Author: kasmir

Daniel Schade and James Bartholomeusz note the appointment of Donald Tusk and Federica Mogherini to major positions in European government.

By Daniel Schade and James Bartholomeusz

* This article, along with the images, was originally published by Project for Democratic Union

Recent weeks have seen the appointment of two figures to positions at the apex of European government: the President of the European Council; and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the primary position of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Many Europeans will be asking two questions. Who are these appointees? And how will they impact on the short- and medium-term future of the European project?

Europe’s heads of state and government should be congratulated on their recent choice to fill the seat of Europe’s Council President with the current Polish prime minister, Donald Tusk. Awarding this post to an eastern European acknowledges the importance of these countries for the future of the continent, and marks the normality of their membership in the EU exactly ten years after the ‘big bang’ enlargement. Indeed, that Tusk is Polish is of particular significance, as he represents the leading member-state of the 2004 accession cohort.

Furthermore, we can expect that Tusk will fill the role in a somewhat more lively manner than his outgoing predecessor, Herman Van Rompuy, who despite his obvious economic qualifications never shaped the post with the necessary degree of publicity to make it matter. Tusk has other, wider-looking strengths which Van Rompuy has appeared to lack. Aside from the symbolic value of nominating an eastern European for such an important post in times of heightened tensions in that region, Tusk has intimate knowledge of Russia and will be able to converse with his Russian interlocutors in their mother tongue.

Obviously there are downsides to Tusk’s nomination. For one, he does not properly speak either of the Union’s two most common working languages, English and French, though like many other designated Brusselites before him this can easily be addressed. What is more problematic, however, is the fact that Poland is not a member of the Eurozone. Whereas economic and financial matters were at the heart of Van Rompuy’s work, addressing these will be much more difficult for Tusk. This need not be a bad thing, however, as the former ‘Mr. euro’, Jean-Claude Juncker, is now heading the European Commission, the result of post-election wrangling between federalists and Eurosceptics as to the proper interpretation of the Lisbon Treaty. While this will lead to an odd shift of economic and financial matters aways from the Presidency of the Council to the Commission, such a set-up will bring the latter actor back front-and-centre into a policy process from which it has been largely marginalised since the beginning of the financial crisis. The division of labour between Tusk and Juncker is to be welcomed in this regard

Whilst the nominee for the post of High Representative, the Italian foreign minister Federica Mogherini, has been criticised due to her limited international experience, here lies another opportunity. Her initial announcements that she will take her jointly-packaged role as Vice President of the Commission more seriously (an element which her predecessor, Catherine Ashton, has largely ignored) may be good news for the Union’s coherence in foreign affairs, something which is a topic of hot debate in Brussels at present. Mario Telò, head of the Institute for European Studies at Université Libre de Bruxelles, is one supporter of her potential in this regard. It is also most welcome that the representation of women at the highest level of European politics, whilst still severely lacking, has some continuity in the post of High Representative.

Any appointments to positions such as these will encounter inevitable criticism, some of which is well-founded. However, there is hope that with the incoming ‘triumphirate’ of 2014 – Juncker, Tusk and Mogherini – we might be seeing the beginning of a better era of cooperation and coordination between Europe’s key institutions.

Image: ‘Donald Tusk’ courtesy of the EPP via Flickr, released under Creative Commons.

Image: ‘Federica Mogherini 2014′ courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

[In today’s episode of Some call it Belarus, we take a look at the independent sphere in Belarus, the framework it is existing in and the opportunities and challenges for the actors in it.]

Season I Episode V – The state of the Belarusian Independent Sphere

With Belarus entering the European Eastern Partnership Agreement in 2008 and a multitude of state-based and non-state based programmes and donor institutions, the possibilities for Belarusian activists and initiatives to obtain international financing, even with regard to an adaptation by the Belarusian legal system to outlaw such practices, are numerous and diverse, making foreign fundraising one of the core elements to any activism. However, funding opportunities inside Belarus are scarce to non-existent, leading to a de-facto dependency on foreign donors. However, this provision of opportunities leads to a strong influence of changing program priorities and guidelines of the multiplicity of funding programs and focuses of donor organizations that shift on varying short term time-scales, where Belarusian actors are in need of longer-term financing to provide for sustainable activism with lasting effects.

Thus, the general level of activism is dependent on the aforementioned possibilities for funding from international sources, however this alternative political sphere has been described by Tatsiana Vadalzhkaya as “not completely destroyed” and has been sustained since the countries’ shift towards personalized authoritarian rule in the mid-1990s.

While the activists / independent sphere has been kept apart from the rest of society through political repression, even given a more than appropriate amount of activism has been documented by multitudes of resources, another core element of successful activism is visibility to the other parts of society. Through leaflets, brochures and books (both in Russian and English) and funded through international programs, the civic sphere in Belarus has a basic level of material provided, however with limited means of distribution in public, the reach of these printed materials outside the sphere itself has to be seen as limited. Following this and with traditional independent media being consistently pressured, if still existent at all, the opportunities posed by digital media have become a more and more important channel for political opponents to the Belarusian government.

With this in mind – given available German and English sources – critical voices like Pjotr Kuzniatsou (see: here) bemoaning a lack of competent use of digital media for the purposes of civil society activism can be seen in line with a general lack of political thought and discussion in the Belarusian online sphere as observed earlier by Krivotlap and the wider Belarusian public, that before the Crimean Crisis had not been politicized in many years . The threat of government persecution of independent bloggers, censorship of websites by initiatives and surveillance of online activities reaching as far as detaining administrators from social media groups has, however, been a constant in recent years (Freedomhouse 2013).

Unity and Ability to perceive Problems relevant to the Society writ large

When approaching any attempt to societal change from a point of potential impact, it is vital for any change intended by the change actor to be met by an aligning demand for change within the society writ large as well as having a coordinated approach on how to bring about the intended change.

Having been under pressure from the personalized presidential government of Alyaksandr Lukashenka for a total of 20 years (as of 2014), several generations of political opposition, independent activists and thinkers have participated in the attempt to open up Belarus for alternative narratives and – in most cases – closer cooperation with the European Union through different means. However, it is this difference of narrative of the history and present of Belarus – and thus Belarusianness – that has divided independent, European Belarusians from the more traditional pro-Russian understanding of Belarus leading to a disconnect between the two (Beckus). Recent polls by IISEPS (available here) show the approval rating of 3,6% of the political opposition, as of May 2014 a total of 15,5 % of the surveyed would participate in EuroMaidan-like protests against the government in Belarus, with 10,7% willing to participate on the side of the government and 65,3% not interested in actively joining either side.

In a recent study (available here) by the Belarusian Institute of Strategic Studies on ‘What Belarusian Civil Society thinks on reforms’, Belarusian civil society promoted a political reform of the existing system with 57.7% over other sectors of reform. The people surveyed were not decided on whether Belarusian civil society actors is yet ready to take responsibility for reforms in the country and – while the current modes of cooperation between government are perceived as lacking at best – they agree with 88.1% that any effort to reforming the country should be done by all national and international actors together, in coordinated action.

Similarly, even given the decades long struggle against Lukashenka, the landscape of activists and political opposition has remained highly diverse and divided. This can be seen in a high variety of political opinions from inside the different actors, promoting actions and approaches from change through activism to focuses on a more indirect, piecemeal change of processes, from small scale co-operations with the government to a negligence of that possibility (as showcased here). Managing to agree on only two oppositional candidates for the presidential elections in 2006, the Belarusian political parties and activists have fielded 9 oppositional candidates in 2010 (seven of which were imprisoned following the December 19^th 2010 demonstrations and three having been sentenced to 5 or more years in prison by the authorities) and in the precursor to the 2015 elections tensions about the choice of candidate (-s) among the pro-Western opposition have been running high in meetings in July 2014 (see: here).

Formulated Strategy and Conscious Vision

From what source material is available in English, a majority of actors in the Belarusian independent sphere follow decidedly pro-European politics, values and understandings of citizenship, aimed at or even based on the implementation of stronger ties with the European Union. However, a more in-depth analysis of the self-descriptions and mission statements of the various research institutes, NGOs, political parties and initiatives in Russian and Belarusian as well as made interviews with individual leadership is needed for a more detailed framing and evaluation of visions and theoretical backgrounds. Dealing with a very high diversity among the independent political actors, ranging from politically ‘green’ initiatives involved with the implementation of waste disposal in cooperation with the WTO, to the official parties opposing the Lukashenka government and independent research institutes and think tanks existing in Belarus – every attempt to evaluate the conscious vision of the civil society and political opposition as one agent in the framework of this paper has to be deemed superficial at best. However, a number of non-state research institutes such as the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, the Centre for European Integration, or the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies is allowed to exist in the country aiming to negate the lack of available, independently compiled, data on Belarus. These datasets and the work of think tanks as well as international co-operations and analysts, and their academic and theoretical discourse based on them have provided non-state actors in Belarus with valuable theoretical reflection and data to base their activities on.

In the light of the above analysis, the Belarusian independent sphere is put between a rock and a hard place. Dependent on foreign actors for funding and with trouble finding a unified voice and approach, even academic and analytical prowess can all but provide data and insights to be used in better days to come.

Next week: Episode 6 – Crimea and Beyond

Quoted literature:

Beckus, Nelly (2010). Struggle over Identity: The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness”, Budapest: Central European University Press (available here)

Krivotlap, Alexei (2008). Live journal and a local newspaper in the 2007 elections context in: Political Sphere, English Issue #11/2008, Minsk: Palytika

Vadalazhskaya, Tatsiana (2012). The struggle against dissent in the labour and employment sphere. The employment ban: a new phenomenon on the old foundations, in: Matskevich Uladzimir (Ed.). Desovietization in the context of Belarusan society’s transformation, Vilnius

Picture credits: English PEN, Andrew Spratley

Sweden’s Social Democrats return to power – but the political issues the country faces are hardly solved by this election. 

By Daniel Nord

* This article, along with the image, was originally published by Project for Democratic Union

After eight years in power, Swedish voters have told their prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and his center-right alliance to make room for a new government. Last Sunday, the Social Democrats, together with both the Green and the Left Party, gained 43.7% of the national vote. Thus, and as polls had predicted, the center-left opposition narrowly beat the four-party alliance, which in its turn ended up convincing a mere 39.3 % of the electorate. Mr Reinfeldt went on to announce his resignation from the Moderate Party already in his election night speech, a move few had foreseen. Currently, Social Democratic leader Stefan Löfven is facing an intricate task of forming a new minority government. Having declared already the day after the election that this government won’t include the Left Party (which is seen as a too troublesome governing partner), Mr Löfven has instead attempted to reach out across the aisle to the liberal People’s Party and the Centre Party. The invitation has been met with cold shoulders. It seems that the former union boss has burned a bridge only to run into a closed door. At a time when a second election cannot yet be taken off the table, voices are raised to bring about an end to the organization of Sweden’s largest parties into left and right coalitions.

The alliance has largely successfully manoeuvred the country through an economic crisis that has left much of the rest of Europe scarred, but a repeated campaign message emphasizing responsible governing did not convince Swedes to let Mr Reinfeldt – widely respected even by many who don’t vote for him – go on to lead the country for a third time. Voters’ attention has been directed towards continually high unemployment, privatization of parts of the welfare state, and school results increasingly dropping in international comparisons. These are problems that according to the socialist-green opposition, and many Swedes have emerged worsened from the past eight years. Jobs especially have been at the focus of debate, and Mr Löfven’s promise to modernize infrastructure and bring about “trainee jobs” in the care for the elderly to battle youth unemployment have been concrete suggestions as how to bring about improvement. More than anything, it seems that Swedes have felt that some type of change after eight years couldn’t hurt.

But given Sweden’s immensely strong social-democratic tradition, the return of Mr Löfven’s party to power has been most cautiously celebrated. In fact, the Social Democrats’ voting numbers (31%) were only marginally better than those in the last election, which were in turn viewed as a big failure. The Green Party, also, ended up with weak numbers (6.8%) in a campaign that did not concentrate as much on environmental issues as party speakers Gustav Fridolin and Åsa Romson would probably have hoped.

Instead, the center-left victory can mainly be ascribed to the drop in numbers for the alliance. Continuing the disastrous trend from this spring’s EU elections, Mr Reinfeldt’s Moderate Party lost almost eight percentage points compared to 2010. This relates to what has been viewed as a major aspect overshadowing the election: the nationalist Sweden Democrats more than doubled its seats from when it first entered the Riksdag, Sweden’s national parliament, four years ago. With almost 13% of the vote, the party led by Jimmie Åkesson is now Sweden’s third largest, and it is primarily from the Moderate Party that the Sweden Democrats have taken over new voters. Polls had shown that the anti-immigrant black sheep in Swedish politics was growing, but numbers rarely went above 10%. On election day, however, more than one in every ten decided to cast their vote on what is often described as a racist party – despite the social stigma attached to doing so. This means that the overwhelming agreement in Sweden four years ago to treat the political newcomers with ridicule, taunting and protest instead of argument has backfired. Even if the Sweden Democrats will most certainly remain isolated from influence in the parliament, their continued success is sparking debate. If elsewhere the economic crisis has been given as an explanation for a wave of right-wing populism over Europe, Sweden’s relative immunity to austerity means that explanation could hardly be seen as plausible as to why the Sweden Democrats have steadily kept attracting voters.

Instead, it appears that in Sweden, a country with some of the highest levels of immigration in Europe, failed integration is viewed as a highly important topic. And while other parties have tried to deal with the subject by either staying away from it or inventing slogans against racism, the Sweden Democrats have been the only party loudly talking about the issue. How the center-left and center-right parties can win back those voting for the Sweden Democrats will surely be the big question in the time ahead, and until voters hit the booths again in 2018. But various combinations of silence and shouting won’t do.

Finally, the Feminist Initiative, a party headed by former Left Party leader Gudrun Schyman, has received much medial attention in the last months leading up to the election. Described by one writer as the “option for the discontent middle class voter”, the Feminist Initiative, with its emphasis on feminism and anti-racism, has portrayed itself as being diametrically opposed to the Sweden Democrats. Although the party will be represented at the local level – especially in Sweden’s big cities – it only received 3.1% in the national elections, which means it did not pass the 4% threshold to enter the national parliament. Perhaps the lack of success here can be ascribed to other parties’ ambition to properly deal with gender equality issues.

If a similar responsible conversation can come to include immigration, without falling for the Sweden Democrats’ ideas and rhetoric, Sweden might have a better chance to avoid what has increasingly started to look like the beginning of a culture war. Such a conflict, in perhaps one of the world’s most culturally homogenous countries, should be avoidable. And to avoid it should rank high on any party’s agenda, as it diverts from a much-needed discussion of bigger questions concerning the whole of the continent. For example, security policies appear to be only of mediocre interest to Swedes, despite this year’s development in the Ukraine.

Whether or not the breaking of the conventional coalition politics is indeed about to happen remains unclear, but it could be a welcome first step towards healthier politics at a time when a majority of the Swedish population claimed to wake up to a gloomy September 15^th.

Image: ‘Stefan Löfven at the Swedish Social Democratic Youth League’s genaral election camp 2014’ by josve05a_at_Wikimedia

The Eagle and the Bear: Conclusions and Recommendations

While the USA’s current arctic strategies and policies, along with its Navy’s own arctic strategy, recognize the need to exert a strong sovereignty for the sake of national security and the control of resources in Alaska and the American Arctic littoral, the actions being implemented so far have not enough. Additionally, the general objectives appear to be either vague or simply wishful and unrealistic.

The first problem is that the United States seeks the region to be an area free of conflict, a concept that affects not only this country but also the others reviewed so far. Even worse, it assumes it will remain so. This is far from accurate. The assumption that any one of the actors is willing to cooperate and put aside its own national interests while abandoning the idea of using the military force is unrealistic and, currently, the facts are against such assumption. The recent aggressive and assertive actions of Russia in Ukraine, the military manoeuvres in the Far East, and the violations of Scandinavian and Baltic countries’ airspace, along with the close flights to Canadian and American airspace in the recent years should have provided a base for a different approach to US policymakers.

Russia is materializing its strategic interests with a military comeback in the Arctic, which alone has strong implications that a poses a threat to the Arctic nations that would be directly affected by any Russian military move. Currently, Russia is re-opening the military bases it had in the New Siberian Islands, as well as establishing new ones near Alaska. Additionally, the new Yasen class submarines are about to be deployed in Murmansk, very close to the Scandinavian Peninsula and Svalbard Islands, and new units near Alaska and Finland are to be deployed as well (Bodner & Eremenko, 2014). The Russian Air Force, in turn, sent four Su-34 attack aircraft to reach the North Pole and is preparing the Mig-31 interceptors to operate in the area[i].

To make matters worse, during the NATO Wales summit, some Russian Tu 95 strategic nuclear bombers flew above Arctic territory to a “launch box” (a site where it is optimal for firing nuclear missiles at  the United States) which coincided with a recent request by a Russian general to the Russian government to authorise the launching preemptive nuclear strikes against the US and NATO[ii].

In the meantime, the Obama administration is giving no signs of reaction at all, while designing and implementing weak policies. This takes us to the second problem: the US arctic strategies discuss “gathering information to take good decisions”, and having “innovative arrangements to meet the objectives”; statements that sound too general and shallow. Indeed, as this suggests, there is no clear direction or path; the US arctic strategy is, at best, vague. As Coffey (2013) points out, the strategy proposed by the current Obama presidency reflects more the lack of interest given to the Arctic more than anything else [iii].

In contrast to the Obama administration’s position, the US Navy and the Department of Defence have designed a better strategy. However, these are also full of problems. One is that they focus activities partially on executing scientific expeditions as a way to exert sovereignty, while the Department of Defence labels as a national interests the preservation of the environment and sustainable development Slayton & Rosen (2014).

Beyond any doubt, the environment is important, but it is more important for the United States to exploit resources that, as Slayton & Rosen (2014) point out, could provide the US with some energy independence and have a higher strategic leverage when it comes to oil and economic recovery. This is even more essential when it comes to aiding Europe in having an alternative source of energy and to reduce the influence of some rogue states and Russia.

The other problem is the scheduled presence of the Navy in the Arctic, which is very slow in pace and does not reflect either the importance that the Arctic should have, something that smaller navies such as that of Denmark or Norway have been doing. Since Alaska is not only a strategic crossroad, but also a strategically valuable area where anti-ICBM missiles can be deployed, it is more than imperative that the US Navy provides a shield to Alaska, while at the same time contributes to the defence of US allies’ interests in the region.

The United States indeed has a lot of things to do regarding the Arctic. One of the first and most important things is to give the Arctic the strategic importance it deserves, not only because of the new resources and the opening of new shipping routes, but also because of its geopolitical importance and the increased presence and interest of other states.

The security of the United States can be jeopardized today in the same way it was during World War II and the Cold War. This has been illustrated by the renewed Russian military modernization and build up, as well as the potential risk of a nuclear-armed Chinese naval presence in the Arctic Ocean.

In other words, the United States has to entirely redesign its Arctic strategies to increase the focus on the military & security aspect while enhancing the sovereignty exertion objectives, and decreasing the environmental concerns.

The second action aimed at materializing the protection of such an important region is an increase of US Navy assets in the region, along with an increase in the US Coast Guard’s assets for Search and Rescue operations and sea policing. The US Air Force also has to play a role in protecting Alaska, the US Arctic maritime territory and in assisting the allies in a case of conflict with Russia. The US Army and some special forces can also increase their presence in protecting Alaskan territories and assisting Canada in the defence of its Northern Territories.

Moreover, the United States can implement a similar proposed measure for the Canadian case, and establish by its own one or two naval groups whose main area of activities is Alaska and the Arctic Ocean, in a close cooperation with other Arctic navies like the Canadian, Danish and Norwegian and with the US Coast Guards.

The third action is to eradicate for good the wishful mind-set and the excessive reliance on a conflict-free Arctic, as well as the assumption that Russia is keen to cooperate and discard the utilization of armed forces to meet its interests. Not only the Ukraine crisis, but also the increased military presence of Russia near Alaska and Scandinavia are more than enough indications that cooperation is not among the priorities of Russia and that it is more willing to accomplish its own interests.

This means that the US has to rely less on Russia’s good will and more on its own military assets and those of its European allies. Here is where NATO comes to play an important role: it can be the forum where the United States can lead and assist the Arctic NATO countries as well as assist the potential new members of Sweden and Finland in defending their own High North Territories. By doing so, the United States not only provides a needed leadership, but it also guarantees its own security by guaranteeing its allies’ security. NATO, moreover, can provide a bridge and a framework between the US and the EU for securing the Arctic as well as complementing each other should Russia increases its assertiveness and threats to the Arctic and the Scandinavian-Baltics region.

Therefore, a fourth action means bringing NATO into the Arctic and creating a NATO Arctic task force that would include Sweden and Finland, envisaging a strong cooperation with the European Union Nordic and Easter Battlegroups, along with the NORDEFCO countries (including the Baltic states).

This idea, in particular, is very feasible and very welcome, though not exempt of opposition. This is for three reasons: first, the fact that most of the Arctic countries are NATO members re-opens the area to NATO, since their defence strategies has NATO as an important, if not the sole, defence asset; second, NATO’s Article 5 places the Arctic within its core area of operations and Russia is a considerable concern when it comes to security issues; and third, propositions about an increased NATO Arctic role highlighted the importance of focusing on “inside” area operations and activities in the same way “outside” operations are being prioritized (Conley, 2012)[iv].

Nevertheless, NATO currently executes the monitoring of military activities and coordination of joint training exercises such as the Cold Response Exercises, the biennial submarines’ Ice Exercise, Northern Eagle, Arctic Edge, Arctic Care, amongst others (Conley, 2012).

The problems facing a NATO Arctic involvement consists in the – in this author’s opinion very overrated – preoccupation of the Russian exclusion of NATO and its opposition to any NATO activity in the region. Conley (2012) reasons that this has become a serious problem for NATO and has caused the lack of consensus among NATO Arctic allies regarding Russia’s reaction to NATO involvement in various situations, along with the Canadian move to not allowing NATO arctic involvement for to sovereign reasons and the lack of clarity on the arctic issue (Conley, 2012).

One of the previously reviewed countries, Norway, is among the leading voices on bringing NATO closer to the Arctic to perform a much more active role in the region. It argues for the employment of NATO’s core functions and activities such as situation awareness and surveillance capacity building, and the coordination of search and rescue operations, rather than a full presence such as it had during the Cold War (Conley, 2012).

In any case, given the current international crisis, the presence of NATO at the same levels of the Cold War, or even beyond, is more than necessary. This means that NATO should not only cover activities as those proposed by Norway, but also to increase its military presence by reinforcing the currently operational ones and re-establishing previous bases, such as Keflavik in Iceland, while at the same time creating new ones in Alaska and Northern Canada. This would also include the creation of naval bases in the aforementioned countries to increase the vital naval presence of NATO in the region to monitor civilian and military activities, and protect commercial shipping and touristic cruise, while cooperating and assisting the Coast Guards of each NATO country in their tasks.

As Conley (2012) points out, the naval presence of NATO is ideal – this author would add, necessary – and might take advantage of the experience gained in the anti-piracy and anti-terrorism operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Mediterranean Sea, and apply it to Arctic activities in regards to military training, defence procurement and acquisition, contingency planning and tackling illegal activities.

NATO activities should not be limited to Search and Rescue and illegal activities combat, but should consist of an increased naval presence in the area with a respective Naval and Air Group with permanent or long term deployment of both NATO and EU assets, for air defence, surveillance, air superiority, interception, anti-submarine warfare and other tasks. After all, and paraphrasing Hilde (2013), traditional security concerns are no stranger to the Arctic and its significance will simply increase with time.

The United States needs a strong leadership that gives the Arctic the attention it deserves, not only for the environment but for the strategic implications and the security that the region has for the United States and, in the end, for the West. Its importance is highlighted by the recent aggressive Russian attitudes and the likely Chinese naval presence. Not to mention that the deployment of the new Russian submarines is a clear threat to Scandinavia and a reason for NATO to augment its naval, aerial and even ground presence. The same applies to the US after the reopening of Soviet-era bases in areas close to Alaska.

The Arctic can be a stable and secure area, but only a strong and decisive deterrence build up can do the task, rather than wishful thinking and reliance on cooperation that alone is not enough to create stability and security in any region. And by showing a bit of decision and strength things might even change for good in certain southern areas.

The Eagle, simply, must lead the Vikings and the leaf, and also must help them.

—

[i] See: http://theaviationist.com/2014/08/14/su-34-mig-31-north-pole/

[ii] See: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/russian-bombers-practice-cruise-missile-strikes-on-us-during-nato-summit

[iii] An argument that is solid enough when doing a comparison with other nation’s strategies, as Coffey (2013) points out.

[iv] And the Russian renewal of aggressive actions should be convincing enough.

—

Sources:

Bodner, M. &, Eremenko, A (2014). Russia Starts Building Military Bases in the Arctic. In: The Moscow Times. Retrieved from: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-starts-building-military-bases-in-the-arctic/506650.html on 08.11.2014

Cenciotti, D (2014). Russian Su-34 attack planes “conquered” the North Pole. Mig-31 interceptors prepare to. In: The Aviationist. Retrieved from: http://theaviationist.com/2014/08/14/su-34-mig-31-north-pole/ on 27.08.2014

Coffey, L (2013). Obama’s Arctic Strategy: Just a Tip, no Iceberg. In: National Review Online, The Corner. Retrieved from: http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/348670/obama%E2%80%99s-arctic-strategy-not-so-hot-luke-coffey on 27.08.2014

Conley, H, A (2012). A New Security Architecture for the Arctic: an American perspective. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Gertz, B. &, Washington Free Beacon (2014). Russian Bombers Practice Cruise Missile Strikes on US During NATO Summit. Retrieved from: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/russian-bombers-practice-cruise-missile-strikes-on-us-during-nato-summit on 12.11.2014

Hilde, P. S (2013). The “new” Arctic – the Military Dimension. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 15 (2), pp. 130 – 153.

Slayton, D. S. &, Rosen, M. E (2014). Another region where the Russian military threatens to dominate the U.S. In: CNN, Opinion. Retrieved from: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/14/opinion/slayton-rosen-russia-u-s-arctic/ on 10.08.2014

*Cover image ‘130506-F-LX370-079‘ by Arctic Warrior

[In todays’ episode of Some call it Belarus, we take an introductory look at the Economics of Belarus, briefly touch on issues of labour rights and highlight some inherent challenges and opportunities of the Belarusian economy.]

Season I Episode IV – The economic situation in Belarus

Given its geographical position, the Belarusian economy has borders with both Russia and the European Union as potentially profitable trading partners and has long profited from its close ties with Russia, especially in regard to energy prices. These have been set near the domestic Russian price levels for extended periods of time and only gradually risen throughout and after the financial straits of 2008. The countries’ predominant economic trading partners in exports are Russia, the Netherlands, Germany, Ukraine, Great Britain, Poland and Latvia, focussing on machinery and equipment, mineral products, chemicals, metals, textiles, foodstuffs. Similarly, Russia, Germany and Ukraine are the countries’ main partners in terms of imports, focussing on mineral products, machinery and equipment, chemicals, foodstuffs, metals. The country is ranked 150th in terms of economic freedoms globally and 42^nd out of 43 in the Europe region by the Index of Economic Freedoms with a GDP of 146.7 billion, a per capita income of 15,634$ and an inflation (GPI) of 59.2%. In regard to unemloyment, there are highly differing accounts to be taken into consideration between the government’s estimations of less than 1% in 2011 and estimations of around 24% by independent sources, making an overall evaluation prone to political bias (see here and here).

With government steered companies making up for a majority of economic activities in Belarus – and a public opinion in favour rather more than less government interventions in the economy, a Belarusian economy that is moderated rather than dominated by state doctrine is a concept only shared by the Belarusian independent sphere.

One area in which Belarusian companies that are not necessarily state dominated play a slightly larger role though is that of information technologies. Several companies that were founded in the last days of the Soviet Union and in the nascent democracy of the early 1990s, such as Effective Programming for America (EPAM) and ASBIS have each risen over the years and by now employ several thousand (EPAM: 9300, ASBIS: 1700) employees in their respective markets while being internationally active companies led by entrepreneurs. Success stories like these non-withstanding however, the Belarusian state-centric approach to the affairs of the economy considerably limits the amount of areas in which they are possible, especially for those up and coming today.

In terms of possibilities for employees to partake in and influence their employers’ endeavours through unions, the course of Belarusian authorities has been less than forthcoming especially to those seeking participation through independent, not state-organized unions. These have been described by authors like Tatsiana Vadalazhkaya and reports like VIASNA as an elongated arm of the government’s labour policies, independent labour unions often face discrimination and their leaders consequences such as loss of their workplace or legal persecution. As Vadalazhkaya points out, this restriction of independently active members of the Belarusian society can be traced back to the soviet understanding of states as workers’ states and thus the punishing of unwanted personnel through restrictions and repercussions in the labour marked be traced back to the soviet heritage still prevailing in the Belarusian society and – state.

Internationally, the various sanctions enacted upon Belarus and its political and economic leadership due to transgressions against Human Rights, impede the countries’ attractiveness to foreign investors, especially from Western countries. Most recently, Belarus has been struggling with rising prices across the board and the economic fallout of the crisis in Ukraine.  While the weakening of the Russian economy due to Western sanctions have negatively impacted the Belarusian economy, the lack of access of Russian companies to European goods may very well benefit Belarus in the short to middle term. Similarily the overall economic consequences of the crisis on the trade relationship between Belarus and the Ukraine remain to be seen.

Next week: Episode V – The Belarusian Independent Sphere

Quoted literature:

Vadalazhskaya, Tatsiana (2012). The struggle against dissent in the labour and employment sphere. The employment ban: a new phenomenon on the old foundations, in: Matskevich Uladzimir (Ed.). Desovietization in the context of Belarusan society’s transformation, Vilnius

Recent reports:

Belarus Digest: Digest of Belarusian Economy: http://belarusdigest.com/story/output-grows-inflation-hurting-macroeconomic-stability-digest-belarusian-economy-18433

BISS, Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies

What Belarusian society thinks on reforms:  http://belinstitute.eu/sites/biss.newmediahost.info/files/attached-files/BISS_SA10_2014en.pdf

What Belarusian civil society thinks on reforms, Retrieved from: http://belinstitute.eu/sites/biss.newmediahost.info/files/attached-files/BISS_SA11_2014en.pdf

Index of Economic Freedoms: Belarus Economy: Population, GDP, Inflation, Business, Trade, FDI, Corruption: http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2014/countries/belarus.pdf

VIASNA, human rights center: Forced Labour and the Pervasive Violations of Workers’ Rights in Belarus: http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/rapportbelarusuk623-bassdef.pdf

Picture by: Dennis Jarvis

By Musa Aziz

Who would have thought that in 2014 there are women being sold for as little as $10? If you haven’t been too busy with the news on Gaza you might have heard that it actually happens every day in the Middle-east. Yazidi Kurd, Assyrian and Christian girls are being captured, enslaved, raped and sold openly in Mosul, now the de facto capital of the Islamic State.

The dramatic rise of the Islamic State and the declaration of the Caliphate might not seem as shocking to people who have no idea what it really intends to do than to the people who are facing them in Iraq, Syria and Kurdistan. Christians are being labelled and then coerced to pay taxes, accept Islam or die in cold blood. The same is happening to the Yazidi Kurds, who follow an offshoot of Zoroastrianism (or an independent religion linked to Zoroastrianism). Hundreds of Yazidi men were captured and massacred in one day and their women and girls raped and enslaved. Many of them spent weeks on the mountain of Sinjar without water and food till they were rescued by the Pishmarga Kurdish forces. Twelve-year old girls had to take arms and fight for their honour, for their freedom and for humanity.

What is frustrating and most bothering is that there is no voice of condemnation from the so-called Muslim world; all one hears is the statements released which acknowledges IS (Islamic State) as a non-Islamic group and that religion has no role to play in the conflict. Why is it very important to clear the image of Islam than to condemn the atrocities? Why doesn’t the murder of Non-Muslims by Muslims cause an outrage in the Muslim world? Why is it that they believe IS is created by Israel (though they fail to provide any evidence/fact)?

There are more questions; Does not the Islamic State call itself the saviour of Muslims? Did not it establish an Islamic Caliphate? Aren’t their members and fighters Muslims? Aren’t they fighting under the banner of Islam? Aren’t they asking for an Islamic law? So what makes you think that you are more of a Muslim than they are? What makes you think that what they are doing is any different than the founders of Islam did?

I wonder if I could find answers to these questions…but I only wonder.

P.S. I condemn slavery from the bottom of my heart and I despise anybody who condones it or even tries to debate the legitimacy of its existence.

Author Biography

Musa Aziz, is a DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) fellow and holds a Master from University of Erfurt – Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Germany. Before starting his MPP degree at the Willy Brandt School, Musa completed an accredited certification in Good Governance Afghanistan from the same institution.

He has worked with different governmental and non-governmental organizations for over three years. Throughout his academic and professional career, Musa particularly focused on poverty reduction, economic development, human rights, education, peace-building and conflict resolution.  His research interests are contemporary political issues and political discourses in South Asia and Middle East.

You can find him on his Website

*Cover image ‘Freedom go to hell ‘ by SS&SS

[In today’s episode of Some call it Belarus, we talk about the situation of law and an independent judiciary in Belarus and briefly cover the processes following arrests made during protests after the presidential elections in December 2010.]

Season I Episode III – The situation of Law in Belarus

In the following, the attempt will be made to provide an account on the situation in regard to the availability of legal protection and independence of the judiciary in Belarus. Given the importance of political rights for possibilities of broader scale societal change, a focus shall be put on the availability and implementation of political and Human Rights.

From a point of view of structure, the Belarusian legal system is divided into the country’s constitutional courts and its universal courts. This group of universal courts then consists of the oblasts’ and town courts as well as the Minsk city court, economic courts in the oblasts and Minsk as well as finally the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus. These universal courts deal with trials covering administrative, criminal and economic topics as well as those with regard to the military. The constitutional court is tasked with controlling new legislation and their alignment with the constitution. From the 12 constitutional court judges, six are appointed by the president of the republic and another six elected by the Council of the Republic while the presiding judge is appointed by the president and approved by the Council. In light of an independent judiciary system, various allegations of politically motivated imprisonments in Belarus have been made, i.e. by the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers to the United Nations Human Rights Council (2006, 2007, 2008), as well as the appointed Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Belarus of the United Nations Human Rights Council and the United Nations Human Rights Council, labelling violations of Human Rights “systemic and systematic” are urging the Belarusian Government  to “carry out a comprehensive reform of the justice sector and bar associations in order to guarantee the full independence and impartiality of the judiciary, the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial and the right to an effective review of sentences and convictions by a higher tribunal established by law and to freely chosen legal representation throughout all proceedings, as well as the availability of information on the implementation of all sentences” (source document).

While in general, the Belarusian constitution and other acts guarantee the independence of the judiciary, the presidential administration and ministry of justice have considerable leverage. During the process of appointment of judges, viable candidates are listed on ‘reserve lists’ and then examined by both the regional head of the department of justice and the chairman of the court offering the vacant position. Candidates for juridical positions are then proposed by the Minister of Justice along with the Chairman of the Supreme Court, both of which are appointed by the President) to the President of the Republic of Belarus who has then the right to appoint or decline candidates without publication of reasons.

The provision of political and Human Rights shall here be exemplified by the case of legal persecutions made in the aftermath of political demonstrations in Minsk on December 19^th 2010, following the results of the presidential elections in Belarus earlier that same month. The following account is based upon the study ‘Square 2010’ conducted by the Legal Transformation Centre based on the hearings and data obtained on the 14 trials taking place between February 17^th and October 12^th 2011.

The trials were based upon arrests originally made on December 19^th 2010 during protests in Minsk. After originally more than 600 people detained for participation, among them 6 of the 9 opponent candidates to the incumbent Alyaksandr Lukashenka, eventually 14 criminal cases were heard with direct connections to the presidential elections and subsequent protests. All cases ended with guilty verdicts ranging from sentences of 6 years in prison to financial fines. During the period of and leading up to the trials, several of the convicted were denied private consultations with their lawyers, they were partially relocated between penitentiary facilities on a frequent basis with little to no contact to the outside world and were at times deprived of sanitary facilities. Additionally there were reported cases where the prisoners were forced to strip naked and physically punished. During the trials several of the accused activists were not allowed any direct or indirect communication with their lawyers during questioning and while the courts admitted an overall of 117 motions against the defence, a total of 14 were admitted against the prosecution.

Recommended reading: Legal Transformation Center Lawtrend ‘Square 2010 – through the eyes of Belarusian Human Rights defenders”, made available here.

Next week: Episode IV – The Economic situation of Belarus

Picture credit: lempkin

When NATO began its 1999 air campaign in Kosovo without U.N. Security Council approval, Russians perceived this as part of ‘NATO’s drive for unilateral security in Europe’ (Blank 2000). The Russian Federation feared that this military campaign signalled U.S. and European domination in the international system, but also a breach of the norm of sovereignty in international relations. This is the moment when tensions between NATO and the Russian Federation started to rise and the impact is still long term, affecting Kosovo’s foreign relations

With the most recent mediation of the European Union between Kosovo and Serbia, in February, Kosovo is in a much better situation in negotiating and being represented in regional initiatives. This shows that ‘the carrot and the stick’ game played by the EU in Serbia is working well and that Serbia has no choice but to move incrementally towards the EU. In the constructive relationship between Serbia and the EU, Kosovo plays a very important role, as Serbia cannot join the EU without resolving the issue of Kosovo.

The Russian position over Kosovo hasn’t changed at all, even after such agreements with Serbia have been reached. This shows that Russian policy towards Kosovo is not only to support Serbia but to (mis)use Serbia for its own great power ambitions in international relations. The Russian position seeks to continue blocking any decision in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and not only to block Kosovo as entity but to demonstrate its veto power against the other permanent members of the UNSC.

Russia seeks to play the role of ‘watchdog’ of International Law in international affairs. It wants to be seen as the antidote to the failures of international law in Afghanistan and Iraq, and a barrier to a wave of democracy-promotion and the Arab Spring. Kosovo plays a very important role in shaping Russian foreign policy, as it was the first international intervention carried out without authorisation from the UN, and despite a Russian absence in the UNSC.

In November 2011, Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s ambassador to NATO, announced at the NATO headquarters that about 21 000[i] (quoting Serb sources only) Kosovo Serbs are seeking to get Russian citizenship. However, this policy changed slightly after a series of senior governmental meetings dealing with this issue, as reported in a briefing by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs of:  ‘We will continue to help secure through politico-diplomatic means the legitimate rights and interests of the Serbs living in Kosovo[ii]’. By doing this, Russia shows how it uses Serbia as its own stick, to flex its power, while at the same time guaranteeing Kosovo Serbs’ well-being according to the Foreign Policy Concept ‘to provide comprehensive protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad[iii]’

When he visited Kosovo Serbs in 2011, Rogozin posted on his Twitter account that ‘Local Serbs have lived [in Kosovo] isolated from Serbia for a long time and trust no one but Russians.’[iv] He was representing Putin whilst meeting with the Kosovo Serbs, and did not meet anyone from the Kosovo Government. This also shows how Russia’s policy in Kosovo has developed, and how states use ethnic minorities to exert influence in the international system. If Rogozin was really interested in settling issues between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, he would at least have met with both sides.

Even today when Kosovo and Serbia agree day-to-day on many things, including the Integrated Border Management and regional representation of Kosovo, Russia still doesn’t agree. From the Russian point of view, no human right or any other legal right is more important than the concept of ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity’ of Serbia as prescribed by the UNSC Resolution 1244.[v]

During UN Security Council meetings, Russia has held very strong positions against Kosovo. With such a stance, Russia opposes not only Kosovo but also the US, the UK and other EU states which support its indepdendence. Kosovo is only represented in the UN by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), and can only speak through the SRSG.

In fact, not only does Russia oppose all progress that has happened in Kosovo, but it has also tried to physically stop the Foreign Minister of Kosovo, Hoxhaj, from speaking in the UN media corner. While Hoxhaj was addressing the media, Churkin, the Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN, told Hoxhaj: ‘You are not able to talk here at all without UNMIK person, I’m sorry sir. ’[vi] Hoxhaj smiled and replied: ‘Ok, then you can ask UNMIK to come here’ and Churkin admitted later that ‘it was just a friendly reminder. ’[vii] This anecdote shows how Russia is even physically opposing Kosovo’s diplomatic representation on the international stage, not purely because of Kosovo, but because the United States supports it. This is also illustrated by Rogozin’s view of global relations, as exemplified in his Twitter post: ‘The world is ruled by fear and interests. Everything else is propaganda’.[viii]

Russian foreign policy in the Balkans can be seen as part of the traditional international relations approach of deterrence. Eventually, Serbia’s stand on Kosovo will change in an incremental manner and this, by definition, will have an impact on Russia’s policy towards Kosovo. However, Russia will still maintain a high-profile denial of Kosovo’s independence, attempting to stop Kosovo by any means from accessing the international stage.

Author Biography

Abit Hoxha is a doctoral researcher at the Ludwig Maximilian University (LMU) in the INFOCORE project in January 2014. He earned his first degree in Political Science in 2005 from the University of Prishtina in Kosovo and holds MA degree from the Kosovo Institute of Journalism and Communication ( 2007), focusing on ‘War and Post-War Reporting in Kosovo’. He studied for his second postgraduate degree at the Durham Global Security Institute at the Durham University in UK focusing on Social Movements and Islam. He worked in various institutions both government and non-government sector in Kosovo including as researcher for the Kosovo based think tank, Kosovar Center for Security Studies, World Bank-Kosovo Youth Development Project, UNDP in Kosovo-Support to Security Sector Development and other positions. Abit has been also involved in the Kosovar media research working on different subjects and published academic and non-academic articles.

You can find him on Twitter

Bibliography

Blank, Stephen J. (2000) Threats to Russian Security: Views from Moscow. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute.

Clark, Wesley. (2001) Waging Modern War. Prishtina : PublicAffairs Ltd.

Drachev, Viktor. (2002) 7 Questions to Paul Goble. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2008/08/26/seven_questions_russias_big_mistake  (accessed February 29, 2012).

FAS. (2000) Federation of American Scientists. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm (accessed February 29, 2012).

Fedenko, Pavel. (2001) BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11688392 (accessed February 28, 2012).

NATO. (2000) NATO. http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm (accessed February 1, 2012).

Ouimet, Matthew. (2003) The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy. Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press.

Petrovic, Zarko (2010). Russia Serbia Relations at the beginning of XXI Century. ISAC Fund International and Security Affairs Centre

[i] http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/russia-reviews-kosovo-serbs-request-for-citizenship

[ii] http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/188d4badea45d06d4425795a00577257!OpenDocument

[iii] http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml

[iv] https://twitter.com/#!/Rogozin/status/149453041471471617/photo/1

[v] http://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm

[vi] http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xl4v85_ambasadori-rus-churkin-pengon-ministrin-hoxhaj-ne-konferencen-per-media_news

[vii] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OCtjTRuScIg

[viii] http://twitter.com/#!/DRogozin/status/143347218001301505

*Cover image ‘Kosovo Flag (Official Flag) 17.02.2008‘ by Kosovo Future Maker

[In today’s episode of Some call it Belarus, we take an introductory look at the politics and political system in Belarus while also briefly glancing over to the freedoms of independent media and those surrounding them.]

Season I Episode II – The (internal) Politics of Belarus

The political status quo in Belarus has often been described as that of an authoritarian regime, ruled by president Lukashenka since his electoral win in 1994. Officially a republic, Belarus is governed by the bi-cameral national assembly, consisting of the Council of the Republic and the House of Representatives, that elects the government under leadership of the Prime Minister. However, while the prime minister primarily functions as a primus inter pares, the government is in practice led and appointed by the President of the Republic. The current national assembly consists of 64 appointed members in the Council of the Republic (upper house) and 110 in the House of Representatives (lower house) supporting the president, a majority of these elected representatives are without affiliation to any official party, while others belong to parties such as the Communist Party of Belarus, the Agrarian Party or the Republican Party of Labour and Justice. Although there is a number of registered or formerly registered, political parties in Belarus belonging to and voicing the concerns of the opposition to Lukashenka’s government, none has been able to secure a seat in the House of Representatives. Authors like Korosteleva date this split between the political parties into camps supporting and in opposition to the presidency back to 1994 in the precursor to the 1995 parliamentary elections. Similarly, they decline the notion of a system of political parties existing in Belarus in a traditional sense, but speak rather of a conglomerate of political forces.

Since his first election in 1994, current president Alyaxandr Lukashenka and his government have severely limited the possibilities of opposing political thought and activities in the country through several reforms of day to day practices that hinder his opponents. The consequential disenfranchisement of the Belarusian public with political processes – and thus the possibility of political change – has led to the perception of elections in general and presidential election specifically to be perceived as democratic rites to validate the status quo of the presidency.

Especially in the light of the conduct of political protests surrounding the most recent presidential elections of 2006 and 2010, that followed allegations of electoral fraud, where on either occasion considerable numbers of protesters (400 in 2006 and 600 in 2010) were detained and participating presidential candidates and leaders of the political opposition sentenced to prison terms of up to six years.

Analyst Tatsiana Vadalazhskaya reports of a concerted effort to use a number of repressive tools, summarized as a form of employment ban, to separate a part of society consisting of independent trade unions, political parties, active public associations, private and self-organized initiatives from the rest of Belarusian society. While simple survival is the dominant aim for these actors, it is still possible for people active in this sphere to make a living. However, simultaneously to their survival and the mere fact of their existence, this part of Belarusian society is nearly exclusively occupied with European topics due to the space provided to them by the Belarusian authorities, leading to their stronger association and identification with Europe over Belarus itself. This in turn leads to a disenfranchisement between potential change-makers and the society they aim to change based on economic sanctions against them. While there are possibilities for non-state or non-state controlled actors and media to exist and work in Belarus, their given framework of existence is highly regulated and processes of registration for non-governmental organizations have repeatedly been halted, licenses revoked and independent media shut down. Similarly, perceived leaders of independent movements and opinion have repeatedly been apprehended by the state authorities or sentenced by courts for their activities in absentia.

In regards to an independence of media, the major television, news and print networks belong to the state-owned  Tele-radio-company while especially independent newspapers such as Pahonia or Local Time (shut down 2001 and ‘02 respectively) were out under political pressure and eventually shut down in the early 2000s. Digital media like the World Wide Web have witnessed a similar rise in importance in Belarus with internet-penetration reaching 54,2% of the population in 2013, up from 25,3% in 2005 (source: Internet World Stats). The internet provides one of the main possibilities of outreach for members of civil society, independent analysts and media portals in Belarus. However, as showcased by the Freedomhouse on the Net index, freedoms on the internet have been under heavy pressure in Belarus, with censorship of access to websites in times of elections and beyond, the persecution of independent bloggers and technical attacks against independent websites being commonplace.

Next week: Episode 3 – The Economic Situation of Belarus

Picture credit: Adrian Murphy

Cited literature:

Korosteleva, Elena (2005). Emergence of a Political System in: White, Stephen et al.. Post-Communist Belarus, Lanham:  Rowman & Littlefield Publishers

Vadalazhkaya, Tatsiana (2012). The struggle against dissent in the labour and employment sphere. The employment ban: a new phenomenon on the old foundations, in: Matskevich Uladzimir (Ed.). Desovietization in the context of Belarusan society’s transformation, VilniusTags: Belarus, Civil Society, politics, Some call it Belarus

[In our new series ‘Some call it Belarus’, we take a look on the oft-forgotten case of  Belarus and highlight some of the issues why we think the country deserves more attention.]

Young People displaying Belarusian Flags in Minsk

Season I Episode I – Introduction

Looking at it as an outsider, Belarus is both a very odd place in many ways and in other ways not at all.

When I grew up, I was probably one of the very few kids raised in ‘the West’ for whom ‘Belarus’ was a topic that was always kind of ‘there’, a mythical place not too far away, where a strange man was very good at doing bad things and no one seemed to care; a fact that hasn’t much changed since the 1990s. This strange man seems to have successfully created a way to a stable situation in this mythical country, where change is not likely in the short term and long term strategies are too tedious for modern day attention spans. One additional factor for this lack of interest and knowledge can however be seen in the language barrier between the English language internet and that in the Russian/Belarusian language, a gap that we aim to bridge with these articles (although the author speaks exactly four words of Russian and even less of Belarusian).

This series of articles is aimed at providing an introduction to current day Belarus in the form of interlinked articles that showcase some general and outstanding aspects of the country’s situation and the likelihood of change within it. In this first ‘season’, some more general aspects of the current status quo of and in the country will be highlighted such as the legal, political, and economic situation as well as the strength of its independent sphere and the impact that the Ukrainian Crisis has had on the country. Potential following ‘seasons’ of the series could then target specific points in time, such as the country’s transfer into independence in the late 1980s/early 1990s, Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s fortification and consolidation of power in the mid-1990s, the political protests of 2006 and 2010, or the subsequent ‘Decemberist trials’, to name but a few. Additionally, we have some interviews that were conducted with Belarusian activists earlier this year lined up to be published as podcasts.

So, for now Season 1 of ‘Some call it Belarus’ will look as follows:

• Episode 1: Introduction
• Episode 2: The Politics of Belarus
• Episode 3: The Economic situation in Belarus
• Episode 4: The legal system of Belarus and its independence
• Episode 5: The Belarusian independent Sphere and its issues
• Episode 6: Crimea and Beyond
• Making of: Different concepts of Belarusianness

The series is based in my personal interest in and work on the topic of Belarus as a subject of potential change, that lead to a master’s thesis titled ‘Case Study Belarus – Civil Society on the Grindstone’. This series has thus to be seen as written and coordinated by an outsider with a distinct bias towards the pro-change independent sphere in Belarus. Not withstanding however, the voicing of personal opinion will be avoided as much as possible and labelled appropriately in case of need.

On Belarus

Belarus in its current state is an oft forgotten place, located in the dead angle of public perception as a country and potential issue when perceived in its own right.

Especially when referring to democratic citizenship – and the development thereof – Belarus is facing challenges unlike most contemporary states. Throughout the history of what is now called Belarus, there scarcely was a political entity that was sovereign from foreign dominance. Coming out of the middle-ages, most of it was part of the Grand-Duchy of Lithuania, later its union with the Polish Commonwealth and succeeding that: Russia. Only during two brief windows of time, an independent, democratic Belarus existed: the first of which was the Byelorusian Peoples’ Republic of 1918 that was to be ‘integrated’ into Bolshewik forces only one year later and be part of the USSR until 1991. The next window of opportunity was then to reveal itself just after the fall of and independence from the Soviet Union. Only in the four years between the beginning of its independence and Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s success in the 1994 elections, was there a chance for democratic values to freely develop.

Since his meteoritic rise during the 1994 electoral race and consequently swearing-in as President of the Republic of Belarus, Lukashenka’s government has been highly efficient at limiting political rights and independent political thought and activities in the country. Having been repeatedly labelled ‘Europe’s last tyrant’, the development of the state under Lukashenka’s rule has been a seemingly stable one with open public dissent only occurring during elections and both protests and protestors being reliably ‘taken care of’ by the policing state agencies. Stable times. Good times?

Next week: Episode 2 – The Politics of Belarus

Picture by Ilya Kuzniatsou