Author: kasmir

Prologue

The Vikings made ashore in a land where tall green pines stand covered by snow. They join with the others who had been advancing by land having started the journey long ago. Both groups had begun their travels from the south, following the shoreline northwards. The men discuss the next steps to take, whether they carry on northwards or send the ships home to the South. It is a difficult decision; both places are important for them. The north promises vital resources to send home but pushing on into the unknown is daunting. But the quest they are on, to avoid or prepare for a possible Ragnarök, the Twilight of Times, was given by the Gods. The prospect freezes them and they ask themselves if they are ready to defend or prevent such terrible event. And yet there is no decision to be made. They must, because the strong howl that can be heard carried on the wind from the east might be the sinister Fenrir or Garmr, coming ever closer. Even the Naglfar, the ship made from the nails of the dead, might be sailing in the nearby with the terrifying Jörmungandr lurking beneath the water. The men shiver. They do not wish to see the terrible face of Hell.

Sweden and the Arctic/High North: Yggdrasil

Currently, Sweden is facing a similar situation comprising three issues: the Importance of the Arctic and the Northern Region (Lapland) for the Security and economy of Sweden; Russia being a northern actor (along with its attitudes towards Sweden, the EU and NATO); and the geographical and strategic importance of the Baltic. As a matter of fact, all of the three are interrelated and pose a serious challenge for Sweden, the most important being the integrity of the country. And following the recent events of Ukraine, the Russian intervention in Crimea and its annexation, evidencing Russian willingness to use the military force for the sake of its interests and its expansionist ambitions, this challenge or risk is manifesting itself strongly.

First of all it is essential to review the importance that the Arctic and the High North (in this case, the Lapland region in Swedish territory) has for Sweden in many areas, from its economy to its national defence, and also to point out the interests that the country has in the area(s). This to assess why a country like Sweden would have interests in, even if it does not have a direct access to, the Arctic and why in the end the Arctic or the High North matters for Sweden. This first article on Sweden will focus on topics other than defence, which will be reviewed in the next article.

The ties between Sweden and the Arctic provide a basis for the strategic priorities of the country in the region and serve as an argument for Sweden to consider itself as an Arctic state, despite the fact that it does not have a coastal territory on the Arctic. The first tie is of an historical nature: the consideration of the Swedish powers of Lapland as part of the realm and the interaction with the Sami people since the Middle Ages, and the resultant colonization towards the northern areas, together with biologic and botanic research. Other activities related to research have also been carried out by Sweden in Svalbard, as well as mining, and by the 1980’s and early 90’s Swedish icebreakers reached the Pole to execute research activities and the Swedish Polar Research Secretariat was established (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2011).

The second tie is related with security in the area: Sweden recognizes the influence that the Arctic has on the country’s security. For instance, the Cold War placed Sweden and its Lapland Arctic region between the interests of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Today this situation takes place in a similar way with the US and Russia. Sweden, however, thinks that there is no significant high level of risk in the area given the US – Russian Reset Initiative and the frameworks drawn up by the Arctic Council, plus the border agreement between Norway and Russia in 2010 at the Barents Sea.

But the presence of economic resources and new shipping routes in the Arctic means the rise of new security and strategic chances and challenges. An interdependent Europe makes Swedish security policies be more oriented towards cooperation, an example being the Nordic Declaration of Solidarity which will be discussed later (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2011).

The third tie is in the economic realm, where Sweden is making investments in resource extraction, fisheries and wood-related industries, along with reindeer herding and hunting. Also, research and development projects in the Arctic allows the country to cooperate for a more effective resource use with the private sector. For example, the space industry is based in the northern parts of the country, and Sweden has expertise in Arctic shipping and vehicle testing. Tourism is also being developed in the area (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2011).

The fourth tie is related with climate and environment, given the fact that the Swedish climate and environment are part of the Arctic and are affected by it. Extreme weather has an impact on Sweden’s society and infrastructure, as well as its native cultures.

The fifth tie consists of the research made by Sweden in engineering, natural sciences, social sciences and humanities being carried out by various Swedish institutions and organizations for the past 150 years.

The sixth and final tie between Sweden and the Arctic is the native people, the Sami, who have lived in the area for centuries and whose cross-border existence have allowed Sweden to reach various agreements with its neighbours, Norway especially, in this matter (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2011).

Along with the aforementioned ties, Sweden has great interests in the area that inextricably links the country to it, thus every event in the arctic will have a knock-on effect. In a general sense, Sweden aims to keep the Arctic a low political tension area, to strengthen the Arctic Council as a forum for discussing Arctic related issues as well as the Barents cooperation, while enhancing a common policy and specific projects. Sweden also aims at contributing to an EU Arctic Policy while promoting the EU as an important cooperating partner in the region, utilising in turn the cooperation mechanisms between the Arctic Council and the Barents Cooperation. In the same way, Sweden wants to focus on projects taking place in the Arctic that have an important value for the Arctic Council. Sweden also intends to exert any activity and cooperation projects within the frames of International Law, UN conventions and other international treaties (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2011).

All the previous general interests mean that Sweden has as an overall – and main – priority in an efficient multilateral cooperation, through dialogue, confidence-building, transparency and cooperation within international law. This approach is also the basis for Swedish security in the Arctic. The discussion on whether the most effective way will be made in the second part of this article.

Sweden focusses on a number of important actors for the sake of its multilateral and cooperative approach including: the Arctic Council, the European Union, the Nordic Cooperation, the Barents Cooperation, the United Nations, the five other Arctic coastal states (in order to gain a more active participation in the decisions of the Arctic Council and other political issues on the area), and the Sami Cooperation.

In a more specific way and according to the Ministry of Defence of Sweden, Perry and Andersen (2012),  and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011), the country’s Arctic Strategy has three main priorities.

The first of all is the climate and the environment, with a focus on climate, environmental protection, biodiversity and climate and environmental research. Bergh and Oldberg (2011) remarks that environment is the top priority to be fulfilled by cooperation focused on oil spills and their prevention, as well as focusing on air pollutants and strengthening natural and societal resilience before any climate change.

The second is the economic development of the region, with a focus on free trade in the Arctic, promoting industrial interests in the Barents region, meeting educational and research needs, and promoting the Swedish economic interests in the Arctic [i].

The third is the human dimension, with a focus on the effects on health by the Arctic’s geographical conditions, the impact of climate change and hazardous substances on the population, the impact on native cultures, their industries and the survival of their language (Sami), transfer of knowledge, and a research programme on the Sami people.

Sweden, although it is not an Arctic state in the sense that it has no direct coast on the Arctic Ocean, has strong interests in the area because of the diverse causes, resources and infrastructure there, along with the obligation to protect the environment and native people. But as it happens, similarities between the Swedish approach and that of the Canadian, Icelandic, and Finnish approach are strikingly similar in the placement of environment, native peoples. Even their approach to the economic issues in the Arctic are similar, placing cooperation as an important tool for the reaching of agreements. The accuracy of such an approach might prevent Sweden from securing the Arctic, its interests and even itself. The reasons for this will be explained in the next article.

Sources

Bergh, K., & Oldberg, I (2011). The New Arctic: Building Cooperation in the Face of Emerging Challenges. Conference report. SIPRI. Stockholm, Sweden. Retrieved from: http://www.sipri.org/research/security/arctic/arcticpublications/conference-paper-26-april on 20.01.2014.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2011). Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Departament for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Arctic Secretariat. Stockholm, Sweden.

Ministry of Defence (n.a). Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic Region. [Power Point Presentation]. Retrieved from: http://www.arctic-council.org/eppr/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/ppp-Sweden-Strategy-for-the-Arctic-region.pdf On 20.01.2014.

Munch, P. A (1926). Norse Mythology. Legends of Gods and Heroes (Trans. Hustvedt, S. B). The American – Scandinavian Foundation. New York, US.

Perry, C. M; & Andersen, B (2012). Chapter 4. Other Key Stakeholders in the Future of the Arctic. Sweden. In: New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and Cooperation (pp. 138 – 140). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

*Cover image ‘Sweden Grunge Flag‘ by Nicolas Raymond

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[i] Those interests are, according to the Ministry of Defence of Sweden (n.d.): mining, petroleum and forestry; land transport and infrastructure; maritime security and the impact of shipping on the environment; Search and Air Rescue (SAR); ice – breaking; energy; tourism; reindeer husbandry; and others.

In our increasingly interconnected and digital world, cyber-security has come to be considered one of the main security challenges of the 21^st century, not only for Europe but also worldwide. Much like their citizens, governments have embraced online technology to improve communication and provide enhanced services. Examples such as Estonia’s E-governance infrastructure, considered one of the world’s most advanced with services like E-business, E-notary and E-voting, have inspired many other countries in Europe and worldwide.

Recently a number of EU countries have started to adopt similar E-governance initiatives seeing it as the future. Finland recently went one step further, signing an agreement to cooperate with Estonia on the continued development of its E-governance system. And it is almost certain that in time other countries will follow suit.

However, the increased reliance on these advanced electronic services comes at a price. It has rendered the public and the private sector increasingly vulnerable to so-called ‘cyber terrorism’ and ‘digital espionage’. High profile examples include the cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007 when governmental and banking websites were rendered inoperable as a result of a political protest. Also the case of Edward Snowden, a former NSA employee who leaked a vast amount of secret online documents, revealing, amongst other things, that the USA conducted around 231 invasive cyber operations in 2011 aimed at countries such as China, Iran, North Korea and Russia.

With cyber warfare practiced by individuals and states alike, it is clear that online security is already equally important to any other national security issue. But how can the EU counter this threat?

The greatest challenge in combatting cyber terrorism according Eugene Kaspersky, founder of Kaspersky Lab, is that it is nearly impossible to track down the attackers: “with today’s attacks, you are clueless about who did it or when they will strike again”. Broadly speaking the internet is not limited by geographical borders or jurisdiction, however governments, businesses and the organizations that currently combat such threats are.

Currently responsible for cyber security in the EU is ENISA, a primarily passive organization providing knowledge exchange and information on cyber security. If the EU is serious about combatting cyber terrorism then a new approach to enforcing cyber security is necessary. The EU has the ability to transcend borders and unite its members and therefore the opportunity to create a more active, unified, focused and structured approach. It should also present a more coherent strategy to the world from a unified force that could potentially collaborate with other nations and international agencies.

A common framework or organization could be established that would take advantage of this and allow governments, corporations, secret services, military and police to cooperate on such matters without being constrained by geography.

Greater connectivity is a double-edged sword; it leaves you more vulnerable to an attack but also more flexible and capable to counter it. The whole world is becoming increasingly connected and it stands to reason that those within the EU responsible for countering cyber terrorism should do the same.

*Cover image ‘cybersecurity‘ by Free Press

A Ground for Discussion (Introduction)

The Military intervention in Kosovo by the inter-governmental military alliance NATO is an important chapter in the discourse on the issue of the Third Party Intervention. The decision has been one of the widely debated military interventions in the history of International Relations as it lacks a sound grounding in laws and was the first intervention on “Humanitarian Grounds” and the “Right to Protect” and without an authorization from the United Nations (Falk, 1999). But this two parts article seeks to analyse the collective decision of the then 19-members of NATO to exercise the military option in Kosovo conflict through the prism of Morality in the International Relations.

In the run-up to this decision, the US authorities had used various historical metaphors to describe the situation at hand and to stir the international community including the UN into action on Humanitarian grounds. The four pertinent metaphors employed by the US Government – including by President Bill Clinton and his administration officials in their speeches – to garner support for its decisions have been the Holocaust (the genocide committed by Nazi against the European Jews), Munich (the 1938 Munich Conference, where the western democracies failed to stand up to Hitler and the Balkan Powderkeg[1] (Paris, 2002) and the lessons learnt from the inaction during the Bosnian crisis (Yost, 2007). Ultimately, the NATO used these reasons to push for a military intervention in the Kosovo on Humanitarian grounds.

The moral scrutiny of Humanitarian Intervention is relevant as aims at the maximizing the human beings’ welfare. One school of thoughts calls for restricting the occurrence of war as military force brings with it horrific human sufferings (Walzer, 1977) and second contends that humanitarian intervention is ‘morally desirable’ as it saves innocent people from the clutches of abusive authorities (Beitz, 1979). Both strains of thoughts take the preservation of human life and its quality as ultimate goal.

So the NATO’s claims of Humanitarian Intervention will be scrutinized under the Theories of Statism and Cosmopolitanism explained through the writings of Michael Walzer and Charles Beitz respectively. The two viewpoints are important when the world is debating how sacrosanct is the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of a country and under what circumstances the country forfeits these rights. In his book Just and Unjust wars (1977) Walzer considers a country’s right to territorial integrity and political sovereignty completely inviolable and any aggression tantamount as crime (Doppelt, 1978). Walzer makes a case for disregarding the right to Sovereignty of a country if there are grave human rights violations like “enslavement or massacre” (Walzer, 1977). Beitz’s Cosmopolitanism, in direct challenge to the Statism, makes states subject of the external moral scrutiny on its treatment of its citizens and; makes citizens and not states as the basic unit of international principle of morality (Beitz, 1979).

The moral assessment aims at finding answers to when, why and under what conditions humanitarian intervention has moral sanction and if the NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo fits the bill.

Stage-Setting for NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo

Located in the South Eastern Europe Kosovo contained several elements of classic conflict. The intractable tussle between the Kosovo’s Albanian and Serbian population left it ethnically divided. Also the animosity had an aspect of contested territory, as Kosovo had important historic and religious sites important to Serbian national identity (Mccgwire, 2000)(Posen, 2000). The conflict became more complex with the issues of the human rights violations in Kosovo and the sovereign rights of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The culmination into the NATO intervention was also interesting as the military alliance entered the war on the side of Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) that was earlier blacklisted as a terrorist organization by the US.

Kosovo conflict hit headlines in the 1990s and has its genesis as a  fight  for  autonomy  against  the  Yugoslav  government  and  then spiraled  into  an  ethnic  conflict  and  Kosovo’s  quest  for  independence [2]. The US and its allies in Europe were seized of the Kosovo conflict, which has been raging for few years and as all attempts to broker peace between the rebelling force KLA and the ruling dictator Slobodan Milosevic had failed.

By mid-1990s mass Albanian protests were mounting against Milosevic government which were dealt with high-handedness. KLA’s attacks against the state authorities were also on the rise. In January 1999 took place Racak massacre of which Serbs were accused of. In the massacre 45 civilian Albanians were allegedly killed by the Serbian forces in a Kosovian village of Racak. It has shaped NATO’s resolve of intervening in the Kosovo conflict.

The massacre was followed by the Rambouillet Talks in France[3] (Weller, 1999). On 18 March 1999, Albanian, American and British delegations signed the accord, however, the Serbian and Russian delegations rejected it. The main point of contention besides the increased autonomy to Kosovo, has been the last minute inclusion of the provision giving the NATO troops access to the whole of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the purpose of transportation and basing of the troops (Posen, 2000)[4].

After the failing of the Rambouillet Talks, events unfolded fast. On 22 March Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) withdrew its international observers from the region and on 24 March, NATO commenced its 78-days long pounding of Yugoslavia under the operation codenamed “Operation Allied Force”. NATO leaders expected that the use of air power will put a quick end to the humanitarian crisis and stall an imminent genocide in Kosovo.

However, as the airstrike commenced Yugoslavian forces increased their crackdown on Albanian civilians, making millions of people refugees in the process (Teson, 2009) who took shelter in the contiguous European Countries (Wedgwood, 1999) .

NATO’s objectives of the air campaign, in turn, were enlisted in a statement issued at the Extraordinary Meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO on 12 April 1999 and were reiterated by Heads of State and Government in Washington on 23 April 1999[5]. They were –

• a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression;
• the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces;
• The stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
• the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations;
• the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords, in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

All the reasons behind the NATO’s intervention – officially stated and strategically implied – can be encapsulated using the Pillar’s method as follows

FIGURE 1: Various Reasons Triggering Nato’s Intervention Encapsulated Using the Pillar’s Method. Source: Own source.

The next part  will focus on the theoretical frameworks, as well as analysing the factros that led to NATO’S intervention in Kosovo, in the light of the abovementioned theoretical frameworks. More importantly, the main core of the next part will rely on the issue of NATO’s intervention morality and the question about it.

Author Biography

Ritu Sushila Krishan has been a Journalist working in India for 8 years, and for better part of her stint she has been covering defence and strategic issues along with social conflicts. Presently she has been pursuing her Masters degree from Willy Brandt School of Public Policy and interests herself in conflicts revolving around religion.

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[1] Balkan Powderkeg refers to the region before World War I, when overlapping territorial claims made it a highly contested region in Europe.

[2] For a summary of the Kosovo conflict read http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5165042.stm

[3] The copy of the draft can be accessed at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm

[4] This clause reads as follows: “NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations.”

[5] The official statement is available on the NATO website http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm

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Sources.

Beitz, C. (1979). Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Doppelt, G. (1978). Walzer’s Theory of Morality in International Relations. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8(1), 3–26.

Falk, R. (1999). Kosovo, world order, and the future of international law. American Journal of International Law, 93(4), 847–857. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555350

Mccgwire, M. (2000). Why did we bomb Belgrade? International Affairs, 76(1), 1–23. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.00116/abstract

Paris, R. (2002). Kosovo and the metaphor war. Political Science Quarterly, 117(3), 423–450. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2307/798263/abstract

Posen, B. (2000). The war for Kosovo: Serbia’s political-military strategy. International Security, 24(4), 39–84. Retrieved from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228800560309

Teson, F. (2009). Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention. Amsterdam LF, 1(2). Retrieved from http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/amslawf1&section=21

Walzer, M. (1977). Just and Unjust Wars. United States: Basic Books.

Wedgwood, R. (1999). NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia. American Journal of International Law, 93(4), 828–834. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555347

Weller, M. (1999). The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo. International Affairs, 75(2), 211–251. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2346.00069/abstract

Yost, D. S. (2007). NATO and the anticipatory use of force. International Affairs, 83(1), 39–68. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00602.x/full

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Image: ‘Fleeing Kosovo‘, by Cliff. Released under Creative Commons 2.0 (CC BY 2.0) License.

Over the past days and weeks the situation in Ukraine has escalated rapidly with protests all over the country intensifying, president Yanukovych fleeing Ukraine, Russia invading Crimea, the US becoming involved in negotiations and the increase in gas bills by the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom.

It is alarming to see that Ukraine, a country that was close to joining the European Union, now has a new government and is facing huge debts and political and social instability. Some describe current events as being the most serious tension in Europe since the cold war ended.

But how did it start?

The crisis in Ukraine began in November 2013 when president Viktor Yanukovych decided not to sign an agreement with the European Union and to strengthen its ties with Russia, leading to widespread protests. In December 2013 around 800,000 demonstrators occupied Independence square and the city hall in the Ukrainian capital Kiev. By mid-December Russia agreed to buy $15bn of Ukrainian debt and to reduce gas prices by a third.

In January 2014 Ukraine’s Prime Minister Mykola Azarov resigned as the situation escalated with the first protestors being killed as government buildings and offices became occupied. In February violence increased drastically; many more people were wounded and killed. At this point, the EU decided to intervene and sent out three foreign ministers to try and reach an agreement. Russia also sent a representative. On the 21^st of February, president Yanukovych signed an agreement with the leaders of the opposition that would hand powers back to the parliament so that a new government could be formed.

One day after signing the agreement, Yanukovych disappeared, reappearing a few days later in Russia. In the meantime, Olexander Turchynov was appointed as temporary president of the new government. One of their first actions was to issue a warrant for the arrest of Yanukovych.

Crimea

Crimea is a peninsula located in the south of Ukraine and on the northern coast of the Black Sea. It is an autonomous republic where most of the population consider themselves as being ethnically Russian. Russian is also the dominant spoken language in the region. Crimea was once a part of Russia, having been annexed by the country in 1783, until it was transferred to Ukraine in 1954 under the regime of the Soviet Union.

On the 27^th of February, similar protests over the EU–Russia deals broke out in Crimea. On the same day, Pro-Russian gunmen took advantage of the chaos and took control of key buildings in the Crimean capital Simferopol. The situation in Crimea escalated significantly as Ukraine’s interim president Oleksandr Turchynov advised Russia not to interfere in the area, since the Russian Black Sea fleet is located in the port of Sevastopol near Simferopol.

The majority of the population in Crimea backs the ousted president Yanukovych believing that he was a victim of a coup. This subsequently encouraged separatists within the parliament to vote for becoming a part of Russia once again. On the 6^th of March, the parliament scheduled a referendum for the 16^th of March.

Diplomatic Tensions

The United States warned Russia that any military intervention would be a mistake. But Russia on the other hand stated that it would defend the rights of its citizens and that violations to human rights would not be tolerated.

Despite the warnings, Russian president Vladimir Putin sent an appeal to the Russian parliament requesting permission to mobilize Russian forces in Ukraine. Putin wrote “I’m submitting a request for using the armed forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine pending the normalization of the socio-political situation in that country”. On the 1^st of March, the parliament approved his request.

As a result, interim president Turchynov told Ukraine’s army to be prepared. In a phone call to president Putin, US president Barack Obama demanded Russian forces be pulled out of Ukraine but Putin stood his ground by asserting that Russia has the right to defend its interests as well as Ukraine’s Russian speakers.

Economic Repercussions

In addition to the diplomatic tensions caused by the Russian involvement in Ukraine, economists warned that it could also have serious economic consequences for Russia, especially after the Sochi winter Olympics, becoming another drain on its resources. Further economic loss is also predicted due to the strained relations between Russia and western countries. Such consequences were seen on the 3^rd of March, which became known as ‘Black Monday’ as the Russian Stock market fell 10% as a result of the military intervention.

Gazprom

Ukraine is going through turbulent times with the formation of a new government, and with debts continuously increasing and a stagnant economy. To add to this pressure, the Russian company Gazprom implied that gas prices would increase starting next month since the Ukraine did not pay what it owed to the company for the month of February. Overall, Ukraine owes Gazprom $1.55bn in unpaid debts. President Putin claimed that the increase in gas prices had ‘nothing to do’ with the situation in Crimea. He stated: “We gave them money. They failed to deliver.”

The increase in gas prices will put a further strain on Ukraine’s economy and also increase the necessity of an international bailout. The new Ukrainian government requested the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and claimed that they will need around $35bn for the next two years so that a default can be avoided.

The United States plans to offer $1bn in loan guarantees to Ukraine to assist the country in its recovery and the European Union has also offered the new government financial assistance worth 11bn euros for the following years once Kiev reaches an agreement with the IMF. Germany has also stated that it would provide bilateral financial assistance to Ukraine.

No end in sight?

On the 5^th of March talks to reach an agreement between Russia and Western countries were held in Paris but no agreement was reached. Just as Obama called Russia’s actions in Crimea a mistake, the foreign secretary of the UK, William Hague, echoed his remark calling it a “big miscalculation”. To some extent they may be right. If no diplomatic agreement between Ukraine and Russia is reached, Western countries might implement economic sanctions against Russia and annexing Crimea would, without doubt, damage diplomatic ties with the West. Effects of this can be seen already as the EU halted its negotiations with Russia concerning visa-free travel for Russian citizens in Europe. More importantly for Putin, European leaders are also considering reducing the import of gas from Russia and have expressed intentions to import more of it from the US. This would have a huge impact on the Russian economy and its diplomatic leverage but it is yet to be seen if these are simply empty threats. Regardless, Putin should consider his options carefully as just one wrong move might irrevocably jeopardize Russia’s economy and severely set back diplomatic relations with Western countries.

*Cover image ‘IMG_6187‘ by Sasha Maksymenko

An initial answer would state that it depends more on whether Europe wants to execute more Peacekeeping operations or to counter the Russian modernization and its increasing assertive attitudes on the Baltic, Eastern Europe and the High Arctic (Klein & Pester, 2014; Perry & Andersen, 2012). And Russia could wage a contest with Europe for controlling the newly discovered resources at the Arctic, using its newly modernized and increased naval assets (Laruelle, 2011; Zysk, 2010).

Europe then, should increase its naval assets. It could fight piracy and terrorism among other threats, protect resources and commerce, and even provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Swartz, 2011). Navies can take the land and air assets where they are needed, if Europe prioritizes the execution of peacekeeping and assistance missions abroad. But if Europe wants to focus more on Russia, the sea domain could perform some tasks such as to protect Europe from seaborne attacks, protect trade and even block the potential adversary’s ports and coasts, contest the dominion of seas and oceans (Artic and Mediterranean), act as a nuclear deterrent backyard, and support the armies (Swartz, 2011). Sea power could base an “anti – access and sea denial” strategy to suffocate Russia for the worst of the cases, and acting as a “flank force” supporting the defensive operations of the armies.

In turn, land combat systems – from infantry to armoured divisions – are important for the immediate defence of European territory. They demonstrate the resolution of every society to achieve a certain political outcome and, they can capture, occupy, hold and even retake territory (Gray, 2008). In the event of an increased Russian aggressive attitude, the land power can deter or take most of the weight of the defence. If priority is set for peacekeeping, land warfare assets can meet the objectives and assist both government and civil community and enforce political agreements.

However, if naval power can take troops abroad for peacekeeping operations or act as a supportive strategic branch for defence, and if land power can ensure peace on the assisted countries abroad or defend Europe’s territory, air superiority provides a protective umbrella over these forces. It decides the strategic outcome of operations in the battlefield, and can act as a fast and long – ranged train of supplies and delivers support for the operations of both land and sea (USAF, 2011; Lambeth, 1999). Thus the close air support and naval aviation along with aircraft carriers are vital to control the battlefield.

Through strong air power – from the single and smallest drone to the most sophisticated satellite – Europe can gain supremacy over every scenario and for either territorial defence or peacekeeping operations, thus being able to drive the strategic events to its benefit through this particular domain. Because of this, Europe should prioritize on that one. But it is important to mention that air power should be gained and executed with a strong cooperation and coordination, along with a joint mentality (Dobrowolski, 2013). The other domains are, in the end, interdependent, and cannot prevail by themselves alone.

*Cover image ‘TLP C130 EUFOR ET 2000N‘ by Rock Cohen

Where does Kosovo stand in international arena? The Key Mechanisms and Factors behind Diplomatic Recognition

International Recognition in the scope of the UN

Kosovo, one of the world’s newest states finally declared its independence on the 17^th of February 2008, becoming the seventh state to emerge from the former Soviet republic of Yugoslavia. A small country situated in the Western Balkan region, Kosovo has about 2 million inhabitants, of whom 90% are ethnic Albanians.

For a newly independent state like Kosovo, gaining diplomatic recognition is not easy. There are a seemingly infinite number of variables that lie behind achieving such recognition, from political, geopolitical and economic ideologies to social and religious beliefs, and many more besides.

As a pure political and interest based decision, diplomatic recognition is the reason why new entities run a rough competitive process of lobbying to receive and increase the number of recognitions. But perhaps the most crucial criteria in diplomatic recognition is the potential interests and benefits that a recognizing state will face afterwards.

The current international order is quite consolidated; the existing states set their diplomatic ties and cooperate based on their interests. Similarly, when dealing with a country with an unsettled political status such as Kosovo, the international community also takes into consideration common and individual interests. As such, recognizing a new state that could potentially jeopardize the system can be very costly for the recognizer.

On top of this, every UN member state signs the UN Charter, a part of which requires that respect be given for every other member state’s sovereignty. Thus any state that recognizing a new entity that has broken from or emerged out of an existing sovereign state runs the risk of being in potential breach of the charter.

There are, however, numerous factors and mechanisms that can alter according to the case and status of an issue as determined by international law to help a recognizing state to grant diplomatic recognition.

In Kosovo’s case, the international community has been divided and the number of recognitions granted to Kosovo so far is not sufficient for a UN membership. As a result, so far as the international community is concerned, Kosovo does not possess the status of a sovereign nation.

The key mechanisms and factors behind diplomatic recognition in case of Kosovo

From early 1998 to mid-1999, Kosovo endured a brutal war fought between the Serbia which controlled Kosovo before the war, with air support from NATO. On the 11^th of June 1999, the Kumanovo Treaty brought the war to an end but Kosovo’s battle for independence and diplomatic recognition did not begin immediately after the ceasefire.

Indeed, even the idea of independence had yet to take hold. First it began to seek support and form allies; it was only during this period when the actual idea of independence from Serbia began to take shape.

Nearly a decade after the end of the war, Kosovo declared its independence on the 17^th of February 2008 and began to establish its government and institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the main body responsible for establishing international diplomatic relations.

Kosovo’s independence declaration was expected to bring peace in the Balkan region, but in fact did the exact opposite and created turmoil in international affairs.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) did not manage to have a common position on whether or not to approve or disapprove Kosovo’s claims of becoming independent and a sovereign state member of international bodies. Without a common decision, each state within the international community had to decide how to respond unilaterally to the Kosovo declaration. This political attitude created more positioning and disputes in international relations rather than settling the problem. As a result, the political and diplomatic status of Kosovo still remains disputed and receives no unilateral international recognition nor an international status.

To make matters worse, Serbia still claims sovereignty over the territory of Kosovo which has the effect of making the diplomatic battle for recognition move in two different directions. Kosovo on the one hand struggles for more international recognition and to maintain its current diplomatic ties, while Serbia on the other hand, constantly develops campaigns against Kosovo’s independence by lobbying to gain more support from the sceptical nations by calling for non-recognition of Kosovo’s “illegal” secession.

To date, Kosovo’s Declaration of independence has been formally recognized by 106 UN member states while the main supporters are from Western Europe and the USA. However, it has been rejected by Russia and China, while the rest of the international community has remained silent and undecided. This group of undecided states is the main target of the Serbian and Kosovar governments in their recognition battle.

The case of Kosovo: the legal dispute and domino effect

The case of Kosovo has been a laudable and complicated issue in international law; many would agree that the international community has failed to solve the case. The main problem is that the rules and principles set by a number of international covenants on self-determination and secession leave room for discussions and interpretations from different points of view. On top of this there was no clarity whether these principles could be used for the case of Kosovo, so the issue was treated as a unique or unprecedented case in international law (Ober & Williams, 2006, pp. 110-111). This legal confusion left room for the third party, in this instance the other states, to reproduce and interpret international law in the case of Kosovo based on their interests and positions in the international arena.

According to liberalist theory, how states act in the international arena depends on domestic conditions and interest. Therefore, every decision in foreign politics has to be in parallel with the national interest (Slaughter, 2000, p. 241). In the case of diplomatic recognition of Kosovo, the recognizing state must also take into consideration the so-called domino effect and whether such an action would cause domestic implications.

Facts have shown that the states most likely to reject Kosovo are those with similar domestic problems; Spain, for example, having the unsolved case of the Basque and Catalan regions (Summers, 2004, p. 428). Hence, statistics show that countries with domestic unresolved political and separatist disputes (e.g. Spain, Russia and China) strongly oppose Kosovo’s declaration with the fear that it would set a precedent and lead to the domino effect – i.e. the eventual recognition of their own internal separatist groups (Researcher, 2011, pp. 32-33).

How the Kosovo case was viewed by countries in the international community varied. A number of decided to consider the case of Kosovo as a precedent while others viewed it as a unique oddity in international law. Another group made up of UN members [1], consider that the legal aspect of the declaration breaches the main principle of the UN Charter as the territorial integrity of Serbia was breached (Castle, 2008). A further group [2] call for further negotiations and discussions over the situation with the purpose of reaching the final decision (Summers, 2004, p. 296).

It is clear that one of the main factors that every potential recognizing state takes into consideration before any diplomatic recognition is what domestic repercussions recognizing a new state will have. In the case of Kosovo this is especially true due to the fear of causing a domino effect combined with the country’s disputed legal status.

Democratic Solidarity and Human Rights

In the case of Kosovo, the democratic solidarity and human rights factors have consistently been seen as the most common factors behind diplomatic recognition. Democratic solidarity refers to the first group of states that recognized Kosovo immediately after its declaration of independence in 2008 (Harris & Kuperman, 2007). While most countries stressed that their decisions on diplomatic recognition were made for political reasons, the “democratic solidarity” group [3] stressed the importance of peace and security in the Balkan region. Many of these recognizing countries, including Albania (Kaufman, 2013, p. 139) and the UK (Thakur & Schnabel, 2000, p. 136), also noted that the Kosovo situation put an end to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the series of conflicts seen during this period in the Balkans.

By far the most common reasons given for countries giving diplomatic recognition to Kosovo have been human rights, democracy and peace and security in the Balkan region. Very often the declaration has been considered to be an exceptional case in international law, not comparable with other existing cases. Many countries also pointed out that the case of Kosovo cannot be fully explained by current international law.

Religious and geopolitical factor behind recognition

Besides human rights and peace and security, there are two other important factors in Kosovo’s struggle to gain diplomatic recognition: religion and geopolitics. Both are intentionally incorporated alongside each other in the list of key mechanisms behind Kosovo’s recognition but are also considered double-edged swords, giving Kosovo both favourable and unfavourable results.

In terms of religion, a secular country with two main religious groups, Islamic and Christian (Government, 2008, p. Art 1) located in eastern Europe provides the opportunity to lobby for recognition in two directions, to the western world that has provided Kosovo with much support and to the middle east, a region that has promising opportunities such as the Arab League.

However, despite all the efforts, lobbying and expectations in receiving recognition based on its Islamic population, only 11 out of 22 member of Arab League recognized Kosovo (Ker-Lindsay, 2012, pp. 144-145).  Most Islamic States already had a position towards Kosovo and the religious factor was not mentioned or included as a determining factor in the process of developing diplomatic relations.

The Balkan region that Kosovo is a part of is a territory that was historically known for being under Soviet power. However, with the support of the US, Kosovo has helped define a new and different geopolitical landscape in the Balkan region (Abazi, 2008, p. 2). Kosovo’s independence had a significant impact on diplomatic relations between the US and Russia after the Cold War Era by setting new diplomatic and security relations between the US, EU and Russia. Nevertheless, in terms of gaining diplomatic support and recognition, the situation has been quite different; as previously mentioned, Kosovo has received diplomatic recognition and strong support from the western world while the rest of the world has been sceptical.

This issue can be explained primarily by the fact that most of the countries that make up the rest of the world were not part of the conflict and the dispute settlement. For them, the issue of Kosovo will not affect or produce a specific and personal political outcome. As a result many states decided to prioritize their own domestic problems and issues rather than helping to solve the diplomatic issues of other states, in this case of a state most likely located on the other side of the world, that will not produce any noticeable benefit for itself.

Six years after the independence, where does Kosovo stand?

Only a couple weeks ago from the time of writing, Kosovo celebrated its sixth anniversary as an independent country. However, six years after the declaration, Kosovo remains in a diplomatic limbo; it still does not have a seat in the United Nations and is unable to be represented in the international arena as a fully independent state. The UN “Big Five” remain staunch in their positions on the issue and despite the fact that Kosovo received a number of recognitions from smaller states, most of them are small and carry little weight in the international arena.

Some of the most important UN members have withheld recognition, either by silence or explicit rejection. While countries like Brazil, China and India have refused to recognize the new country, Russia as the most laudable opponent vowed to veto any kind of resolution that would help clarify Kosovo’s status or a potential seat at the UN.

While Kosovo is fighting an ultimate battle for international legitimacy, issues such as European Integration and membership of the major international organizations is being kept on hold. Six years after the act of independence Kosovo is still struggling to get an international status and aiming the ultimate goal – a seat at the UN.

*Cover Image Panorama of Newborn (Independence) Sculpture – Pristina – Kosovo by Adam Jones

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[1]Argentina, Belarus, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Cyprus and Greece

[2]Argentina, Brazil, Comoros, Chile, China, Georgia, India, Iran, Jordan, Laos, Vietnam, Kuwait, Mexico, Philippines, Singapore and South Africa

[3]Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Montenegro, Macedonia, Lithuania, France and Turkey. All the recognition texts from these states are published in the following website: http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/ (Retrieved on June 2013.

Unless Prime Minister Najib Razak promotes a more inclusive vision of the country, it seems increasingly likely that the more progressive People’s Justice Party will defeat his National Front at the next election.

Background

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak is attempting to steer his country through a difficult period of economic reform, while keeping his party’s hold on leadership intact. That can be a hard task anywhere, but particularly at present in Malaysia, where polarising government policy threatens to rupture the country’s ethnic and religious harmony. The National Front (Barisan Nasional, or BN) is rapidly losing ground to the People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, or PKR) and the Prime Minister’s popularity is plummeting. A controversial upcoming by-election in the wealthy industrial state of Selangor has commentators suggesting that the PKR leadership is ready to raise the stakes.

Comment

General elections in 2008 and 2013 saw the BN returned to power, but by much narrower margins than in previous years. Many ethnic Chinese and Indians, as well as a significant number of Malays, are growing intolerant of the inequality stemming from institutionalised pro-Malay favouritism. They have turned to the PKR, with its focus on anti-corruption measures and social justice, in the hope of achieving equality in business and education. Now, faced with a rapidly depleting support base, Najib is clinging to the ethnic Malay vote. Consequently, he is yielding to hard-line right wingers within United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the largest party in the ruling coalition.

This has only served to further upset Malaysia’s delicate ethnic balance. In October last year, a court ruled that only Muslims were allowed to use the word “Allah”, despite its common use as a proper noun. In January, the first major repercussions of the ruling were seen in Selangor, when 321 Bibles were seized from a Christian group. The government remained silent on the issue, presumably to appease the predominantly Muslim ethnic Malays, which only confirmed to minorities that the BN was willing to encroach on their rights for political gain.

Tension was exacerbated when Teresa Kok of the Democratic Action Party (DAP), released a satirical Chinese New Year video that was perceived as critical of the government and Malaysian royal family. Islamist NGOs responded by offering a monetary reward to anybody who would slap Kok. Protests against the video have continued, with hardliners splashing Kok’s house with red paint and leaving a chicken carcass on the doorstep on
19 February.

Ben Suffian, head of the Merdeka Centre in Kuala Lumpur, has suggested that conservatives within UMNO are exploiting religious tension to turn attention away from the economic reforms, which have threatened to undermine the party’s support among rural Malays.^[1] Undoubtedly, Malaysia’s economic situation has not made it easy for Najib.

Thanks to its considerable oil wealth, the Malaysian economy has remained relatively stable, despite significant fuel and food subsidies. But, with oil reserves running out and the cost of economic development rising, debt has risen to over 53 per cent of GDP.^[2] In a move lauded by the International Monetary Fund, Najib has introduced a six per cent sales tax, cut fuel and sugar subsidies, and placed a limit on civil service perks. Although he has attempted to mitigate hardship by providing assistance to lower-income Malaysians and cutting personal income tax, many are still blaming Najib for the strain posed by the rising cost of living.

Anwar Ibrahim, leader of the PKR, has acknowledged the validity of the principles underlying economic reform, but stated that the government moved too quickly and, in doing so, made life difficult for much of the population. Certainly, dissatisfaction with the government is reflected in recent opinion polls. According to leaked reports, support from Chinese Malaysians is down to eight per cent and the rate of approval among Indian voters has dropped from 45 to 30 per cent. Most concerning for the BN, however, is that ethnic Malay support is now hovering around 50 per cent.^[3]

Now, it seems that the PKR is moving to take advantage of the government’s plummeting popularity. With the sudden resignation of the PKR representative in the seat of Kajang, Selangor, a by-election has been scheduled for March. Given that the PKR won the seat in a landslide against a Chinese member of BN in the last election, Anwar, who will contest the seat this time, remains the favourite. The suspicion is that he will then replace Khalid Ibrahim as Chief Minister of Selangor, a position that would afford him the opportunity to prove his legitimacy to the Malaysian population. If Anwar can successfully navigate ethnic divides in Selangor and promote an inclusive and open vision of Malaysia, Najib may find himself unseated from the Prime Ministership.

Weaning the country off an extensive subsidy programme will pose a challenge to whatever party is in power, but exploiting racial divisions to shore up support could be disastrous for the National Front. If Najib really wants to act in the national interest and retain power, he must embrace inclusivity, support minority rights and fight corruption. It may already be too late, however. Anwar’s reputation as both an administrator and communicator is on the rise and increasing support for his party is a trend likely to continue. At this stage, it looks as though UMNO’s ‘perpetual electoral success, albeit in coalition, since independence from Britain’ is getting closer than ever to drawing to a close.

Isabella Borshoff
Research Assistant
Indian Ocean Programme

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[1] Grant, J., ‘Knives Out for Malaysia PM Najib Razak’, Financial Times, 5 February 2014. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e4aea196-8e0c-11e3-ba55-00144feab7de.html#axzz2touzudru>.

[2] Grant, J,. ‘Najib Razak Cuts Subsidies in Effort to Plug Malaysia Deficit’, Financial Times, 31 December 2013. <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0f0034f0-3d54-11e3-9928-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=uk#axzz2touzudru>.

[3] ‘Malaysia’s Ruling Party in Crisis: Approval Ratings Plummet,’ ValueWalk, 19 February 2014.   <http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/02/malaysias-ruling-party-in-crisis/>.

While transitioning to a green economy can benefit countries through increasing sustainable development, reducing poverty, job creation, environmental conservation and reducing harmful gas emissions, developing countries still have some concerns regarding the benefits and risks of doing so.

Benefits

One of the main benefits of adopting a green economy is its potential to alleviate the environmental impact caused by pollution; a benefit that would be felt globally and locally. On a global scale, it can contribute to the fight against global warming, desertification, and the loss of biodiversity. On a local and regional level, adjusting to a green economy could lead to significant improvements in air, water and soil quality.  (Cosbey, n.d, p.41)

Besides the environmental aspects, a green economy also has a great potential to lead to economic growth. Cosbey asserts that, with the shifting of an economy, new markets are created in areas such as biofuels and renewable energy sources. And such new markets would bring international advantages having the potential to be funded entirely through exports, or an increase in domestic sales fueled by increasingly tighter environmental regulations. (Cosbey, n.d, p.41)

Emerging countries in particular can gain from a shift to a green economy as it can provide an opportunity to create more economic and social advantages. For example, by investing in alternative energy sources, access to energy services can be improved and infrastructure can become more energy efficient. This can also lead to the decrease of energy importation and potentially save money. It can also improve resource efficiency as agricultural production will become cleaner and, due to these sustainable agricultural techniques, food security[1] will be improved. (Lefèvre, 2013, p.156-157)  Additionally, new environmental friendly technologies that emerge as a result of a green economy, will help protect and improve agricultural production. (Ocampo, n.d, p. 6) Eventually it is hoped that by embracing a green economy, emerging countries will be able to open a new market segment for the production and exportation of green products and services. (Lefèvre, 2013, p.156-157)

Investing in a green economy and renewable energy sources will not only lead to the creation of new employment but also to benefits in population and environmental health, whilst also improving energy security in the long run.

However, it is important to keep in mind that transitioning to a green economy will not be an easy process, since many countries lack technology and need to guarantee the well-being of their citizens during any transition. Such a transition also does not happen overnight; UNEP’s Green Economy Report illustrates that initially the reallocation of investments towards the transition might slow down economic development during the first years until natural resources are restored, but that in the long term it will lead to faster economic development. (Ocampo, n.d, p. 6)

There are also difficult decisions to be made by governments, especially those of emerging countries with millions of people who do not have regular access to energy, in choosing between immediately alleviating their energy issues or investing in expensive renewable energy sources that require infrastructure and time to implement. The trade-offs must be examined carefully. However, once costs and long-term benefits are taken into consideration, several solutions provided by a green economy are seen as being more attractive. (Bapna and Talberth, 2011)

It is necessary to understand that transitioning to a green economy is not a magic cure for global warming and the world economy. It is a gradual process and one not free of risks or costs.

Risks

Emerging countries worry that shifting to a green economy will hamper economic development and therefore its capability to reduce poverty. Many people also question if the transition is even affordable, as many of its solutions are seen as being costly. Developing countries also feel that they lack know-how regarding green technology and that this will be a disadvantage when it comes to guaranteeing future markets. (Bapna and Talberth, 2011)

Another concern of many developing countries is that changing the market focus of a country’s main industries will also lead to job losses in industries seen as being unsustainable or not environmentally friendly such as coal mining. These companies and their employees will suffer the full impact of a green economy transition, and supporting them will be essential in building a comprehensive and successful green economy. (Bapna and Talberth, 2011)

There is also a fear that developed countries and companies will exploit the green economy model using their technological advantage and the environment as a pretext to gain market access and guarantee a market share by using the excuse that their products are environmentally friendly. A number of emerging countries have already expressed the fear that green economy can be used to promote commercial interests to the World Trade Organization (WTO). (Lefèvre, 2013, p.157)

In addition to not being able to keep up, the lack of technological knowledge and resources prompts another concern that developing countries will be unable to meet the required environmental standards imposed on their product export which would subsequently affect their economic development. Khor states that in order to level the playing field, it will be essential for developed countries to provide emerging countries with, at the very least, the resources and technology to enable them to meet these standards. (Khor, 2011, p.74)

According to Khor, one of the main concerns expressed by developing countries is of the green economy concept jeopardizing them due to its inappropriate use: “there are risks that the promotion of the “green economy” concept may give rise to unhelpful or negative developments, and these must be avoided”. (Khor, 2011)

Khor concludes that inappropriate use of the concept can happen in two main ways:

The first is if it is deployed in a so-called “one-dimensional” way; i.e. sold as an environmentally friendly concept but removed from the overall concept of sustainable development, separated from its equity and development aspects and ignorant of its potential negative impact on emerging economies. (Khor, n.d, p. 72)

This misinterpretation – or misuse – of the green economy concept, could happen by emerging countries using a transition as a pre-condition to receive loans, or the possibility of debt renegotiation. Subsequently this could influence others to adopt a focus on achieving a green economy purely through environmental measures without considering sustainable development and social equity.(Khor, 2011, p.76)

The second is if it is applied to countries in a so-called “one size fits all” way. Such an implementation would be disastrous and inevitably result in no developmental or environmental gains. Khor goes on to state that for a green economy to succeed, it must be tailored to each country’s level of development and should particularly take developing countries’ conditions and prime concerns into consideration. In addition, developing countries should also be given more assistance in areas such as finance and technology and have less stringent regulation imposed upon them. (Khor, n.d, p. 72)

Uncertainty is another important issue brought up by developing countries, since the benefits, risks and costs of moving to a green economy can only be estimated and will be different for each country. Structural risks can appear, along with the economic shift of countries which changes their demand and as a result companies may lose market shares. (Lefèvre, 2013, p. 157)

Some countries also feel that the green economy concept is used as a pretense by developed countries to lift trade barriers on the exportation products of emerging countries. (Bapna and Talberth, 2011)

This ties in with another risk that developing countries face with a green economy transition: that developed countries might use the environment under the green economy implication as a reason to adopt trade protection against the products and services of emerging countries so that unilateral trade can be practiced. This could occur if a carbon tariff or a new border tax on the production process of a product were to be introduced. Industrialized countries could allege that the production process does not obey any standards or limits when it comes to the emission of CO². These measures could significantly harm the economy and market of an emerging country since they do not possess the necessary financial resources and technology to invest in and expand low-carbon technology. (Khor, n.d, p.72)

Developing countries are also worried that they will be at a disadvantage since industrial countries have the resources to provide their firms with subsidies to conduct research and develop low carbon technologies. Emerging countries do not have the financial resources necessary to do the same, which results in an uneven balance between industrial and emerging countries. If developing countries were to lower the tariffs on their green goods they would stand no chance against the products from an industrial country. But this is already happening, with a number of industrial countries encouraging emerging countries to eliminate these tariffs on their environmental friendly goods. (Lefèvre, 2013, p.157-158)

During a Rio +20 preparatory meeting, many developing countries expressed the feeling that the green economy concept does not address the inequality that was shaped by the current economic system. These countries also wanted to be reassured that new premises would not disorganize the current financial and technical measures, which were formerly approved following sustainable development principles, and some expressed that they do not want to see the economic transition based on pre-established global conditions.  (United Nations, 2010)

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[1] FAO defines food security as being a household’s physical and economic access to enough food that will satisfy the members in terms of dietary needs and food preferences. (FAO, n.d)

Lefèvre, C. (2013). Green Economy – A key policy sector for Governance Reform. Complexity Governance: change Management under Challenges of Glocalization. (1., Aufl. ed., pp. 153-172). Hamburg: Kovac, Dr. Verlag.

*This Article is adapted from my master’s thesis: ‘Sustainable Development & Green Economy: the planet’s future or greening indigenous communities into oblivion?’ which was completed as part of the Master’s Curriculum at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Erfurt, Germany.

*Cover image ‘Transition’ by Tal Bright

I have often wondered who should be responsible for the development of Africa. This issue has been one of constant debates with the globalization push that began in the late twentieth century.  A lot has been written about this issue. A lot also has been said. The more I have thought about  this, the more I become convinced that it is Africans who will usher in the new era of African  development. In my estimation, this ushering in has to be focused, brutal, well planned and   thoroughly executed! In fact, it has to involve a revolution, conscious as it were, and in which the  shedding of the bloods of patriots and tyrants (think Thomas Jefferson) may not be unlikely. From my observations, much as Africans are trying, the fire that need burn in their hearts to realize the  level of development needed for the twenty-first century is not yet sufficiently aflame!

The issue of who should lead, take the blame for, or coordinate the leadership of the continent has been one of constant debates and academic discussions with scholars often pitted at polemical poles. Foremost amongst these have been such works as Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa,William Easterly’s The White Man’s Burden: why the West’s efforts to aid the rest have done so much ill and so little good (2007), Dambisa Moyo’s Dead Aid: why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa (2009), and most recently Andrew Macleod’s A Life Half Lived (2013), efforts have constantly been made either to show the moral and historical guilt of Europe (Walter Rodney) or to show that in this post-colonial era, the development of the underdeveloped world must be led by the underdeveloped world actors themselves (William Easterly) or still to buttress the need for a new institutional order (Dambisa Moyo). However, on the other side of the spectrum, we have a mind like Jeffrey Sachs who shares a Panglossian optimism for the wonders that the world’s affluent nations must work in the world’s poor nations. Somewhere in between Sach’s Panglossianism and the nayism of Easterly and Moyo (with regard to expressing faith in the effectiveness of the affluent nations to cure the social and economic underdevelopment and dependency of the pauper nations – through engagement in positive moral duties like aid delivery) – comes Pogge’s moral philosophical approach. Pogge’s moral philosophical approach that a new global institutional order – in this era of global ethics and not international law – must be established just as positive moral duties like Official Development Assistance (ODA) are also engaged in.

For obvious reasons, since the two World Wars of the twentieth century, there has been a demonization of violence and/or conflict. The prevalent idea has become that wars and conflicts, especially those of them that might involve the use of guns and the shedding of blood must be avoided by all means. The international relations and the international institutions of the twentieth century were indeed established to avoid a repeat of the events of 1914-1919 and 1939-1945. In academic disciplines and literature, the events of these two wars can also be observed in the paucity of theorization of conflict and/or wars that is observable since the advent of the twentieth century. Lewis Coser, a foremost theorist of social conflict, is indeed of this opinion. He was the foremost to theorize conflict as a neutral phenomenon which can have either positive and/or negative consequences. In his classic, The Functions of Social Conflict, he elaborated on the various aspects and possible functions that conflict can have and can do in a society. When I here speak of the conflict that will usher in the new era of African development, I think of conflict in the Coserian sense of that phenomenon. A force that is actually needed to realize any meaningful change and improvement in that sub-Continent, a force that if it does not take hold of the soul of the citizens of sub-Saharan Africa will see only half-baked, patronizingly annoying results for Africans in spite of Pogge’s and Moyo’s reforms of the global institutions.

The necessity of conflicts and revolution is pretty much acknowledged in world history and indeed its (positive and negative) effects dot the history of the world. Patriots in all ages, especially so in the earlier centuries than now have had the need and the duty to shed their blood. They indeed knew it was their price to do the maximum duty and pay the costliest price for their countries or faith. They expected this as a part of service for their fatherland or for whatever other cause they believed in. The early Christian martyrs, upon whose blood it is believed the seeds of the early Church germinated, are core examples. The American, French and English revolutionaries did the same. The reason for such extreme price is that institutions so terribly entrenched need more than a tiny rustling of feathers to overthrow.

It is once again instructive that great men and women through much of world’s history have had either to advocate or to actually pay their price for their countries, their loves and their faiths. Such great men and women, indeed, more than any other person were aware of the necessity of the conflict or revolution I expect to usher in the new era of Africa’s development. And as can be expected, more than any other persons, these patriots have written and/or spoken in defence of my proposition. Thomas Jefferson, renowned author of America’s Declaration of Independence, did declare: The tree of liberty, must be refreshed from time to time, with the blood of patriots and tyrants. Two hundred years later, Ronald Reagan, another American president asserted that since freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction …. It must be fought for, protected, and handed on from one generation to the other to continue the fight, otherwise, elderly Americans will one day spend their sunset years telling their children and children’s children what it was once like in a United States where men were free.

I will end this piece by paraphrasing the words of a man who though his body is separated from us, his memory still lives. No other than Nelson Mandela asserted that, [w]hen a man is denied the right to live the life he ought to live, he has no choice but to become an outlaw.  The commonality of the phenomenon of poverty in Africa has denied the African poor of the life she ought live. It is now her duty to demand it when she is ready. The realization of the level of development the African poor needs will involve in my opinion, drastic measures, a total overhauling of the status quo, steps that might even include, blood and guns.

Author Biography

Tochukwu Akunyili is a graduate student of public policy at the University of Erfurt Germany. He is interested in management and development consulting, international development, climate issues and global affairs.

You can find him on his blog & Twitter

*This article was originally published on his website Tochukwu Akunyili . You can read it here.

*Cover image ‘Africa Food Security Research 6‘ by Kate Holt/Africa Practice

Belgium is a small country located in the heart of Europe, rich in culture and history and home to an incredibly complex political system. The main aim of this article is to provide an insight into how the country is run and how its separatist party, the NVA, has been gaining more power in recent years. In order to understand the current political situation in the country and the disagreements between its two regions, the Dutch (or Flemish) speaking  Flanders and the French speaking Wallonia, it is necessary to look back at its history.

Historical Background

Belgium has always been something of an odd collection of territories and cultures and has been disputed throughout history by a number of European countries including Spain, Austria, Netherlands, France and Germany. Interestingly, Belgium has its roots in separatism having been part of the Netherlands before declaring independence in 1830. Leopold I became the first king of Belgium in 1831 after being elected by the Belgian congress. The Netherlands, however, were not so keen on the terms of separation proposed by Leopold and decided to invade Belgium. Through Anglo-French cooperation, the Dutch were expelled three years later in 1833, but problems in the region continued until 1839 when both countries signed the Treaty of London establishing Belgium’s independence.

During World Wars I and II Belgium was invaded and occupied by Germany. After WWI, the Treaty of Versailles gave Belgium a stretch of German land near its border, adding another language and cultural group to the country. Until today this area is the German speaking region of Belgium, although politically and geographically it is considered to be a part of Wallonia.

Belgium became a country with three different language groups: Dutch, French and German. Nowadays Dutch is spoken by 60% of the Belgian population (a population of nearly 11 million), followed by French with 40% and German with less than 1%.

Political structure and language issues

It is not a secret that tensions between the Flanders and Walloon communities have increased over recent years. It was during the 1960’s that relations between the communities first began collapsing and jeopardizing the formation of governments. In 1962 a language border demarcating and dividing the Dutch and French speaking regions was established.

Early 1970’s Belgium went through extensive constitutional reform in which three partially autonomous regions were formed: Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels. Each of these regions has a government and a parliament in which they exercise their authority in issues regarding economy, employment, energy, transport, public works, environment and housing issues.

Besides the three regions, Belgium created three political entities to represent its ethnic groups (French, Dutch and German speakers). Each of these communities has a government and a parliament to deal with the concerns of their language group, focussing on issues such as language, culture, education and care.

Despite these reforms, problems within the communities continued throughout the 1980’s. In 1993 a federal state was established and a new set of reforms provided additional autonomy to the regions.

Only issues that affect all Belgians such as foreign affairs, defence, social security, justice and finance are dealt with at a federal level.

The federal state, the regions and the communities that make up Belgium are all essentially autonomous and all have substantial power. The figure below illustrates the Belgian federal states, the three languages communities, and the regions.

Fig: European Environment Agency

Economic shift and the increasing popularity of the NVA

The economic and industrial shift from Wallonia to Flanders plays an important role in the dissatisfaction of the Flemish. In the 1950’s, Wallonia had a prosperous mining and steel industry but lost its competitiveness on a global scale due to the lack of modernization. At the same time, industry in Flanders started to bloom. Poverty and unemployment gradually started to increase in Wallonia and many Walloons relied, and still rely, on social security provided by the Belgian federal government. Since it is mainly the Flemish industry and taxpayers who provide government funds, many in the Flemish part of Belgium are becoming increasingly frustrated at what they see as Flemish money being used to support the Walloons: “The Flemish part of the country is growing tired of this one-way sponsorship, while Wallonia does not seem to want to change the current situation: it is neither able to provide the social security its inhabitants need, with unemployment rates twice as high as the national average, nor to improve their weak economy.” (Lauwers, 2010)

This growing dissatisfaction pushed many in Flanders to vote for the pro-Flemish independence party, the New Flemish Alliance (NVA), led by Bart de Wever. In 2010, the year in which Belgium faced a political deadlock, the NVA won the elections in Flanders receiving almost 30% of the votes. This victory happened in a period where separatism was becoming a trend.

In Wallonia, the Socialist Party (PS) emerged as winners with 40% of the votes under the leadership of Elio di Rupo. The 2010 elections in Belgium were a wake-up call for the population, leading to changes in the political landscape. Several political parties reduced their budgets and many politicians resigned. It became “more obvious than ever that Belgian people live in a country with two completely different democracies, two different cultures and two different opinions.” (Lauwers, 2010)

In April 2011, Belgium had been without a central government for over a year as talks were not moving forwards. The deadlock – which lasted 541 days – ended only in December 2011, when French-speaking Elio di Rupo, leader of the Socialist Party, was elected to be prime minister.

In October 2012, the NVA became the largest political party in Flanders after receiving a large number of votes in local elections. As a result, Bart de Wever became the mayor of Antwerp, the city with the second largest port in Europe.

For the NVA, nationalism and separatism represent the solution to solve the problems Belgium is facing. The socialist party on the other hand represents social security and support in the long run, which the Flemish perceive as being Wallonia’s lack of commitment to change and progress.

The May 2014 elections in Belgium are expected to be a game changer as it might be the final step for the NVA towards achieving Flemish independence. However, although the NVA party wants to benefit from the unhappiness within the current government, because the European elections overlap with those in Belgium, there are also disadvantages for the NVA as many questions would have to be answered on a European level. How would Flanders, a Belgian sub-state, become a member of the EU? How would the future of Belgium be defined? What would happen to the international organizations based in Belgium and what would be the capital of Flanders?

Brussels

If Belgium breaks up, Brussels will be a very problematic issue to deal with.

Brussels, the capital of Belgium, hosts several major political institutions such as the EU and NATO, and around 19% of Belgium’s GDP is generated in Brussels. “International institutions make up for about 13 to 14% of the city’s employment and GDP. Brussels hosts some 16,000 business congresses a year, which represents 2.5% of the city’s GDP.”

Brussels is also located in the Flemish region, despite around 85% of its inhabitants being francophone. If Belgium decides to break up, the Flemish and the Walloons would both try to claim Brussels for themselves. According to an Ipsos poll, 68% of the people in Brussels expressed their opinion that they would prefer to become independent in case Belgium splits up.

What is the opinion of the Belgian people and how has it changed over the years?

In the 1990’s an average of 84% of the Belgians considered the country to be their nation and home. In October 1991, one third of the Flemish favored separation after an internal Belgian crisis. Between 2004-2006 the number of separatists in Belgium fluctuates around 20%. In 2008 when Europe was facing the economic crisis, around 30% of the Flemish were in favor of separatism. In 2010, the year in which Belgium faced a political dead lock, one third of the Flemish favored independence. After the economic and Belgian political crisis settled down, the number of people that favored independence reduced to 20%, meaning that around 80% of the people were either in favor of the union of indifferent. Amongst the younger generation and students 90% said that they were against splitting up the country.

Throughout the years the polls show that the number of separatists has been stable for around twenty years fluctuating between 10- 20%. Most people that favor Flemish independence are located in the north of Belgium. In Wallonia and the region of Brussels these numbers are lower.

To leave or not to leave?

It is clear that Belgium is a divided country and that many, especially those in the Flanders region, are not happy with the current state of the government. However, recent polls and statistics illustrate that despite this, the vast majority of Belgians do not see Flemish independence as a solution.

But 2014 will still be an interesting year, not just for Belgians but also for the UK with the upcoming Scottish Independence referendum and Spain with the Catalonian independence vote. The rise of separatism and nationalism in Europe has been marked in recent years, especially since the advent of the economic crisis. It would appear that this year will be an important one in defining whether this rise was simply a knee-jerk reaction to the economic crisis or something altogether more serious.

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*Cover image ‘Belgians, Flemish and Walloon alike, protest against their country’s lack of a federal government in 2011‘ by Clark Boyd