Author: kasmir

Season I Episode VII – Why it matters

Talking and writing about Belarus is an eerie business. It is seemingly both very hard and very easy to get an angle on the country and the issues surrounding it. At first glance, the issues Belarus as a country and society is facing sound like a best-of of the classical large-scale problems:

• Authoritarian political leadership
• De facto dependence on a (voluntarily or not) beneficial regional power
• International isolation due to Human Rights violations

That being said, these problems are hardly unique on the globe, or even in Eastern Europe. Especially in younger, Eastern democracies, the political and cultural heritage of past authoritarianism still looms large (as it was in the now settled democracies of Western countries like Germany 20 years after their democratization, but that’s a point for a whole different article). Similar are the subduing of political opposition and resource-dependence on other countries which are hardly unheard of. These days, there aren’t many countries around the globe that are doing well, and even should you ask people coming from those, their list of ‘things to be improved in the country’ will probably sound like an extended lecture on the end of the world.

So, what is so special about Belarus?

Nothing, really. And everything. As many countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Belarus is still heavily influenced by its Soviet heritage, especially given Alyaksandr Likashenka’s pre-democracy /‘democracy’ career and on the ground policies (such as maintaining and upgrading Soviet-era military equipment up to the third decade of the 21^st century). After his earlier ambitions to become Russian president, the former collective farm manager has now settled for Belarus, even though for life, most likely. Funded by Russian de-facto subsidies to the Belarusian economy (and military), the Belarusian government has been able to provide stability and a decent-enough level of social security.

Taking a look at Belarus from an amoral point of view, one couldn’t help but shaking Lukashenka’s hand and congratulating him on a job well done. He has managed to disempower democratic institutions in Belarus within the first three years of being elected president, established elections as little more than pesky rituals and diminished his opposition by predicting their moves even before they have been thought of. He has stabilized the economy of the country on a low, yet high enough level for no opposition to be able to benefit from it, has negotiated the tight-rope relationship between maintaining the many benefits from Russian goodwill and ensuring Belarusian sovereignty with the Russian Federation and managed that no one seems to care about all that.

There are many and more interesting stories to be told about Belarus, from hunger strikes and forced labour, to those of the presidential candidates who have spent years in prison and torture after the 2010 elections and the difficulty of sustaining a civil society from within and without. And while the world seems to be spinning ever-faster, any lens through which we might look at Belarus is fraught with misconceptions. Given the beat-down on any non-state sanctioned, independent thought and civic education efforts, any effort in this regard, starting out with or without political intentions, has been highly politicized. From a socio-scientific point of view, any and all data on Belarus is consequently by default biased as there is no data available that has been collected from independent sources. As an example, even the data available in English and seemingly is following scientific standards, has most likely been financed with funding from the EU or other international, pro-change sources.

Trying to summarize, the reasons for a public lack of interest in Belarus might be summarized as follows:

• The situation in the country has been relatively stable for 20 years
• The causes and interdependencies of the situation are as varied as they are many
• This is unlikely to change due to the proven talent of the government to stop any change before it even begins
• The casualties of the regime are well hidden and less publicized
• Available sources for information are very likely to be biased, if at all existing
• There are many more interesting conflicts and dramas happening around the globe that provide for more usable media footage

And all that is actually the main reason why the topic of Belarus needs to be better publicized. Yes, it is a bad situation; yes, it is more complex than the picture is being painted by partisan media; yes, change is not likely to happen any time soon; yes, as soon as you start writing about it, you are prone to picking the wrong sources no matter what; and yes, these days, the dramas around the globe are many and on a short term worse than that in Belarus.

Why should we talk about Belarus? – Because hardly anyone does, simple as that.

Just because it is hard to understand, it isn’t impossible to tell the stories; just because sources are biased that doesn’t mean a meaningful interpretation of them is out of the picture; just because other conflicts and dramas around the globe are in the spotlight for good reason, it doesn’t mean that Belarus cannot share the stage every once so often and just because the situation is stable and boring at first glance, it doesn’t mean that there are no interesting stories to be told. In fact, the opposite is the case, just take a look at its geopolitical position and the situation, effects and role of Belarus as a victim, mediator and actor in the Ukrainian Conflict.

• Moritz Borchardt, 27/10/2014

Picture credit: Zachary Harden

The protests in Istanbul during 2013 started with an environment-oriented reaction to the planned removal of trees in Gezi Park in Taksim Square.

Gezi Park, at Istanbul’s beating heart, saw itself turned into the centre of a unique cultural melting pot, uniting crowds from different walks of life within the country to utter their discontent and despair with the country’s political status quo. The unity between the different fractions apparently only survived for a limited time. A year after, the relentless crackdown on the different civic organisations is considered to have widely dispersed and immobilised any remaining opposition to the ruling AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) political class’s authority. There was widespread popular condemnation of the AKP party’s response to the initial protests, showing a total lack of coverage by the government controlled mainstream media. For as much as 84% of the participants this was reason to revolt, whereas 56% had pointed at the plight of the trees at the park as their reason to join the protests (online poll conducted by Istanbul Bilgi University).

The government’s uncompromising stance and a heavy-handed police crackdown on protesters led to the protests quickly spreading all over Turkey.
Since its inception in 2001, AKP has developed into the successful single ruling party with increasing authority and continuing success starting from its landslide victory in the 2002 parliamentary election.
Put in the words of Cemal Karakas, a political scientist and research associate at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), ‘’Turkey’s political culture is primarily influenced by nationalism (or more specifically Turkish-ness), Sunni majority Islam, pronounced ideas on centralism and the desire for strong political leadership figures. Concepts such as liberalism, the rule of law, interfaith dialogue or the capacity for self-criticism are largely alien.’’ What the protests have apparently shown is that despite rising dissent, the single ruling party has not lost the support of its core constituency. The protests would also have shown a weak opposition illustrating the fact that Turkey would still lack a persuasive and feasible political alternative.

In her article the dream is over, Luise Sammann, a German freelance journalist based in Turkey, emphasizes ‘‘…yet the Turkish prime minister, at whom much of the protestor’s rage was directed at the time, was not brought down. The opposite was, in fact, the case: never in the past 12 years of its government has the AP’s power seemed as rock solid as it does now. Not only the clear results of the local elections at the end of March [2013], but also Erdogan’s confident domestic and foreign public appearances, his decisions in parliament and his dealings with his political adversaries seem just as uncompromising and authoritarian as ever.’’

She also questions the fact whether these protests were functional at all, interpreting effective prospective changes with respect to all that is wanted.
‘’… are the AKP’s election victory, it’s recently passed service act, the repeated attacks on the freedom of press and the commonplace police violence not proof enough that the Gezi protests were all for nothing? That is simply isn’t enough for hundreds of thousands to shout ‘’No!’’ all at once if no one is capable of defining what is actually wanted instead or developing political alternatives?’’

The increasingly authoritarian system of governance and the Islamist-influenced agenda, that can be seen in increasing restrictions of the freedom of speech and non-biased and independent press, absence of freedom of expression and assembly, lack of respect to minority rights of Kurds, Christians and Alevis, lack of free and critical mainstream media coverage, lack of independent judiciary, widespread unemployment and income inequality, lack of healthy platforms for objective journalism as well as vehement corruption were among the yearnings of protesters.
‘’ If there was a flashpoint for the ‘Gezi’ anger, it was the media. Almost every mass-media outlet in Turkey is owned by the same large conglomerates that also do significant business with the government and vie for the lucrative urban renewal, energy and construction projects which have fuelled Turkey’s economic growth. These outlets rarely publish anything critical of the government and have been known to come out with identical (government-friendly) headlines on certain critical days ‘’ writes Zeynep Tufekci, a research fellow at Princeton University, in her analytic piece – Pepper Spray and Penguins.

With respect to the 2013 protests, of great significance is the fact that it all took place spontaneously with no prior planning or organisation whatsoever. Still, apart from different non-governmental organisations, the protests also brought together different labour unions and professional associations representing large number of lawyers, doctors and engineers. It shows that no matter how much disparity was present within the aired voices of complaint, the whole movement bore with it a great strength and power.

With the mainstream media compromised, internet comes in to play through large coordination via social media like twitter and Facebook.
To prove how resultant and operative the role of social media can be in initiating, firing up, spreading and even organising a political movement, the Social Media and Political Participation Lab at New York University made a thorough analysis of the Turkish tweets throughout the ‘Gezi’ protests. 22 million tweets mostly entailing three major hashtags of #direngeziparki, #occupygezi and #geziparki have been reported. What is significant about this phenomenon is that despite governmental restrictions on the use of social media in times of crisis, most of the tweets and similar online correspondence have been carried out from within the country rather than from abroad. This is unlike the uprising in Egypt where the majority of virtual activities were stemming from outside the county.
The report phrases it as ‘’…certainly an impressive utilization of social media in overcoming the barriers created by semi-authoritarian regimes.’’

In its printed version under the headline of The March of Protests (2013), The Economist also reported that through the means of technology the pace of protests has considerably been accelerated by organising and spreading information via social networks.

The fact that the media have mostly been acquired by business ‘insiders’ has rendered them more restraint, impotent and susceptible to political manipulation and control. This is caused the ruling party’s vast power to decide, determine, impact and shape the profit opportunities in the sectors where also the media investors bear direct economic interests.

‘’The recent wave of protests has revealed both the extent to which the media has been silenced by the government, and how available communication technologies undermine the ability of repressive governments to control the flow of information and limit the freedom of expression. Coming together in a demonstration and acting in solidarity in a movement of resistance becomes relatively easy for people who are used to virtual friendships formed on the internet’’ says Ayse Bugra, professor of political economy at Bogazici University.

The major kick-start of reactions to press indifference and news sharing was where CCN Turk, a franchise of CNN International, broadcasted an arctic documentary on penguins while heavy clashes were taking place in the streets between the public and riot police under command of countering the protestors with violence and disproportionate reactions. Following this, penguins became a symbol of press criticism and self-censorship.
Pelin Turgut, a Turkish political and cultural commentator for TIME magazine and The Independent, in her article in Time puts forward that ‘’critics say Erdogan’s government has sought to control the media by levying heavy tax fines and seizing the assets of media firms perceived to be critical of his administration. Many large media companies also own businesses in fields like energy, banking and mining. Though the government denied any political motivation in those cases, the end result has been a deferential approach on the part of mainstream news outlets to government policies. Controversial journalists were quietly asked to leave. News items were whitewashed. Meanwhile, Erdogan often sued cartoonists and journalists who criticized him.’’

Yet lack of clear-cut and well-defined figure(s) to lead such a movement towards a unified direction with a set of pre-planned and discussed-upon demands in a hierarchical manner, has resulted in the fading away of the participants’ focus on what was actually being demanded from the system. On top of this, the opposition parties kept their distances from attempts to politically manipulate the demonstrations.

Similarly, with regards to the recent 2014 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong, Ishaan Tharoor, a senior editor at TIME magazine, sets out the main reasons for the argument that they could so far have been considered as a failure:
– The protesters won next to nothing
– The restraint and patience of the authorities
– A lack of leadership
– Loss of popular support

One can see some apparent resemblances. In Turkey, there was a lack of strong underlying reasoning which would have acted as a stimulus for continuing country-wide demonstrations. An uncoordinated number of demands were aired against the governing system leaving the whole movement with no apparent tangible success or solid consequences.
Moreover, an over-reactionary and disproportionate attitude from the Turkish government and police forces throughout the protests has resulted in human rights violations as reported by Amnesty International in its document published on October 2013. It shows how far the ruling elite have been willing to go in beating down these nation-wide unrests.

“The attempt to smash the Gezi Park protest movement involved a string of human rights violations on a huge scale. They include the wholesale denial of the right to peaceful assembly and violations of the rights to life, liberty and the freedom from torture and ill-treatment,” said Andrew Gardner, Amnesty International’s expert on Turkey.
The decentralised nature of the protests, the lack of clear-cut list of demands, and the lack of sufficient and supportive leadership either independent or linked to any of the opposition parties, has again been a main feature of the 2013 Turkish protests. Ayse Bugra explains that economics is also part of the bargain ‘’…the self-protection of society against a particular form of governance which neutered politics and silenced voices of dissent by appealing to the requirements of economic success.’’

As an allegedly young republic, the tradition of political opposition in Turkey seems to be weak and in need of revitalisation. After the military coup in September 1980, opposition to the political establishment in the country has been almost non-existent.

‘’Although AKP managed to bring a significant blow to the Turkish Armed Forces, which were protected in large extent by the 1980 regime, it seems that they were replaced by the police and passed on to them the role of the guardian of the state. The violence of the police and the congratulating message by the Prime Minister concerning the effectiveness of the police actions is quite revealing in that respect. It is the police and the media, to name just two of the institutions that played a key role in recent events in Taksim square, that AKP employed, as other governments before did to suppress opposition,’’ evaluated by Nikos Christofis, a PhD candidate at Leiden Institute for Area Studies (LIAS), as part of his contribution to the comprehensive and collective 2013 study of Reflections on Taksim – Gezi park protests in Turkey at Keele European Research Centre.

There seems to be an absence of common or accustomed ideologies around which ultimately an existing or potential opposition political movement could acquire a clear-cut role of leadership.

Therefore there would be a need for a novel understanding and definition about the new appearances of political power and opposition.
Following a restructuring of its institutions, the country’s secular image has been tarnished even more heading towards a ‘New’ conservative Turkey. Secularism in schools has been undergoing a transformation that signals a reticence on the part of the AKP to separate religion from politics. Aysegul Sert, a New York-based journalist, writes studies that according to a report by the Education Reform Initiative (ERI), a nongovernmental education think tank in Istanbul, there has been a 73% increase in the number of religious vocational schools or ‘imam-hatip’ since 2010, reflecting a deliberate assimilation project aimed at nationwide Sunni indoctrination.

The AKP has demonstrated through its 12-year rule and its advocacy for freedom of choice a tendency towards establishing more religion within the education system. During this period, however, the rights to freedom of assembly, freedom of media and freedom of speech seems to have visibly come under surmounting pressure, as claimed by Aysegul Sert in her Turkish Reforms Entangle Education article.
It would be an over-simplification to consider the 2013 protests mainly and only as a collective unrest and utterance of discontent towards an ever-increasing authoritarian and Islamist system of governance.
Alternatively they should also not just be seen as an anti-capitalist drive against the privatisation of public space.

Philosopher Slovaj Zizek questions the underlying and foundational real reasoning in the backstage of the story.

‘’ It is also important to recognise that the protesters aren’t pursuing any identifiable ‘real’ goal. The protests are not ‘really’ against global capitalism, ‘really’ against religious fundamentalism, ‘really’ for civil freedoms and democracy, or ‘really’ about any one thing in particular. What the majority of those who have participated in the protests are aware of is a fluid feeling of unease and discontent that sustains and unites various specific demands. The struggle to understand the protests is not just an epistemological one, with journalists and theorists trying to explain their true content; it is also an ontological struggle over the thing itself, which is taking place within the protests themselves. Is this just a struggle against corrupt city administration? Is it a struggle against authoritarian Islamist rule? Is it a struggle against the privatisation of public space? The question is open, and how it is answered will depend on the result of an ongoing political process.’’

The ‘fluid feeling of unease and discontent that sustains and unites various specific demands’ is a development that is seen around the globe.

Irrespective from which type of protest or its presumed motives, which country or region one analyses, there is an apparent unity in the way any suppression of an individual’s identity by ‘authority’ is collectively rejected. On a general level, struggles in the 21st Century seem to be about the empowerment of the individual, that is armed with a smart phone and backed up by a world army of online ‘virtual friends’ acting as individual critics.

In this perspective, it becomes almost irrelevant whether the government and the ruling class are represented by a majority of votes in its elected parliament. It also does not matter ‘what is actually wanted’ by protestors as their case seems to be first and foremost about the acknowledgment of their individual rights irrespective of their social or ethnic background or political affiliation.

The power of the modern enlightened individual is illustrated best by the ‘Tank Man’ of Tiananmen Square. The images of him moving in front of a column of tanks on June 4, 1989, the morning after the Chinese military had suppressed protests by force, was filmed and seen worldwide and quickly became a powerful symbol of both the bloody events of 1989 and of non-violent resistance. Equally, the image of a protester shielding himself from tear gas with an umbrella has become a symbol of this year’s massive pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong. This ‘Umbrella man’ has been shared on social media thousands of times. Since 1997 Hong Kong has been part of the PRC. China has developed one of the most sophisticated cyber-control units in the world. However, despite doing everything to keep a lid on the protests, China can’t control the information Hong Kong is sharing with the world.

In Turkey, a lone protester, Erdem Gündüz, stood silent on the 17^th June 2013 in Taksim Square for hours, staring at the Turkish flags on the Ataturk Cultural Centre. The Internet distributed images and the ‘Standing man’ was the recipient of the 2014 Václav Havel Prize for Creative Dissent. Founded by the Human Rights Foundation (HRF), the recipients of the prize are claimed to be the ‘’ones who with bravery and ingenuity, unmask the lie of dictatorship by living in truth.’’

The ‘Gezi’ protests will leave a legacy of having been the first protests of unity between different civic groups in Turkey, in favour of the power of the individual. The protests may arguably also symbolise the start of the end of totalitarian rule by a governing Turkish political elite. An elite that is judged for broadcasting penguins instead of a popular protests footage, and judged for using excessive violence to suppress them, by billions of online critics around the globe. Like China, Turkey has been unsuccessful in curbing its social media. It would seem plausible then to conclude that such will be the catalyst for political change for any anachronistic totalitarian style of governance of this generation.

Continuing to ignore the individual rights of its citizens, the Turkish political elite may face a Trojan horse ready to impose its rule through a flood of patient lone but online ‘standing men and women’ who are all ready to come out of anonymity.

About the Author

Golnaz A. Jafari obtained her B.A. in English Language & Literature from Tabriz State University in her native Iran, she has also studied LLB in International and European Union Law and LLM in International and European Union Business Law respectively from University of Birmingham, United Kingdom, and the Vrije Universiteit Bruxelles, Belgium. She is specialized in International law, Global governance, International Economic law and organizations as well as European Union law, Policy structure & Institutional framework in general.

Currently located in Istanbul, Turkey, Golnaz has previously worked in Ankara –Turkey being involved in the assignments concerning the country’s foreign affairs with European Union with regards its accession and candidacy phase. She has also taken part in different voluntary projects as a research analyst in the field of Human Rights and Humanitarian laws. Golnaz is part of GPPW’s internship programme.

References:
– Sammann, L. (2014) The dream is over. Qantara.de [online] 6^th June 2014 Available from: http://en.qantara.de/content/turkey-a-year-after-the-gezi-protests-the-dream-is-over

– Karakas, C. (2014) Where to now, President Erdogan? Qantara.de [online] 8^th September 2014 Available from: http://en.qantara.de/content/turkeys-new-president-where-to-now-president-erdogan

– Karakas, C. (2014) Turkey’s paradigm shift Qantara.de [online] 10^th February 2014 Available from: http://en.qantara.de/content/the-erdogan-administration-turkeys-paradigm-shift

– Turgut, P. (2013) As Turkey’s protests continue, Attention Falls on Failures of Turkish Media Time [online] 6^th June 2013 Available from: http://world.time.com/2013/06/06/as-turkeys-protests-continue-attention-falls-on-failures-of-turkish-media/

– Tharoor, I. (2014) 4 Reasons Hong Kong protest’s failed (and 4 reasons they didn’t) The Washington Post [online] 8^th October 2014 Available from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/10/08/4-reasons-hong-kongs-protests-failed-and-4-reasons-they-didnt/

– Bugra, A. (2013) Turkey: what lies behind the nationwide protests? Open Democracy [online] 6^th August 2013 Available from: https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/ayse-bugra/turkey-what-lies-behind-nationwide-protests

– The march of protest (2013) The Economist [online] 29^th June 2013 Available from: http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21580143-wave-anger-sweeping-cities-world-politicians-beware-march-protest

– Turkey’s Protests: still out on the streets (2013) The Economist [online] 29^th June 2013 Available from: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21580196-even-protests-calm-down-questions-linger-about-turkeys-political-future-still-out

– Pope, H. (2013) Turkey’s protests: The Politics of an Unexpected Movement Crisis Group [online] 4^th June 2013 Available from: http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2013/06/04/turkeys-protests-the-politics-of-an-unexpected-movement/

– Tufekci, Z. (2013) Pepper Spray and Penguins: Analysis of Turkey’s Social –Media Fuelled Gezi Protests Juncture [online] 3^rd October 2013 Available from: http://dmlcentral.net/blog/zeynep-tufekci/pepper-spray-and-penguins-analysis-turkeys-social-media-fueled-gezi-protests

– Zizek, S. (2013) Trouble in Paradise London Review of Books [online] 8^th July 2013 Available from: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n14/slavoj-zizek/trouble-in-paradise

– Christofis, N. (2013) Gezi Park: the powerfully symbolic chance to act together! Reflections on Taksim-Gezi park protests in Turkey Journal of Global Fault lines p.47 Available from:  http://www.keele.ac.uk/journal-globalfaultlines/publications/geziReflections.pdf

– Social Media and Political Participation Lab (SMaPP) (2013) A Breakout Role for Twitter? The Role of Social Media in the Turkish Protests. New York University Available from: http://smapp.nyu.edu/reports/turkey_data_report.pdf

– Amnesty International (2013) Gezi Park Protests: Brutal Denial of the Right to Peaceful Assembly in Turkey. UK. Available from: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR44/022/2013/en/0ba8c4cc-b059-4b88-9c52-8fbd652c6766/eur440222013en.pdf

– Sert, A. (2014) Turkish Reforms Entangle Education. The New York Times [online] 12^th Oct. 2014 Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/13/world/europe/turkish-reforms-entangle-education.html?_r=1

Picture credit: Eser Karadag

Something is happening in Britain and the USA. Shia LeBoeuf recently declared that “British politics just got interesting.” England’s Daily Telegraph described a “populist surge” that was engulfing America. On each side of the Atlantic there is a politician breaking boundaries, redefining politics, and riding on a wave of popular discontent with the traditional political system. These two individuals are the brash, blonde billionaire Donald Trump, and the understated, bearded Jeremy Corbyn. On the surface, they could not be more different. But, scratch the surface, and you will find that, for all their ideological difficulties, they both owe much of their success to the fact that they are promising something different, something new, and something at odds to what they denounce as an outdated political system.

Voters in both Britain and in America have become increasingly disillusioned with politics, and politicians, in recent years. In Britain the expenses scandal exacerbated the view of politicians seeing themselves as a different class to the people they represent, while in the States, disenchantment with a system that is seen as morally and financially corrupt is not helped by the fact at the prospect of the next Presidential contest being between the brother of a former President and the spouse of another. In both nations complaints abound about “professional politicians”, who care too much about their own ego and wallets, and not enough about their voters. It is this sense of political alienation that both Corbyn and Trump have capitalised on.

This disillusionment with the political class was demonstrated in a recent article in The Atlantic magazine, which highlighted the fact that in the US, and within the Republican Party especially, the trend has been to prefer those with less political experience over more “war-weary” candidates, with plenty of years in the Senate behind them, but who are not deemed fresh enough. “As voters have grown angrier with government,” the article notes, “they have become more receptive to outsiders”. Trump is an even more extreme example of this, a candidate supported not simply because he is fresh and new, but because he explicitly denounces “traditional politics”, and is turning away from accepted political norms and etiquette. After every controversial quote or outspoken comment, political commentators have consistently predicted that Trump’s support will falter. And, equally consistently, his momentum has not been interrupted. What is clear about his success is that it is not occurring despite his controversial statements, but because of them. Every time he makes outlandish claims, every time he emphasises how different he is from the prevailing political class, he is solidifying his support base amongst those who have become disillusioned with “professional politicians”, who are looking for something, anything, different.

Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership campaign tapped into a similar feeling of discontent with the political class. The Labour Party membership, and those registered as affiliated voters, consciously eschewed the Blairite policies of Liz Kendall, the moderacy of Yvette Cooper, and Andy Burnham’s establishment credentials, in favour of a candidate who has spent 30 years as a backbench MP quietly (and sometimes not so quietly) working for the causes he believes in, and representing his constituents in North London. There is no doubt that Corbyn is not your everyday politician, despite his many years of work in Westminster: in 2005-10 alone he voted against the Labour Party 25% of the time; and during the 2009 expenses scandal he was found to have had the lowest expenses claims of any Member of Parliament. Difference, change, and a new style of politics were consistent themes throughout his campaign, and these were themes he has carried on into his leadership role, declaring in his speech at the Labour Party Conference that voters don’t have to “get what they’re given”, and that a vote for him was “a vote for change in the way we do politics”.

What’s striking about both the rise of Trump and that of Corbyn is that both have been caricatured – in newspapers, on social media, and by their fellow politicians – as occupying a certain extreme position on the political spectrum, but that both transcend, in many ways, the positions attached to them. A recent survey showed that whilst Trump is culturally and socially to the right – his attacks on immigrants the most obvious example – he is economically to the left. His support base amongst Republican supporters is not with the Tea Party, nor with the Christian Right, but amongst those who support higher taxes on the rich while fearing the impact of immigration. Simply put, it is amongst those who have felt that, for too long, both parties have neglected their interests. Trump is a shameless populist, but by tapping into that populism he is appealing to a population that feels as though it has not been appealed to in a long time. Corbyn, although unashamedly a left-wing politician, has a broader appeal than that. A closer look at his policies reveals that he is more moderate than the British media, and, in fairness, Corbyn’s own supporters, have sought to portray. In fact, Corbyn’s message of a new, more democratic and less divisive politics, is strikingly non-doctrinal, and during his first Prime Minister’s Questions – during which he asked the Prime Minister questions suggested to him by the general public – Corbyn even got Cameron to admit that “if we are able to change Prime Minister’s Questions … no one would be more delighted than me”. Since Corbyn was elected leader over 50,000 people have joined the Labour Party; these people aren’t joining because they are all raving, flag-waving socialists, but because they are buying into the new vision of politics that Corbyn is outlining. A grassroots movement arising out of the Corbyn victory, called Momentum, seeks to “create a mass movement for real, progressive change” in British politics.

Of course, the two politicians have their differences. Despite owing much of their support to similar phenomena of discontent and disillusionment, they have gone about exploiting that support in different ways. Corbyn’s desire for a less divisive politics could not be further removed from Trump’s confrontational approach and personal attacks on his fellow Republican candidates. And Corbyn’s humanitarian call for Britain to accept more Syrian refugees is at striking contrast from Trump’s declaration that were he to become President he would send all Syrian asylum seekers home. Similarly, to associate Corbyn, with his many years of political experience, his carefully thought-through politics and genuinely held principles, with Trump’s racist and sexist outbursts, is clearly unfair to the Labour leader. What is clear, however, is that without tapping into a popular discontent with traditional politics that transcends the left-right divide, neither of them would have seen as much success, or as many newspaper headlines, as they have done so far.

The limits of each politician’s respective successes remains to be seen. The odds are still against Trump winning the Republican nomination, while Corbyn faces an uphill struggle if Labour are to win the 2020 General Election. Nevertheless, regardless of whether President Trump will ever have his finger hovering above the red button, or whether Corbyn will ever right his bicycle in 10 Downing Street, one thing is certain. Politics in Britain, and in America, may never be quite the same again.

Author Biography

Joe Mansour is a history graduate from the north of England. He loves travelling and experiencing different cultures, and it is this that informs most of his work. He is interested in British and US politics, global inequality, and structural barriers to social mobility, and seeks to use his knowledge of history to inform his understanding of current affairs and events. In the future, he wants to go into journalism or public policy, using his writing raise awareness of the problems of inequality societies around the world face.

*Cover image ‘coins’ by Jason Rogers

[In the second part of his article on Bulgaria between the crises, GPPW-contributor Felix Troeltzsch takes a look at the impact the Syrian Conflict has had on Bulgaria and the situation of refugees and immigrants in the country.]

Today, Bulgaria finds itself situated between some of the most alarming conflicts of the last decades. In the north-east, just across the Black Sea, Ukraine is about to dissolve in a violent war. Inner-state separatists seem to team up with Russia’s government, which is reclaiming power in the region by proclaiming a new “Novorossiya” (Robins-Early 2014). In the south-east of Bulgaria, the three-year-old civil war in Syria spread to Iraq and developed into a vast crisis of unexpected magnitude. The last report briefly observed Bulgaria’s unique perception of the Ukrainian Crisis. In this second part, the analysis will therefore focus on Bulgaria’s indirect role in the current conflict in Syria and Iraq – most importantly as one of the EU’s most significant receptors of refugees from the region. It will investigate how the Balkan country deals with asylum-seekers and formulate suggestions for the future.

The Current Refugee Situation in the EU

According to UNHCR, in 2014 the number of refugees, asylum-seekers and internally displaced people worldwide has, for the first time in the post-World War II era, exceeded 50 million people (UNHCR 2014). In 2013 more than five million people have fled from the conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan into neighboring countries and millions more became internally displaced. Due to the recent intensification of the crises in Syria and Iraq, as well as their expansion to Yemen, Lebanon and other parts of the Middle-East, these numbers have increased by today (Barett 2014). Many of these refugees have been heading west, seeking their fortune in the prosperous and peaceful European Union.

For the purpose of this analysis, it is important to differentiate between the origins and routes of the refugees as well as legal and illegal border-crossings into the European Union. Generally, many displaced persons are entering the EU legally, which means that they are using an official border-crossing point at an airport or at the external border of the Union. However, people who either cannot afford regular plane tickets, lost their passports / identification documents, or are planning to apply for asylum in a country, that differs from their first country of entry, or the country their relatives live in, commonly try to enter the EU illegally. According to chapter three of the Dublin III-Act (see: note 1), only one EU country can be responsible for the asylum process. If the applicant does not have any close relatives or family members in a certain country, the EU member-state that received or apprehended him or her first is responsible for the application procedure (Europäisches Parlament 2013: 9-11). Consequently, different routes of illegal entry into the EU have developed over the years. The three most important ones are the Central Mediterranean route to Malta and Italy (more than 40 000 people in 2013), the Eastern Mediterranean route to Bulgaria, Greece and Cyprus (about 25 000 people in 2013) and the Western Balkan route (almost 20 000 people in 2013). Among these, Syrians are currently by far the biggest group of illegal immigrants in the EU and accounted to about 25 000 alone in the year 2013 (Frontex 2014: 31).

Asylum Applications in Bulgaria

Together with Greece, Bulgaria is one of the EU countries that has been most affected by illegal immigration originating from the Syrian conflict (Economist 2013). It plays a specifically important role as a destination for illegal boarder-crossings of asylum-seekers taking the Eastern Mediterranean route from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Between 2012 and 2013 the use of this route increased by about 43 % and from January till April 2014 alone, almost 6000 asylum seekers tried to enter the EU clandestine via this connection through Turkey (Barrett 2014; Frontex 2014). Although exact numbers are hard to gather, it is estimated that in this context more than 10 000 people entered Bulgaria illegally during the last years. At the same time, the numbers of legal entries through official Bulgarian border-crossing posts and asylum applications in Bulgaria remained relatively low (Frontex 2014; Eurostat 2014). So, why are many people entering Bulgaria illegally, if, according to their passport, they are rightfully able to transit Turkey and apply for asylum in the EU in a provided way ?

This question can be answered by looking at the situation and motives of the refugees more closely. Asylum-seekers in Bulgaria can be characterized as, firstly, young people who flee from the conflict in Syria and Iraq to seek better futures in the EU. Secondly, people who decide to take the Eastern Mediterranean land route, do not have enough money to fly into the European Union and cannot draw on good contacts to relatives or friends who would be able to lend the necessary money. Thirdly, most of these people are attracted to economically strong EU states, with a functioning social system to be able to start over again. Lastly, many refugees get caught by gangs of smugglers who, most of the time, capture all their identification documents and promise to convey them further to Western Europe, leading them to be stuck in Bulgaria (Amos/Marrouch 2013). This means that many asylum-seekers enter Bulgaria illegally, either because they intend to continue travelling to Germany, France or other more wealthy EU countries, or because their identification documents were stolen, making them unable to leave Turkey. Having this in mind, it becomes apparent that least fugitives apply for asylum in Bulgaria voluntarily but only see the Balkan country as a transit stop to enter EU territory.

Bulgaria’s Reactions

In the last years, many illegal immigrants were caught at the green border-line or several kilometers after. Together with the regular asylum-seekers, these illegal immigrants brought the Bulgarian administration to the limits of its capabilities. “On average, Bulgaria registered about 1 000 asylum seekers per year in the past decade. This changed in 2013 when more than 11 000 people […] lodged asylum applications” (HRW 2014). Bulgaria was completely unprepared for this surge of refugees and reacted in two separate ways.

Firstly, the Balkan country launched efforts to hinder immigrants to cross the Turkish-Bulgarian border illegally. For this purpose border controls were expanded in cooperation with Frontex and a fence of barbed-wire was built at the most popular green crossing-lines. Moreover, the whole border was equipped with new surveillance technology such as infrared cameras and special alarming mechanisms, that call the nearest patrol if illegal crossings are detected. In this context Bulgarian border patrols were accused of so called “Push-Backs” by Human Rights Watch. The non-profit organization claims in its most recent report on Bulgaria (April 2014) that , according to interviews with several refugees, multiple Bulgarian police officers prevented people from crossing the boarder by pushing them back by force into Turkish territory without giving the fugitives the opportunity to ask for asylum. If this is true[2], the Bulgarian authorities clearly violated international human rights law (HRW 2014; Jones 2014). However, these measures seem to be quite effective: From January to June 2014 only about 1500 people could enter Bulgaria via the green line, whereby in October 2013 alone more than 3600 asylum seekers were successful.

As a second strategy to deal with the new surge of asylum-seekers, the poorest EU country expanded its institutional network of detention facilities, registration and reception centers. There are currently seven of these centers in Bulgaria – four are situated near the Turkish border, one lies in the middle of Bulgaria and two centers can be found near Sofia. Most refugee centers can still be recognized as old barracks from the Cold War era. Although they usually have running water and beds, most buildings are overcrowded and suffer from a lack of basic humanitarian assistance like proper sanitary facilities, heaters, food or clothing. All asylum-seekers must be detained until their identity, origin and responsible EU country is clarified. Nevertheless, once people are granted the refugee or humanitarian status, they are allowed to move freely in their region of Bulgaria and look for jobs. However, since most of them fled from Syria and Iraq without money or possessions, many refugees are forced to stay in the centers because they cannot afford a flat. Furthermore, due to a lack of knowledge of the local language and culture as well as Bulgaria’s high unemployment rate in rural areas, only very few refugees could actually find a job (HRW 2014; Novinite 2014).

Reasons and Chances for Bulgaria

The reasons for this mostly poor treatment of refugees and asylum applicants are obvious. Bulgaria has one of the weakest economies in the EU and suffers from a high unemployment rate, especially in rural areas. Caring properly about refugees costs money that the Bulgarian treasury does not want to spend. Besides, there is no influential lobby in the country’s political environment that would foster investments in refugee centers or general humanitarian care. The current political course is framed by deterrence rather than assistance. However, since the conflict in Syria and Iraq are not likely to end anytime soon, more asylum-seekers will enter Bulgaria illegally, no matter how high the barbed-wire fence is.

Instead of fearing asylum-seekers, Bulgaria might be served best by welcoming them. Who else, if not Bulgaria? The Balkan country has one of the fastest declining society in the world and therefore suffers from a huge brain drain. The majority of Bulgaria’s educated young people want to emigrate to Western Europe. Europe’s poorest country has lost almost 25 % of its population since 1989 and decreased with an annual rate of -0,82 % in the last ten years. Differing from that, many refugees from Syria and Iraq have a university degree, worked as doctors, lawyers or skilled craftsmen. They are predominantly young and highly motivated workers that are determined to make something out of their lives. Mainly due to administrative obstacles they are not allowed to pursue their professions in Bulgaria and the EU. Taking chances as they are, the Balkan country could reduce its brain drain and develop into a better future through the creation of equal opportunities for migrants, the unification of standards and the opportunity to regain degrees and certificates..

Bulgaria always layed at a cross-road between superior powers and still does today. At first glance, this seems to be a burden. If managed correctly, though, the country could eventually profit from its unique position between Russia, the EU and the Middle-East. Its political leaders now need the  political will to look beyond short term costs and initiate internal and external policy changes. If this is successful, Bulgaria has the potential to play a leading role in the region and emerge as mediator between future crises.

Author Biography:

Felix Troeltzsch recently graduated from the University of Jena with a master’s degree in Political Science, focusing on International Relations and Peace Studies. Before that, he studied International Relations and American Studies at the University of Leipzig and University of Warsaw. Felix is mainly interested in international conflicts, security policy, human rights, the European Union and the Middle East. During several stays abroad he has dealt intensively with the Balkans and the Black Sea region.

Literature and Notes:

[1] The so called Dublin III Act (EU Regulation No 604/2013) became law on 26 June 2013 and establishes the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person.

[2] The assertion of Human Rights Watch is entirely based on interviews with affected people. However, most of them presented consistent stories about the places of their entry, uniforms of the police officers and other details.

Amos, Deborah, Rima Marrouch. 2013. With The Help Of Smugglers, Syrian Refugees Sneak Into Europe In: http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/12/07/248742786/with-the-help-of-smugglers-syrian-refugees-sneak-into-europe (10/06/2014).

Barrett, David. 2014. Illegal Immigration to Europe Shows Sharp Rise In: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10865652/Illegal-immigration-to-Europe-shows-sharp-rise.html (10/05/2014).

Economist, The. 2013. Bulgaria is struggling to cope with Syrian refugees In: http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21590946-bulgaria-struggling-cope-syrian-refugees-nightmare-all (10/07/2014).

Europäisches Parlament. 2013. VERORDNUNG Nr. 604/2013 (Dublin III Abkommen) In: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/PDF/uri=CELEX:32013R0604&qid=1399150600127&from=DE (10/06/2014).

Eurostat. 2014. Asylum Statistics In: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics (10/06/2014).

Frontex. 2014. Annual Risk Analysis 2014. In: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2014.pdf (10/06/2014).

HRW. 2014. Containment Plan In: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2014/04/28/containment-plan (10/05/2014)

Jones, Sophia. 2014. Bulgaria Violates International Law By Denying Syrians Asylum, Rights Group Says In: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/18/bulgaria-violates-interna_n_5841984.html (10/07/2014).

Novinite. 2014. Only 19 Refugees in Bulgaria Have Managed to Find Jobs in 4 Months In: http://www.novinite.com/articles/163551/Only+19+Refugees+in+Bulgaria+Have+Managed+to+Find+Jobs+in+4+Months (10/06/2014).

Robins-Early, Nick. 2014. Here’s Why Putin Calling Eastern Ukraine ‘Novorossiya’ Is Important In: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/18/putin-novorossiya-ukraine_n_5173559.html   (10/07/2014).

UNHCR. 2014. World Refugee Day: Global forced displacement tops 50 million for first time in post-World War II era In: http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html (10/06/2014).

Picture credit: Mitchell Roth

By this point in time, it should be old news that xenophobia is rearing its ugly head again in Germany of late. This past Saturday, October 17^th, something new happened: While campaigning for the next day’s mayoral election in Cologne, non-party candidate Henriette Reker was attacked and stabbed by an assailant that is said to have a long standing far-right background and that spouted xenophobic phrases upon his arrest.

Mrs Reker survived and has, albeit being in intensive care for the moment, good chances to make a full recovery and has gotten the job she applied for. In the final result, she got 52.7% of the votes and reached the necessary absolute majority comfortably.

Being the incumbent head of the Department for Social Issues, Integration and the Environment, she was one of the primary actors responsible for coordinating the city’s response to the current influx of refugees. Her candidacy was supported by the Christian Democrats (CDU), Liberals (FDP) and the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen).

While I am happy to hear that she is on her way to recovery and that now, more so than probably with other candidates, the integration of migrants into the community will be invested in, it is a sad, terrible thing to have happened. Let’s be honest for just one brief second and admit that, had she not been stabbed, her victory, if at all (she was one of the front-runners before), would have been a much narrower one.

Maybe, hopefully, more people will start to take the threat posed by the extreme right more seriously now: Within hours of the stabbing, videos surfaced showing right wing ‘activists’, training to stab people in the jugular, which is exactly what happened to Mrs. Reker. The extreme right is crossing lines right now faster than we can draw them. And with only 40% electoral participation in Cologne, within 24 hours of the attack, optimism is in high demand.

We all know and knew that things are going to get worse before they get better in Germany, that people would get hurt, likely even killed during this (hopefully) transitional phase. And yet, it is scary – and it scares me. Maybe less so on a personal level, but on a structural one: It scares me that xenophobes have become courageous enough to actually go through with an attack like this one, it scares me that they will, over time, get their martyrs to celebrate, sacrificed for the ‘greater good’ in a world they don’t understand – and it makes me furious that people so much better than them will get hurt because of them.

Germany and the EU, at least politically, have been somewhat of a real-life attempt at utopia: the utopian ideal of solving different problems together amongst a community of nations, to unite people of many and more ethnicities, beliefs, traditions and geopolitics. The German social welfare system, albeit flawed, and its redistribution of wealth that outsiders have called socialist while Germans usually call it ‘broken’ and/or ‘not enough’, has been something that we should be proud of. Not because it is perfect, not because everyone gets the support he/she/they need, but because it would simply be unthinkable in too many other countries and circumstances.

Promote self-sufficiency and economic/political agency, help those that need help and take care of those that can’t help themselves, that is the core idea. An idea based on the mutual support within society and amongst societies, an idea of a fellowship, of ‘we’ rather than ‘they’, of ‘with’ rather than ‘against’ and one of ‘welcome’ rather than ‘what do you want’.

All this is under threat right now, all that is on the line when people get stabbed while speaking out for an open society, all that is on the line when too many thousands protest against things they don’t understand. And all that will not be taken away by inactiveness in the face ignorance.

It shall not.

It must not.

That being said, it is sad that by now, we have become numb to the news of human and humanitarian tragedies, to too many things that are directly opposed to an inclusive, humanitarian point of view and to the many fights at the many fronts that people are dedicating their lives to trying to make other peoples’ lives better. We have become numb, because horrible things are happening to good people and if we chose to feel and be affected by them, we would scream out in anger and pain for weeks on end.

So, we count our blessings, we count the hours and days that we don’t hear anything too horrible, celebrate motivational quotes on Facebook and are genuinely happy about any place in which utopian ideas such as ‘it works, maybe not well, but nothing is overly broken’ are still a possibility.

In the end, this is why I think every line that is being crossed in Germany hurts beyond personal sentiment: because we know it is possible, because we have seen it work.

History will be the judge of these early steps of the 21st century. Let’s wish it well; let’s hope that what we do will be enough – let’s hope that utopia prevails.

Just this once.

Moritz Borchardt is a director of GPPW.

Picture credit: dronepicr under a attribution 2.0 generic (CC BY 2.0) creative commons license

The city of Kobane,  located at the border with Turkey, is the heart of Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan).  The recent events in Kobane have drawn global attention and have put Turkey’s role in the conflict under intense scrutiny.

Kobane is also called ”Ain El Arab” in Arabic due to the Arabisation process under the Baathist regime. The population is mainly Kurdish with minorities of Arabs, Assyrians and Turkmens.  Since the start of the Syrian civil war the Democratic Union Party of Syria has had control over the town. The group, called PYD in Kurdish, is closely affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, a group not favoured by the Turkish government as it is considered to be a terrorist organisation.

After advancing extensively in Sunni populated areas in Iraq, the Islamic State (IS) militants were not able to advance in to the autonomous region of Kurdistan in Iraq and have suffered severe defeats from the Peshmarga Kurdish forces stationed there. IS also planned to attack the Syrian Kurdistan and control the strongholds of YPG/YPJ (People’s Protection Units), the military wing of PYD, and currently the town of Kobane is surrounded on three sides by Islamic State militants with Turkey on the fourth side. Turkey has allowed the safe passage of civilians into the country (which should not go unappreciated) but hesitates to allow Kurds from Turkey to join forces with YPG/YPJ in the town to help defeat the Islamic State militants. Furthermore, it is believed that the IS militants get reinforcement and funds from Turkish soil and that the Turkish government is turning a blind eye to it. Even though it is a hugely debatable issue, there are quite a few facts supporting the claims.

Kurdish people have taken to the streets around the world in the last few days and are demanding that Turkey takes a neutral role in the conflict and are asking the Turkish government to allow the passage of Kurdish fighters to Kobane. However, some media outlets have been telling a different story, that the Kurds want the involvement of Turkey in the conflict, which is largely inaccurate. It is understandable that getting involved in the conflict is not yet  an option for Turkey, but any support for IS coming from within Turkey is unacceptable and should be stopped, if indeed the accusations are true.

There are many counter arguments supporting the Turkish stance on the issue, many putting the emphasis on the inaccurate stories in the media or on alternative theories trying to shift the focus to the Assad regime.

Recently there was a message from Turkish President Mr. Erdogan circulating on social media, in which he accused the supporters of the movement against him of turning a blind eye to the atrocities done by the Syrian regime in Homs and other parts of Syria. He also mentioned the chemical weapons used by the Assad regime. However this message does not justify his actions, or lack thereof, by proving Assad guilty. 

Another argument put forward by the supporters of the policies of the Turkish regime is that the Islamic State is only advancing in Iraq and Kurdistan region of Syria and not in Syria. However, the Islamic State faced no strong resistance in the Sunni populated areas they are currently holding and they considered Kurdistan to be an easy-to-conquer region. As far as they are now occupied in Kurdistan, it is highly unlikely they should think of getting into a fight with a strong and heavily armed Syrian regime, as opposed to Kurdish forces who are armed with outdated weapons. And should the Islamic State decide to attack more regions in Syria, it has not only to fight the Syrian regime but also the Syrian opposition and other Islamist and Jihadist groups.

Recently a blogger put forth an accusation that the aerial bombing of a few regions in Syria by the Assad regime facilitated the advance of the Islamic State. This is true but does not necessarily prove that the Assad regime is supporting the Islamic State. The Islamic State militants, many of whom are well experienced and have the expertise of tactical warfare, have benefited from such situations and have known when to move forward. In short, the Islamic State has no friends in the region and it is at war with anybody opposing them.

All things considered, the Turkish regime is playing the same role in this conflict as the Pakistani regime played in the Afghan civil war. Not only did the conflict in Afghanistan destroy Afghanistan, but it also disintegrated the political system in Pakistan and has caused the rise of extremism and the loss of more than 70,000 innocent Pakistani lives. Turkey should consider not denouncing the PKK and weakening the Kurdish resistance. It should take serious measures to stop the flow of funds and reinforcements to the Islamic State from its soil and should play a truly neutral role in the conflict in Syria, not help exacerbate a civil war which has already taken so many innocent lives. The Turkish regime should not only do these for the sake of innocent Iraqis and Syrians but for the sake of its own people who could be dragged to an unnecessary war, and for the sake of staying a united, secular and democratic Turkey where both Turks and Kurds co-exist as equal citizens.

Author Biography

Musa Aziz, is a DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) fellow and holds a Master from University of Erfurt – Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Germany. Before starting his MPP degree at the Willy Brandt School, Musa completed an accredited certification in Good Governance Afghanistan from the same institution.

He has worked with different governmental and non-governmental organizations for over three years. Throughout his academic and professional career, Musa particularly focused on poverty reduction, economic development, human rights, education, peace-building and conflict resolution.  His research interests are contemporary political issues and political discourses in South Asia and Middle East.

You can find him on his Website

*Cover image ‘Berlin ist Kobane demo’ by Montecruz Foto

Fatidic Decision

Berlin, 1890. Otto von Bismarck, the architect of the realpolitik and the ‘Gleichsgewicht’ policies that preserved some peace and equilibrium in the continent after the German Unification, is removed from his position as Chancellor of the German Empire by the Kaiser Wilhelm II. With that removal, the speed of events that would eventually lead to the First World War increased, and terrible tragedy that was waiting its time to happen.

From 1890 to 1914, Germany’s foreign policy was mostly in the hands of Kaiser Wilhelm II, taking very different paths from the ones Bismarck intended from the beginning. And while it is true that ill-conceived actions such as not renovating the security pact with Russia or the naval race with the British Empire, along with the desperated search for colonies accelerated the pace towards the war, it is not the only factor to explain the War. During the 1890-1914 period, the other powers around the globe also had their share of responsibility besides the German Empire. This question will be partially discussed in this section and the next one.

The Titans’ Rush into a Clash: The Central Powers

Germany, for instance, was a strong emergent state that was an industrial power by 1914, thanks to the meteoric industrialization and economic growth after its foundation, and especially after 1890. As a consequence of the increased industrialization, the agricultural sector diminished to such an extent that it would play a decisive role during the food shortages during the war and following the Royal Navy blockade. The country was also having a strong debate between democracy and authoritarianism, but it was one of those cases where autocracy met modernization (Kennedy, 2004; Segesser, 2013).

Additionally, as mentioned in the previous article, Germany was enjoying high levels of education and possessing significant amounts of capital, factors contributing to economic growth as the factories, businesses, laboratories and other sectors were receiving high-qualified personnel. This in turn led to high levels of industrialization in sectors such as electricity, optics, and chemistry, where benefits from technological advances where being enjoyed by the German economy. The country also had the second biggest merchant navy and was the European financial centre of the times, after the British Empire (Barth, 2012; Kennedy, 2004). This prosperity took place in the same period where the Kaiser’s foreign policies where being implemented, and where such conditions might have encouraged the Kaiser’s decisions to change the course.

Nevertheless, the policies implemented broke the delicate efforts made by Bismarck and destroyed the existing equilibrium entirely: First, the breaking of relations  with Russia and the negligent lapsing of the Reinsurance Treaty signed with it prompted Russia to approach to France; second, the Kaiser decided to implement a ‘Weltpolitik’ that complicated a strategic situation that was already complicated for Germany; third, the naval race with the Royal Navy, mainly encouraged by Von Tirpitz under the argument of Germany becoming a true Great Power; and fourth, the rivalries due to German interests in the Balkans and Africa, mainly with the British Empire and because of the colonies (Barth, 2012; Segesser, 2013, Morgenthau, 2006)[1].

To blame the Kaiser solely for the consequences of the foreign policies after 1890, however, is unfair: In fact, the strategic objectives and their perception in the military and among businessmen and investors, as well as in the general public was erratic and unfocused. The Navy was focussed on preparing for a war against the British Empire for the control of the seas, the army on neutralizing France, while  businessmen and investors where pushing the German Empire to assert its economic interests in the Balkans, Turkey, and the Middle East. And, the public opinion was mostly in favour of the ‘Weltpolitik’ to such extend, that it was forcing the Kaiser and the government in General to look for a conflict in which to follow nationalistic feelings and a political test for a Kaiser that needed to alleviate inner tensions (Kennedy, 2004). These situations were creating a tragic trap.

The Austrian Empire, in turn, was a great power that was very dependant of the German Empire, especially in regard to strategic issues, a cooperation with its own geopolitical complications. The annexation of Bosnia only made Austria strategically compromised by Serbia and its nationalist movements following a change of dynasty in 1903, and the divide-and-rule strategy to check the interethnic tensions was not a guaranty to fully cope with such and the ones created by Serbia. At some point those tensions reached such a scale that plans to occupy Hungary where contemplated (Kennedy, 2004; Segesser, 2012) openly.

Those tensions also complicated the situation of Austria abroad, due to the fact that many of the non-German minorities were the same of most of Austrian neighbours, surrounding it with enemies or hostile nations. The Austrian army, for example, considered a pre-emptive strike against Italy in 1900 after tensions rose with the Italians at the countries’ southern border. Rumania was also a factor to consider because  Romanian minorities were looking more towards Romania, while Serbia was the biggest risk of all, given the special interests of Russia. In the case of a general war, the Austrian army had to face the decision of preparing to engage Italy or Russia, or Serbia and Montenegro (Kennedy, 2004).

Economically speaking the picture was not entirely positive for the Austrian Empire either. It was weak  despite the considerable level of industrialization and productivity in coal, textiles, oil, beer, sugar and other agricultural products, and the weapons production (Kennedy, 20014). This situation would leave Austria in a very complicated strategic position where the geopolitical and security objectives could not be entirely met due to the weak economic base, and considerable inner tensions that were fuelled by the countries’ neighbours involvement in them, all adding up to the already complicated geopolitical situation. Consequently, Germany was a core ally for achieving Austria’s objectives, but in the end, as Germany, it was a victim of a structural trap.

The Ottoman Empire was, beyond any question, the weakest among the Central Powers. Victim of the ambition of the great European Powers in the Balkans as well as of the national aspiration and ambitions of the newly-created Balkan states, it was depending on Europe as a provider of industrial products (Segesser, 2013).

The Titans’ Rush into a Clash: The Allies

Of the Allied Great Powers, the two most important ones were the British Empire and France. The British Empire was the most powerful of all, in the military (especially with the Navy, which was as big as the two following fleets combined) and economic spheres. It had the most important merchant fleet and a strategically important wide network of bases and communication lines around the globe and controlling no less than 20 million kms². The Royal Navy, the Indian Army, the Australian and New Zealand contributions to the defence of the Empire and the Alliance with Japan by the first year of the 20^th century contributed to the security and strategic superiority of the Empire, improved by the 1904 alliance and agreement with France and Russia on colonial issues. It was also the most important country economically speaking (Kennedy, 2004; Segesser, 2013).

The Empire had important African interests (where the Suez Canal was only the tip of the iceberg) as part of its overall strategic interests, where the defence of India, the maintenance of the Naval supremacy (the German naval challenge for sure provoked high amount of anxiety for the Admirals and Politicians), the attempts to preserve the European equilibrium on its own way, and the preservation of the Empire were other objectives with the same  importance for London (Kennedy, 2004; Segesser, 2013).

Yet, the British Empire was facing important challenges in every aspect. The industrial revolution was no longer benefiting the British Empire alone, leading to a decline of the industrial supremacy and resources for defence were diminishing. There were important issues with the colonies that were actively seeking for more autonomy and concessions – like Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa – while keeping the contribution for the defence of the Empire, being their naval and military assets under British control in case of war, and an India that was strictly controlled given its importance for the British economy and international position (Kennedy, 2004; Segesser, 2013).

These concerns, moreover, were making it more sensible to any clash in Africa and the Asia-Pacific, facing Germany on South Africa, the United stated and the Venezuelan Borders with British Guyana. It was the least affected by the German rise until 1904, but it was being affected by the American rise and actions in the Caribbean, Canada, and the American economic penetration of Latin America, jeopardizing the British investments there. The Russian railroad expansion compromised its interests in the Middle East and India, any event in China could also affect its position there. As a result of those colonial concerns, the Royal Navy was reaching its maximum strategic operability while the small army was not able deploy in every needed scenario and was more prepared for waging colonial wars rather than long term European wars. Still, the British Empire enjoyed a strategic superiority in Europe should a war break out on the continent, although it was very overconfident in diplomatic agreements (Kennedy, 2004; Segesser, 2013).

France, on the other hand, was undergoing an inner crisis where  civilians and the military were the main actors – and this crisis in particular would not be solved entirely until 1911 – while at the same time it was witnessing an economic diversification where the investments in Russia played a strategic role by securing  Russian support in case of a war (and making it very dependent of France). However, its investments also contributed to its geopolitical objectives in Italy (bringing Italy closer to France despite their rivalry in/on/for the Mediterranean Sea), China with the securing of railroads and other sectors concessions, as well as inTurkey and the Balkans. The countries’ industrialization was important for this case, all the while 40% of the population were still dedicated to agriculture, resulting in some way in a military inferiority facing Germany (Kennedy, 2004; Segesser, 2013)[2]

It was France that predominantly benefited from the Germany’s shift of policies and the dismissal of Bismarck, having now an open road to reclaim the lost territories after 1871 cleared and settling the Entente Cordiale with the British Empire.In doing so it strengthened its general position while convincing the British empire of the importance of the security of France for the sake of the Empire’s own security. Similarly, benefited from the solution of the colonial stand-offs with the British Empire in 1898, but  was still struggling for the control and access of markets and territories around the globe (Kennedy, 2004; Segesser, 2013).

Russia was, contrary to the British Empire and France, the weakest of the allied powers. It was a country with low levels of industrialization, large amounts of debt and banks in foreign hands (as well as its comparatively few industries), depending heavily on French investments and placing itself at the mercy of French interests and desires in case of war (such as asking Russia to attack Germany). The country’s overall productivity was inefficient and the economy was mostly agrarian, although railroads – the Trans-Siberian route – were intensively being constructed. Russia, additionally, was still recovering from the defeat of the 1894 and 1904 wars with Japan while facing huge inner social tensions that involved the intervention of the army in 365 cases by 1902, just to control peasant riots, as well as ethnic problems in a similar way as Austria (Kennedy, 2004; Segesser, 2013).

Militarily, the general weakness of the country was having an impact on its capabilities in arms. The troops where low-skilled while logistics and railway managements were inadequate for a fast mobilization and deployment plans. Similarly, the nature of Russian foreign policy did not helped: pan-slavic nationalism, the total obedience of the state to the Czar and open xenophobia pushed Russia to take active part in every international event, even beyond it own capabilities. Similarly, the countries’ eagerness to support Serbia and France was forcing Russia to execute an offensive it was not prepared for, with fear of a French defeat were urging Russia to do so. East Asian ambitions before the war with Japan needed to be met and Russia was simply trying to assert its interests where the British Empire, Austria and French were doing the same, leading to clashes of interests most of the time.

Questions about the potential event of a war in Europe were of that importance that the spending in defence on a high level, seeking to recover the decimated fleet after 1905 and trying to modernize its armed forces where central during the period. How and where to deploy the army (if against Germany or Austria), what to do about the fortresses in Poland where the most modern artillery was placed, and whether to execute a total or partial mobilization in case of war were troubling the minds of the Russian government and military as well. In any case, the leadership was of such bad quality that Russia, alone, was no match for the German Empire, making its alliances all the more necessary, but also putting the country into a strategic trap that would have a decisive consequence in 1917 (Kennedy, 2004; Segesser, 2013).

In the next part the “eccentric powers”, like Japan, Italy and the United States will be reviewed, as well as the small conflict that shaped the decision-making and the conditions of some Great Powers, as well as a review on the plans of war and a final discussion about the responsibility of each and single Great Power in the tragedy of the First World War.

_

Sources:

Barth, R. (2012).1871 – 1919: Aufstieg und Untergang. Preußen. Die eigenwillige Supermacht. Zum 300. Geburtstag von Friedrich dem Großen. STERN Extra, 1, 86 – 97.

Kennedy, P. (2004). Auge y caida de las grandes potencias [The Rise and the Fall of the Great Powers, Ferrer Aleu, trans.]. Barcelona, Spain: Mondadori (Original work published in 1987).

Morgenthau, J. A. (2006). Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (Revised by Thompson K. W, & Clinton D. W. 7th Edition). New York: McGraw Hill.

Segesser, D. M. (2013). Der Erste Weltkrieg in globaler Perspektive. Stuttgart, Deutschland: Marixverlag.

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[1] More accurately and according to Barth (2013), the reasons behind such actions might be explained by the Kaiser’s desire to be popular, along with his inner chauvinism and narcissism.

[2] 4500 machine guns of the Germans versus the 2500 machine guns of the French, 6600 77mm guns of the Germans versus 3800 similar weapons of the French, and the absolute German supremacy in heavy artillery. See: Kennedy, 2004, pp. 359 – 360.

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Cover image ‘HMS Hannibal, unknown port‘ by James Morley

Should we negotiate with ‘terrorists’ or not?

With the latest case of exchange of prisoners of the US Government and release of Bowe Bergdahl from the Taliban, we still saw a big dilemma among policymakers and those who plan development and post-conflict recovery phases regarding negotiations with so-called terrorists. We also saw that negotiation was not done for the principles but for solutions, an approach that should be adapted for longer term strategy in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Also, lately there are initiatives to a joint response to the developments in Iraq but not only. There is more fear among international community from the ISIS and there are initiatives to joint responses against ISIS. Interventions from the air just achieve to do whatever ISIS wants the west to do because it does not involve them in the process at all. Despite the fact that ISIS refuses to negotiate anything with anyone, airstrikes against targets will just qualify ISIS for negotiation in future similar to air strikes in Afghanistan throughout 2000s that qualified the Taliban for negotiations later. With the horrific actions of the ISIS and decapitation of their hostages, does the situation change drastically in “negotiations” between US, European states and others in one side and the ISIS and other organisations in the other? In principle, no. Despite its horrific past and support for violence, Hammas, Hesbollah, Taliban and other type of such political movements seem to be good negotiating partners in comparison with the ISIS.

Despite the successful ‘negotiation’ there is still doubt among decision makers and academics on the power of negotiations. One of the arguments also among the academics against negotiating is that they get motivated and recognised to do what they do-terrorize civilians to reach their goals and not fulfil parts of agreements out of negotiations. As Harmonie Toros argues ‘such a course of action would legitimize the terrorists and terrorism more broadly (Toros, 2008: 408) and the other question that Toros raises implicitly is that whether legitimising ‘terrorists is a bad thing?!’ when it comes to dealing with violence and finding solutions on transforming conflicts in possibly smaller scale violence conflict instead of ignoring them totally. The ‘widening’ the scope of study and therefore widening also the scope of thought out of ‘state view’ enables a different approach to this problem. This is also argued by Maskaliunaite ‘the very fact that the subject of terrorism is studied from so many different angles may well be an advantage and not a shortcoming of the field’ (Maskaliunaite quoted on Jackson, 2009:13). Practically this enables different understanding of insurgencies and ‘terrorist’ organisations and therefore different approach to negotiating with them.

Critical Study is crucial approach also in other work of other scholars that even Toros uses in her argumentation (Jackson, 2011; Gunning, 2007; Richardson, 2006) and others that generally argue that labeling entire organisations as ‘terrorist’ does not contribute to finding solutions and decreasing intensity of conflict and violence. Similarly also the United Nations Security Council Resolution on Terrorism reinforces the fact that ‘terrorism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group (UNSC, 2006)’. Also this is supported also by Ranstrop where he identifies problems with terrorism studies as lacking evidence based research (Ranstrop, 2009: 17) similarly also Silke discusses that ‘much of the writing in the crucial areas of terrorism research…is impressionistic, superficial and at the same time often also pretentious, venturing far -reaching generalizations on the basis of episodic evidence’ (Silke, 2009: 36). According to these interpretations, the states leave no open solutions but to militarily confront ‘terrorism’ and not negotiate.

Labelling of groups as terrorist is the first division where the question of negotiation comes into surface as ‘once one act carried out by a group is categorized as ‘terrorist’, the group’s subsequent actions will often also be categorized as such even though they may be very different from the former and may not correspond to ‘terrorist’ actions (Toros, 2008: 409)’ and also practically this has been policy of the United States for many decades. Since Ronald Reagan framed the debate over whether to talk to terrorists in terms that still dominate the debate today. ‘America will never make concessions to terrorists. To do so would only invite more terrorism, once we head down that path there would be no end to it, no end to the suffering of innocent people, no end to the bloody ransom all civilized nations must pay (Cambanis, 2010)’ and to be continued in 2000’s by President George W. Bush who said ‘You’ve got to be strong, not weak’. The only way to deal with these people is to bring them to justice. You can’t talk to them. You can’t negotiate with them (Bush, 2003)’. And this tradition of ‘state approach’ towards these problems is explained earlier than 9/11 events by the Director of Defence and Policy Studies of Cato Institute where he says that ‘most attention has been focused on combating terrorism by deterring and disrupting it beforehand and retaliating against it after the fact. Less attention has been paid to what motivates terrorists to launch attacks (Eland, 1998)’.

So the first problem starts with the terminology and the definition of terrorism as idea and action as well. ‘Terrorism’ or ‘terrorists’ are labels used to define the government perspective on ‘war on terror’ more than it is used to describe actions or ideas of the movements that are violent and do such actions that are considered terrorist.

Tores’ argument that ‘terrorism can be understood as a violent means aimed at triggering political change by affecting a larger audience than its immediate target that is to be examined using both problem-solving and critical theory and focusing on its socio-historical context in an analysis embedded in broader social and political theory that acknowledges a normative role to theory ’ is valid and of a crucial importance in setting the grounds for negotiation with so called ‘terrorists’ as their actions are not aiming at their primary victims or primary targets but instead they have larger goals and want to make a point with their actions.

Governments are in a very difficult position with this framework. On one hand the  debate that legitimising terrorists will increase and intensify their actions is based on government discourse in a way and after de-legitimising and demonising them (UN, 2002: 6) puts government into a very difficult position to negotiate afterwards with such groups which brings another problem in the field of study. Legitimisation of the groups is normally done by the governments’ side and in a way governments control with the legitimisation. Toros’ argument about this is that ‘that talks legitimize terrorists and therefore weaken the norm of nonviolence appears to be based on a two-dimensional understanding of legitimacy, in which states have legitimacy and simply grant or deny it to insurgents (Toros, 2008: 413).

The traditional method of not negotiating with ‘terrorists’ has led to inability to address the problems and gave states limited access to such groups. The Afghan Government understood this earlier than International community and created Reconciliation Council which aims to ‘end inter-group armed hostilities, resolve unsettled national issues, facilitate healing of the wounds caused by past injustices, and take necessary measures to prevent the repeat of the civil war and its destruction (2005)’.

The case of Afghan Taliban vs ISIS

After the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001 (9/11) and the attack in Afghanistan ruled by the Taliban movement, the United States lead anti-terrorism doctrine of cutting everything that has to do with terrorism and dividing the situation in ‘good and evil’. What President Bush indicated with his statement ‘Over time, it’s going to be important for nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity? You’re either with us or against us in the fight against terror (CNN, 2001)’ has been a clear division of discourse that no one can negotiate, help, deliver humanitarian aid or have any contacts whatsoever with ‘terrorists’, yet the negotiations have been held between the US Government and the Taliban.

Afghanistan and the Taliban regime was the main target in lack of Al Qaeda physical targets and for supporting Al Qaeda. Although the Taliban is a wider regional movement, negotiating with the Afghan Taliban has been inevitable because their goal is to deny the west’s victory in Afghanistan in the public discourse level. Also because of many other implications with the regional issues such as Pakistan impact, dispute over Kashmir, invasion in Iraq, Palestine and other problems, many volunteers find their way to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban. In this context, as stated by former British Ambassador in Kabul ‘In particular, America will need itself to talk to all the internal and external parties to the conflict, including the Taliban (Cowper-Coles, 2011: 291)’ exactly because of these implications. By negotiating, one focuses the Taliban in domestic affairs and not region and international affairs.

ISIS is much more different from all Islamic movements that we have seen so far because of its political aims, organisation and ideology. Negotiations with the ISIS at any point in the future will be asymmetrically and terribly difficult not because of practical issues but rather because of its nature. First of all, its precise size is unclear and will always be due to atrocities and crimes committed openly but also because it is thought to include thousands of foreign fighters that will “disappear” as soon as such organisation shakes or weakens.

Reconciling with ISIS is not an option for the US and others but defeating them will be as painful as reconciling due to the operational nature of the ISIS units. Additionally, the negotiations need authoritative guarantees which nobody is nor will be in position to provide on ISIS behalf. At the moment, negotiations in this front seem impossible for both sides but US and others should learn from both Afghanistan and Iraq to prepare for such negotiations.

Negotiations for solutions not principles

In 2001 after the 9/11 events, the US gave an ultimatum to the Taliban government to handover Osama Bin Laden and heads of Taliban movement started closing opportunities for negotiating. When attacks started against Afghanistan, no one wanted to negotiate anymore. As a result, Al Qaeda expanded rapidly in public discourse and gained sympathy not only in Middle East and Africa but also in Europe.

Also the mainstream studies on Al Qaeda and Taliban of the time such as RAND and other policy documents during Bush Administration are mainly based on how to destroy them and not how to manage them. But lately, with the Obama Administration promoting reconciliation with the Taliban is an idea that has reappeared and is being spoken more often. Even in the administration’s own White Paper on U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan (America.gov, 2009, SAIS, 2009). But not only US Government is doing that but European Governments participating in the Coalition forces as well. New German military guidelines are looking more into ‘local concepts of legitimacy (Spiegel, 2012)’ although as it appears, the local population support for the Taliban is not increasing. According to a report assessing current strategy about Afghanistan ‘reconciling with the Taliban is both premature and unnecessary for the success of Western aims. The Afghan public, by an overwhelming margin of 82 % to 4 %, is still very much opposed to the Taliban (Tellis, 2009: v)’.

But the reality in the field is different in terms of control over the territory and stability. In 2007, 54% or Afghanistan territory was considered as ‘Taliban heavily active’ with 34% with ‘substantial Taliban insurgent activity[1]’ and followed with 8% of territory where there was no Taliban activity (CISD, 2009). The Taliban strategy in Afghanistan is working in a way due to lack of state structures and high corruption. It is gaining more support following inability of ISAF[2] and other developing agencies to create sustainable solutions. ‘The Taliban appears to be winning on another front – the battle for hearts and minds (CISD, 2009)’, so this ‘battle’ is about principles and not solutions.

What ISAF and other international community didn’t count is strategies and tactics of Taliban to gain control and gain popularity among local population. Use of terror and violence is often mean of gaining power among local population from the Taliban and again this is a principal matter that is “justifiable” from a Taliban perspective. Principals of Taliban movement is returning the rule of Sharia Law and governing Afghanistan whereas concepts of US democracy and freedom hardly make sense in their views.

Negotiations about principles in this regard are designed to fail whereas concentration of negotiations should be on a technical levels to ensure security is increased and stability to bigger scale.

Negotiations on technical and local level

Because Taliban is wider movement it does not mean that one should negotiate only with the leaders of the Taliban. As rightly suggested in a backgrounder in 2010 ‘Instead of conferring legitimacy on senior Taliban leaders in Pakistan by seeking high level political negotiations, the U.S. should focus on reconciling with Taliban commanders on the ground in Afghanistan (Curtis, 2010)’, to negotiating with the Taliban in local level, can be of advantage in terms of establishing some sort of stability. Giving political power in the local level and legitimising groups in political forms decreases chances of violence or at least institutionalises the accountability of such individuals. Initially it is also admitted as the SRSG[3] Lakhdar Brahimi in ‘The Bonn talks were dominated by one group and at that time nobody was ready to consider the partly defeated side of the conflict; therefore, the Taliban were left by themselves, which gave an opportunity to spoilers to regroup (Stanekzai, 2008)’ and also it is often argued that ‘the Taliban are an active insurgency that is very difficult to fight the idea of reconciliation, understood as a negotiated bargain with either the Taliban leadership or its base soldiery, is unlikely to be successful at this point in time (Tellis, 2009: 3).

But as stated by the former British Ambassador in Afghanistan Cowper-Coles that ‘successful stabilisation requires strategic stamina, massive resources, lots of time and plenty of ambition (Cowper-Coles, 2011: 285)’ the persistence in Afghanistan has been more into questioning the ways of system that Taliban wants to install rather than trying to find mediated solutions while also including Taliban in decision making and engaging them in the reconciliation process. By engaging Taliban in the process of negotiations in a way the local support for them engages in creation of accountability process and therefore also a system of governance and democracy. Such argument is also supported by modern counter-insurgency as mobilising structures such as tribal and social structures can be channelised to political empowerment instead of violence.

Taliban is also a group that is influenced by many other geo-political factors, the de-radicalisation was unable to proceed further due to many other events that happened when reconciliation started in a small scale. As it started in 2003 when ‘some moderate elements of the former Taliban regime approached Kabul and eventually accepted a reconciliation offer and it is likely that later negotiations too only involved noncombatant elements of the old Taliban government or individual commanders’ (Giustozzi, 2010: 189)’ it was possibly a good time to start negotiating with the Taliban at that time and include them in the process but intervention in Iraq by the coalition forces happened in the same year, which might have had impacted the Taliban’s.

Conclusions

Although this paper looks at the impact that negotiations can have on reducing violence and is specifically looking at the Taliban movement in Afghanistan context, it is known that the process of negotiations does not entirely depend on the Taliban or the Afghanistan Government or the Coalition forces per say.

The critical terrorism studies imply a wider inclusion of factors that impact such problems and tend to explain this phenomenon from a critical perspective, as well as explain the reasons and obstacles that are on path of negotiation.

One of the biggest challenges of negotiating with such movements comes as a result of their labeling as terrorists by states. This puts states in a very difficult position to negotiate as they are, in theory, working against their own interests. However, practically speaking, states need to negotiate with ‘terrorists’ through media, mediators or in a proper negotiation processes.

Another challenge faced in negotiation with ‘terrorists’, is the affection of violence that they bring to the negotiation table. From a state-centric perspective this is illegal and unacceptable because of the Rule of Law and legal framework. Thus, the US government is unable to officially negotiate with the Taliban and so is the Afghan Government.

[1] http://contreinfo.info/prnart.php3?id_article=2403

[2] International Security Assistance Forces

[3] Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations

Author Biography

Abit Hoxha is a doctoral researcher at the Ludwig Maximilian University (LMU) in the INFOCORE project in January 2014. He earned his first degree in Political Science in 2005 from the University of Prishtina in Kosovo and holds MA degree from the Kosovo Institute of Journalism and Communication ( 2007), focusing on ‘War and Post-War Reporting in Kosovo’. He studied for his second postgraduate degree at the Durham Global Security Institute at the Durham University in UK focusing on Social Movements and Islam. He worked in various institutions both government and non-government sector in Kosovo including as researcher for the Kosovo based think tank, Kosovar Center for Security Studies, World Bank-Kosovo Youth Development Project, UNDP in Kosovo-Support to Security Sector Development and other positions. Abit has been also involved in the Kosovar media research working on different subjects and published academic and non-academic articles.

You can find him on Twitter

*This paper was part of the post-graduate course at Durham Global Security Institute at the Durham University in the United Kingdom in 2011-12. Updates on the ISIS and latest developments are recent. Views expressed in this paper are personal and do not represent views of any institution that the author is affiliated with.

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Curtis, L., 2010. Taliban Reconciliation: Obama Administration Must be Clear and Firm. Backgrounder. Washington DC: The Heritage Foundation The Heritage Foundation.

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Gunning, J., 2007. A case for Critical Terrorism Studies. Government and Opposition.

Hellyer, H.A., 2007. Engagement with the Muslim COmmunity and Counter Terrorism: British Lassons for the West. Analysis Paper Nr. 11. The Saban Centre for Middle East Policy and the Brooking Institution.

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Jonsson, C., 2001. Conceptualisation of the Negotiation Process. conference report. Canterbury: International Negotiations.

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*Cover image ‘Syria, Aleppo’ by IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation

Season I Episode VI – Crimea and Beyond (Geopolitics)

Of all the external events in recent history, especially the Crimean Crisis of 2014 has had a significant impact on Belarus and the politics in and surrounding it. Previously, the so called colour-revolutions of the early 2000s in Ukraine, Kyrgistan and Georgia had given hope to pro -change forces in Belarus and led to the ill-fated protests of the denim- or jeans revolution in the country. However, with the hope and chance for change that had been perceived in the successful protests on the Kievan Maidan square this changed with the intervention of unmarked military units in Crimea and in neighbouring regions of Ukraine. In these circumstances, arguments are made that the Crimean Crisis and the consequential international backlash against such kind of Russian interventionism will prove to be an incentive for Russia to keep its ties with Belarus as one of its closest allies and could thus turn out to have little to no effect on the Belarusian – Russian relations (Dejevsky).

Diplomatically, Belarusian state functionaries have been in the predicament of having to balance their own interest of sovereignty over their own territory against foreign forces like a potential Russia with their economic and political dependency on the goodwill of and discounts by the Russian Federation. As analyst Andrei Yahorau put it: “Belarus is independent in the issue of Ukraine, though considerably restricted. Minsk is putting a brave face on a sorry business; supporting Ukraine with gestures and rhetoric, Belarus is compelled to support Russia with actions. Belarus occupies this dubious position since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war.” (full article and quote here) Given this position of the Belarusian state, the Crimean Crisis and the preceding EuroMaidan revolution has similarly been seen as a reminder of the possibility for political change to happen through grass-roots and organized activism, leading to an increased watchfulness by the Belarusian authorities. In the face of the crisis, polls conducted by the Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies indicate that the Belarusian public follows its president in condemning the coup in the Ukraine (available here) with a 70% majority of the surveyed stating that they would not want similar processes to happen in Belarus and 68% claiming they would not partake in any of those processes on either side of the issue. (ibid.) The conflict is however indicated to have politicized the Belarusian society for the first time in quite a while (ibid.).

Following the same poll on the recent events in Crimea and Ukraine, a strong majority of Belarusians support the state-fostered interpretation of the events as an illegal coup, and while a similar majority of 70% would not take part in protests similar to those at Maidan Square, 15,5% would take active part in such protests against the government, while 10.1% would actively side with the Lukashenka government.

Another set of consequences of the Ukrainian Crisis for Belarus have been its economic effects as, firstly, the Belarusian-Ukrainian economic relations are yet to be seen through the crisis, having been one of the major trading relations of Belarus. Secondly, Belarus has received more than 25.000 refugees from Ukraine with effects that will only reveal themselves over time (see: Smok), while, thirdly, the Western sanctions against Russia and its increasing international isolation have opened up new possibilities to closen the ties to Belarus’s western neighbours (Borowska).

As regards to security and affiliation, Belarus is in a position between its two more powerful neighbours, namely the European Union and the Russian Federation. Geopolitically situated at a crossroads between the European and Asian part of Eurasia, Belarus has the potential to be a mediator between Russia and the EU as well as other non-Russian central Asian states. Sharing historical roots and tradition, especially in its western part, with Poland and Lithuania, the most prevalent and closest ties of the country are to post-soviet Russia. Even though the aspirations of Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka to become leader in a potential unified country of Russia and Belarus were thwarted in the late 1990s to early 2000s by then newly elected Russian President Vladimir Putin, Belarus has been a reliable ally to Russia since Lukashenka’s rise to power. Over the year the Russian-Belarusian relationship however has been an uneasy one at times due to the imbalance between the partners. In general, it can be observed that for the most part of its independent existence, the Belarusian economy has de-facto been subsidized by Russian discounts on oil and gas, selling them at below-world market prices. After the so called oil wars of the mid-2000s however, Lukashenka’s Belarus has partially broadened its scope of international relations to countries like Venezuela, while also strengthening its ties to China (Nedzhvetskaya).

With a vast majority of its machinery to date still inherited from the days of the Soviet Union, the current state of the Belarusian military is remarkable in several ways. Being officially neutral in the Ukrainian crisis, albeit being part of a shared air-defence space with Russia and the international climate surrounding the climate inching towards a Cold War-like situation, Belarus has to counter-balance its national independence from Russia, while also paying dues to its de-facto alliance with the very same. Similarly, while Alyaksandr Lukashenka has been increasingly keen on retaining Belarusian independence in terms of military forces – and the command over them – in the country, military forces in Belarus are still dependent on the maintenance and keeping up to date of its Russian-made equipment, ideally on lower-than-world-market prices as has been the case in the past (Parotnikau).

From a Russian point of view, following the pro-Western fall-out of the Maidan-square movement in Ukraine, with Belarus one of its other established allies has been rediscovering its national independence and sovereignty. The state of the Belarusian military is insofar an difficult issue for Putin’s Russia as while it cannot be in the economic interest of the country to provide military utilities to Belarus at too low a cost, while at the same time having to negotiate the fact that in case of open war, those very troops and armies would be tasked with protecting parts of Western Russia – and with them the strategic access to Moscow and Nowgorod – giving too strict a stance of refusal of supporting the Belarusian military the possibility to backfire more than originally intended (ibid.).

In summary, given the recent events in Ukraine and the Russian Federation’s portrayed willingness to actively protect its interests across borders, Belarus is in a difficult position to either of the conflict’s parties. Especially the relationship to Russia is a challenging one for Belarus as – while President Lukashenka is keen on preserving Belarus as a sovereign country – its economic de-facto dependency on the goodwill of its neighbour limits its ability to politically manoeuver quite considerably.

Next week: Episode 7 – Why it matters (Making of)

Quoted articles:

Borowska, Paula. Belarus and Poland: Brought together by Russian sanctions, Retrieved from: http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-and-poland-brought-together-russian-sanctions-19270

Dejevsky, Mary. Ukraine crisis: Russia’s neighbours are nervous – but the huge costs of intervention beyond Crimea are likely to make Moscow think twice, Retrieved from: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-russias-neighbours-are-nervous–but-the-huge-costs-of-intervention-beyond-crimea-are-likely-to-make-moscow-think-twice-9179093.html

Nedzhvetskaya, Nataliya. China and Belarus: A Special relationship, Retrieved from: http://harvardpolitics.com/world/china-and-belarus-a-special-relationship/

Parotnikau, Andrei. Kremlin’s Agression in Ukraine frightens Lukashenka, retrieved from: http://belarusdigest.com/story/kremlins-aggression-ukraine-frightens-lukashenka-belarus-security-digest-17515

Smok, Vadzim. Belarus Hopes that Ukraine’s Refugees will Save its Agriculture, retrieved from: http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-hopes-ukraines-refugees-will-rescue-its-agriculture-19011

Picture credit: rogiro

[In today’s article, guest contributor Felix Troeltzsch takes a look at the sometimes overlooked country of Bulgaria and showcases the background and reasoning behind the special role it has played in the current Ukrainian Crisis.]

When you fly into Sofia by plane, you will find the city encircled by a multitude of mountain ranges. Having the Balkan range situated in the north and the Vitosha and Rila mountains in the south, your entire stay in Bulgaria’s capital will be shaped by a feeling of diminutiveness, originating from these massive and steady formations. Similarly, Bulgaria as a whole is located – geographically and culturally – between three major spheres of influence. There is the economically strong European Union in the west, the purportedly old ally Russia in the north-east and the crisis-ridden Middle-East in the south-east. Between these big geopolitical regions Bulgaria, a country of a little more than seven million inhabitants, seems almost as minuscule in the geopolitical environment as a person in the middle of Sofia’s mountain ranges. However, due to the evolving conflicts in Syria and the Ukraine in the recent months and years, the Balkan country developed into a key player in dealing with the effects of these crises and therefore gained diplomatic influence within the European Union. This first report will focus on the following two questions: (1) how has Bulgaria been dealing with the conflict in Ukraine and (2) why has it been acting so different from most other eastern European countries.

Bulgaria Opposes Strong Sanctions against Russia

After Russia started its push towards the annexation of Crimea in February and March 2014, the European Union debated about possible consequences almost immediately. After several acts of condemnation, the EU imposed its first travel bans and money freezes in late March. After a further escalation of the situation, due to the conjectural shooting down of the Malaysian Airline flight MH 17 and after Russian troops advanced into Ukrainian territory, the EU passed further sanctions that were targeted at Vladimir Putin’s direct entourage. Moreover, especially eastern-European countries, like Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania demanded an expanding military presence of US and NATO troops in their region. In contrast to these developments, the Bulgarian government did not push sanctions or demand military armament (EurActive 2014): it even slowed the whole EU decision-making process down[1]. As the only eastern-European country it opposed stronger phase-two sanctions in March and as one of two eastern-European countries (with Slovenia) it opposed the introduction of phase-three sanctions against Russia in July. Although phase-two and phase-three sanctions came into effect eventually, Bulgaria has been supporting a salient pro-Russian course in the group of eastern-European countries during the whole Ukraine crisis. This surprising circumstance can be explained by looking closer at the history and politics of the small Balkan country.

Bulgarian Dependence on Russian Oil and Gas

Firstly, although Bulgaria’s biggest trading partner is the EU, it depends hugely on Russia regarding its oil and gas supplies. Bulgaria obtains about 90 % of its energy resources from Russian state companies like LUKOIL or Gazprom (Lopez 2014). It would be catastrophic for the Balkan country, if Russia decided to stop its deliveries as a reaction to European sanctions. Therefore, the Bulgarian government has been stating during the entire Ukraine crisis that it opposes strong economical sanctions, since the Russian reactions would most probably hit Bulgaria the hardest.  In January 2009, for example, when Russia restricted its gas deliveries and Ukraine needed most of the remaining gas for itself, people in whole south-east Europe were affected directly. In Bulgaria, many houses stayed without energy and people froze to death (EU Commission 2009). Up to today there are no real alternatives to the energy supplies from Russia. With the new pipeline “South Stream” Bulgaria – along with many other south-east European countries – even substantiated its commitment to Russian gas. Whereas the building of “South Stream” in Bulgaria was temporarily stopped in August 2014 by the EU Commission, the Bulgarian government is determined to continue the construction of the pipeline soon to become independent of Ukraine as transit country. All of these findings suggest that Bulgarian officials are not interested in becoming independent from Russian oil and gas. On the contrary, they seem to have tightened the energy relations in the last years. Apparently, a country with such a strong present dependence on Russian oil and gas and future plans of a direct pipeline through the Black Sea must be concerned to offend its most important energy provider. For this reason, the extension of EU sanctions or even the risk of a military conflict can not be in the national interest of Bulgaria.

At this point, some might rightfully point out that other countries like Lithuania (92 % oil, 100 % gas from Russia) or Poland (91 % oil, 60 % gas from Russia)  depend even more on Russian energy exports and still pushed for stronger sanctions in the EU. Since this is absolutely correct, there must be more reasons for Bulgaria’s rather calm standpoint towards Russia.

Bulgaria’s History in the Region

Secondly, in the collective memory of Bulgaria’s people, Russia is still largely understood as the historical liberator of the country and is therefore rather a subject of gratitude than aversion. During its history the Balkan country experienced many different types of foreign rulers. Much like today, medieval Bulgaria was situated next to influential and expanding empires. After the glorious time of the First Bulgarian State, which stretched further than today’s boarders, the country was foreign ruled for several hundred years. From the year 1018 until 1185 it was a part of the Byzantine empire and experienced its first “lost period” (Dimitrov 2001: 2). After a strong strive for freedom and a Bulgarian nation-state from 1185 until 1396, the Ottoman Turks conquered the country and established a bloody rule for almost 500 years. During this time, the Bulgarian territory served mainly as source for agriculture and was ruled merciless by local lords. Moreover, the ethnic composition was changed drastically and the ethnic Bulgarian population declined, until it reached a low point in the late 15^th century. In other words, the Turkish rulers forced the traditionally Christian-orthodox state to sacrifice its European history and transform into an Ottoman-like country. It was the Russo-Turkish War from 1877 to 1878 that finally liberated Bulgaria and helped to establish the independent nation-state that we know today. Until today, the conquest of Bulgaria by the Turks, the fall of the nation-state and the forced destruction of central European values is “almost universally regarded by the Bulgarians as the most tragic point in their history” (Dimitrov 2001: 2-4). One can come across this mostly exaggerated notion of the brutal “Ottoman Yoke” in many everyday situations – read about it in newspapers, hear it during conversations, or watch references on TV. As a result of this collective memory, Russia is still commonly considered as historical liberator of Bulgaria[2]. Due to this positive image of the world power in the north-east, it is not politically worthwhile for any Bulgarian party to promote a radical anti-Russian agenda. Therefore, only a few political parties in Bulgaria are promoting a radical anti-Russian agenda and demand stronger sanctions.

Bulgaria’s Political and Economical Elite

Lastly, Bulgaria’s political and economical decision-makers have been maintaining very close ties with former and present Russian elites. In contrast to many other eastern-European countries, Bulgaria’s society never really processed its past as a totalitarian system and reappraised its Cold War history. This means that unlike Germany or Poland, civil servants and politicians were never extensively controlled for their past. After 1990 the former political class basically remained in power. Bulgaria’s socialist party BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party) which is the second largest fraction in parliament and a former[3] part of the government, must be seen as the direct successor of the ruling socialists during the Cold War. Hence, most socialist politicians maintain close relations to Russia. The same can be said about its former coalition partner DPS (Movement for Rights and Freedoms) of the Turkish minority in the country. These two parties are commonly known not only to have a close relationship to Putin, but also to promote a Russian-friendly agenda in Bulgaria (Spiegel 2014). Moreover, also the ultra-nationalist and xenophobic party ATAKA (Attack) and its leader Volen Siderov is known for its anti-European and extremely pro-Russian attitudes. During the last year ATAKA supported the Bulgarian government with votes in parliament and ensured its majority. Siderov, who also rails against Roma and Turks, supported Russia’s annexation of Crimea openly and tried to discredit the Ukrainian government constantly. He as well acts within Vladimir Putin’s closest environment and ATAKA is believed to be financed by Russia to a large extent (Hassel 2014). Only Bulgaria’s president Rosen Plevneliev and GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria), the party of the former prime minister (2009-2013) Boyko Borrisov,  are known for its rather Euro-friendly agenda. Plevneliev, who is independent, but sympathizes with GERB, has criticized Russia after the annexation of Crimea and for its engagement in eastern Ukraine.

Nevertheless, even GERB has not yet dared to turn on Russia openly. Aside from that, Bulgaria’s economy is widely controlled by oligarchic structures. Many economical branches, like the financial-, construction-, or media industry are involved in this. A few people own large antitrust companies that often spread through many different sectors. These oligarchs have, most of the time, very close connections to leading politicians in Bulgaria and Russia. Two of the most recent examples for this are Deljan Peevski and Tzwetan Wassilew, whose struggles for power in Bulgaria were referred to as “The Bulgarian Game of Thrones” by Forbes magazine (Coppola 2014). Peevski, a media tycoon, and Wassilew, who is mostly active in the construction and finance sector, are involved in intensive businesses with Russia. Moreover, Peevski, whose appointment as head of Bulgaria’s National Security Agency (DANS) led to nationwide protests in 2013, and Wassilew were both suspected of corruption and the granting of illegal benefits a couple of times, also in connection to high politicians and other Bulgarian decision makers (Coppola 2014; The Economist 2014). Having this in mind, it becomes clear that neither most leading Bulgarian politicians, who are known to have close political ties with Russia and Putin, nor Bulgaria’s economical elite, who maintains a strong influence within the Bulgarian governing bodies and whose businesses depend on Russian partners and the connection to the Kremlin, have any interest in stronger sanctions against Russia whatsoever.

Added together, these factors show why Bulgaria reacted differently on the Ukraine conflict than most eastern-European countries. It has been trying to halt determined sanctions and prevent military threats against Russia, rather than demanding them. This is due to its severe dependence on Russian oil and gas, the positive perception of Russia in Bulgaria’s collective memory and the close ties between Bulgaria’s political and economical elite with Russia. This brief analysis shows, once again, how heterogeneous the European Union still is. The next part of the series will focus on Bulgaria’s decisive role in the Syria conflict and how it deals with the resulting challenges.

Author Biography: 

Felix Troeltzsch recently graduated from the University of Jena with a master’s degree in Political Science, focusing on International Relations and Peace Studies. Before that, he studied International Relations and American Studies at the University of Leipzig and University of Warsaw. Felix is mainly interested in international conflicts, security policy, human rights, the European Union and the Middle East. During several stays abroad he has dealt intensively with the Balkans and the Black Sea region.

References:

Coppola, Frances. 2014. The Bulgarian Game of Thrones. In: http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2014/07/15/the-bulgarian-game-of-thrones/ (09/14/2014).

Dimitrov, Vesselin. 2001. Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition. New York: Routledge.

EurActive.com. 2014. Bulgaria opposes immediate EU sanctions on Russia. In:

http://www.euractiv.com/global-europe/bulgarian-minister-instructed-av-news-534171  (09/12/2014).

European Commission. 2009. The January 2009 Gas Supply Disruption to the EU: An Assessment.           In: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/strategies/2009/doc/sec_2009_0977.pdf (09/12/2014).

Giumelli, Francesco. 2013. How EU Sanctions Work: A Narrative. In: Challiot Paper 129 (May).

Hassel, Florian. 2014. Putins Rechte Freunde. In: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/nationalistische-verbuendete-putins-rechte-freunde-   1.1938496 (13/09/2014).

Lopez, German. 2014. […] Europe’s Dependence on Russian Gas. In: http://www.vox.com/2014/7/25/5936521/why-europe-wont-punish-russia-in-one-map (09/12/2014).

Spiegel. 2014. Brückenkopf in die EU: Bundesregierung fürchtet Russlands Einfluss in Bulgarien. In: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/bulgarien-bundesregierung-fuerchtet-russlands- einfluss-a-968785.html (09/13/2014).

[1]              On the EU decision-making process for sanctions see Giumelli 2013.

[2]              Naturally, not every Bulgarian will share this view on Russia. However, a majority of the literature suggests that the historical liberation of Bulgaria in 1878 still has a big impact people’s opinion about the world power in the north-east.

[3]              The Bulgarian government resigned on July 23, 2014. Till the next elections in October 2014 an interim government is in power.

Picture Credit: Stella VM