Author: kasmir

Introduction

Terrorist group ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), sometimes referred to as ISIS or simply IS, is now controlling a huge amount of land both in Iraq and Syria. Their influence is growing and their numbers are increasing on a daily basis. However, recruits of ISIL do not come only from the Middle East but also from Western nations. Many also come from former Soviet countries, mostly from Central Asia and the Caucasus region with huge numbers coming from the Russian North Caucasus, mainly Chechnya and Dagestan.

Central Asia

According to Erlan Karin, an expert on the Middle East from Kazakhstan, there are large numbers of Central Asians fighting for the Islamic state with around 250 Kazakh citizens, 100 Kyrgyz, 190 Tajiks, 360 Turkmens and more than 500 Uzbeks. Reports say that military units are created with fighters only of Uzbek ethnicity; those units are called Imam Bukhari Jamaat. Other sources estimate that there are anywhere between 1000 to 5000 jihadists from Central Asia in ISIS, with Central Asians from Russia and Turkey also joining the Terrorist group. New members from this region are recruited mostly through Russian speaking social media (Vkontakte and Odnoklassniki) and in mosques (Uznews, 2014).

ISIL represents a serious threat to Central Asian regimes, with many fighters already returning home and in increasing numbers. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (a terrorist group known as IMU) has already declared their allegiance to ISIL. Other disturbing elements for Central Asian countries have also occurred such as the appearance of ISIL symbols on Tashkent Bridge in Uzbekistan and the appointment of an ethnic Tajik as an Amir of Raqqa province in Syria (Stobdan, 2014)

Overall, the threat of Islamic extremism to Central Asia is very real. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are the most vulnerable countries while Kazakhstan seems to be more stable.

North Caucasus (Russia)

The vast majority of fighters that join the Islamic State group from former Soviet countries are from the Russian North Caucasus, the Muslim majority republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Adygea. The North Caucasus and Chechnya in particular have a long history of religious extremism and terrorism (First Chechen war, Second Chechen war, Insurgency in the North Caucasus). Arab mujahedeens used to send their fighters and Amirs to support the Caucasus Emirate movement, a terrorist group with strong ties with Al-Qaeda led by Dokka Umarov (killed in 2013).  But now the movement of fighters has reversed. Mujahedeens from Chechnya and other republics have joined ISIL fighters in Iraq and Syria in big numbers.

Militants from the Caucasus might not be the most numerous units in ISIL but they are some of the most successful. Chechens and others have occupied high ranks in ISIL and conducted successful operations. There has been a slight quietness in the north Caucasus itself after the two Chechen wars, however experts believe it might not take much time until the fighters will return from Syria and Iraq to continue jihad against Russia. The Islamic State group members made numerous videos with threats towards Putin’s regime. But among the Chechen Islamists there is confusion over ISIL, due to the Caucasus Emirate’s long-time affiliation with Al-Qaeda which has ended any connection it had with ISIL. (Ekkel, M.; Tlisova F.; and Kalandadze A; 2014)

South Caucasus

ISIL is a big problem not only for the North Caucasian republics but also for countries in the South Caucasus. Armenia is not mentioned often in news because there are almost no Armenian citizens involved in terrorist activities abroad. However, Armenians are often victims of ISIL. There is a large Armenian minority in Syria and because they are Christian, Islamic State fighters in Kessab and elsewhere have prosecuted them. Armenians were killed and expelled, while Armenian churches were destroyed during the Syrian civil war. (Brown, 2014)

According to unofficial sources hundreds of Georgians are fighting under the ISIL flag. Georgia has a large Muslim minority (around 10 percent), half of them are Sunni (ethnic Georgians in Ajara region; Kists and Chechens from Pankisi valley), and half of them are Shia (Azeri minority). Two Georgian nationals are listed among 21 individuals on the US sanctions list, including one of the key military leaders of ISIL. Georgia wants to cooperate with Western allies to combat ISIL and its authorities had planned to help moderate Syrian rebels but were afraid of the Russian response, a long-time ally of Assad regime. (Mdzinarishvili, 2014)

One of the most notorious and influential Georgian jihadists, Abu Omar (Tarkhan Batirashvili), comes from a village called Birkiani in the Pankisi Valley. He was born into a mixed Georgian-Chechen family, with his father a practicing orthodox Christian. However, Omar chose a different path and has become one of the key military leaders of ISIL. It was his units that captured Iraq’s second largest city of Mosul and he is now currently involved in the siege of Kobane, a Kurdish city on the Turkey-Syrian border. He is considered a hero for many young radicalized Muslims in the Pankisi valley and elsewhere in the Caucasus. (Akhmeteli, 2014).

Azerbaijanis are fighting for both sides in the Syrian civil war, some Azeri Shias are going to assist the Assad regime while Azeri Sunnis are fighting with ISIL members. Foreign jihadists from Azerbaijan come mostly from the capital Baku and from northern regions, where many Sunni Azeris and north Caucasians live. It is believed that hundreds of Azeris went to Syria and Iraq. ISIL has also included Azerbaijan in its maps and issued threats towards the Azeri government (North Caucasus Caucus, 2014)

Conclusion

ISIL is a major threat not only for Syria and Iraq but also for the wider Middle East, primarily countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, and the whole world. The threat is also particularly high for Russia and other former soviet countries; ISIL terrorists have included the Caucasus into their ‘maps’ and have promised to start a jihad against Russia. The North Caucasus and Central Asia might be the next hot spots after Iraq and Syria.

About the Author

Giorgi Shengelia is a graduate of University College Dublin (UCD) with a bachelor’s degree in Politics and International Relations, and a master’s degree in Geopolitics and Global Economics. He has completed an internship in the Georgian Embassy to Ireland and is currently working in the Human Rights Committee in the Parliament of Georgia. His fields of interests include Geopolitics, Human Rights, European Union and Middle East Politics. Giorgi is part of GPPW’s internship programme.

You can find him on Facebook and Linkedin 

*Cover image ‘On both sides of the border between Syria and Iraq there are now 35.000 Squaremiles ‘Islamic State” by Karl-Ludwig Poggemann

NORDEFCO is of great importance for the participant nations, especially in the sense of contributions that a mutual defence cooperation provides in the light of the increasing geopolitical importance of the Arctic and the Baltics-Scandinavia regions as well as the Russian assertiveness.

For Sweden, NORDEFCO means the possibility of a joint contribution of troops or international peace missions, as well as to develop, procure, maintain material, officers’ training and exercises. It also means the possibility to create capabilities through common readiness that would provide a high operational efficiency, superior quality, cost effectiveness and ability to maintain high capacity as results. Additionally, the defence industry would be benefited, since it can provide products intended to meet Nordic requirements for regional and international operations, along with the stimulation of common production and units by NORDEFCO members[1].

For Norway, 2014 is the year where this country is currently occupying NORDEFCO’s chairmanship. Generally, the country seeks to develop rather the practical side of the cooperation, while ensuring its progress through a cooperation based on results, efficiency and relevance. The objectives set for its chairmanship are:

Firstly, to enhance security policy dialogue among (and affecting) Nordic countries through NORDEFCO. Secondly, to strengthen the Nordic ability to contribute to any international peace operation. Thirdly, to ensure further progress on training and exercises, and extending the existing ones along with cooperation between Nordic, Nordic-Baltic, and NATO. Fourthly, to adopt a result-oriented approach to cooperation in capabilities and armaments, and to direct resources to highly potential projects. Fifthly, to strengthen cooperation on capacity building and security reform in post-conflict and young democratic countries, and to offer such to NATO, the EU and UN. Last but not least, to enhance dialogues between NORDEFCO and the national defence industries, as well as to revitalize cooperation on Public-Private Partnerships (PPP’s) among the countries and the defence industries[2].

Needless to say, the Norwegian approach towards NORDEFCO is a positive one, since it is being regarded as the important tool to solve some crucial issues and challenges that the Scandinavian nations are facing in regards to defence. Additionally, tight financial constraints, increasing prices for advanced materiel and the abovementioned challenges, makes a regional and multinational defence cooperation’s development something natural, from a Norwegian point of view[3].

Denmark, in turn, perceived NORDEFCO as an instance to enhance dialogues and cooperation in three main aspects: first, cooperation on capacity building in East Africa and under UN frameworks; second, cooperation in the Arctic; and third, joint initiatives in regards to materiel, education and training[4].

Iceland, on the other hand, perceives NORDEFCO as an ideal instance to address issues such as natural and man-made disasters, terrorist and cyber-attacks[5]. Iceland, due to its lack of armed forces, has only a political role in NORDEFCO, in a similar way as in NATO. In fact, its defence relies on air surveillances executed by both NATO and NORDEFCO assets, something of increased importance after the closure of Keflavik Air Base by the United States (Forsberg, 2013; Jokela & Isu-Markku, 2013).

For Finland, NORDEFCO was of capital importance in 2013, as the country held the chairmanship of the organization. The objectives it set were: first, to develop the existing activities with a focus on capability cooperation, operations and training and exercises; second, to frame NORDEFCO’s objectives and activities through the development of a long-term plan; and third, to enhance the Nordic perspective on defence issues through seminars and workshops[6].

Both Finland and Sweden have special relations and cooperation with Estonia – the reasons were exposed on the previous articles about Sweden and its strategic triangle – in various issues, defence included[7]. The recent event of the Russian submarine incursion in Swedish waters made both countries to recognize the importance of strengthening such ties, which consist on the Baltic Defence College, joint procurement and cooperation in training Estonian troops[8]. Finland, in turn, has a cooperation agreement with Estonia in the fields of cyber-security, political and defence consultation and shared practical endeavours from 2012 to 2015[9].

The Warriors of the North: facing the Future, facing a common threat

At the moment, NORDEFCO is a cooperation structure rather than a command structure. It is not either an alliance in the strict sense as NATO yet it implements some joint operations, training, exercises and production of defence assets under defined standards in a very similar way. This structural deficit could be the very first and general mistake the Scandinavian and Baltics nations are doing. Although one should not forget that both NATO and the EU are also there – however NATO can provide the needed security better than the EU – and that following it, it does not make any sense in introducing a new defence organization that might overlap some of their functions, further advances in consolidating NORDEFCO as a command and operational structure with its mentioned cooperation activities is very needed.

Another fact is that cooperation is yet to be formalized, both at political and military level. The steps done in order to pursuit that have been timid, if not few. This does not mean that the current efforts and achievements should go unrecognized. Yet the increasing importance of the Artic, the Baltic, the military build-up by Russia and its assertive policies aimed at the Baltic and the Arctic (regions of importance for the security of ALL Scandinavia and the Baltic states, not to mention Europe and the United States and Canada) somehow enforce the Scandinavian and the Baltic nations considering the transformation of NORDEFCO into a new military alliance in the near future. Moreover, instead of replacing NATO or overlapping with its functions, it can simply complement it and even transform itself into a big Nordic group within NATO command and operational structure, thus reinforcing NATO activities and objectives in the Arctic-Baltics-Scandinavia area[10].

This, in the end, could be a great contribution to the security of Scandinavia, the Baltics, Europe, the Northern Hemisphere and the West, as well as the same Arctic, facing the increasing Russian assertive actions and repeated military incursions in NATO, EU and Scandinavians territories. And it could also provide an excellent balancing against a Russia that clearly is not hesitating in using its military power to meet its objectives and achieve its political purposes, as well as threatening all of its Western neighbours.

A final problem that is quite hard to solve is the focus that should be given to NORDEFCO. Certainly, due to the awakening of the Russian bear, the focus could be on regional defence and assistance, and all of the assets eventually could be oriented towards meeting that strategic objective. This is something that nations with strong “out of zone” objectives, like Denmark and at some extent Sweden, has to recognize and assume as their core for every action within NORDEFCO areas, and eventually under its operational area, should NORDEFCO transform into a full operational and command structure. They could also promote in a more active way the strengthening of cooperation between the Scandinavian countries and the Baltics, as well as to push for NORDEFCO to adopt the abovementioned necessary transformation. This for the sake of their own territorial integrity and security and dealing the important threat that Russia means.

It is time for the Warriors of the North to become closer allies and face together the lurking Ragnarök.

Sources:

Estonian Embassy in Helsinki. (n.d.). Finland. Retrieved from: http://www.estemb.fi/eng/estonia_and_finland

Försvarsmakten. (n.d.). Nordic Defence Cooperation Strengthened. Retrieved from: http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/about/our-mission-in-sweden-and-abroad/nordic-defence-cooperation/

Ministry for Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). Nordic Co-operation. Retrieved from: http://www.mfa.is/foreign-policy/security/nordic-co-operation/

Ministry of Defence. (2011). Nordic Defence Cooperation – NORDEFCO. Forsvarpolitikk. Retrieved from: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/Selected-topics/forsvarspolitikk/nordic-defence-cooperation—nordefco.html?id=532212

Ministry of Defence. (2014). Norway assumes NORDEFCO chairmanship. Press release No.: 01/2014. Retrieved from: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/press-centre/Press-releases/20141/norway-assumes-nordefco-chairmanship.html?id=748235

Ministry of Defence. (n.d.). Finnish NORDEFCO chairmanship in 2013 in Nordic defence policy related co-operation. Retrieved from: http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?l=en&s=730

Republic of Estonia, Government. (2014). Estonia and Sweden have common views on the security of the Baltic Sea. Retrieved from: https://valitsus.ee/en/news/estonia-and-sweden-have-common-views-security-baltic-sea

[1] See: Försvarsmakten (n.d.). Nordic Defence Cooperation Strengthened. Retrieved from: http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/about/our-mission-in-sweden-and-abroad/nordic-defence-cooperation/

[2] See: Ministry of Defence (2014). Norway assumes NORDEFCO chairmanship. Press release No.: 01/2014. Retrieved from: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/press-centre/Press-releases/20141/norway-assumes-nordefco-chairmanship.html?id=748235

[3] Ministry of Defence (2011). Nordic Defence Cooperation – NORDEFCO. Forsvarpolitikk. Retrieved from: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/Selected-topics/forsvarspolitikk/nordic-defence-cooperation—nordefco.html?id=532212

[4] When Denmark had the chairmanship in 2012, those were the objectives during its leadership.

[5] Ministry for Foreign Affairs (n.d.). Nordic Co-operation. Retrieved from: http://www.mfa.is/foreign-policy/security/nordic-co-operation/

[6] See: Ministry of Defence (n.d.). Finnish NORDEFCO chairmanship in 2013

in Nordic defence policy related co-operation. Retrieved from: http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?l=en&s=730

[7] Finland also has a strong Baltic approach due to its geographic position and the neighbouring Russia. See: Herolf, 2013, p.5.

[8] Republic of Estonia, Government (2014). Estonia and Sweden have common views on the security of the Baltic Sea. Retrieved from: https://valitsus.ee/en/news/estonia-and-sweden-have-common-views-security-baltic-sea

[9] Estonian Embassy in Helsinki (n.d.). Finland. Retrieved from: http://www.estemb.fi/eng/estonia_and_finland It is important to remark that Finland was the first country to recognize Estonia’s independence in 1920 and 1991.

[10] The same thing applies for the EU. In addition, the transformation of NORDEFCO into a command and operational structure should not block the needed joining of NATO by Sweden and Finland.

___

*Cover image ‘Cold Response DV dag‘ by Soldatnytt

Writing and expressing oneself is not an easy job in Afghanistan. It is true that the media in Afghanistan is free compared to its neighbours, but it still has its own unique challenges.

The media landscape in Afghanistan is typical of a country with such a meagre literacy rate. Radio and TV are the main sources of information for people both in urban and rural areas, whereas few have access to or are interested in the print media. But interestingly, for the last few years, the internet, particularly social media, has gained widespread popularity thanks to the availability of internet services on mobile phones. In fact, social media is becoming the only major and constructive medium for breaking stories, sharing opinion pieces, and conducting debates and discussions.

The opinion sets and rationales in Afghanistan are as diverse as the ethnic groups in the country. These could conveniently be divided on the basis of either faith or ethnicity, with major ones being the extremists, the ultra-conservative Islamists, the conservatives, the secular Muslims, the liberals, the non-religious extremists (or the liberal fascists) amongst others. So, every opinion piece published on the media could be evaluated through different perspectives and barometers, and could spawn various responses. Some of these responses could even provoke and cause anger in the public.

The public discourse in the country is still dominated by the ultra conservatives who are still far from accepting any sort of criticism or debate related to Islam. An article recently published by The Afghanistan Express Daily under the title “The Islam of the Taliban and ISIS” caused a public furore and uproar. Not surprisingly the writer was accused of blasphemy and many called for his public prosecution.

Even though, I did not find the article a scientific piece backed by facts or rationality, it did, somehow, make some sense. The writer tried to rebuke ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham) and the Taliban and expressed his frustration towards divinity. It was perceived as if the writer was rebuking Islam itself. What people need to understand is the fact that even if the someone tries to  rebuke or debate some conservative or outdated notions in a religion it shouldn’t be considered as a crime. For me, the reaction against the writer was completely agonizing.

Abdo Rabb-er-Rasul Sayyaf, a former warlord and now parliamentarian, was one of the first people to denounce and condemn the article and call on the government to punish the writer. In his Facebook post, he labelled the writer as an apostate, calling for punishment and a legal action against the newspaper. He also added that Islam should not be criticised for the action of a few Muslims.

I believe that it could have been very reasonable of him had he put some effort on reflecting on the actions of ISIS and Taliban against the fundamentals of Islam rather than scapegoating a mere writer. His actions clearly proved that for him, ISIS and the Taliban stand for Islam and thus it was his “duty” to unintentionally (or intentionally but hypocritically) defend them.

Another warlord, politician and prominent member of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan Qutbuddin Hilal even took the effort to write a whole article on the issue. His article was nothing more than a mere translation/interpretation of the article under question. In his last paragraph, he condemned the writer, the newspaper and called the writer an apostate. Furthermore, he cursed the writer and asked the government to punish him for his “blasphemous insult” of Islam. He failed to put forward any counterargument or defy the writer with reason. In fact, he could have written about human rights in Islam and proven that slavery, tax on non-believers and murder of non-Muslims are not permissible in Islam – contrary to what ISIS and the Taliban do.

In both the aforementioned cases, the warlords are merely trying to limit the freedom of speech, so as to avoid any sort of criticism on Islam, or its extreme interpretations by ISIS, the Taliban and their associates.

As long as the Clergy (Mullahs) and Religion enjoy unaccountable authority to decide on people’s fate, freedom of speech and thought cannot prevail.

Issues such as blasphemy and insult of belief should not be treated with anger and condemnation, rather debated and discussed in a civilised manner. The public should be encouraged to be able to deal with such issues with patience and debate the issues with open minds and free thoughts. Until then, one cannot hope and wish for a progressive Afghan society.

Author Biography

Musa Aziz, is a DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) fellow and holds a Master from University of Erfurt – Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Germany. Before starting his MPP degree at the Willy Brandt School, Musa completed an accredited certification in Good Governance Afghanistan from the same institution.

He has worked with different governmental and non-governmental organizations for over three years. Throughout his academic and professional career, Musa particularly focused on poverty reduction, economic development, human rights, education, peace-building and conflict resolution.  His research interests are contemporary political issues and political discourses in South Asia and Middle East.

You can find him on his Website

*Cover image ‘Freedom of Speech‘ by AlbertBurgers

The EU’s role in setting a standard for human rights, and acting as a source of international pressure when it comes to enforcing these rights, has long been acknowledged. Comparing this aspect of the EU to other instances of regional governance in human rights reveals the dynamism and flexibility of regional forms of government.

By Charlotte James

*This article, along with the in-text images, was originally published by Project for Democratic Union

 Regionalism, a multi-national expression of shared identity and goals combined with institutions intended  to shape cooperative action, is seen by many as a fresh turn in the history of political association.  Movements towards regionalism, such as the creation of the European Community or the establishment of  ASEAN, have gathered speed since the middle of the twentieth century. It may even come to be seen as a  primary form of government, altering the way in which nation-states relate to one another and changing  the nature of state-sovereignty.

The European Union is by far the most advanced institution of integrated regionalism in the world today.  Its common parliament and multiple presidents are testament to the EU’s commitment to explore regional  integration to its full potential. Its values include a declared affinity with the democratic process and transparency (enshrined in the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon), its commitment to equality in freedom of movement and work across its nations, and an eschewing of nationalism. These ideals embody a very ‘western’ form of regionalism.

However, the EU’s interpretation of regional governance is only one of many and should not be used as a basis for judging or understanding other instances of regionalism. Jürgen Rüland, writing for the Keio University in Tokyo, argues that theories of regional integration are Eurocentric and disregard the structures and values that underlie other regions. Regionalism takes place across the globe in many forms, from political and economic unions, such as the EU, to the establishment of Free Trade Areas, such as the new free trade agreement between Australia, New Zealand, and ASEAN (AANZFTA). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is itself a regional institution, overseeing ten countries in the Southeast Asian region (Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar). It has a further form under the title ASEAN+3, (APT) which includes China, South Korea, and Japan. ASEAN has a long and distinct history that has shaped common values that are distinct to its own form of regionalism. Analysing a few key moments in ASEAN’s history provides an example of an alternate path to the EU’s western style system of integration.

ASEAN has sometimes been dismissed as nothing more than a ‘talk-shop’. However, there are many ways in which ASEAN is a significant achievement. It is animated by values common to the region, and was founded despite strife between its founding members. ASEAN has passed many resolutions and continues to develop as an institution. After all, the EU too has seen its fair share of criticism, especially with the rise in popularity of Eurosceptic parties.

Vastly different histories and pressures shape the EU and ASEAN. These histories inform different solutions to similar problems. Understanding the contexts in which regional governance emerged across the globe is vital to assessing the relative success or failure of different approaches to regionalism in a variety of contexts. Extending the field of reference and studying regionalism as a global phenomenon could help to develop a greater range of tactics and strategies for achieving its goals.

One way to achieve this comparison is through comparing their approaches to human rights infringements. It is worth exploring the historical roots to these regional projects in order to deepen our understanding of what the potential of regional governance is.

When the Bangkok Declaration was signed in 1967, bringing ASEAN into existence, its ethos was shaped by the post-colonial stress on independence strongly felt in ASEAN’s founding countries. Narciso Ramos, the foreign minister of the Philippines, bemoaned that the infighting of the South-east Asian states could only lead to a ‘self-perpetuating dependence on the advanced, industrial nations.’ Protecting the independence of states from outside forces was a founding principle of ASEAN, which championed a ‘spirit of equality and partnership,’ and ‘national independence’ in its Bangkok Declaration. Its treaties and declarations repeatedly stress the value of autonomy. The important 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) explicitly established a sense of autonomy amongst its signatories. The TAC stressed the right to national existence free from external interference, and particularly stated that no signatory should interfere with the internal affairs of any others.

The value of autonomy in the EU does not begin to approach this level of centrality to its founding philosophy. The EU favours a more supranational approach to regionalism, reflected in its drive towards monetary union. This is perhaps due to the EU’s role in witnessing the ways in which nationalism can destroy cooperation and lead to war. The EU’s federal style of government raises important questions over the extent to which it should be able to control the internal affairs of states. Inconsistency between member states causes problems for the EU. For instance, the disparity in attitudes towards economic and financial governance between Greece and Germany, who must nonetheless coexist in monetary union, has complicated recovery from the global financial crisis in 2008. The question of how different regional institutions act as arbitrators between states and international actors can be explored in the EU and ASEAN’s differing policies toward forced migration and human rights abuses in Myanmar.

ASEAN’s emphasis on autonomy complicates its ability to deal with the transgressions of Myanmar, admitted into ASEAN in 1997. It sought to engage with Myanmar within a framework of constructive cooperation. This strategy is antithetical to the EU’s sanctions regime, which would have cut Myanmar out of international trade and affairs until it was forced to comply with international standards. There were calls from the west to suspend Myanmar’s ASEAN membership. This strategy would merely have driven Myanmar towards its other neighbours, such as China, who were less concerned with its human rights record.

The EU has often set a gold standard in terms of the treatment of human rights in the international community. However, its policies have not produced any significant progress in Myanmar, because of limited international cooperation and a lack of will to meet word with deed. Equally, ASEAN’s commitment to resisting external pressure and non-interference in the affairs of member states compromised its ability to deal with Myanmar. ASEAN’s international standing was damaged by its perceived lack of action in Myanmar. One analyst argued that the political pressure that led Myanmar to begin to comply with international standards, by compelling it to join ASEAN in 1997, was now meaningless, as ASEAN acts as a cover against external political pressure.

ASEAN worked to build a relationship with the leaders of Myanmar, and was able to exploit its close contacts in order to allow the UNHCR access to key populations, such as the Rohingya people. ASEAN’s work became more able to promote cooperation and understanding between Myanmar and the international community after Cyclone Nargis in 2008. By acting as a negotiator between Myanmar and international institutions, ASEAN did much to socialise Myanmar and open it to international aid.

However, ASEAN’s involvement has faced important limitations. This is particularly due to the fact that it seeks to provide a remedy to the suffering within Myanmar, rather than a solution to its causes. Its cooperation with the military junta has done little to empower Myanmar’s people to determine their own fate. It has made its ability to deliver aid dependent upon several factors that could change at any moment. ASEAN’s involvement in Myanmar is contingent upon personal and informal relationships with military decision-makers, and the aid it facilitates is dependent on the continuing generosity of international donor-nations. These limitations point to the failure of ASEAN’s strategies to produce a systemic change in Myanmar. However, it proved much more effective in opening up the country to international aid, and was more able to manage the country’s symptoms, if not cure the disease.

The EU and ASEAN have been led down different paths of response to international situations as if by instinct. This speaks to the important role of common histories in shaping shared values and protocols for action across regions. ASEAN’s high regard for its autonomy, and the independence of its member states contrasts with the EU’s expectation that exerting political and international pressure will result in change.

Comparing the ways in which regional bodies act internationally is just as important as understanding their internal functions. This is especially the case today, as the neighbours of both ASEAN and the EU, China and Russia respectively, have caused unrest in disputed and nearby territory. The challenges of regional government across the world offer a rich and complex image of how we might continue into the future. If regionalism is to be a viable option, fundamental values must be revised so that they can be understood in a new light. The enforcement of global justice and human rights, the operation of democracy, and state sovereignty must be reconceptualised to fit with the regional paradigm. By viewing the attitudes and approaches of different regions to these concepts, we allow the world to become an experiment chamber, where the effects of different policies can be evaluated for their worth and effectiveness. Regionalism is not just potentially the next ‘stage in government’ from the nation-state. It is, much more importantly, a chance to innovate the way we relate to the world.

*This article is published in Partnership with

Image and in-text image 1: ‘Hello! Human Rights’ courtesy of Andres Musta via Flickr.com, released under Creative Commons 2.0.

In-text image 2: ‘ASEAN’ courtesy of AK Rockefeller via Flickr.com, released under Creative Commons 2.0. 

Nestled in the Himalayas, Nepal is one of the very few countries in the world today to have never been colonised by any major global power. Ranking low, however, in the Human Development Index, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world while its unique geographical and cultural diversity attracts millions of tourists from around the globe.

Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, was founded in the 2nd century A.D. Nepals’ modern history starts with the unification campaign of King Prithvi Narayan Shah dating back to the 18th century. The Shah dynasty ruled Nepal for more than 240 years, and was succeeded by a Khas dominated government system, one that perceived the ‘other’ caste as a minority in the mainstream politics. King Shah’s unification campaign promoted the nationalist feelings among Nepalese for safeguarding their country  from the British Empire which was at its prime in India, and at the time, in Southern Nepal. This nationalist sentiment was purely based on the Khas which profoundly sidelined other indigenous communities of Nepal resulting in considerable inequalities. The caste system in Nepal (Brahmin, Chettri, Vaisya and Shudra),both in religion and in cultural practices, contributed to the creation of development gaps in terms of socio-economic and political upbringing among the people. Today, Nepal is going through a cohesive struggle of marginalised communities who have never been a part of the ruling elites.

In modern times, Nepal has been on the verge of moving towards a system of federalism, while its specific dynamics have not yet been decided; discussing the issue of Caste is still in it’s early stages of debate, both culturally and politically.

After 1990, through its establishment as a multi-party democracy, Nepal has become part of a globalized world and many young people started going abroad for study and work in Middle East. Privatization started in Nepal from 1992 onwards, liberalizing Nepalese society with the advancement of industry under private ownership. Different civic movements also promoted participatory democracy, access to information, and the empowerment of people respectively. Nepalese society has also witnessed the beginnings of a feminist movement resulting in a transformation of gender roles. Women are becoming the head of the families, a role previously held only by men. Under such circumstances, women have now started taking care of families, children, and the outside world.  Ironically, violence against women has risen also because women have started reporting crimes which was limited in the past. In recent times, the issue has come under public vigilance.

Since the rise of India and China in global politics, Nepalese significance for these countries has similarly risen in recent years. Global terrorism and crimes, political activities, diplomatic exercise, globalization etc. are only some of the factors that every country has become more conscious about. Nepalese leadership has always been guided with Dependency Theory in mind in regards to dealing with its neighbours, especially India. Nepal being a very small country in comparison to India and also being hugely dependant on the latter, is perceived as having and inferior status during negotiations. 

Corruption is prevalent in Nepalese bureaucracy and in high profile political leadership, including the policy level.  This issue is today pivotally tied to the country’s energy crisis. Nepal has a huge potential in hydro power. Yet, electricity production via water has been prone to wide loopholes in its political and diplomatic implementation. Most of the hydro projects once signed, face a tough time for their implementation for which political instability is predominantly blamed. The Mahakali Treaty or Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project (PMP) which was signed in 12 Feb 1996 with India remains incomplete. Treaties with India are always facing wider transparency, greater political commitment and by engaging in such treaties, Nepal is cautious against expansionist sentiments from India. However, high hopes are connected with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is seen as trying to maintain and develop peaceful and progressive relationships with Indias’ neighbours, particularly in South Asia. 

Not an ‘Economic standpoint’ but always a ‘political’ ideology

In April 2006, an uprising started in Nepal against King Gyanendra’s direct and undemocratic rule. This Democracy Movement forced the King to restore the Parliament and terminated his direct rule. The peoples’ expectations of this movement was to lay the foundations for a sustainable, peaceful and prosperous Nepal.  The Republic of Nepal was established after the consensus of the first meeting of its Constituting Assembly (CA). There remains, however, a degree of scepticism from experts that it is undemocratic to abolish a 250 years old Monarchy in the first meeting of the CA instead of having a referendum on the matter. The Democracy Movement of 2006 could not lift the aspirations of Nepalese people and thus the country is more fragile than before. This has an adverse affect on about 1500 youngsters who migrate on a daily basis to the Middle East to chase their dreams. The bottom line of the April 2006 movement was purely political, and not an economic one. The Constituent Assembly is elected for the second time in history to draft the constitution. Yet, Nepal is still at a crossroads and it is unclear which side of the road Nepal is going to take, leading to a waning of public support for the Constituent Assembly, which seems to have failed to meet peoples’ hopes.

After the civil war in Nepal (1996-2006), production has declined considerably, and more workers migrate to the booming Middle-Eastern nations. The country is now witnessing a major brain (and labour) drain that has affected Nepalese agricultural productivity. Nepal has still not recovered from the war and the country is experiencing a major decline in the development sector.

Nepalese economy is now solely dependent on remittance which comes from Middle East (Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia etc.). According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Nepal’s GDP grew by an estimated 5.2% in 2014 which was 3.5% oneyear before. Remittance boosted 6.1% growth and monsoon rains boosted agriculture by 4.7%. Adding on, Nepal is still dependent on traditional agricultural methods rather than scientific ones. Monsoon rains determine food production and entire livelihoods, and thus affecting the Nepalese agro-dependent population in regards to food supplies, chances of floods, draught etc.

According to the UN, currently 25% of Nepalese people live inpoverty in Nepal which was 42% in 1996. The most substantial challenge for Nepal is a weak political consortium and elected local bodies as well as its political elites.

Nepalese civil society gained momentum right after the advent of a multi-party democracy in 1990. According to the NGO Federation of Nepal, currently there are 40,000-60,000 NGOs working in Nepal which was only 219 until 1990 (Social Services National Coordination Council).

Civil society organizations (CSOs) in Nepal have been relatively successful in empowering people in terms of access to information, participatory development, human rights promotion, and activism as well as campaigning. The improvement in some of these social indicators has long been attributed to CSOs in Nepal with development assistance. This has contributed to a certain degree of progress in the MDG goals of the United Nations.

Activism through online tools is also one of the achievements of Nepal; as the access to the internet is rapidly increasing in the global south, users of internet in Nepal have also increased. Tools of IT have similarly revolutionized the way of thinking of the Nepalese people. Several youngsters have participated in different global campaigns due to the advancement of the internet in the developing world. Digital technologies are also creating and maximizing the efficiency of individuals. Truly, as with Thomas Freidman’s famous line, “World is becoming Flat”, even in this Himalayan nation.

About the Author:

Saurav Raj Pant is an undergraduate student of Sociology & Population at Tri-Chandra Multiple Campus of Tribhuvan University, Nepal.  He is also a blogger and Campaigner in Nepal working for international issues that affects commons. His field of interest includes Globalization, European Union, Trans-Atlantic issues, Climate Change, public policies, Social Media, Geopolitics and Geo-economics. He is actively involved in organizing global campaigns and mobilizing youths in Nepal. Saurav is part of GPPWs internship programme.

Relevant links:

http://www.telegraphnepal.com/national/2014-08-13/nepali-ngos-willing-to-do-any-work-provided-money-is-available.html

http://www.ngofederation.org/

http://www.adb.org/countries/nepal/economy

http://www.salamnepal.com/2011/12/bravest-of-bravegurkhas-army.html

Picture credit: Przemek Siemion

News of a scandal involving claims of corruption in the biggest and most expensive civilian mission of the EU broke on the 27^th of October after the publication of an article by Pristina’s leading newspaper Koha Ditore that revealed compromising information on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) in Kosovo. The article implicated EULEX officials in taking bribes in return for closing delicate cases and referred to confidential documents. It also used information allegedly received from Maria Bamieh, a British prosecutor of the mission, who as a result was suspended so that an internal probe into the leakage of classified information could take place.

However, Bamieh denies leaking any information, stating: “They suspended me for giving documents to the press, which I didn’t do. I never gave documents to Koha Ditore. That suspension destroyed my image in Kosovo, so I had to go public”.

What is EULEX?

The EU launched its EULEX mission in 2008 under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which operates under Resolution 1244 adopted in 1999 by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The mission focuses on three main areas: policing, judiciary and customs, and was created primarily to assist and support the authorities in Kosovo in establishing the rule of law in these areas. EULEX also has an executive mandate to investigate serious crimes such as organized crime, terrorism, corruption and war crimes.

The EULEX mission is scheduled to finish in June 2016 having being extended in June 2014 after Kosovo’s President Atifete Jahjaga and the former EU High Representative Catherine Ashton exchanged letters.

Allegations of corruption

In an interview about the scandal, Bamieh once again denied the claims, stating that she had “never handed them (newspaper Koha Ditore ) or anybody else any documents, I thought it was important that I had to protect my reputation which was being denigrated by EULEX.” The interviewer asked Bamieh to clarify what she was accusing EULEX of and why she had been suspended. Bamieh replied by claiming she had suspected foul play as far back as 2012 saying “I haven’t accused them now, I accused them in 2012. I have come across intercepts in the course of my work which suggests that there is something suspicious going on with the chief EULEX prosecutor and Mr. Francesco Florit (EULEX judge)”.

Koha Ditore had revealed internal letters written by Bamieh directed to her supervisors. In these letters she wrote that her colleagues were carrying out unlawful activities. They referred to EULEX chief prosecutor, Jaroslava Novotna, and former chairman of the EULEX Assembly of Judges, Francesco Florit, closing sensitive cases in return for money in 2012 and 2013. The letters allege that Florit would have received a bribe of 300,000 Euros or more. Another senior EULEX official, Jonathan Ratel, was also supposed to be blocking internal probes into the case. According to the newspaper, EULEX also provided confidential information to Serbian intelligence services. Koha Ditore editors also confirmed that Bamieh was not the source of the leakage.

On the 30^th of October, EULEX chief Gabriele Meucci countered the claims of corruption reaffirming that the mission was functioning according to the law and fighting corruption. At a news conference in Pristina she stated that  “We guarantee the citizens that we are operating in accordance with the law. We are interested in and are working on dealing with corruption”.

The EU’s Reaction to the allegations

In a letter written to the EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini, two senior members of the European Parliament Elmar Brok and Ulrike Lunacek stated that “if the allegations were to be confirmed, it would be a disastrous situation. The credibility of the EULEX mission and of the EU in Kosovo is at stake. The mission’s role in Kosovo is to fight against corruption, and it should set an example”.

Mogherini announced on the 4^th of November that an independent legal expert would be appointed to investigate the corruption allegations of judges and prosecutors from the EULEX mission, including their involvement with criminals, the covering up of evidence and any other obstruction that occurred to the investigations. This move was welcomed by many EU officials.

The former head of the economic unit of International Civilian Office (ICO) in Kosovo, Andrea Capussela, claims that the scandal is just the tip of the iceberg, just a glimpse of the wider problems that EULEX is facing.

Capussela examined 15 noteworthy cases that had led to indictments by EULEX and discovered that only four cases had resulted in convictions. Furthermore, Capussela contends that seven of these 15 cases were only undertaken due to external pressure placed on it by the EU and public opinion. He also claims that there are eight cases he examined where “credible and well-documented evidence strongly suggesting that serious crimes had been committed” led to neither an indictment nor even an investigation by EULEX, and suggests that this is not a unique occurrence. EULEX inherited 1,187 cases from the pre-independence United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Should Capussela’s suspicions be validated, then it is highly likely that there are many other cases like these which were not handled appropriately.

*Cover image ‘Graffiti on building on Rr. St. U1. Rexhep Luci ‘ by The Advocacy Project

NORDEFCO

The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) came to light after a meeting of the Scandinavian defence ministries held in 2009, where it was decided to merge the three existing similar and previous initiatives into a single one: NORDEFCO[1]. The Memorandum of Understanding of 2009 defined NORDEFCO’s purpose as the mechanism to strengthen the national defence capacities of the participant countries and cooperation on defence. NORDEFCO’s core objectives are to serve as an instance for common defence issues and policies; to increase the quality of the members’ armed forces; to enhance interoperability for joint operations; to develop cooperation in defence technology, multinational operations[2]; and to achieve common technological benefits. Cooperation, then, is the main framework of the organization (Jokela & Isu-Markku, 2013; NORDEFCO, 2009; NORDEFCO, 2014; NORDEFCO, 2014) [3].

On the pure military aspect, NORDEFCO intends to have as main objective the cooperation of every defence structure of the members aiming at interoperability of their armed forces.

This objective has three sub-objectives, which are: to improve the production of military capabilities (or assets of any kind); to maintain and develop the national operational capabilities; and to encourage a cost-effective contribution to efforts in maintaining or achieving peace and security (Jokela & Isu-Markku, 2013; NORDEFCO, 2014)[4].

In order to meet with the abovementioned objectives, NORDEFCO has five cooperation areas.

The first of them is ‘Capabilities’, aimed at addressing development (defence) plans and processes, along with procuring operational effectiveness. The second is ‘Armaments’, aimed at achieving financial, technical and/or industrial benefits regarding armaments life cycle and acquisition. The third is ‘Human Resources and Education’, aimed at enhancing cooperation on military education and facilitation of experiences exchange. The fourth is ‘Training and Exercises’, aimed at coordinating and harmonizing joint military training activities. And the fifth is ‘Operations’, aimed at planning, coordinating, preparing and executing any – decided – military operation (Jokela & Isu-Markku, 2013; NORDEFCO, 2014; NORDEFCO, 2014).

All of the mentioned cooperation areas are to be implemented between the armed forces, their structures and branches. These areas are also the bridges for cooperation between the members’ armed forces (NORDEFCO, 2014; NORDEFCO, 2014).

Seeking Unity: Background and Antecedents

NORDEFCO is not the first concrete initiative in defence cooperation in Scandinavia. As a matter of fact, such attempts can be traced back to the mid-19^th century. Ideas about a Nordic unity occupied the minds of the cultural elites, despite strong clashes between Denmark and Sweden, which were the dominant powers of the time[5]. Culture and history were being regarded as a ground for establishing a strong union, but they were not enough as Denmark received little support when fighting against Prussia. Nevertheless, the idea of cooperation was of such scale that a temporary monetary union took place from 1875 to 1914. Finland, additionally, joined the cooperation initiatives right after its independence and the end of Russian occupation (Herolf, 2013).

Issues related to security and defence were among the main concerns for the Scandinavian nations. However the Second World War shattered any further advance on that regard: the occupation of Norway and Denmark by Germany, the occupation of Iceland by the Great Britain, and the wars after the Soviet Invasions of 1939-1940 and 1944, with the following special treaties that Finland was forced to sign, broke any possibility for a union in a military sense. As a result, the years after the Second World War would witness the failure of Sweden’s efforts to create a neutral Scandinavian defence union. Denmark, Norway and Iceland joined NATO, perceiving the latter as a stronger alliance that could provide the security they needed, and the appeasing policies followed by Finland towards the Soviet Union (Herolf, 2013; Jokela & Isu-Markku, 2013).

The Finnish and Swedish decision to remain neutral (or become neutral in the case of Finland) gave the region a sort of neutrality but that also meant that any idea of a strong military cooperation had to be ruled out. Not entirely, though, because in the 50’s, other steps towards a union in a non-military sense were made. For instance, a passport union, a common job market, welfare agreements, voting rights, a Nordic-language convention, and even the establishment of the Nordic Council (cooperation between Scandinavian parliaments) and the Nordic Council of Ministers were implemented at that time[6]. Even more, the UN peacekeeping missions provided a path for an embryonic military operational cooperation with the jointly deployment of Scandinavian troops for the mentioned operations, leading the way into the Nordic Cooperation Group for Military UN Matters (NORDSAMFN) (Forsberg, 2013; Herolf, 2013; Jokela & Isu-Markku, 2013)[7].

The end of the Cold War meant the end of the facts restraining defence cooperation and the emergence of new frameworks and thematic areas. As a result, the five Scandinavian countries found themselves among the founders of the Council of the Baltic States, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Arctic Council. This situation also meant the emergence of new political factors that hampered the cooperation process. For instance, Finland and Sweden joined the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP), all of the Scandinavian nations but Norway and Iceland applied for an EU membership. And although Norway takes part of the Common Defence and Security Policy, Denmark is not entirely compromised in both EU and Nordic defence initiatives, focusing instead (and more) on NATO (Forsberg, 2013; Herolf, 2013; Jokela & Isu-Markku, 2013).

Still, some initiatives gained ground, not without many complications. NORDAC was created but it faced problems of operational design and orientation of equipment. Reasons were i.a. the different paths taken by the Scandinavians during the Cold War, and projects such as the Viking submarine or the Standard Nordic Helicopter Programme ended with the countries acquiring other sort of equipment or stepping-out. Still, procurement of similar battle tanks – Leopard 2 – were an example of successful coordination in procurement. NORCAPS – The NORDSAMFN – faced also challenges of its own due to the fact that the Nordics were not leading in peacekeeping missions anymore and the new nature of those missions required a high training, support and equipment. Generally, Finland wanted to prioritize the idea of autonomous defence, while Denmark, Norway and Sweden wanted to focus more on fighting indirect threats ‘out of area’ (Jokela & Isu-Markku, 2013).

Midnight sun: NORDEFCO today and Baltic-Artic role.

To understand what is the current role and importance of NORDEFCO for Scandinavian countries, it is important to examine the meaning that this particular defence organization and alliance has, as well as others like NATO or the European Union.

The previous segment made clear that NATO is important in a full or partial way (either being a full-time member or joining the PfP). However the actual role that the EU has and how its perception plays a role in deepening NORDEFCO’s activities and objectives remains rather unclear.

According to Herolf (2013), the federalist approach and the EU’s foreign policy approach are less liked or perceived as ‘suspicious’ because they would mean a giving up of sovereignty. This means that cooperation among the Nordic states seems more likely to take place rather than cooperation between Scandinavians and the EU. However and despite the abovementioned perceptions regarding the EU, cooperation between Scandinavians (for example there are close defence ties between Sweden and Finland), EU and even NATO takes place in parallel ways.

The Baltics and the Arctic are two other areas that are increasingly falling under the action area of NORDEFCO[8].

In the case of the Baltics, the nations within that region were invited by NORDEFCO to join some of the cooperation areas in 2010 and 2011, at the point to even include cyber defence as an area for cooperation and to transform NORDEFCO into a Scandinavian-Baltic initiative. The reasons behind this are various. Firstly, the Scandinavian nations perceive the Baltic nations’ inclusion as an important step to keep and strengthen the abovementioned cooperation, whereas cooperation in defence between the two regions was even labelled as ‘necessary’. Secondly, the military build-up and the importance of the Baltic sea route for the economy of Russia makes such an approach inevitable in strategic and security sense, given the strategic correlation (and vulnerability) between Scandinavia and the Baltics before the renewed assertive Russian policies (Forsberg, 2013, Herolf, 2013; Jokela & Isu-Markku, 2013; NORDEFCO, 2014).

In the case of the Arctic, the geopolitical importance is one of the reasons why NORDEFCO is increasing its range of activities into that area: the proximity of oil reserves and transportation routes for energetic resources and trade[9]. And in a similar ways as the Baltics region, the fact that Russia is securing its interests through aggressive policies and renewed utilization on military assets to secure its interests, is a motive behind NORDEFCO’s focusing on the Arctic Area. Thus, the initiative is becoming an Arctic actor just like NATO, and especially in the area of security. As a result, a monitoring and early warning system, along with a Maritime response force were proposed, along with the development of national Arctic/High North security and policy strategies intended to help the countries to meet their national interests and objectives.

The recent events of Russian incursions with air and naval assets, along with exercises whose objective were mock-attacks on Baltic, Scandinavian and other nations’ territories will definitely make Nordic (and Baltic) cooperation much more closer (Forsberg, 2013, Herolf, 2013; Jokela & Isu-Markku, 2013; NORDEFCO, 2014).

Those events and the increasing attention given by NORDEFCO to the Arctic highlights it geostrategic importance. An importance that inevitably involves the Baltics and Scandinavia, because the three areas – Arctic, Scandinavia and the Baltics – will be equally affected should tensions take place or escalate in any of them.

Sources:

Forsberg, T. (2013). The rise of Nordic defence cooperation: a return to regionalism? International Affairs, 89(5), 1161 – 1181. Oxford: The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Herolf, G. (2013). European Security Policy. Nordic and Northern Strategies. International Policy Analysis. Berlin, Germany: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

Jokela, J., & Isu-Markku, T. (2013). Nordic Defence cooperation: Background, current trends and future prospects? NORDIKA Programme, Note N° 21/13.

NORDEFCO. (2009). Memorandum of understanding on Nordic defence cooperation. NORDEFCO.

NORDEFCO. (2014). Annual Report 2013. NORDEFCO.

NORDEFCO. (2014). GUNOP, Guidelines for NORDEFCO military level operating procedures, final (unclassified). NORDEFCO.

___

[1] Those previous initiatives were the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS), the Armament Cooperation (NORDAC) – its activities were included within NORDEFCO cooperation areas – and the Nordic Supportive Defence Structures (NORDSUP).

[2] Either for national defence or for international operations (like peacekeeping).

[3] It is specified that it is not a command structure. See: NORDEFCO, 2013, p. 6.

[4] The general objective is divided into three by NORDEFCO itself, although the three parts can be understood as objectives by themselves, as they reflect the ones defined by the 2009 Memorandum of Understanding.

[5] Denmark was controlling Iceland, while Sweden was controlling Norway after the loss of Finland due to the Russian invasion of 1809.

[6] Finland had a door opened to join thanks to the exclusion of any foreign policy issue, being common defence among them.

[7] This path was, according to Josela & Isu-Markku (2013), ideal for the Scandinavians to highlight its neutral stance, to show the Soviet Union that they were not a significant threat – despite some being members of NATO – and that they were more willing to contribute to world peace, stability and security. That contribution is, even nowadays, one of the pillars for NORDEFCO.

[8] The Netherlands have been approaching NORDEFCO in order to join the initiative.

[9] The Northeast Passage, which extends from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Northern Sea, all across the Arctic Ocean and in parallel to Russian seashores.

* Cover image ‘Flags‘ by miguelb

The wounds were still ripe when millions of Bangladeshis protested at Shahbagh square demanding death sentence for those accused of war crimes in Bangladesh war of 1971. What was exhilarating about the Shabagh square protests was to see women turn out in large numbers to voice their dissatisfaction in a country which largely relegated their experiences as rape survivors to the margins. Not only have women continued to play a huge role in the civil society but also have perhaps paid the biggest price in the nation building process of Bangladesh.

Bangladesh struggle for independence cannot be viewed in isolation from the geographical division that resulted from India’s Partition into West and East Pakistan and the subsquent wars that were fought over disputed areas. The nine months of military repression conducted by Pakistan was preceded by a separatist movement in East Pakistan which later culminated into full fledged freedom struggle. Later, India stepped in to assist Bangladesh gain independence from Pakistan.

Atrocities were committed on a large scale by all warring sides, while Pakistan never really brought the perpetrators to books, India and Bangladesh chose to remain silent as well after their victory. Around 2,00,000 to 4,00,000 lakh people were killed by the Pakistan forces,though its Government has set the number as low as 26,000. Hundreds and thousands of women were raped and tortured. Given the socio-cultural fabric prevalent in Bangladesh, the real number of women who were raped will never be known.

It was only after the Bosnia war that rape was recognised as a war crime. Earlier armies considered rapes as the legitimate spoils of war. During the 1971 Bangladesh war there prevailed a poor understanding over rape being used as a strategic weapon in war. In a war like situation the idea of mother and the nation become almost synonymous and rather inseparable. The traditional notion which tends to merge the idea of honour with that of a woman further explains how rape is used as a strategic weapon to wipe off the ethnic make up of the community.  Women who witnessed the horror of 1971 cited how the Pakistani soldiers said that “they will make them breed Punjabi sons”. It denotes the underlying violence that is directed towards “dishonouring” and “emasculating” the nation.

Susan Brownmiller who is an author of a groundbreaking book “Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape” on rape survivors has mentioned that captive women and young girls were raped anywhere by two to eighty men every night. Khadiga, a 13 year old survivor when interviewed in an abortion clinic by a female photojournalist said that at first they were gagged to keep from screaming during attacks. Women were starved in the rape camps unless they did not relent and offered sexual services to the military officials. As time passed, “The captives spirit was broken , the soldiers devised a simple quid pro quo. They withheld the daily ration of food until the girls had submitted to the full quota”.

The situation was so fragile and all pervasive that even family members, relatives and neighbours commited violence against women. Many women commited or were forced to commit suicide by their families to preserve their honour. Some women instead had preferred to stick with their rapists for fear of rejection at the hands of their own countrymen. Begum, one of the rape survivors, said  that her captors—Pakistani Army soldiers known as the “Khans”—had bound the women to green banana trees, and “burned our faces and bodies with cigarettes. My body was swollen, I could barely move,” she said. Between being raped, she was given some bread or a few fried vegetables, she said.”We went with them voluntarily because when we were being pulled out from the bunkers by the Indian soldiers, some of us half-clad, others half-dead, the hatred and deceit I saw in the eyes of our countrymen standing by, I could not raise my eyes a second time. They were throwing various dirty words at us … I did not imagine that we would be subjected to so much hatred from our countrymen.”

In an attempt to integrate them into the society, survivors of rape camps were labeled as “Biranganas” or “Brave women” by the Bangladesh Government, the ground realities however were quite different.Abortion services were rendered free by the Bangladesh government in order to revive their hard earned nationalism and get rid of the “Pakistani bastards”. International adoption schemes were introduced, and  there still exists no proper record of those children. Mother Teressa had offered to keep those children in her orphanage, however many women did not come forward for fear of shame and rejection.An example of which is clearly reflected in the following statement by Nilima Ibrahim ‘No apa. Please send away the children who do not have their father’s identity. They should be raised as human beings with honour. Besides, I do not want to keep that polluted blood in this country”.

This term “Biranagana” however later became synonymous with Borangana, which means a fallen woman. This not only further contributed to the ostracisation of the women but also of their children. A girl named Eka, in her teenage, wrote a song in response to the discrimination she has faced because of her mother’s past, “I am the child of a Birangona, I wander around, for a glimpse of you, O father of nation. No one sees my pain, after all I am just a child of a Birangona,”

The State also responded by encouraging men to marry women and restore their lost honour. Yet for many men it was just an opportunity to extract more money for dowry. Some women sort refuge in a pack of lies and told of themselves as widows and not rape survivors lest it might have hampered their chances of leading a normal life again.

Laily Begum who was kidnappped by the Pakistan army but later fought with them and escaped says that her efforts still remain unrecognised. “We lost everything, our reputation, children, husbands, homes, we did not want them to get away with it. There was hatred in our hearts, we were determined to kill the Khans and save the country. We fought with the Himayat Bahini. But nobody remembers us. Where is our name in history? Which list? Nobody wants to thank us. Instead we got humiliation, insults, hatred, and ostracism.”

The trauma of those who had survived in the war has not been sufficiently addressed. Feminists across Bangladesh have little hopes from the International Crimes Tribunal set up in 2010 to adequately address the issue of sexual violence suffered by so many women. The dominant patriarchal and conservative framework has put a veil of ignorance over this issue. Women should be allowed a secure and free environment to testify.

As Bina D. Costa in her book , “National buidling, Gender and War Crimes in South Asia” has also very rightly cited that the movement around the issue of Korean Comfort women has  persisted and pressurised Japan to make an official apology in sharp contrast to Bangladesh women’s movement which has failed to consolidate its voice and support over the issue of rape survivors while restricting their effots to “charity and justice for individual women”.

Saeha Begum, one of the rape survivors has cited that she see no point in telling anyone because no one did anything to compensate for what she had lost. “Bangladesh became a free nation and I became a fallen woman”, she said. There are many like her who still await justice.

Author Biography

Pratibha Singh is a researcher & writer on issues pertaining to women in conflict zones at the Institute for Transnational Studies and a graduate student at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy. 

References:

Das Bijoyeta, “Bangladesh Rape Victims say War Crimes Overlooked”, Women’s News.org,September 2011

Saha Bubana Aparajita, “Women’s Bodies as Battlefields: Reflections on the Birth of Bangladesh” , War Scapes Review, December 2011

Islam Shehreen Kajalie, “Breaking down the Birangona: Examining the Divided Media Discourse on the War Heroines of Bangldesh’s Independence Movement” , International Journal Of Communication, 2012

Das Bijoyeta, “Rape Victims or War Heroes: war women in Bangladesh” , Deutsche Welle, June 2011

Hirche Lent Michele , “Bangladesh”, Women Under Siege Project, February 2012

Roy Nilanjana, “Bangladesh’s War toll on Women still Undiscussed” , The New York Times, August 2010

Murthy Laxmi, “The Birangana and the Birth of Bangladesh” , Himal South Asian, March 2012

Smith Spark Laura, “How did Rape become a Weapon of War” , BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4078677.stm

Hossain Anushay, “The Female Factor: Bangladesh Protests Break Boundaries”, Forbes, February 2013

Aquino Faith, “Korea warns Japan that further delay of comfort apology may lead to permanently damaged relations”,JDP, October 2013

http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgsexualviolence.shtml

This article was first published in September 2014 by the Institute for Transnational Studies under http://www.transnationalstudies.org/Article/77 and is republished here with permission of the author.

Picture Credit: Zoriah

Since Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia signed an economic and political agreement with the EU, what has changed in Russia’s plans to establish the Eurasian Union in 2015?

On 27 June 2014, the European Union (EU) signed an economic and political association agreement with 3 former Soviet states: Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. These developments have angered Russia and provoked officials in Moscow to adopt more aggressive policies towards the aforementioned countries.

At the moment Russia is creating its own Union, namely the Eurasian Union, to include itself, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Other former Soviet countries such as Armenia and Kyrgyzstan have also expressed interest in joining the union.

Ultimately, with this Union, Russia aims to have an influence in all post-Soviet States. Putin once famously said that collapse of the Soviet Union was the ‘catastrophe of the century’ (Osborn, 2005). One of the ways to have this influence in former soviet countries is to attract them to join the Eurasian Union. Since Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine chose the path towards the European Union much has changed in Russia’s plan to establish its own Union.

Moldova

Recently the Constitutional Court of Moldova approved the removal of all pro-Russian and anti-EU parties from the upcoming parliamentary elections. This move has angered Russia and some of its officials, including Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who began speaking with direct threats towards Moldova. (Dojdev, 2014) Russians often uses the most valuable instrument it has against Moldovans: the pro-Russian breakaway region of Transnistria.

In a recent statement Lavrov mentioned that Russia would recognize the independence of Transnistria if Moldova said no to neutrality and joined any Western political or military union (Levchenko, 2014).

Needless to say, the rhetoric of the Russian Federation has changed significantly since Moldova signed an association agreement with the EU. Russia has been using all the methods available, including threats, in an attempt to reverse the decision. Russia has even asked Moldova and the EU to wait until 2016 with the implementation of the economic aspects of the association. (Bizliga, 2014) Overall Russia still has hopes for Moldova to change its decision and join the Eurasian Union as it considers the country under its sphere of influence.

Georgia

Georgia has had for a long time the most anti-Russian and pro-Western policies of the post-Soviet Union countries (although today it could be argued that Ukraine has surpassed it). However since Mikheil Saakashvili, leader of the Democratic pro-Western Rose Revolution in 2003, lost the election to the Georgian Dream party in 2012 Georgia began to normalize its relations with Russia. The two countries still do not have diplomatic relations, but economic trade and tourism have significantly improved in recent years.

The Georgian public has also become less excited about NATO and the EU due to the fact that it has been more than 10 years since Georgia has been aspiring to join these blocks without significant achievements.

Russia also has influence over Georgia through its breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two de-facto states already recognized by Russia and its few allies (Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru). The only way through which Russia can put pressure on Georgia is by threating the country’s sovereignty or by integrating the breakaway Georgian regions into the Russian Federation.

Immediately after the current government came to power, Prime Minister Ivanishvili said that Georgia would join the Eurasian Union if it would bring back its breakaway regions and be economically beneficial (Shilov, 2013). However, such a discussion does not exist since Georgia has singed an association agreement with the EU.

Since Armenia is joining the Eurasian Union and Georgia is planning to join the EU, the two countries have agreed to protect each other’s interests in the rival institutions (Regnum, 2014).

The Russian reaction to this was predictably negative. Officials in Moscow now plan to format a joint armed force with the de-facto Republic of Abkhazia to encourage deeper relations with the breakaway Georgian regions. The Georgian government is concerned that Russia is planning to annex Abkhazia just as it annexed Crimea (Blinov, 2014).

Ukraine

Ukraine under the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich was one of the closest allies of Russia. In November 2013, Yanukovich declined the offer of an association agreement with the EU, instead opting to join the Eurasian Union. This sparked the pro-EU and pro-Democracy EuroMaidan movement, which began as a response to this decision.

By February 2014, the Euromaidan movement succeeded in ousting Yanukovich, who later fled to Russia. Russia responded by occupying and annexing the traditionally pro-Russian Crimean peninsula.

Similar to Crimea, Eastern and Southern Ukrainians have closer ties to Russia with many of their relatives residing in Russia and Russian being the dominant language in these regions. In the Donbas and Luhansk regions of Ukraine popular pro-Russian protests quickly transformed into an armed conflict with Russia allegedly supporting rebels.

Together these two de-facto republics are planning to form a new state entity called Novorossia (translates as ‘New Russia’). Russia has already punished Ukraine for its European ambitions and it can do much more. Other parts of Ukraine such as Kharkhiv Oblast and Odessa have also significant minorities that support the pro-Russian ideas of the Donbas rebels (Diuk, 2014).

 Conclusion

Overall with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova signing an association agreement with the EU, there have not been many significant changes in Russia’s plan to establish the Eurasian Union in 2015.

The establishment is still going ahead as planned, with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Armenia all on board and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan also expressing an interest in joining.

Russia had hopes that Ukraine would be part of this Union; some officials in Moscow also believed that Moldova would be interested in Eurasian Union, but very few politicians had aspirations about Georgia’s membership.

Russia is quite concerned that the EU and NATO are moving closer to its borders and feels that it has to do something in defense. Other potential future members of the Eurasian Union could be Azerbaijan (President Ilham Aliev has chosen neutrality for now), and Uzbekistan (President Islam Kerimov has criticized the Eurasian Union and said that in case of membership Uzbekistan could lose some of its sovereignty) and Turkmenistan (expressed similar concerns over sovereignty). Another potential future member is Turkey, which has for long time aspired unsuccessfully to join the EU, with Kazakhstani President Nazarbaev inviting Turkey to join the Eurasian Union.

The Eurasian Union is a reality and one day might be a significant force that could counter the European Union. Some members of the new union have vast reserves of natural resources, huge territories and big economies.

 About the Author

Giorgi Shengelia is a graduate of University College Dublin (UCD) with a bachelor’s degree in Politics and International Relations, and a master’s degree in Geopolitics and Global Economics. He has completed an internship in the Georgian Embassy to Ireland and is currently working in the Human Rights Committee in the Parliament of Georgia. His fields of interests include Geopolitics, Human Rights, European Union and Middle East Politics. Giorgi is part of GPPW’s internship programme.

You can find him on Facebook and Linkedin 

*Cover image ‘Minsk forum on Ukraine‘ European External Action Service

The Russian-Ukrainian crisis was a game changer, garnering huge international attention and sparking debates as to the consequences and importance of the events in Ukraine for Europe. Many European and neighboring countries clearly demonstrated their position and were quick to comment on the events. Hungary, however, was more reticent, displaying initial reluctance to state their official position on the matter.

By Teona Surmava.

* This article, along with the in-text image, was originally published by Project for Democratic Union

Before 3rd March, 2014, Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban and his government remained silent on the Ukrainian situation. Upon breaking his silence, Orban stated that “Hungary is not part of the conflict”. This pragmatic approach to foreign policy can be contrasted with Orban’s approach at the beginning of his political career, which saw his frequent and unhesitant criticism of Russia and her actions. The Hungarian rapprochement to Russia under Orban’s government thus represents a marked shift in approach.

 What are Hungary’s main concerns in the Russian-Ukrainian crisis?

A primary concern for Hungary was for the significant Hungarian minority living in Ukraine, which includes 156 thousand living in the area of Transcarpathia. A potential consequence for Hungary was thus a significant influx of refugees and the repatriation of the Hungarian minority as the Ukrainian situation became ever more complicated. Furthermore, Hungarian political leaders were concerned about a new law proposed by the Ukrainian parliament, which aimed to abolish the 2012 law “On state Language Policy” in order to ban the minority languages and prevent further separatist attempts from the Russian minorities. The proposal became one of the main issues for the Hungarian political elite, which was articulated at the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Visegrad countries plus Romania, Bulgaria and Greece in Budapest on 24th February, 2014.

On the 1st March 2014, the Hungarian foreign minister János Martonyi expressed his concern about the situation of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. His speech highlighted the attitude of the Hungarian government towards the Hungarian minorities residing abroad and the policy can be translated into the slogan established four years ago: “Don’t hurt the Hungarians.”

Later, the Prime Minister made his first comment on the Russian-Ukrainian crisis stating that “Hungary is not part of the conflict.”

Thus the primary concern of Orban was about the safety of Hungarian minorities in Ukraine. This anxiety was echoed by parties on all sides of the political spectrum. However, it was clear that, while the situation may have been dangerous for the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, there existed the potential to renegotiate their status for the better. As Jobbik announced on their official web site on February 3rd , 2014, “It is particularly important that the Fidesz introduces the strongest national advocacy because the Ukrainian crisis easily creates a historic opportunity to finally reconcile and even solve the situation of Hungarians in Transcarpathia.”

Nuclear Deal

There are important reasons behind Hungary’s reluctance to weigh in on the condemnation of Russian aggression in Ukraine. One of the reasons why Hungary feels a responsibility to be careful about criticizing Russia is the strong economic links between the two countries, including the Nuclear Deal which was signed on January 14th, 2014. The 3 trillion forint-loan ($13.33 billion) Moscow offered to finance the construction might be behind Oran’s silence.

The two new nuclear reactors at Paks, born of the “marriage” between the Great Russian Bear and Viktor Orbán are the largest and most costly construction projects of the century for Hungary. The agreement, an outcome of Hungary’s policy of opening towards the East, encompasses just about every aspect of Hungarian energy policy for the next half century, the costs of which will be borne by succeeding generations.

The estimated full cost of the project, EUR 12.5 billion, is over half of the entire funds transfer received by Hungary from the European Union between 2007 and 2013.

Raising such a huge loan has its price. In the first seven years, Hungary will have to repay 25 percent of its debt, then 35 percent and finally 40 percent. When the Hungarian–Russian nuclear agreement was signed, the Hungarian government justified it by claiming that only half of the present capacity of Paks will remain operational until 2030 but it failed to offer a professional explanation of why it is necessary to make up for the gap from a nuclear source.

The new reactors to be built in Paks will not reduce Hungary’s dependence on the Russian energy resources because the Hungarian–Russian nuclear energy accord foresees that Russia will supply Hungary with fuel rods in the coming 20 years and perhaps beyond that.

The agreement for the expansion of the Paksi nuclear power plant was part of Orban’s policy of opening up to the East to reinforce trade, business, and education ties with various countries in Asia and the Far East. Following the deal, a Hungarian official said Budapest is enjoying “an increasingly enjoyable” business relationship with Moscow.

Russian-Hungarian symphony

In the context of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Orban has been keen to exploit the full range of benefits which result from Russia’s particular interest in developing co-operation with those EU and NATO member states with which it has close relations.

Hungary seeks to establish warmer relations with Russia and, as Viktor Orban stated in August 25, 2014, by imposing sanctions on Russia in punishment for Ukrainian events, Europe had “shot itself in foot”.

If we look at Hungarian-Russian relations briefly throughout history, we can see that it began with a period of mutual turning away, a policy of denial and a dramatic contraction of contacts in 1990-91. The following years saw the growing stabilisation of relations, leading to a situation that can be characterised as a kind of peaceful coexistence. By the end of the term of Hungary’s first democratic government (1994), the relationship with Russia had acquired an increasingly pragmatic character. Finally, the Hungarian government which came to power in 1994, while acknowledging the importance of Russia’s role, did not place priority on developing it, so communications evolved in the direction of standard interstate relations.

However, the foreign policy program of the Hungarian government that took office in mid-2002, identical with that of the Socialist Party in opposition during the pre-election campaign, accorded top priority to the need to develop relations between Hungary and Russia. Since then the Hungarian government has taken a soft line on issues relevant to both countries and its Russia policy has so far consisted of more pageant than substance. In this context the new Hungarian government has done little more than arrange a visit for Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy to Moscow. There has been a continued decline in Hungary’s exports to Russia and no substantive progress has been made on the hoped-for return of Hungarian works of art.

Hungarian-Russian relations after the regime changes were mostly centered on the question of how to develop business and trade between the two countries.

Despite this superficial approach to Hungarian-Russian relations, it is clear that parallels can be drawn between Putin’s political philosophy and the approaches of the Orban government.  It is obvious that there is a lot of Russian sympathy with Orban’s anti-Muslim and anti-minority mentality, along with an acceptance of the criticism that liberal democratic values drive deficits and hurt production. Similarities to Russian political ideology might also include taking control over media, breaking down of civil society, and implementing tough immigration policies.

This is highlighted in looking at Hungary’s media system, which falls under one of the most stringent state controls in Europe, and which has become a disturbing example of how a political elite can roll back democracy. Regarding the implementation of tough immigration policies, it is clear that Orban has promised to take a hard line on immigration. In a speech on the 25^th of August, 2014 Orban openly spoke about further improved relations with Moscow. Furthermore, Orban’s demands that ethnic Hungarians should be given more rights in Ukraine have been given a lot of publicity in the Russian press and fit in with the Russian government’s narrative, in which they accuse the Ukrainian government of discriminating against national minorities.

Russia is Winning

Relations with Russia may become an important line of division between countries in the region, particularly in the shadow of the Ukrainian crisis. As mentioned in the beginning, the Ukrainian crisis can be a crucial turning point for the European countries and can change the geopolitical balance, not only for Europe, but for the International community as well. It is important to recognise and understand the challenge levelled at Europe by Russian political strategy.

Why is it ever more important for European countries to act together?

Russia seeks to rewrite the rules in three ways. First, it does not believe that its neighbors should make their own decisions about their geopolitical futures. Russia’s security, in short, depends on these countries’ insecurity. Russia particularly begrudges the former captive nations of the Soviet empire their freedom, their prosperity, and their independence. These pose an existential challenge to the stagnant and autocratic model of government pioneered by the Putin regime.

Furthermore, Russia also wants to end role of the European Union as a rule-setter, especially in energy policy.

Russia has not only challenged the European security order and seized another country’s territory, Crimea, but is  now in the process of seizing more land, creating a puppet state called Novorossiya (New Russia). It has already crippled the Ukrainian economy and threatens to turn Ukraine into a failed state. The response from the West has been weak, late, and disunited.

Sadly, many European countries, like Hungary, have no appetite for confrontation with Russia and they take an essentially pacifist stance. Consequently, Russia is successfully using the dubious political state of those countries to its advantage, posing an increasingly serious challenge to European security, with its possible future sights on Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia or Moldova, and most likely in the Baltic states.

*This article is published in Partnership with

In-text image: Image courtesy of Kremlin.ru via Wikimedia Commons, released under Creative Commons 3.0. 

Cover Image: ‘EC13‘ by Európa Pont