is acquiring once again. Cooperation with Russia and the hosting of NATO exercises are the main actions to be taken and the exertion of sovereignty is beyond any doubt the aim behind this objective (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

All of the previous objectives are framed within four more general objectives of the current High North Policy: the safeguarding of peace and stability while providing stability; the ensuring of an environment friendly resource management; the strengthening of international cooperation and rule of international law; and the strengthening of basis for employment, value creation and welfare through regional, national and international cooperation. Three key words capture the soul of the Norwegian High North Policy: Knowledge, Activity, and Presence (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

Environment is one of the core preoccupations of the Norwegian strategy, along with the issue of resources and potential new Arctic shipping routes. But the fact that Norway, along with Finland, is a country that shares an immediate border at sea and land with Russia makes cooperation with Russia an imperative action, as Huebert, Exner-Pirot, Lajeneusse, & Gulledge (2012) all remark. Cooperation, as it seems, is the main feature of the Norwegian policies on the High North, but on the other hand the desire to increase military presence and capabilities is another feature that takes into consideration a possible failure of the cooperative dynamics. It is a possibility that Norway takes very seriously into account, not only because of the fact that Norway is a neighbouring NATO country with Russia but also because of the strategic implications of an opening Arctic in which exertion of Sovereignty turns into an important matter [iv] (Huebert, Exner – Pirot, Lajeneusse, & Gulledge, 2012).

As a matter of fact the policy recognizes that, regarding Russia, there are some important nuclear units present there and the High North area is being used as the scenario for military exercises involving air and naval units of great capacities. Norway also aims at protecting its interests in the area, which includes a climate of stable and predictable relations with Russia and other actors present in the area, along with the protection of maritime resources, as Skagestad (2010, p.12) explains.

Jensen, Jensen & Rottem (2011) explains in a similar way that the military presence in the High North responds to an aim of “traditional state security” (p. 18), where deterrence is the absolute top of such measures in order to tackle any desire of high-level military confrontations[v]. NATO is a cornerstone for such aims but Norway also wants to deal with “minor strategic” conflicts by itself, such as a conflict taking place on one of its fisheries, for example [vi]. As such, sovereignty, protection of national interests and resources, and deterrence are the primary reasons behind the dual approach of Norway on its Arctic area, not forgetting that its policy has cooperation with Russia in every single instance as the second-most important framework, along with the discussed (military) presence in the area.

In a deeper way, the High North Strategy points out that the Armed Forces have as a priority the preparations for strengthening their presence in the High North, becoming the gravitating objective around which the Armed Forces will be organized. Particular attention is being paid to the Coastal Squadron and the Coast guard, along with the Norwegian Intelligence Service. New vessels are being incorporated (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011) and the modernization of the Navy and the Air Force are also set as actions to do on the list of priorities: new vessels, helicopters for both Navy and Coast Guards ships and the replacement of the current F – 16 fighter flotilla (with possibly F -35, advanced 5^th Generation multirole fighter in which Norway took a part on its development) for the sake of surveillance and rapid reaction in the area. Following this, the Armed Forces Joint Headquarters has been established at Bodø, in the north of the country (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Moreover, there is a convergent recognition of the High North/Arctic as a place strategically important for Norway and Russia in military and energetic aspects, and subsequently demanding the presence of the Armed forces in the area Norwegian Ministry of Defence, 2013).

NATO might be one of the cornerstones of Norway defence policies, but the Nordic Defence Cooperation is another important element for the Norwegian High North Defence. Fighter training is currently taking place among the air forces of the member states, in the High North area, along with a cooperation between Norway and Finland on artillery systems, the Finnish purchasing of Norwegian-made SAM missiles and the possible joining of Sweden and Finland on the NATO Air Situation Data Exchange (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

The assets in which Norway has been investing to give the High North Strategy and policies the strength to be executed are of great importance and capacity. First of all it has introduced 5 stealth Fridtjof Nansen class Frigates that are multi-role, capable of attacking surface and submerged targets. What makes these vessels so special is that have incorporated the Aegis System, marking a close cooperation with the United States, and have provided the vessels with a high-rank anti-air defence. Secondly, the Norwegian Navy has introduced a class of 5 small and stealth patrol vessels class Skjold, with anti-surface and anti-air capabilities (though the latter is a one of short range) and also capable of speeds over 100 knots. It also has six diesel Ula class submarines and there are plans for the purchase of large support ship for the frigates, increasing the naval assets and their capabilities for the High North. There is also a research ship capable of gathering intelligence and 8 OPVs, three of them capable of having a helicopter and some armed with a 57 mm gun and NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) protection, the latter being operated by the Coast Guard[vii] (Wezeman, 2012; Huebert, 2010; Huebert, Exner – Pirot, Lajeneusse, & Gulledge, 2012).

As was mentioned, there are plans for the replacement of the 60 F-16 fighters for 48 F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, complemented by six P-3 Orion ASW and long-range patrol aircraft (Wezeman, 2012; Huebert, 2010; Huebert, Exner – Pirot, Lajeneusse, & Gulledge, 2012). Finally, since 2009 the Brigade Nord has been stationed above the Arctic Circle having winter training and is a heavy mechanized unit meaning that it has infantry fighting vehicles like the M-113 and CV 9030 within its ranks, along with BV 206 all-terrain carriers, Archer self-propelled artillery systems, and Leopard 2A4 Heavy Battle Tanks (Regehr, 2012). This, according to Pettersen (2012), is a reaction to the declaration by Russia a year beforehand that it would create units capable of operate in the Arctic [viii].

Like Denmark, Norway is among the few countries that it is taking the right measures in the light of the changing Arctic, its transformation into a new geopolitical hotspot, and the everyday possibility of a Russian comeback with a similar aggressive attitude as the days of the Cold War. Norway’s position makes it clear that stabilization and cooperation with Russia in order to reach it is an important issue for the sake of stable and peaceful relations with its powerful neighbour (which reminds one in a certain way of how things were during the Cold War). Being a NATO member also seems to push Norway into such direction. Still, Norway is far more conscious than other nations such as Finland, Iceland and Canada, about the possibility of a conflict involving China or Russia. In the Russian case, Norway hold all the keys to the immediate gateway that would allow Russian vessels, or not, into the open seas of the North Atlantic in the case of a conflict. That gateway is Svalbard, where Norway and Russia, the Vikings and Pomors, might collide in the light of those potential conflicts. In Regards to China, the need to exert sovereignty is more than clear for a Norway that will see more than one flag sailing through its waters in the near future. This of course includes the provision for controlling potential harmful ships as well as SAR operations and disaster management. Sovereignty also comes into the fact that Norway must control and secure the resources, and their exploitation, in the area.

Norway is relying on its preparations to defend itself and manage a potential situation of conflict with its NATO membership and with the Nordic Defence Cooperation. This is an important step taken in the light of a conflict that, as it has been reviewed with the previous Scandinavian cases, will affect them entirely in one way or another, having an Arctic Littoral or not. For instance, if Finland is very vulnerable due to its large border with Russia, Norway, in turn, is very vulnerable for its great maritime border with Russia and the shape of its coasts, just as Iceland is very vulnerable to the sight of Russian warships and submarines raiding near its waters. Therefore, it is very positive that Norway is boosting its cooperation in every sense with some Scandinavian nations, moreover when it comes to dealing with some immediate potential threats.

Norway, in other words, is ready to contribute by peaceful means to a good environment in the Arctic area, but it is also ready to hold the axe and fight if tensions spark. The Cold War might be over, but given recent Russian actions, Cold War instruments and mentality might partially return to the minds and desks of the politicians and generals of Norway. And if so the Arctic might become a very warm place, but not necessarily because of the environmental change.

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[i] The document accounts the good trend the relations between Norway and Russia had, although it recognizes that differences still remain due to some issues Norway has, such as being a NATO member. See: p. 11.

[ii] Bear in mind the prospective presence of oil and gas in Arctic waters.

[iii] This includes the acknowledgement that pollutants impact the region, as well as the impact of the radioactive pollution made by the Soviet Union at the Kara Sea during the Cold War. According to the Organization Bellona, there are 17000 containers of radioactive waste, 19 ships with such type of waste, 14 nuclear reactors – 5 of them still contain nuclear fuel – and 735 pieces of radioactive contaminated machinery, along with one nuclear submarine – the K27 – whose two reactors are still loaded with nuclear fuel. See: http://bellona.org/news/uncategorized/2012-08-russia-announces-enormous-finds-of-radioactive-waste-and-nuclear-reactors-in-arctic-seas

[iv] Other “soft” security considerations includes SAR and environment.

[v] It will be very interesting to see how this is going on in the next case: Russia.

[vi] Surprisingly, Jensen & Rottem (2009) point out that the Norwegian policies on the Hard area apparently responds not only to a Russia increasing its military presence in the area, but also to the consequences of a rising China, making such policies to be understood in the light of the geopolitical changes and are not isolated from such.

[vii] Some of them are from the (and named) Svalbard class.

[viii] See: Pettersen, T (2012). Norway establishes ‘Arctic Batallion’. Barents Observer. Retrieved from: http://barentsobserver.com/en/topics/norway-establishes-arctic-battalion on 15.01.2014

Sources:

Bellona (2012). Russia announces enormous finds of radioactive waste and nuclear reactors in Arctic seas. Retrieved from http://bellona.org/news/uncategorized/2012-08-russia-announces-enormous-finds-of-radioactive-waste-and-nuclear-reactors-in-arctic-seas on 15.01.2014

Huebert, R (2010). The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment. Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. Calgary, Alberta, Canada.

Huebert, R., Exner – Pirot, H., Lajeneusse, A., & Gulledge, J. (2012). Climate Change and International Security: the Arctic as a Bellwelther. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. Arlington, Virginia, USA.

Jensen, L. C.; Jensen, Ø; & Rottem, S. V (2011). Norwegian foreign policy in the High North. Energy, international law and security. In: Atlantisch Perspectief, 3/2011 (35). Den Haag, Netherlands.

Jensen, Ø; & Rottem, S. V (2009). The politics of security and international law in Norway’s Arctic waters. In: Polar Record 46 (236), pp. 75 – 83. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

Norwegian Ministry of Defence (2013). Competency for a new era. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Oslo, Norway.

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011). The High North 2011. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Oslo, Norway.

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011). The High North. Visions and Strategies. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Oslo, Norway.

Pettersen, T (2012). Norway establishes ‘Arctic Batallion’. Barents Observer. Kirkenes, Norway. Retrieved from: http://barentsobserver.com/en/topics/norway-establishes-arctic-battalion on 14.01.2014

Regehr, E (2012). Circumpolar Military Facilities of Norway. The Simons Foundation. Vancouver, Canada.

Skagestad, O, G (2010). The ‘High North’. An Elastic Concept in Norwegian Arctic Policy. Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Lysaker, Norway.

Wezeman, S. T (2012). Military Capabilities in the Arctic. SIPRI Background Paper. SIPRI. Stockholm, Sweden.

*Cover image‘Missile Torpedo Boat’ by Sten Dueland

Deforestation, Logging and Minning: a deadly combination for the Amazon rainforest

The Amazon forest is the largest, and one of the most bio diverse rainforests in the world. It covers an area of 5.5 million square kilometers and is shared by nine countries, as shown by the yellow line in figure 1 , including: Brazil with the largest share at 68%; then Peru at 13%; Bolivia at 11% and Colombia at 6%. Venezuela, Ecuador, Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana also hold a small part of the forest. (Simpsons, 2009, p.1)

The green line on figure 1 shows the Amazon forest that lies within the Brazilian territory. As much as 59% of Brazil’s entire territory is part of the Amazon forest.  The red line in figure 1 shows the area known as Legal Amazon (Amazônia Legal) that was created in 1953. This territorial boundary was established due to the need of economic growth in the region and therefore is not considered to be a part of the forest’s ecosystem. (IPEA, 2007)

This area can be seen better in figure 2 where it shows that the forest comprises 8 whole Brazilian states: Acre, Amapá, Amazonas, Mato Grosso, Pará, Rondônia, Roraima and Tocantins, and is also present in a part of the state Maranhão. It is in these states that most indigenous groups reside with around 56% of the indigenous population. (IPEA, 2007)

 The Amazon has one of the richest eco-systems in the world; according to Case it contains an average of “40,000 plant species, 427 mammals, 1294 birds, 378 reptiles, 427 amphibians, 3,000 fishes, and likely over a million insect species”. The Amazon basin also supports individuals with agriculture and silviculture[1] besides providing natural resources for the creation of medicines and materials used in construction. The Amazon river is a great source of freshwater and it represents 15 to 20% of universal river flow. (Case, n.d)

The Amazon Rainforest plays a key role in regulating the earth’s climate and is often referred as the lungs of the world due to its vast consumption of carbon dioxide and production of oxygen, without which the earth could not survive. As such, the survival of the Amazon is directly linked to the survival of the planet. However, despite this fact it is under threat from logging and farming. (WWF, n.d)

Threats

The Amazon is threatened by several activities such as deforestation, logging, mining, forest fires and road infrastructure. Over recent years the situation has improved but it is clear that a lot of work still needs to be done. Below there will be a short introduction to some of  the threats that affect the Amazon forest.

Deforestation

Since the 1960s and 70s, deforestation in the rainforest, particularly in the Brazilian Amazon, has been very high mainly due to the greater access allowed by the construction of highways, such as the Trans Amazonian Highway, through the forest. Prior to 1970, the forested area of the Brazilian Amazon was 4,100,000km²; by 2008 it had been reduced to 3,375,000km². (Simpsons, 2009, p.2)

Around 65 – 70% of  the deforestation in the Amazon is caused mainly by cattle ranches, followed by local scale agriculture with 20 – 25%, commercial scale agriculture with 5 – 10%, logging with 2-3% and forest fires, mining, urbanization, construction of roads and dams with 1-2%. (Butler, 2012)

The graph below illustrates the level of deforestation from 1988 – 2012:

The rate of deforestation from 1988 – 2012 can be seen in figure 3. The highest peak of deforestation occurred in 1995 where, in comparison to the previous year, there was an increase of 95% with 29.095 square kilometers of forestland felled. The lowest point up until now was in 2012 where deforestation decreased by 16% in comparison to 2011, with only 4656km² of the forest being logged.

Figure 4 shows the percentage of change in deforestation from 2000 – 2012 released by the INPE. High peaks were registered in 2002, 2003 and 2004. In 2005 there is a reduction of 31% in the level of deforestation. The figures from 2005 – 2012 show a further decrease in deforestation with the exception of 2008 where deforestation increased by 11%.

Historically, deforestation in Brazil has been closely linked with the country’s economy; a decline in the economy matches a decline in deforestation and vice versa. As Butler notes: “the decline in deforestation from 1988-1991 nicely matched the economic slowdown during the same period, while the rocketing rate of deforestation from 1993-1998 paralleled Brazil’s period of rapid economic growth”. (Butler, 2012)

Butler states that the reason for this is simply that in periods of economic stagnation or decline, ranchers and developers do not have the money to expand their land into rainforest territory and the government has no money to encourage them with tax breaks or highway developments. However, in the last decade the link between the Brazilian economy and rainforest deforestation has become less apparent. (Butler, 2012)

Unfortunately, since this article was written deforestation rose by 28% from August 2012 – July 2013 setting back decades of work. (BBC, 2013)

Logging

Logging refers to the process of cutting down trees and collecting the timber for commercial purposes. The impact that this activity has on the environment still needs to be evaluated properly due to the diverse methods in which logging can be executed. Logging, depending on how it is done, can lead to severe destruction. Illegal logging conducted without following the pre-approved procedures, tends to cause more harm to the environment since the land is often being cleared mainly for pasture. This destroys the equilibrium of the forest and makes it more vulnerable to fires. (Barreto et al., 2006)

Besides cattle ranchers clearing land for their livestock, the rainforest is also being targeted by international corporations and national companies for its wood. Illegal logging contributes a large amount to the overall deforestation of the Amazon with an average of 60-80% of all logging activities in the forest considered to be illegal. Such illegal loggers usually forge permits and cut down trees from preserved and indigenous areas without respecting the legal limitation. These activities are executed in small or moderate scale to make detection difficult. Loggers also take advantage of the fact that the governmental environment agency, IBAMA, is not very present due to the remoteness of the areas in which they work. (Greenpeace International, 2005)

Illegal loggers are also intelligent when it comes to covering their tracks, often using “legally approved forest operations in the Brazilian Amazon commonly provide cover for illegal logging. Logs are frequently cut illegally up river from approved operations and clandestinely floated downstream.” Once they arrive in an area that was approved for forestry activities the logs are legalized with fake documents declaring that they were cut legally. (Greenpeace International, 2005)

To counteract the illegal logging threat the Brazilian national space agency (INPE) launched a program called Deter in 2004 to monitor the Amazon forest live using satellites. Once a satellite detects an abnormal activity it emits a report directly to the Amazonian states so that they can take action against the criminals. The coordinates provided by the satellite are very precise. If the location is difficult to access the IBAMA officials go by helicopter. (Menezes, 2012)

Mining

The Amazon rainforest is rich in precious metals and according to the WWF, “copper, tin, nickel, bauxite, manganese, iron and gold” can be found within the forest and tax benefits are being offered by governments to encourage extraction projects to stimulate economies. The prediction is that mining in the Amazon will increase due to the  technological advance in extractive knowledge combined with such monetary incentives.  (WWF, n.d)

However, many of these extraction methods have an adverse effect on the natural environment. Mining in general often damages the environment; it contaminates water supplies and threatens small communities such as indigenous populations. Gold mining in particular can be especially damaging to local habitats as it often involves the use of hazardous chemicals such as Mercury. (Casey, 2009)

Mercury is a highly pollutant chemical that can cause serious illness in humans and is often found in high quantities around gold mining sites, having found its way into the local food and water supply, contaminating animals and subsequently the humans that eat them. (Casey, 2009) Additionally, once the raw material has been mined, it has to be melted down. This requires charcoal to fuel furnaces that is often sourced from the forest by cutting down trees. (Everyculture, n.d)

Mining activities also affect local populations by polluting the environment. For example, the Kayapó village of Gorotire started to suffer from the environmental consequences of the mining industry that had brought so much wealth. The rivers became polluted, sexually transmitted diseases and malaria increased and the tribe became reliant on food that was brought into the forest as they had reduced their hunting activities. In the 1990’s, indigenous women started to miscarriage or give birth to babies with health problems. This happened as a result of mercury contamination in the soil, water, air and food caused by mining. (Rabben, 2010)

Nowadays natural resources are becoming scarce and the Amazon forest has vast quantities of untapped raw materials such as plants, timber, gold and iron, all of which are currently being exploited illegally. It would be beneficial if the Brazilian government increased control and by patrolling the Amazon region illicit activities can be monitored closely.

The Amazon Rainforest is being plagued by numerous threats such as those mentioned above. As stated, the Brazilian government is taking actions to counteract these threats, but, with a few exceptions, it would seem that many of these measures are not producing the desired results.

*This Article is adapted from my master’s thesis: ‘Sustainable Development & Green Economy: the planet’s future or greening indigenous communities into oblivion?’ which was completed as part of the Master’s Curriculum at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Erfurt, Germany.

*Cover image ‘Amazon forest’ by  Lou Gold

The first time that western countries gathered to talk about global warming and the importance of the environment was in 1972 during the Stockholm conference. By that time, indigenous communities had known for several decades that global warming and climate change was occurring, having seen first-hand the impact on their environment. Indigenous people are mainly farmers, fishers and hunters that possess a hereditary environmental knowledge and foster a close relationship with their natural environment. With their experience and knowledge, they can notice even the slightest changes in water cycles, soil, flora and fauna, and weather.  (Cherrington, 2010)

Since 2000, Indigenous groups have been noticing a gradual increase in the Amazon’s temperature both day to day and yearly. In previous years, it was noted that around 6 p.m each day the temperature would drop. Currently however, the heat continues throughout the night. Similarly, annual weather patterns have also been observed to be changing; historically, the Amazon begins to get cooler in the middle of the year during the winter period in July, signaling the beginning of a new year for many Indigenous groups. Around this time the Miriti fruits mature and serve as food for animals in the forest, birds stop singing, many fish in the river die, and it gets colder and windy. According to indigenous peoples this is when earth “menstruates” and the winds come to impregnate it with fruits, animals and humans. (Kronik and Verner, 2010, pp. 17-20)*

However, many indigenous groups claim that the seasons have changed and are becoming less predictable. For example, summer in the Amazon is traditionally dry and windy but recently there has been very little or no wind during this time. There have even been instances of no summer at all, such as in 2007. Winter also seems to be shorter and arriving earlier than usual and has not been as strong as in previous decades. The rain season has also followed irregular patterns in recent years; an Araracuara Indian described it as raining when it should be dry and warm when it should be cold. River levels have also become erratic; on one occasion in 2005, the Amazon receded killing many fish. In the same year it was also extremely dry and wild fires broke out in southwest Brazil and eastern Bolivia, affecting indigenous groups around the Colombian Amazon River.  (Kronik and Verner, 2010, p.21-22)*

Surprisingly, indigenous groups take part of the blame for these changes. They say that even though “white people” are primarily responsible for polluting the atmosphere, they themselves were being neglectful for living their lives in an unsustainable manner, even though they contribute very little to greenhouse gas emission. (Kronik and Verner, 2010, p.24)*

Climate change is often seen as just a global issue, debated by governments and organizations, but these changes in the environment affect everyone, from globally to locally. As previously mentioned, indigenous people feel these changes the most acutely; climate change poses a real and tangible threat to their livelihoods through food uncertainty and debilitated health. It also disturbs the integrity of their culture and weakens the confidence they have in the solutions offered by authorities and organizations. (Kronik and Verner, n.d)

* Kronik, J., & Verner, D. (2010). Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon. Indigenous peoples and climate change in Latin America and the Caribbean (pp. 15-41). Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

*This Article is adapted from my master’s thesis: ‘Sustainable Development & Green Economy: the planet’s future or greening indigenous communities into oblivion?’ which was completed as part of the Master’s Curriculum at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Erfurt, Germany.

*Cover image ‘Aerial view of the Amazon Rainforest’ by  CIFOR

The Viking Saga III: Snæland, the Far Island of the North

The Viking Drakkars navigate through the mist and the snow, hoping to catch a glimpse of dry land. They sail for hours but there is no sighting and the mist continues to blind the men on the longships. But then suddenly, as though a curtain was opened for all but a split second, the mist clears. There is a shout, a cry: land. Slowly it reveals itself to the men. Mountains, and lots of them, all covered with snow and towering above the sea shimmering ominously under the Northern Lights. There is little wonder that Naddod the Viking, impressed by such a sight, named the land Snæland, or Snowland. Today that land has a different, albeit very similar, name: Iceland, a name given by Floki, son of Vilgerd.

Nowadays, despite not having any direct coastline with the Arctic Ocean, Iceland is within the Arctic Circle and is an Arctic state facing a similar situation to those already reviewed in this series. It is a state that will also be very sensitive to any rise in any tension there, and it is not the first time Iceland faces  such a situation, having been involved in both the Second World War and the Cold War with Iceland being a key member of NATO. And while the Arctic issues won’t be any different for Iceland, it will be an important actor and element if tensions and clashes erupt in a similar way to Finland.

The Icelandic stance regarding the Arctic already takes account of the previously mentioned changing conditions that are giving the Arctic a new importance in the International and Geopolitical spheres, stating that the possibilities of conflict are minimal but mindful that disputes over continental shelf expansion claims can take place and harm relations among the Arctic states. Additionally, Iceland perceives itself as an Arctic State with great interests at stake in the area, which in turn are shaped by its position and access to resources. Increasing the influence of Iceland on the destiny of the Arctic, the safeguarding of economic, environmental and security issues, and furthered cooperation between other nations and other actors are the main aims of the Icelandic arctic policy (Althingi, 2011).

The Arctic Policy of Iceland is, therefore, supported 12 pillars that frame every action and measure taken by the country in a general sense:

• The first of them is the strengthening of the Arctic Council as a multilateral instance where decisions are to be taken and in which Iceland can play a significant role.
• The second pillar is related to the first and states that Iceland must have an increased protagonist paper on Arctic decision making, that the EEZ to the north lies within Arctic area and that Iceland has rights to areas at the north of the Arctic Circle, a claim that ought to be supported by government and institutions.
• The third pillar is based on the promotion of an extension of the geographical demarcation of the Arctic, including the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean to address issues of economic, political, security and ecological natures.
• The fourth pillar is the use of International Law for the resolution of dispute and resource exploitation (Althingi, 2011; Hanesson, 2012).
• The fifth is the increasing of cooperation with Greenland and Faroe Island for their respective and common positions.
• The sixth is the support of Arctic Indigenous peoples’ rights.
• The seventh is the construction of agreements and cooperation with other stakeholders in the Arctic.
• The eighth is the protection of the environment and the promotion for a sustainable development along with the contribution to preserve the culture of the Aboriginal Peoples.
• The ninth is the prevention of militarization in the Arctic Area, aiming instead at a “civilian security” for the area[1].
• The tenth is the intent to deepen the development of trade between the Arctic States and provide job opportunities for nationals in the new markets and industries created.
• The eleventh is the provision of information to citizens on Arctic issues as well as promoting Iceland and its Arctic-related institutions for being the host of related meetings and for its cooperation with other organizations respectively.
• The twelfth and final pillar is the increasing of domestic consultations and cooperation (Althingi, 2011; Hanesson, 2012).

The Foreign Affairs Minister of Iceland, Össur Skarphéðinsson (2012) explains the reasons behind the Icelandic Arctic policy, by pointing out that Iceland and its population depend on the climate and the exploitation of fisheries. As such, Iceland is very vulnerable to the effects of any alteration in climate; fisheries are dependant on climatic and environmental fluctuations and are extremely sensitive to pollutants carried on the currents that flow between the Arctic Ocean and the North Atlantic. Even a minor contamination can jeopardize the fisheries and thus one of the main economic activities of the country.

However, environmental and economic concerns are not the only important reasons why Iceland looks to the Frozen North. Hanesson (2012) remarks that on the area of security, that in terms of reaching of an enhanced general security, mutual trust, confidence and the prevention of militarization of the Arctic are all essential, along with the improving of civilian prevention, preparedness and response mechanism to an environmental or other disaster. Hanesson (2012) also recommends that forms of cooperation are be strengthened, not just amongst the Arctics and the EU, but NATO too, which makes the Icelandic case equally interesting. In the same way as Denmark, Canada, Norway and the U.S., Iceland can call upon the presence of NATO in the area as well as serve as a passage due to its location, a geographical quality shared only with Greenland. This is especially important given that the Arctic is turning into a new geopolitical competition between the US, Russia, and China.

It is important to point out that, in respects to the newly open shipping lines, given their location, Iceland can have a key role in the opening of a Transarctic Route. This could help make the country a hub for commercial shipping, as well as a key interchange point along the Euro – Asian and North American Arctic routes, aided by an Icelandic company willing to develop such an initiative. Iceland can also play a role in the research and maritime study of the new shipping routes[2].

In this regard, the President of Iceland remarks that the Arctic is the strategic backyard of the US, having been militarized during the Cold War, and now is a region where there is an Institution like the Arctic Council that exists in order to reach cooperation and agreements among the Arctic states. The council has become especially important since the region gained greater strategic relevance due to its resources which are attracting other states like China[3], India and South Korea. The president also notes the potential new trade routes and points out the need for the US to pay more attention to Arctic events and how they can affect its homeland security (Miks, 2013).

Regarding NATO, there are two aspects that makes Iceland a strategic gateway for a NATO commitment in the arctic. The first fact, following Stringer (2009), is that the opening of new shipping routes means civilian and military ships from non-Arctic nations (such as China) will have access to the area as well as the fact that the territorial disputes between the Coastal Arctic Nations’ claims can lead to high disputes – and do not forget that every arctic nation is increasing its military presence and capacities in the region – making the Arctic prone to facing a volatile situation with the presence of all the elements needed for a perfect storm. The second fact according to Pétursson (2011), is that the Air Policy that followed the withdrawal of US forces in 2006 allows for NATO members to provide air defence with jet fighters and their logistical support for a short period of time[4]. Cooperation with other Nordic nations like Denmark and Norway are, for instance, based on the NATO frameworks, as well as the one with the UK.

This means that Iceland is likely to bring NATO onto the stage in the same way as Norway, given the importance of the organization and that it is a cornerstone in the defence strategies of all the Arctic states except one. This then gives NATO an even more important role in the Arctic, in both military and political aspects, and is an important point to consider when one is reminded that Russia intends to create an aircraft carrier-based combat group along with the possible marauding of Russian submarines in the area and flights of bombers, as in the Canadian case. This means that, no matter Icelandic intentions, the militarization of the Arctic is likely to continue, adding the fact that new shipping routes means new routes for naval as well as merchant shipping (Pétursson, 2011).

Surprisingly, according to STRATFOR (2012), Sweden and Finland decided to collaborate with the Icelandic Air Policy, showing that the security of the Arctic concerns not only NATO and Iceland, but also Scandinavian nations that, although not part of the Alliance, are willing to contribute to it. Additionally, it is a strong sign of cooperation among the Nordic Nations as well as a sign that NATO can cooperate with said countries.

The fact that Iceland is part of NATO, along with Norway and Denmark, is a good and positive sign for its real security, as well as the fact that an increasing cooperation and integration between the Nordic countries might further increase Iceland’s security. Still, as Benediktsson (2011) remarks, NATO is the main cornerstone for any defence plan of Iceland, and in this sense, Iceland has being kept bilateral consultation with the US, continues to advocate for the continuation of the NATO-led exercises known as Northern Viking (in which Sweden as well as Finland took part), and vows for the continuation of its Air Policy. A membership to the EU can only help Iceland even further and in turn, bring the EU into the Arctic Scenario as a new actor. The active taking part on defence consultation at the Nordic Council are also steps that improves the security of Iceland, as it faces the very uncertain and dangerous changes taking place in the Arctic.

The perspectives then, seem quite eased for Iceland and there is more than one aegis shielding Iceland from any possible aggression as during the Cold War. But the fact that there are some Institutions like the Arctic Council and a less tensed environment than there was during the Cold War does not mean that conflicts will not to take place. On the contrary, the Arctic will become another Geopolitical hotspot with the ‘Great Powers’ contesting for the dominion of important parts of it, as well as control over resources and new routes, while increasing their own military presence either to defend or act on their claims.

The positive aspect is that Iceland is furthering on the security aspect no matter the somewhat nïave prediction of a low possibility of conflicts, even if the country wishes no militarization of the Arctic, as it is a process that will take place sooner or later, as though it were a plot of a Greek tragedy. In this sense, cooperation agreements with the Nordic Nations and NATO are on to be furthered, and Iceland is considering bringing back America and other nations to station jet squadrons for longer times to increase the air surveillance system (for air defence and SAR tasks), and to even allow the building up of a harbour to shelter some naval elements of NATO and Nordic navies facing a possible conflict in the area. One way or another, Iceland’s strategic position is too important to be ignored, even if such moves make the island the front-row spectator, along with Finland, to witness and experience any turn in the geopolitical tides. WWII and the Cold War both offer lessons that must not be forgotten in regards to the Arctic.

Just as the climate change that affects the currents that flow through the economically vital fisheries, a political-military change in the Arctic will affect the life and stability of the country that could lead to far worse than economic problems.

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[1] In other words, the provision of welfare, SAR capabilities and environment protection, to be met through cooperation with other states as well. See: Althingi, (2011), p. 2.

[2] See: Icelandic Government (2007). Breaking the Ice: Arctic Development and Maritime Transportation. Prospects of the Transarctic Route – Impact and Opportunities, p. 26.

[3] As it was reviewed on the First Article of the Arctic Series, China is one of the new outsiders with a strong impact, and most, if not all of the reviewed states, takes that factor into account.

[4] NATO, as a matter of fact, also provides cooperation in surveillance and Search and Rescue.

Sources

Althingi (2011). A Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy. Reykjavik, Iceland.

Skarphéðinsson, Ö (2012). Icelandic Perspectives on the Arctic. Arctic Frontiers – Arctic Tipping Points. Tromsö, Norway.

Hannesson, H. W (2012). Iceland and the Arctic. [Power Point Presentation]Reykjavik, Iceland: Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from: http://www.institutenorth.org/assets/images/uploads/articles/Nor%C3%B0ursl%C3%B3%C3%B0astefna_Alaska_2611_2012.pdf on 30.12.2013

Icelandic Government (2007). Breaking the Ice: Arctic Development and Maritime Transportation. Prospects of the Transarctic Route – Impact and Opportunities. Conference Report. Akureyri, Iceland: Prentstofan Stell. Retrieved from: http://www.mfa.is/media/Utgafa/Breaking_The_Ice_Conference_Report.pdf on 30.12.2013.

Petursson, G (2011). Cooperation in the High North: the case of Iceland. In: Nordia Geographical Publications 40: 4, pp. 77 – 86. NGP Yearbook of 2011. Oulu, Finland: Nordia Geographical Publications.

Benediktsson, E (2011). At Crossroads: Iceland’s Defence and Security Relations, 1940 – 2011. Strategic Studies Institute. United States Army War College. Retrieved from: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Icelands-Defense-and-Security-Relations-1940-2011/2011/8/18 on 30.12.2013.

STRATFOR (2012). Finland, Sweden: A Step Toward Greater Nordic Security Cooperation. In: International Relations and Security Network. Retrieved from: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?id=154657 on 31.12.2013.

Stringer, D (2009). Iceland: NATO Charts Out Battle for the Arctic: Arctic’s thawing seas bring new security risks. On: Globalresearch, Centre for Research on Globalization. Retrieved from: http://www.globalresearch.ca/iceland-nato-charts-out-battle-for-the-arctic/12085 on 03.01.2014.

Miks, J (2013). Iceland’s President: Arctic Crucial to America. Retrieved from: http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2013/10/03/icelands-president-arctic-crucial-to-america/ on 30.12.2013.

*Cover image ‘Iceland’ by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center

In the effort to reach a truly sustainable future it is clear that a lot still needs be done. On the face of it, _­the green economy concept seems to be an efficient solution to reduce global warming and achieve development sustainably. However, it is not without problems. One such major problem is that developing countries do not always have the necessary technology and priorities when it comes to transitioning to a green economy. Their priorities involve providing citizens with access to basic needs such as food, water and employment.

Developed countries on the other hand, have the necessary funds and technologies to shift the focus of their economy. These countries also have a different set of priorities such as reaching new markets, developing new technologies, green products and services.

The only way the transition to a green economy can be successful for all countries is if this transition process is done equally. For this, developed countries need to share their advanced knowledge and technology so that developing countries will have equal opportunities to develop and conquer new markets. This would also have the effect of encouraging more countries to take up green economy initiatives by reassuring emerging countries that they will not be jeopardized or left behind.

Globally, countries view the green economy concept as a positive step towards sustainable development, but since the RIO 2012 summit indigenous groups have been protesting against it. Transitioning to a green economy involves changing key economic sectors such as the energy or transportation sector which can lead to drastic changes in local environments for indigenous populations as a result of the construction of a dam or new roads, for example. There is a danger that in the excitement and rush to implement green economy policies at national and international levels, local governments and policy will be forgotten. Many people, including indigenous groups all over the world, claim that for green economy to be a true solution to climate change it must work at all levels, including the local.

Some projects are trying to do this, proving that the green economy can bring advantages and new sources of income for indigenous tribes at a local level through eco-tourism and handicraft. But for green economy to be accepted by such groups, and be successful, it is vital that indigenous tribes are consulted and informed of the changes and benefits they can expect before a local or regional green economy project is implemented.

It is only by doing this success that can be achieved on a local indigenous level, and it is only by gaining success on a local level that green economy will ever truly help change our world’s economy and its future. Only when it is financially more viable for people in developing countries to embrace green economy initiatives such as ecotourism rather than logging, and for countries to stop the over exploitation of natural resources in favor of sustainable, and internationally equitable development, will we see true global environmental change for the better.

Despite the many issues with their implementation, there are no doubts that the fundamental concepts of sustainable development and green economy are positive examples to follow and provide goals to aim for, so long as they are applied appropriately and with great consideration. The greater danger would be if we did nothing at all. As chief Raoni of the indigenous Kayapó tribe in Brazil once said: “If man continues to destroy the earth, these winds will return with even more force … not once … but many times … sooner or later. These winds will destroy us all. We all breathe one only air, we all drink one only water, we all live on one only earth. We must all protect it.” (Raoni, 2000)

*This Article is adapted from my master’s thesis: ‘Sustainable Development & Green Economy: the planet’s future or greening indigenous communities into oblivion?’ which was completed as part of the Master’s Curriculum at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Erfurt, Germany.

*Cover image ‘Kayapó warriors’ by International Rivers