kasmir - GPPW - Page 20 of 30

India’s Child Soldiers: Reality Check

I joined the military dalam when I was 13 or 14 years old. I was studying in an ashram school (government run residential school) in eighth standard, when Naxalites came to my hostel. I did not want to go. They said I could study until the 10^th standard, but I should go with them. We got training, learnt about landmines and a little karate. (Finally) I had an opportunity to run away… One year after I ran away, both my younger brothers (age 8 and 12) were killed (by the Naxalites in retaliation). They beat my mother and broke her arm. They burned our house and took all our things. (Former Child Dalam member, December 2007) [1]

The police asked me also to become an SPO (special police officer) but I refused because I did not want to become an SPO and commit heinous crimes. I did not want to shoot and kill people. They do not ask anyone how old they are. Even 14 year olds can become SPOs if the police want them to become SPOs. (Poosam Kanya (pseudonym), former resident of Errabore Camp, December 2007) [2]

The above two statements exemplify the horror of exposing children to conflict. They find themselves sandwiched between the violence perpetrated by armed opposition groups and the State armed forces. The Government of India is a signatory to the optional protocol on the Involvement of children in armed conflict [3], which was further ratified on 30^th November, 2005.

According to Asian Centre for Human Rights, there are 3000 child soldiers (including State forces and armed opposition groups) in India (as of March 2013), 500 in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and Northeast India; 2500 in the left wing extremism affected areas. These figures form only the tip of the iceberg. The periodic report submitted by the Government of India (prepared by Ministry of Women and Child Development) in 2011 on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict to the Convention on the Rights of Child has not only denied the existence of child soldiers in India but also misrepresented facts regarding sub conventional conflict taking place in various parts of the country. The report states “Even though India does not face armed conflict, there are legislative provisions that prevent involvement of children in armed conflict and provide care and protection to children affected by armed conflict” [4]. UN Committee on the Child of rights is scheduled to consider it during its 66^th pre-sessional working group to be held in Geneva from 7-11 October, 2013.

This denial has not only distorted facts but also justified or rather absolved rampant recruitment of child soldiers in the armed opposition groups who are increasingly becoming an internal security threat. While terrorist organisations in India have an unprecedented number of child soldiers in their ranks, there are reports of the state police forces too, having recruited people below the age of 18 years. As per unconfirmed reports, the Chhattisgarh police has recruited approximately 300 “Bal Rakshaks” seven of whom are posted with 4^th battalion (engaged in counter insurgency) of Chhattisgarh Police at Mana in Raipur. These reports still need to be verified.

Considering there is a large number of children in the armed conflict of left wing extremism, which has caused an irreparable damage to their lives, it becomes imperative to analyse what drives so many children to pick up arms. Recently, Muppalla Laxmana Rao aka Ganapathi in a 7000 words letter to party members has admitted having crisis within the party due to lack of leaders not only at the top but also in party ranks. Lack of volunteers for the cause is perhaps driving the Maoist leadership to recruit child soldiers. This is clearly visible in the exceptional number of women and children in the naxal cadres. Around 40 to 60 percent of naxal cadres now comprise of women.

Maoists also have a policy of forcibly recruiting at least one child from every family. With heightened security in the region, they use children for covert operations, which involve planting and ferrying lethal weapons and explosives. Mass exodus of leaders from Maoist cadres has led to large-scale recruitment of children who are easy to terrorise and manipulate. A top commander of a banned terrorist outfit (on condition of anonymity) revealed to Tehelka Magazine that, “Minors are an easier lot to train. Initially the boys cry but they also fall in line quickly, because they are fresh and smart. By the time they are fully trained, they can serve the party for a long time. We even recruit girls; they are not given arms training. Some freelancers and collaborators recruit minors for us on commission basis”.

In September 2013, few gun toting rebels abducted eight children and two adults to groom them to make bombs. “They forcibly dragged our children into the nearby jungles and disappeared even as we pleaded for mercy”, says Bilokhan Lohra. His 10 year old son, Pardeshi Lohra was amongst those who were abducted. A week ago, his mutilated body was found dumped near his house, his stomach ruptured and hands torn. The post mortem report has revealed that he lost his life during an explosion. No child of a tribal family deserves that fate. As per the report by Hindustan Times on September 20, 2013, Jharkhand Police has prepared a list of Maoist leaders whose lives are soaked in corruption. The Maoist leaders are busy carving out bright prospects for their own children while putting the lives of other’s children at risk. Some details are:

The son of CPI Maoist Central Committee member Pramod Mishra arrested from Dhanbad colliery town of Jharkhand some years ago, is a qualified engineer.
Ugeshwarji, sub zonal commander of the CPI (Maoist) leads the operation in the border areas of Bihar and Jharkhand has four daughters, three of whom study in a private English school in Latehar.
Maoist Commander Shivlal Yadav’s sons study in a good private school in Daltonganj.
Gopal Ganjhu the sub zonal commander sends his two kids to a popular school.

In left wing extremism affected areas, schools are being targeted to propagate the Maoist ideology. Lessons imparted to young, impressionable minds are distinctly anti-establishment and give a message that a revolution is necessary to overthrow the Government. Government run schools have shut down due to high violence levels forcing the locals to send their children to naxal run schools. This way, many children voluntarily fall into their trap and launch attacks against the State forces.

Due to lack of state intervention in the developmental paradigm of the region, glorification of war by the naxals and the irreparable psychological damage caused by a long drawn conflict, children are increasingly drifting towards the Maoist ideology. As per Mr. Shubhranshu Choudhary, founder of CGNET Swara and author of “Let’s call him Vasu”, “300 boys of the naxal cadres went to Nayagarh from Chhattisgarh. They walked undetected for 3 months with two guns each on their shoulders. If this is possible in India, then we are headed for a very dangerous situation”.

India’s denial of the existence of child soldiers in its armed conflict deprives many families of mere hope to receive justice for having sacrificed the lives of their children. At a time when International Court of Justice has given verdicts against terror outfits in Africa for using child soldiers, which has also contributed towards maligning their image, India has perhaps missed the opportunity. Few recommendations that emerge out of the article are as follows:

Awareness has to be generated regarding the issue of child soldiers in India through media and academic circles.
Integrated Child Protection Scheme launched by the MWCD in 2009 already provides care and protection to children affected by or involved in conflict. A comprehensive rehabilitation scheme should be designed especially child soldiers to control their ever-increasing number.
Strict action should be taken against individuals or groups who are responsible for recruiting child soldiers.
Integration of children into mainstream society through intervention in the field of education and health in conflict zones would be vital.

Author Biography

Pratibha is a researcher & writer on issues pertaining to women in conflict zones at the Institute for Transnational Studies and a graduate student at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy.

This article was originally written and published in 2013 for the Center of Law Warfare Studies and is republished here with the permission of the author.

Notes and References:

[1]Dangerous Duty: Children and the Chattisgarh Conflict, Report by Human Right Watch, September,2008

[2] Ibid

[3] Article 2 of the Optional Protocol to the CRC provides that “State parties shall ensure that persons who have not attained the age of 18 years are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces”. Article 3 further provides the minimum age for the voluntary recruitment into the national armed forces shall be 18 years and above. Article 4 states that the armed opposition groups should not under any circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years and the State parties shall take all feasible measures to prevent such recruitment and use

[4] Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Child on the “Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict”, 2011,Ministry of Women and Child Development(GOI), Under Article 4, point number 15, 16 and 17 http://wcd.nic.in/crc3n4/crc3n4_2r.pdf

Asian Centre for Human Rights, India’s Child Soldiers, March 2013
Murthy Vijay and Sharma Vishal, “Jharkhand: 2 abducted kids flee Maoists, return home”, Hindustan Times, September 2013
Murthy Vijay, “Children of Gods: tactics using minors easy option for reds”, Hindustan Times, September 2013
Singh Pratibha, “Naxal Target Schools”, CLAWS, March 2013
Choudhary Randip, “No Child Soldiers says India. Truth says otherwise”, Tehelka.com, May 2013
Krishnan Murali, “India pressed to address child soldier issue”, Deutsche Welle, May 2013

Winter Skies, Frozen Seas and Northern Shores III: Greenland and Denmark

The Viking Saga I: When Erik the Red went to Greenland…

It was the year 982 a.d., a strong snow falls under a grey sky and a drakkar – a Viking longship – appears on the horizon. As it reaches the shore, a figure can be made out standing at the helm: Erik the Red arriving from the Viking colonies in Iceland, sets his feet for the first time in Greenland. That moment not only marked the Viking relation with Greenland but also the later European connection. Ultimately Denmark became the nation that controlled Greenland, although there is a special provision for its autonomy.

Just as Greenland was an opportunity for Erik it is also an opportunity for Denmark, given the current changes taking place in the Arctic and the resources that are now being discovered in Greenland, among other economic issues. According to Degeorges (2013) the island is now a key strategic location with valuable resources that will have several implications, some of which are already being seen. Indeed, Greenland is in the middle of a new geopolitical hot-spot in which the interest of Great and Middle powers will meet and collide and many of these powers are already being attracted to the island. Additionally, those same resources can boost Greenland’s desire for independence, which, following Degeoirges (2013) ideas, is being perceived as a potential source of risks that may turn into a threat, because of the fact that a small, weak nation immersed within such a hot-spot would be exposed to influences from outsiders.

These resources however also present opportunities for Denmark in the shape of resources that can benefit the Kingdom of Denmark (Greenland, Faroe Islands and Denmark itself). They can also go some way to the maintenance of the harmonic relations between Greenland and Copenhagen, in which the former has autonomy in deciding domestic issues while the latter is in charge of foreign policy; defence; the needed increase of Denmark in Greenlander resources and the foreign investments to develop them; and projects related to resources and infrastructure[i].

Regarding the Great and Middle powers’ interests, it is worthwhile to highlight the interests of China and South Korea, although it is the Chinese interests that are the most “worrisome” ones. China, according to Degeorges (2013), is pursuing an access to strategic resources that are placed in Greenland[ii]. Currently it is looking at the extended coast of Greenland close to Iceland for a location that may be used as a potential hub for shipping for a number of supposed reasons. The main reason is most likely China looking for access to the Arctic Council and a vote so it can promote its interests in the Arctic. Other reasons included the fresh water present there that could become a value resource in the future, and the ice caps which are useful to measure the effects of climate change and thus understand adaptation to it [iii].

Furthermore, and as Degeorges (2013) points out, there have already been some diplomatic contacts and visits between Greenland/Danish authorities and Chinese Representatives and President Hu Jintao between 2011 and 2012, in which Greenland and Arctic interests were the main topic on the Chinese agenda.

According to Degeorges (2013), South Korea on the contrary, mainly has interests in education and research exchange programs, some mineral natural resources, the issue of climate change and environment, and trade[iv].

According to Wezeman (2012), to fulfil its task of protecting Greenland, currently the Danish government is using 3 unarmed maritime patrol aircraft, and there are plans for F -16 deployment in the area (taking into consideration that those were deployed once at Kangerlussuaq in Western Greenland) with the potential reutilization of the Thule Air Base. Also, as Wezeman notes, the Kingdom has two military units operating in the area: the frømanskorps (Frogman Corps) special forces unit, and the slædepratrulje (Sledge Patrol) Sirius. It also has 3 frigates reinforced by 4 Thetis class frigates, two OPV patrol vessels class Knud Rasmussen, and a larger patrol vessel capable of operating in ice waters. The Danish navy has a base at south Greenland, in Grønnedal.

Although Denmark mentions that the main reasons for an increased presence in the area is for environmental protection, enhancing international cooperation, promotion of sustainable development, and security, the real reasons and steps taken go in a very different direction, as Huebert, Exner – Pirot, Lajeneusse, & Gulledge (2012) all point out. As a matter of fact, the increased activity following the diminishing of the ice is forcing the Kingdom to increase its policing and security actions, as well as to increase the military assets for the protection of the national Arctic interests[v]. The fact that Denmark, for example, is increasing its presence with its navy and still develops strong ties with NATO sends the message that it will be prepared for the worst and that will use force if needed (Huebert, Exner – Pirot, Lajeneusse, & Gulledge; 2012).

The Danish Defence Agreement recognizes the importance that the Arctic and Greenland are having for the Kingdom, mainly because of the rights that the Kingdom has for extracting the natural resources present there following the mentioned effect of climate change in the area. The defence then, will be adapted to the new situation as well as of the resources issue, but the defence of Greenland aside, it is also intended to perform task both natural and civilian, and to support other authorities. This means that civilians are to be involved in the defence of the island. Replacement for the older patrol cutter is intended, and the replacement vessel will have marine environmental and research support capabilities. Nine new MH – 60 Seahawks will also be incorporated within the Danish Forces’ ranks and will reinforce the navy’s tasks in the Arctic, as well as the search and rescue services’.

A new command, called the Arctic Command, emerged after the union of the North Atlantic Command with the Greenland and Faroe Island Command, proving again the importance that Greenland has for Denmark[vi]. An Arctic Response Force has been established too, having of course the tasks of defending and preparing the troops to execute defence in the Danish Arctic. Surveillances with UAV are intended to be executed in order to make a risk analysis near Greenland’s waters [vii].

Secondly, and furthering on what the Defence Agreement mentioned, Denmark is currently executing a program of naval modernization. In other words, a modernization of those assets that will be used in the Arctic/Greenland scenario. The Kingdom for instance has 11 Flyvefisken Class patrol ship with a modular design thus being able to be prepared to missions such as patrol, anti-ship or anti-air[viii]. Also, it has 4 Thetis class light-frigates capable to sail on ice-waters and used frequently in Greenland. Two communication and control vessels Absalon class will be incorporated, capable for anti-ship and anti-air missions and capable also to have helicopters and to transport battle tanks and other heavy equipment where needed. Three light Ivar Huttfeldt OPVs will follow too equipped with Harpoon and Tomahawk missiles thus being optimized for Anti-ship and surface-surface deep strikes. The already mentioned Knud Rasmussen ice patrol ships were incorporated in 2008 – 2009. All of the previously mentioned assets show that Denmark intends to have a strong and multi-role Arctic navy in order to protect its national interest, exert sovereignty and secure resources in Greenland (Huebert, Exner – Pirot, Lajeneusse, & Gulledge; 2012).

The steps taken by Denmark are, beyond any doubt, much more defined and focused than the ones taken by Canada. Both may have the similarity of mentioning the environment as one of the main reasons for their interest in the arctic along with the furthering of cooperation and working under International Law, but Denmark is moving in reality for the sake of protecting its national interests. And it is increasing its military assets and presence in the area in a stronger way than Canada. Put simply, Denmark is following the right path with the aim of securing its Arctic interests, having Greenland – no matter the type or relationship between the Metropolitan Denmark and Greenland – as a focal point for doing so. The risks and challenges are as high as the opportunities for the economy of the Kingdom as a whole.

As Huebert, Exner – Pirot, Lajeneusse, & Gulledge (2012) remark, an important point to consider is the relations between NATO (remember that Denmark is part of the Alliance) and Russia in a potential future conflict may involve the region. Additionally they point out another scenario in which tensions between the West and Russia will be felt and lead to the West, not only Denmark, to increase its presence in the area. Additionally, cooperation might be a wish but not a materialized one, given the recently unilateral steps taken by Russia in other scenarios like the Arctic, the Middle East with Syria and now Ukraine.

Another potential conflict might come from a dispute between the EU and Russia and may also have the Arctic as the main, or one of the scenarios, if escalation follows. And Denmark is, for instance, one of the 5 littoral states that will be on the front line. In the same way and as Huebert, Exner – Pirot, Lajeneusse, & Gulledge (2012) point out, there is the issue of the extension of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the UNCLOS: will the Russians and other parties stick to the rule of law or will they try to gain and meet their objectives by the use of force? And will there be place for a military cooperation or will the dynamic be of facing a common threat? The latter seems to be more likely in the Russian case. But it happens that Russia is not the only thing the Danish sailors and pilots will have to be worried about. The Chinese are jumping into the scenario and, as has been mentioned throughout this current series, the Chinese navy will increase its presence not only for protecting the Chinese civilian shipping, but also to use the Arctic as a strategic playground against the United States if a conflict arose with South East Asia and the West Pacific. And with the recent events with the Air Zone area over Japanese islands, the Chinese attitude will be more of “command and control” rather than of making business only. A possible “String of Pearls” involving Iceland and Greenland could take place which could be directed against the United States and even the European Union and Arctic states, if they wanted to push for the winds in their favour.

And finally, as was said with the Canadian case, the environment might be a noble objective to be protected, but military assets are still needed to do so, especially if the opening of new shipping routes brings with them the presence of vessels that might infringe environmental laws and pollute waters. Denmark, it seems, has understood this well and the increasing presence of a refurbished navy is a good sign and an example that other Westerncountries in the area should be following. Not only for protecting their Arctic environments, but also to face together any possible threat coming from the other side of the world and the other shores of the Arctic. The absence of submarines is, however, a worrisome gap on the Danish defence assets and no increase of air assets, save the SAR helicopters, is strongly felt. Denmark will need more new air assets than just the F – 16 to effectively secure Greenland and provide a support to its navy. The solution might lie in a stronger cooperation with the airforces of Canada and the US under the NATO frameworks, while Denmark looks for a replacement for the current F – 16 fleet, a replacement that it is in dire need.

The Vikings may have abandoned the island 500 years after the shoring of Erik the Red on that day of 982 a.d., but this is something that Denmark, if it wishes to secure and benefit from the resources discovered in the island, will not do. A good sign of this is that this time there are frigates flying the Danish flag sailing around the island, and not drakkars abandoning it.

*Cover image ‘Hvidbjørnen dockside in Grønnedal‘ by Boegh

[i] Even in a case of independence, Degeoirges (2013) mentions the possible and beneficial idea of reaching a mutual defence agreement between Denmark and Greenland. That would keep at a certain way the things in a similar way as they are currently.

[ii] Those resources are: Rare Earth Elements, Iron ore, Uranium, oil, and gas.

[iii] See the First Article of this Series: Winter Skies, Frozen Seas and Northern Shores (I). Part 1: On the Frozen Seas of the North a Red Dragon’s flight is worth to note.

[iv] The United States also had and still have in a little sense an interest in the Danish Arctic territories, mainly for the defence of North American airspace.

[v] Diplomacy and cooperation for conflict resolution are being mentioned also as important pillars for Danish actions in the area, as well as the International Law, according to the Denmark Artic Strategy 2011 – 2020.

[vi] Its headquarters are in Nuuk.

[vii] Interestingly, the Agreement mentions along with surveillance the need of combating piracy in the Arctic for the home guard and navy. See: Danish Defence Agreement 2013 – 2017, p. 17.

[viii] “Modular Design” means that the ships can change their weapons to execute the mission they are intended to do, instead of having a fixed ones. This results in a very flexible and versatile platform.

Sources

Degeorges, D (2013). Denmark, Greenland and the Arctic: Challenges and opportunities of becoming the meeting place of global powers. The Royal Danish Defence College. Copenhagen, Denmark.

Government of Denmark (August 2011). Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands: Kingdom of Denmark Strategy for the Arctic 2011 – 2020. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Copenhagen, Denmark.

Huebert, R., Exner – Pirot, H., Lajeneusse, A., & Gulledge, J. (2012). Climate Change and International Security: the Arctic as a Bellwelther. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. Arlington, Virginia, USA.

Danish Defence Agreement 2013 – 2017 (November 2012). Copenhagen, Denmark.

Wezeman, S. T (2012). Military Capabilities in the Arctic. SIPRI Background Paper. SIPRI. Stockholm, Sweden.

Greek Parliament Votes on Future of Eurozone

As of Tuesday GREXIT, an exit of Greece from the Euro-zone is back on the table. So is a large scale debt write-off for the country.

By Benjamin Zeeb

*This article, along with the in-text images, blockquote, charts and graphs, was originally published by Project for Democratic Union

The Greek Parliament at Syntagma square, Athens Greece

On Tuesday, prime minister Antonis Samaras asked the Greek parliament to move forward the presidential elections in the country to 17 December. The vote will be held in parliament, where Samaras’ ruling coaltiton holds a majority of just 5 votes.

Should parliament fail to elect a new president, snap elections will be held, with Syriza, Greece’s anti-austerity party, currently leading the polls. Despite the momentous consequences this decision could have for the Euro-zone, the media in many countries have been almost eerily silent on the subject. In Spain and Germany neither Süddeutsche Zeitung, nor Der Spiegel, nor El País feature the news prominently on their websites.

The move by Mr. Samaras has brought down the Greek stock index 13% on Tuesday, its largest drop since the beginning of the Euro-zone crisis with investors in fear of a comeback of the turmoil that haunted the continent from the summer of 2011 until Mr. Draghi put an end to the drama with his vow to “to do all that it takes” in 2012.

What is at stake?

The consequences should Syriza come to power in Greece could indeed be dramatic:

“Greece in the next six weeks may prove to be more important for global markets than Russia/Ukraine was in 2014,” Charles Robertson, chief economist at Renassiance Capital told the Financial Times. He added that “a possible Syriza election victory may force the Euro-zone to choose between a fiscal union or the first euro exit.”

Robertson is not the only one warning of the potential risks of a failed parliamentary vote. under the title, “The Greek endgame begins”, Paul Mason, a journalist for Channel 4, wrote in his blog:

“Syriza has been in the City of London and other financial centres outlining its plans: it will demand a 50 per cent write off of the outstanding debt and that the ECB buy all Greek debt for the next 60 years at zero interest rates. An executive from Capital Group, a major investment firm, produced this leaked summary of one investor briefing with Syriza in which he described their plan as “worse than communism.”

While this outcome is of course contingent upon the parliamentary vote failing and even then Syriza might not win decisively enough in the following elections to substantially alter Greece’s course on the Euro, sooner or later Euro-zone leaders will have to expect some version of this scenario becoming reality. Keep in mind that Greece is not the only country in the Eurozone where a pro-default party is polling highly:

Greek Parliament Votes on Future of Eurozone

The Spanish elections next year in particular should be cause for concern to anybody with vested interests in upholding the status quo. While less radical than Syriza in many regards, Spain’s Podemos party holds almost identical views regarding the current governance of the Eurozone and is leading the polls in front of the social democrat PSOE and conservative PP.

Possible scenarios

Once a pro-default party is voted into power in any of these three countries, there are three basic options available:

1. Let them leave

The most unlikely scenario given the unforeseeable consequences. Still representatives of the Commission and core Euro-zone states are likely to hold this up in any coming negotiations as the big stick, pretending that it isn’t the banking sectors of their home countries that would be hit hardest by this scenario.

2. Bail them out

This might come in the form of an outright debt-write down. But the most likely scenario is a semi-disguised bailout via a huge bond-buying program of the ECB. Economist Wolfgang Münchau puts the total cost of such a move at about 3 trillion Euros – vastly more expensive than issuing Euro-bonds. But the fear of giving up national sovereignty reigns supreme on both sides of the negotiation table, so we might well see a dramatic end to Mrs. Merkel’s course of responsible monetary policy. This of course would relieve all pressure on peripheral Eurozone countries to engage in any meaningful reform and cement a powerful and in-transparent ruling structure where key decision makers do not rely on any democratic mandate.

3. Euro-bonds and democratic accountability

All existing state debt is federalised in a once-off move through the issue of Union Bonds to be backed by the entire tax revenue of the common currency zone. This is accompanied by the introduction of an automatic balanced budget requirement for all national and regional administrations with a subsequent ‘no bail out clause’ and an insolvency purge of all insolvent private sector financial institutions, in which deposits, but not loans, shares or bonds, are to be refunded by the Union. In order to legitimize such a move this new Union would have to be run by a directly elected representative of all Euro-zone countries.

Obviously the third option is what PDU is trying to make happen. Until we succeed there will always be a next election during which an entire continent holds its breath.

*This article is published in Partnership with

Cover Image: ‘Greek Parliament Building‘ by Tilemahos Efthimiadis

Learning from past mistakes: what Afghanistan can learn from Iraq

The Iraqi government in Baghdad is facing a deadly insurgency since American troops left the country. Will the new Afghan leadership be able to avoid similar issues after ISAF troops leave the country in 2014?

American troops left Iraq in 2011, although peace has not been achieved in this Middle Eastern country. In the years following the withdrawal of foreign troops, sectarian violence has increased with terrorist incidents happening on a daily basis. Recently the situation became even worse when the Islamic State group seized large parts of Western Iraq including most of the Anbar province and the second largest city of Mosul. NATO and ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) troops are planning to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014, however recently there have been talks to extend the deadline.

Afghanistan recently experienced a peaceful transition of power for the first time when elections were organized and president Hamid Karzai was succeeded by Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai. Ghani will have a difficult job to maintain relative stability in Afghanistan and not to repeat the mistakes of former Iraqi PM Nouri Al-Maliki.

Iraqi experience

In 2011 when US troops were leaving Iraq, US president Barack Obama famously said that it is harder to end a war than start it. The situation in Iraq today is worse than before the American invasion in 2003. Immediately after the withdrawal of US troops, sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shias intensified and the number of terrorist incidents increased. In the capital Baghdad attacks became a weekly occurrence, and after the last American troops left Iraq on December 14^th2011, fighting, bombings and other violent incidents occurred immediately. After 2011 Iraq has experienced everything from suicide bombings in mosques in Baghdad to Yazidi massacres, using female captives as sex slaves, and the capture of large cities such as Mosul, Fallujah or Ramadi by terrorist organizations. (Taylor, 2014)

This surge of violence resulted in an increase of the number of deaths in 2012 in comparison to previous years and has now almost reached those in the early years of the US-led invasion. Sunni residents were not happy with the policy of former Prime Minister Al-Maliki, who later resigned due to the ongoing crisis (Piven, 2012). The fact that the amount of victims of violence has increased dramatically is proved by an Iraqi Body Count agency. Figures of 2014 are the highest since 2006-07 (IBC, 2014).

Developments in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is set to face a new phase in its history when foreign troops leave the country in 2014 (although this date is still disputed as there have been talks about extending the ISAF mission for one more year) and Afghanistan is facing these challenges with new leaders. The presidency of Hamid Karzai was controversial and Ashraf Ghani has many issues to solve. The new president was formerly a finance minister and a World Bank economist and in order to come to power he had to sign a power-sharing agreement with his former opponent Abdullah Abdullah. When Ghani was proclaimed as president, Abdullah became the chief executive of Afghanistan (prime minister). The new government allowed for a small number of US troops to stay after 2014 while the previous government had refused to do so. (Gul, 2014).

The summer of 2013 is already known as one of the most violent seasons in recent Afghani history. In 2014 the attacks by the Taliban increased in number and there is fear that this trend will continue, especially due to the fact that more and more territory is now under control of Afghans (Central Helmand, Kandahar, etc). Even though the concerns are high, it is hard to make a judgment about the situation right now. A clearer picture will be seen a few months after ISAF troops leave, however the bad precedent of Iraq is there. (Felbab-Brown, 2014) Another interesting development might occur after US troops leave Afghanistan such as an increase of influence on the Afghan government by neighboring powers such as India, China, Pakistan and even Russia. Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has already promised support to Afghanistan after ISAF withdrawal.

The future of Afghanistan looks uncertain but despite difficulties there is hope for peace. The Afghani government should learn from the Iraqi experience and from their own mistakes in the past in order to move successfully towards the future.

About the Author

Giorgi Shengelia is a graduate of University College Dublin (UCD) with a bachelor’s degree in Politics and International Relations, and a master’s degree in Geopolitics and Global Economics. He has completed an internship in the Georgian Embassy to Ireland and is currently working in the Human Rights Committee in the Parliament of Georgia. His fields of interests include Geopolitics, Human Rights, European Union and Middle East Politics. Giorgi is part of GPPW’s internship programme.

You can find him on Facebook and Linkedin

*Cover image ‘Daily Life in Herat, Afghanistan‘ by United Nations Photo

Britain First: Populism for the Internet Generation

For better or for worse, the internet has changed the face of activism. In their support of a particular cause, the average person can now log on to internet fora and share ideas with likeminded groups around the world; they can use Twitter to organise rallies and protests; and can opine publically on their topic of choice through Facebook or YouTube. This article investigates what this has meant for politics.

By Niamh Baker-Loughlin

*This article, along with the in-text images, was originally published by Project for Democratic Union

It seems that Russell Brand, comedian and quirky celebrity personality, has succeeded in re-marketing himself as something of a political guru. While one might question the coherence of his oft-ranting diatribes and appreciate the irony of a Hollywood millionaire claiming that money is at the root of all evil, it is clear that something in Brand’s much publicised statements on revolution and the state of the political system has struck a chord with the public. Furthermore, it shows that Brand, who refuses to vote in any political elections in sympathy with what he calls a ‘disenfranchised, disillusioned, despondent underclass that are not being represented by that political system’, has struck a nerve in an age in which trust in politicians and the political system is at an all time low.

While it might be easy to dismiss figures such as Brand as silly, harmless caricatures, this political apathy and discontent has mobilised much more dangerous forces at the extremes of the political landscape. The 2014 European Parliament elections highlighted that the extreme-right has seen a renaissance in Europe, with parties such as Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik in Hungary now gaining a worrying influence over national and European politics.

Interestingly, however, the extreme-right in Britain, which is mostly represented by the British National Party, has seen a decline in electoral success, winning no seats in the 2010 UK General Election, and with then-leader Nick Griffin losing his seat in the 2014 European Parliament Elections. No doubt this decline is in part due to the rise of the far-right but nonetheless undeniably more moderate UKIP, who have appealed to some traditional BNP voters, but who can certainly not be considered in the same mould as the fascist BNP or its Continental counterparts.

In looking at these developments (or lack thereof), one might make the happy assumption that the extreme-right is no longer a real force in British politics. However, it seems that electoral statistics tell only part of the story.

In fact, if one looks at popular social media sites such as Facebook or Twitter, one may well draw quite the opposite conclusion on the state of the extreme-right in the UK. Britain First, a party which, in looking at electoral successes, seems to be of little or no political importance, has succeeded in becoming one of the most significant and popular British political forces on Facebook. With over 500,000 ‘likes’, Britain First now has more internet followers than any of the 3 main UK parties or UKIP.

Why, if voting patterns point to a decline in the support of the extreme-right in the UK, does Britain First, a splinter group of the BNP and self-styled ‘street-defence organisation’ have such a following online?

One possible explanation is that many of those who ‘like’ Britain First do so without realising the true nature of the group. In looking at the Facebook page, one meets a barrage of posts and imagery with a broad, populist appeal. Photos of Churchill are juxtaposed with remembrance poppies and Union Jack flags, and many posts decry the evils of Islamic extremism and child sex abuse. It stands to reason that, in producing a large amount of relatively inoffensive content that a broad section of society will happy share on social media, groups like Britain First can extend their reach. As they happily boast, much of the content created by Britain First is seen by more than a million people. It stands to reason that the broader the appeal of the content of the Facebook page, the more likely the page is to increase its following.

Sadly, this is not to say that there does not exist offensive content on the Britain First website – there is certainly a great deal of Islamophobic and anti-immigration rhetoric. However, Britain First has cleverly ensured that some tenets of their principles which would be less popular among their target audiences on Facebook such as, for example, their stance against abortion, do not really feature in their Facebook content. This guarantees that those who sympathise with much of the supposedly ‘patriotic’ content shared through their Facebook page remain ignorant of many aspects of the party. Indeed, one might perhaps hope that there does not even exist half a million fascists within the UK, which seems to further back up the idea that many of those who ‘like’ Britain First are not fully aware of the true nature of the page.

But does the popular rhetoric of celebrities such as Brand and the ever-increasing Facebook and social media presence of groups such as Britain First represent a shift in the way in which those at the extreme fringes of the UK political scene are reaching out to potential supporters? Or is, rather, the popularity of Britain First an anomaly created by clever over-emphasis of the group’s populist messages combined with the censorship of its less socially acceptable, more fascist material?

The first issue here is whether the Facebook success of groups such as Britain First has the potential to translate into electoral support and thus represent a real threat to the political status quo. Britain First’s only hope for political representation has been in the form of less-than-charismatic Jayda Fransen, who stood in the Rochester and Strood by-election on the 20^th November 2014. Quite in contrast to their online popularity, Britain First managed to secure a meagre 56 votes, roughly a third of the number gained by the Monster Raving Loony Party. A poor turnout for a group that styles itself as the new alternative for Britain.

So it seems rather to jump the gun to suggest that Facebook presence automatically translates into electoral success. However, this does not mean that there is no danger in the activities of Britain First. One potential issue is that an internet forum, especially one in which comments of dissent are deleted, as is the case with the Britain First Facebook page, serves as an amplifier for extremist views. Although there exist no statistics, one might perhaps make the assumption that many of those who ‘like’ Britain First are young or easily influenced, perhaps with below average educational levels. Groups such as Britain First can get away with publishing content which has no factual basis on topics such as Islam as their target audiences have little or no frame of reference. Such content reinforces stereotypes and a cycle of frenzied Islamophobia ensues. This, along with the broad reach of these groups on social media, has the potential to skew the political leaning of some groups in society over time.

What is clear is that the potential influence of these groups must not be ignored. However, there also exists a possibility for mainstream political groups to learn a lesson here. At a time in which youth engagement in politics is low, perhaps it is time for politics to exit its traditional corridors of power to embrace a more interactive democracy. In reaching out to young people through media they feel comfortable with, politics might succeed in rebranding and reinvigorating itself for the next generation. Here, the potential for new forms of democracy, that are based on principles of enhanced participation and deliberation, can clearly be seen.

Britain First: Populism for the Internet Generation

By Niamh Baker-Loughlin

*This article, along with the in-text images, was originally published by Project for Democratic Union

*This article is published in Partnership wit

Image ‘Russell Brand Zuccatti Park’ courtesy of Jessie Essex via Flickr.com, released under Creative Commons 2.0. No Changes were made.

Image ‘[key]board out of my mind’ courtesy of Jypsygen via Flickr.com, released under Creative Commons 2.0. No changes were made.

Image ‘Social Media’ courtesy of Martin Gysler via Flickr.com, released under Creative Commons 2.0. No changes were made

Winter Skies, Frozen Seas and Northern Shores II: Canada Part 2

Part 2: The Cold Dilemmas of the Maple Leave

2.2: ‘Protecting the Frozen Shores! Yes… but how?’

The environment and the provision of services and fulfilment of needs are naturally of utmost importance for every state whose main concern is to exert sovereignty – as with the case of Canada and the arctic – over its own territory. But beyond that, the issue of security by conventional means continues to be of even more importance since it is the provision of such security that can allow every development project to be executed and the environment to be effectively protected. And more importantly, according to Huebert (2009), the resources that are potentially present have to be controlled and protected.

But, to what extent has the provision of these basic needs been achieved? Have they been effective? Riddel – Dixon (n.a) remarks that the Canadian Strategy has a focus on Sovereignty and Resource Development, and that the first is a prerequisite for the second[1]. However, Riddel – Nixon (n.a) also points out that some measures regarding resource development are becoming very short on their intended impact. For instance, the Canadian government has invested 100 million Canadian dollars on resource research, and provided funds to Aboriginal businesses, entrepreneurs, and local development programs with a special focus on infrastructure. As a result, a fishing harbour in Pangnirtung is under construction. Still, some policies are not as effective as they could have been or have had little impact. Problems such as unemployment and economic depression continue to persist and the partnership between the Government and the Aborigines still has room for improvement, according to Riddel – Dixon (n.a).

In turn, and according to Riddel – Nixon (n.a), on the aspect of the problem and in the sphere of Sovereignty have been partially made or not made at all. For instance, an airstrip that was intended to be used by jet fighters has been increased in length and quality, enabling it to be used by other kinds of aircrafts. The communication systems are shown as being back-warded and the facilities are either non-existent or usable for only six months. Additionally, the control of the maritime transit is weak, according to Riddel – Nixon (n.a). Vessel registration is practically “voluntary” and only the ones that weigh over 300 tons have to register[2]. The lack of icebreakers compromises the capacity and readiness of the Canadian Coast Guard or Royal Canadian Navy to cope with any threat or emergency.

In the same way, Riddel – Nixon (n.a) identify a number of changes that Canada needs to make, such as: the need of the SAR (Search and Rescue) helicopter fleet to be modernized; the need to expand the Ranger forces – which have been insufficiently increased; the need to solve the maritime disputes that Canada has; and to define the areas that would be under Canadian sovereignty[3]. They also recommend that cooperation with the US regarding the Northwestern Passage must be made along with the agreements on the Beaufort Sea.

In 2008 Canada issued the Canada First Defence Strategy, which presented as main objectives for the Canadian Forces: the undertaking of national and continental operations, including the Arctic and through NORAD; the support of a major international event taking place in Canada (the 2010 Olympics); the response to terrorist attacks; the supporting of civilian authorities in case of a domestic disaster; the leading/conduction of any important international operation for a long period of time; and the deployment of forces as a response to a crisis and for a short period of time[4]. As a precondition needed for the fulfilment of the mentioned objectives, the Canada First Defence Strategy states that an increase of the defence budget of $490 Million Canadian Dollars for the period 2008 – 2028, and a renewal of some of the current assets that the Canadian Forces has by the hand of a partnership with the local Canadian Defence Industry[5], would be necessary.

The Arctic itself is being recognized by the Defence Strategy as an important issue given the changing climate conditions that makes the area more accessible to maritime traffic and economic activity such as tourism, resource exploitation and shipping. But it also means that the Canadian Arctic will be open for illegal activities and “new challenges from other shores” (Government of Canada, 2008, p. 6). Therefore, there are important challenges for Canadian sovereignty and security that will need the provision of military support. According to the Canadian Government (2008), any support will require a modern, well-trained, well-equipped military that possesses the core capabilities and flexibility to secure the Arctic (and to perform in the other specified missions)[6].

There are four pillars on which the Canadian defence strategy stands: Personnel, Equipment, Infrastructure and Readiness. All four of them are grouped under these headings and have set preconditions to be met, such as the increasing of budget and the renewal of assets important for the fulfilment of each. Regarding the pillar of Personnel, the strategy mentions an increase of the Canadian Forces and a Reserve personnel increase of 1000 and 750 effectives per year, while in the case of Equipment it suggests the purchase of 17 SAR aircraft, the construction of 15 frigates/destroyers to replace the current Navy ships, the buying of 10 – 12 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (the new Boeing P-8 Poseidon for example) along with 65 new generation fighters (such as the F-35 stealth Joint Strike Fighters, in which Canada has collaborated on its development) to replace the current CF – 18, and the introduction of new land combat vehicles and systems[7]. Radars and satellites for the improvement of surveillance in the Arctic were considered as well.

In the areas of Infrastructure and Readiness, the Defence Strategy recommends the replacement of the 25 – 50% of the structures owned by National Defence in the next 10 – 20 years, and the planned investment in personnel training and relief for both personnel and equipment, respectively.

But, as Lieutenant-General (Retired) Macdonalds (2009) points out, there is an even darker scenario than Riddel – Dixon (n.a) on the security or “hard” aspect of the Canadian Arctic dilemma. In the area of Personnel there is a problem of a decrease in experience and quality levels given the reducing numbers of active personnel. Furthermore, Macdonalds (2009) states that the plans for an increase of personnel have no size or capability equilibrium so there is a lack of capacity orientation, and an aim for a simple increase in numbers but not in quality. In the chapter of Equipment, Macdonalds (2009) points out that no new ships would be received after 2015, the new fighters may arrive by 2017, and by now the first of both the C – 130J Hercules and CH -47 would be arriving. Additionally, the SAR assets has seen no program executed while the old CP -140 Auroras will remain as maritime patrol aircraft until 2020. Only the program for the fighters’ replacement seems to be on the go (the F -35 would be on duty for 4 decades), being the exception of the mentioned ones and of other failed programs (like the Joint Support Ship) or ones as the Arctics/OPV[8]. Along with the fighters, the land combat systems programs have received more attention.

In the chapter ‘Infrastructure and Readiness’, Macdonalds (2009) also explains that there are no new projects in sight and that there has been a prioritization of replacements where the Canadian Forces are currently present inside the national territory. He also states that on the latter it is still to be seen what the impact will be since the Strategy effectively plans to put more financial resources in this area so there won’t be a shortage of spare parts and decreased training in the future so there will be more vehicles available either for training either for executing other operations.

According to Wezeman (2012), currently Canada has 18 ASW CP – 140 Auroras capable of operating over the Arctic from their bases on the Eastern Coast and 80 CF – 18 fighters that are being used occasionally over the Arctic with the task of intercepting Russian bombers that approach Canadian air space which are also able to operate in secondary bases in locations in the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, supported by 7 tankers. The helicopter fleet and transport aeroplanes, being the new acquisitions of C17 Globemaster and C – 130J Hercules, are operating regularly in the area and using improvised bases on snow or ice for Arctic purposes. There are also some radars placed there as part of the NORAD defence network system.

Wezeman (2012) also points out that currently Canada has 5000 Ranger troops stationed in northern Canada, although their effectiveness and of other Canadian Army units were affected negatively by the focus in Afghanistan. There are currently two important bases: one in Alert (Ellesmere Island) and another one for training purposes in Resolute Bay. Wezeman (2012) also states that the 12 surface units and 4 conventional submarines are capable enough to patrol the Arctic, even though there is a lack of ice, and are strengthened for surface combat except for the 5 large or medium and 6 small icebreakers that are operated by the Canadian Coast Guard for 6 months of the year. The small coastguard base placed at Nanisivisk is being expanded into a naval base.

It seems then that although Canada is doing well in recognizing the Arctic as an important territory and that their plans are looking good, at least on the paper, that there is a great distance between the paper and the reality. The practical responses to the paper are not being carried out properly, and the fact that the programs for the renewal of equipment are suffering delays or cancellations due to the lack of political clarity and will is simply worrisome.

Canada needs to increase its naval assets in the Arctic so it can provide better protection of the territory with the commercial shipping lines that are emerging after the ice receding, the Aboriginal and Northern communities that currently live there, and the overall environment. The current financial situation of Canada and the whole world is a fact and must be taken into account, but cannot continue to provide Canada an alibi for its lack of actions, nor can the “political procrastination” as Macdonalds (2009) calls it .

The Coast Guard is part of the solution for the control of the more internal waters and sea shores, but without a doubt the presence of the Royal Canadian Navy is more than needed in an area that, as it has been pointed out in the two previous articles of the series, will become a very sensible and important geopolitical hot spot in the future – perhaps at the same level or greater than it was during the Cold War. The presence of foreign navies with a hostile attitude, for example, is a risk that must be taken into account and, as it has been possible to appreciate with the Chinese and Russian presence (especially the latter) it is a situation that is more than likely to take place in a mid or long-term future.

If Canada wants to protect and exert sovereignty on the waters it must create at least one or two more naval bases able to serve for both the Royal Canadian Navy and the Coast Guard, and provide both services with assets suitable to do the task in any condition of the year and in a meaningful number. It could also create a separate branch of the navy with the sole task of operating exclusively on the Northern and Arctic waters in either peace or war, capable of halting more effectively the transit of any ship and to tackle the risk of hazardous (illegal crime, terrorism and others) and hostile ships, and also to minimise any activity taking place within the Canadian Northern and Arctic territories[9]. Submarines should also be taken into account within the planned assets renewal, mainly because of the very potential presence of similar units from China and Russia, capable of launching nuclear missiles.

Canadian submarines, either nuclear or diesel-electric might be the perfect assets and a great contribution for the defence of both North America and the Canadian Arctic. It is very curious to feel the absence of a renewal in that sense[10]. Following the acquisition by Russia of 4 Mistral class amphibious assault/helicopter carrier ships from France, the Canadian Navy should be thinking on investing in hover landing amphibious ship to carry troops and equipment to the islands placed in the Canadian Arctic and following a possible Russian landing on those area, or even an airborne assault against those islands.

The secondary aerial bases from which the current CF – 18 operate should be transformed into permanent, strengthened and main bases for the future fighters or at least an important number of them, able to secure air superiority over the Arctic air space and to provide the Navy/Coast Guard with air support, as well as to the army units in the area[11]. The positive aspect is that the land combat systems have received enough attention, as Wezeman (2012) remarks, capable to execute operations in the area – although the capacities have been compromised not only by previous policies but also because of Afghanistan. The army would have to increase their capacities to operate and respond to any threat against Canadian Northern soil.

Finally, cooperation not only between the Canadian Armed Force branches and the Coast Guard is needed, but also the cooperation between Canada and the United States, as well as with other NATO countries with territory in the Arctic. This also implies that every territorial dispute must be solved and that an agreement must be reached, as Griffiths (2009) and Huebert (2009) also point outs. With all of the mentioned policies in the matter of defence, Ottawa might have a shield to provide the needed protection of the Arctic environment, the provision of socio – economic and infrastructure development to the Aborigines as well as of the new resources.

The Maple Leaf may perceive the Northern and Arctic territories as a heritage, a north and a future. But without the provision of an effective protection, it may become the north, the heritage and the future for other nations.

Sources

[1] And actually, as the author is pointing out, the policies oriented on promoting social and economic development are orbiting around the Resources Development/Exploitation.

[2] Riddel – Dixon (n.a) furthers on this point by pointing out the gap formed by such regulation, and that which would be used by international terrorism, organised crime and illegal migration with vessels below the mandated 300 tonnes.

[3] Riddel – Nixon (n.a) mentions that the (scientific) data to support the claims is to be delivered to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf by the end of the current year, so it seems that the areas under Canadian control will be defined by early-mid 2014. It will be interesting to see the results and the answer given by the Commission.

[4] See: Government of Canada (2008). Canada First Defence Strategy, p. 3.

[5] It is important to highlight the importance of the general frameworks of the Defence Strategy, since those same frameworks can provide the Canadian Forces to exert sovereignty and protect the territory and population, as well as to respond effectively to any military threat against the country’s Northern and Arctic territory.

[6] The Defence Strategy remarks that the defence of the Arctic is somehow vital for the defence of North America and not only Canada. And also, that the Canadian Forces need to receive adequate resources for training, spare parts and equipment if they aim to be effective in the Arctic scenario. See: p. 18.

[7] During the development of the Canada First Defence Strategy, the Canadian Government introduced strategic and tactical transport air platforms like the C – 17 Globemaster, the C-130 Hercules, the CH – 47 Chinook helicopters, trucks, new battletanks (Leopard II) and mine – protected vehicles, along with new Arctic/offshore patrol vessels, the Maritime Helicopter Project, and the Joint Support Ships (though this one was cancelled). See: Government of Canada (2008). Canada First Defence Strategy, p. 16. And, Lt – G(R) Macdonald, G (2009), The Canada First Defence Strategy – One Year Later, p.4. Wezeman (2012) points out the incorporation of 6 UAVs for maritime and Arctic patrol (p. 3).

[8] In the case of the F – 35, it seems that Ottawa has not decided yet to proceed with the purchase. In the case of the Arctic/OPVs, Macdonalds (2009) points out that the requirements were decreased, compromising the utility: First, the fire power was decreased (from 40 mm guns to 25 mm guns) as well as the type of ship (ice – cutter). Second, the size, speed and capabilities were reduced as well. And third, there is a lack of political support and the task of securing the Arctic would fall into the hands of the Canadian Coast Guard rather than the Canadian Royal Navy.

[9] Since the Canada First Defence Strategy mentions the importance of the Canadian Defence Industry, those ships should be made locally, with an export of technical know – how from the South Korean shipyards or with local research to acquire that technical capacities. Doing so may enhance the aim of jobs creation for the industry.

[10] A very interesting discussion and review on the submarines topic can be found in: Gordon, R (June 11 2013). Canadian’s submarine fleet’s future could be at risk. Available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/nova-scotia/canadian-submarine-fleet-s-future-could-be-at-risk-1.1334667

[11] Provision of an AEGIS system as it has been done in the Norwegian frigates could be an ideal, previous technical assistance of the fabricants of the Frigates, the Spanish firm NAVANTIA, and the US approval and support.

*Cover image ‘Incoming Icebreaker (Samuel Risley)’ by E Green

Winter Skies, Frozen Seas and Northern Shores II: Canada Part 1

Part 2: The Cold Dilemmas of the Maple Leaf

2.1: Problems in the North

A cold wind, the wind of times, blows on a place; a small northern island partially covered by snow. A maple leaf is carried on the wind, undecided as to where on the island it should land.

The melting ice on the far Northern Seas is posing more challenges than opportunities to the Northern nation of Canada. So much so that it has begun to consider the Arctic as a serious issue, although it is not yet listed under the list of priorities despite the fact that the resources and the potential new maritime routes will be more than enough of a reason for Ottawa to pay more attention to the area. And all of this taking into account that Canada has a good portion of territory in the area, both land and sea. In short, just like the maple leaf floating on the arctic winds, it seems that Canada does not yet know in which part of the island it should land.

The answers, both proposed and assumed diverge a lot in what comes about prevision and current implementations. Harper (2013) points out that despite the fact that the Canadian government already has a policy and a strategy for the Arctic, little has been done on it what it has proposed. Moreover, he suggests that there has been little interest in the area and that some of the main points of the strategy and policies have not been so well received by the targeted communities (namely, the Aboriginal peoples living in the Northern Areas of the country). Even worse, the military aspect which is essential for the protection of Canada and its Arctic territory against any intrusion, have seen no significant advance[1].

One of the proposed approaches made by Griffiths in a retroactive analysis (2009) establishes that Canada should have a focus on cooperation along with stewardship and enhancing sovereignty[2]. All of the previous having collaboration as the very north of every policy and strategy that was to be formulated by the time. Additionally, Griffiths (2009) proposes as objectives the political elevation of Arctic issues, mainly through the Arctic Council and other international organizations; the engagement of both US and Russia with Canada on a cooperative stewardship; and the reinvigoration of the mentioned Council.

In the case of the first objective, the idea is to give a political elevation of any issue concerning the Canadian Arctic to both the ‘Arctics’ (The countries that are members of the Arctic Council) and the non – Arctics, or those with interests in the area.

The second objective is developed by Griffiths (2009) as the essential engagement of the United States and Russia, in which the latter can provide a sub–regional approach when it comes to dealing with some of the concerns and issues ongoing in the Arctic[3].

The last objective, in a deeper sense, aims at the reinvigoration of the Council by coordinating any action or initiative within and among the members, providing more funds to the institution and its members for special projects, and reach regulations on tourism, fisheries, and find answers to climate change[4].

Where Griffiths (2009) places the ideas on a more multilateral approach, Huebert (2009) places more a Sovereignty and Security approach on his proposed focus for an Arctic policy and strategy. In an even more direct statement, Huebert (2009) states that the Canadian Prime Minister should be the head of a special committee focusing on the Arctic, along with the improvement on the controlling the other’s activities. A common idea with Griffiths (2009) is the cooperation with the US and Russia, and with the Arctics as well, having a similar focus on the same proposed areas. In any case, the special word made by Huebert (2009) is the control of the Arctic areas by the Canadian government; a control in which the whole government, from the Prime Minister to the single head of any native community, must take part, and a control in which the rules and laws of the country should be enforced. Diplomatic and military means are also much needed and the military aspect would have cooperation as a framework too, with the Canadian Forces cooperating with the Coast Guard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

The factors behind the two selected recommendations – which are by themselves challenges and problems – and the following Arctic Strategy made in 2009, are very complex in their nature; they are interrelated and may explain why the response given by the Canadian Government is apparently not so solid, although there is a recognition that the frozen north is a vital area for the country’s future.

Griffiths (2009) takes account of the retreating ice and the opening of new routes and notes that most of the new potential routes, including the Northwest Passage, will happen to cross Canadian territory. Huebert (2009) also accounts that challenge and furthers on its implications. Every resource or trade will rely more on maritime transportation which in turn will be benefited by a more accessible area; area that Canada is seeking to transform into a zone under its control as internal waters but over which it is facing the strong opposition from the US, the EU and – as it was reviewed in the previous article – China.

The problem lies not only in the accessibility, but also in the fact that the labelling of those passages, especially that of the Northwest Passage, would imply that potentially dangerous ships ranging from those used by organized crime and terrorists to any hostile vessels belonging to a certain navy would not be controlled or stopped, and that even the air space over those areas would be free. And since Russia is resuming the patrols with nuclear bombers, those nuclear bombers can go deep into the North American airspace[5]. Griffiths (2009) adds that in a case of conflict in the area, Canada would be the country that would suffer the most.

Similarly in regards to the security aspect, Huebert (2009) mentions the different boundary disputes that Canada has with its Arctic neighbours, the fact that crime and terrorism in the area can take advantage of the low presence of Canadian authorities to penetrate North America, and the fact that many of the Arctic countries are renovating their military and coast guard capabilities in the area[6].

According to Huebert (2009), two of the ‘Arctics’, Norway and Russia, are currently experiencing a high renewal of their arsenals in the area; the US has little military presence there, at least for the time being. The reasons behind the Norwegian renewal are due to the protection of its Arctic natural resources (oil and gas) and the disputes with Russia over the eastern waters near the Svalbard archipelago. Russia’s increasing presence in the region is undoubtedly the primary reason for Norway’s increased military focus, with Russia deploying two destroyers and other minor units in the area recently along with patrolling Tupolev 95 Nuclear Strategic Bombers near the disputed areas with Norway[7].

Russia seeks to increase its presence over the disputed areas, as well as make its presence more strongly felt in the region, along with the Russian view of the Arctic as being a passage to other Oceans and as a key economic element for the country. In any case, the actions of Norway and Russia alone are more than a reason for Ottawa to feel nervous, since any escalation may end up involving Canada, not to mention the fact that, as Huebert (2009) reminds, new laws under the UNCLOS might allow the Littoral Arctic States (US, Canada, Norway, Denmark, and Russia) to increase their territorial control via claims. Claims that might overlap and be a source of any potential conflict.

The last factor that should be a cause for concern in Canada is the mere factor of resources; resources that, as mentioned already, will be more and more exposed to exploitation thanks to the melting ice. The exploitation of the resources that would be discovered within Canadian territory might be a great economic opportunity for the Canadian northern and Native population. And Huebert (2009) states that this might also be a good chance for Canada to exert its sovereignty by protecting not only the territory but also the people and their needs through improving prospects for the young population and the environment[8], providing the country a good way to develop and make its northern areas more active.

But the greater ease of resource exploitation is a double-edged sword in the sense that the receding ice makes them more accessible not just to Canada, but also other states, both Arctics and non – Arctics alike, such as India or China who have particular interest in the potential gas and oil reserves[9]. Of course, the blame does not lie only on the receding ice. The new technologies in Arctic navigation are now available for any nation capable to afford it and, according to Huebert (2009), South Korea is now a leading nation in ice–capable ships that can navigate in both frozen and warm waters, overtaking the Russians and Finnish fleets. Indeed, this factor may increase the disputes over the ships navigating waters that Canada will consider its own. As a result it is increasingly feeling the need to have the ability to control the activities of those ships.

So what answers have Canada given to the question of facing and tackling these problematic and interconnected challenges?

By 2009 the Canadian Government issued Canada’s Northern Strategy, which sets out some general priorities for the region, including: the protection of the population’s welfare; the protection of the environment; an inclusive policy that takes account of and includes every actor, from the Prime Minister to the governments of the local territories and the Natives; and the increased vigilance of Canadian Arctic area at Air, Sea, and Land. Stewardship is also included as another general priority within the document, along with the development of local communities and the labelling of the historical and identity importance of the Arctic for the nation. The strategy defines four main areas which sets out the framework for any future policy aimed at the region: the exercise of sovereignty; the promotion of social and economic development; the protection of the environment; and the improvement and devolving of the Northern governance.

On the chapter of Sovereignty it is states that, according to the strategy, a presence has to be maintained, stewardship should be exerted, and the air, sea and land dimensions are to be protected. For the latter, the strategy mentions: the building of an army training centre at Resolute Bay; the modernization of the Rangers; the building of a fuelling facility at Nanisivik; the introduction of new ice-breakers for the Coast Guard and a new patrol ship capable of operating during the first half of the year when the ice is less thick; the launching of a space-based program with satellites for vigilance; and a collaboration with NORAD for the monitoring and patrols. Stewardship was also mentioned, with the introduction of new water control and regulations recommended along with full environmental control within the EEZ, the mandatory report of any ship to the Canadian Coast Guard, and the securing of the Search and Rescue (SAR) of every local Government and Community. Another important framework within the Sovereignty exertion recommends that Canada defines its domain area through scientific studies and resources recognition, and works towards solving the disputes at Hans Island, Beaufort Sea and Lincoln Bay, and diplomatic management with the US on the Northwest Passage.

In the area of Social and Economic Development Promotion, the Strategy states that environmental protection is important, on a par with supporting the economic development of the Northern Territories. This means that the establishment of institutes and the improvement of environmental regulation is a priority. Additionally, new regulations in the same area are to be introduced.

The support for sustainable development projects with a focus on gas, diamond and pipelines were another of the actions stated in the document. For this, the strategy mentions the creation of geomaps for resource acknowledgements. The promotion of cultural tourism is also set as an action. Infrastructural needs are also to be addressed since infrastructure is viewed as important for moving goods[10], with developments to be made entirely in hand with the local governments. The well-being of local populations was set as another priority to be met through the fund for infrastructural, food and social services, and through investments in supporting programs on the aforementioned areas and with the aim of creating sustainable employments. The support to, and fellowship with, the University of Canada for research programs was also suggested[11].

In the chapter on environmental protection it was stated that the safeguarding of the Arctic Ecosystem was important, and that science and technology were a key element, funded through research on climate change impact and adaptation, that would also have an active participation with locals and collaboration with other transnational institutions, with the implementation of a research station. Lands and waters are to be protected as well through the creation of National Parks and a national maritime conservation area and the introduction of environmental requirements, to respond to pollution, for any company wishing to develop resources in the area.

Finally, in the chapter on the improvement and devolving of governance, the strategy (2009) mentions the placement of local decisions in the hands of local governments, the implementation of policies and strategies made by local population and encouraging that population to manage locally the lands and the resources, as well as to address the challenges and opportunities they present. Any local governance is to be compatible with the local needs and dynamics, and the close work with local governments and communities, along with the provision of special funds for those governments, are pointed out as tools to fulfil this ideal.

The strategy also included an international dimension for the Arctic, labelling the cooperation with other Arctic neighbours as important along with the engagement of international partners and the advocacy of priorities by the Artic Council and other multilateral instances. On the aspect of partners, cooperation, diplomacy and international law are the main elements that would drive any Canadian action, and embracing the stewardship and the promotion of interests are high on the list. The US, Russia and the Scandinavian – Arctic nations are mentioned as essential partners, as well as the UK. The Council itself was intended by the strategy (2009) to be a scenario for setting a common agenda, to raise Arctic issues and to strengthen the partnership for the sake of those issues[12]. The importance of the Arctic Council for Canada is evidenced by the strategy’s recommendation of strengthening it.

In the strategy it may seem that there have been credible answers given by Canada to address and manage those issues discussed in this article that both Griffiths (2009) and Hebert (2009) have pointed out. But what results, if any, have these answers brought? The questions of how effective these answers have been, and whether or not Canada is doing what is necessary in order to protect its sovereignty, population and territorial claims over the Arctic militarily — whether that wandering Maple leaf floating on the icy gusts of wind from foreign lands will land in the right spot — will be answered in the second part of this review on Canada and the Arctic.

[1] Although Harper (2013) points out that the military aspect seems less relevant than the environmental effects on the area and the need to address them for the sake of the Arctic population.

[2] Stewardship is defined by Griffiths (2009) as a locally informed governance with an environmental respect and care. See p. 3.

[3] With the US in turn, the engagement would have focused on a cooperation between the two coastguards on Search and Rescue, improvement of oil-spill clean up, environmental monitoring, fisheries, protection of species, harmonization on vessels identification, cruisers controls as well as of shipping, and in helping small communities in adapt to the climate change.

[4] One concern identified by Griffith (2009) was the question of opening or not the membership to the Council to non-Arctic nations which could be a strategic benefit for a China that eagerly looks for it.

[5] A dangerous aspect in case of a worsening in the relations of both Canada and the US and Russia due to any clash either in the Arctic any other area or issues. Griffiths (2009) mentions a possible reason for clashes being the Ballistic Missile System and the militarization of the Space.

[6] The disputes that Canada has in the area, besides the one with the US over the Northwest Passage, are: Hans Island and Lincoln Sea with Denmark, and Beaufort Sea with the US.

[7] As a matter of fact, Harper (2009) mentions that Russia is planning to operate at least 6 aircraft carrier combat groups in the Arctic zone and to renew again the presence of its nuclear submarines beneath the North Pole. Norway in the meantime, is increasing its navy with Fridtjof Nansen class Frigates that has Aegis (anti – aircraft) capabilities and plans to acquire the new multirole and Stealth Join Strike Fighter F – 35.

[8] It is important to remark that for Harper (2009) Sovereignty goes beyond the mere securing of the territory by military means but also the securing of the people within the given territory and to fulfil their needs, or to protect, to use the same author’s word.

[9] Other resources are iron ore and – potentially – gas hydrates. The exploitation of these resources might have a strong impact on the environment, whose addressing is another concern for Canada.

[10] The construction of a fishing harbour was contemplated in the strategy.

[11] Research programs with a focus on industrial innovation, health, and socio-economic development.

[12] Those issues were intended to be raised in other international instances, according to the Strategy (2009).

Sources:

Griffiths, F (June 2009). Towards a Canadian Arctic Strategy. Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow. No. 1. Canadian International Council.

Harper, S (May 14, 2013). Canada and the Arctic. Frozen Promises. Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2013/05/canada-and-arctic

Huebert, R (July 2009). Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security in a Transforming Circumpolar World. Foreign Policy for Canada’s Tomorrow. No. 4. Canadian International Council.

Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (2009). Canada’s Northern Strategy. Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future. Ottawa: Canada. Author.

*Cover image ‘Quebec City 2013 – Canadian Cost Guarde Icebreaker‘ by Reigh LeBlanc

The Right to Vote Abroad – Lessons Learned from Romania’s Presidential Election

With the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (which later became the EU), the fall of communism, the waves of democratization that followed, and the EU enlargement of 2004, 2007 and 2013 respectively, the demand for free movement of persons and thereby external citizenship rights has been established in Central and Eastern Europe. Citizenship is no longer limited to either inside or outside a state’s territory; this notion is especially true for EU citizens. This piece seeks to explore who should provide national citizenship rights in the EU once an individual moves from one Member State to another. The case study for this piece will be the 2014 Romanian Presidential Election and the citizenship right to be explored will be external voting in national elections because it is a means of political participation in democratic societies. The fundamental question is: if the EU’s foundation of free movement is to continue to flourish then should the EU assume responsibility in ensuring that its citizens can vote in their respective national elections while residing in another EU member state?

On Sunday, 2 November 2014 Romania held its first round of Presidential elections; the following day it was concluded that current Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta, from the Socialist coalition, won the first round after receiving 40 percent of the votes. Ponta’s primary challenger- Klaus Iohannis, an ethnic German mayor of Sibiu who is backed by a center-right Liberal coalition, came in second with 30.5 percent of the votes (Pop, 2014). There are many ways in which societies can enable their citizens to cast their votes abroad. The most popular options include voting in person, postal voting or early voting by mail- which sometimes will require a witness in order to limit tampering, proxy voting- which enables a citizen living abroad to select a proxy to cast their vote for them, or most recently e-voting through the internet, phone, or mobile phone (Administrative Cost of Elections, 2007). There is one system used in Romania for external voting and that is voting in person at a Romanian Embassy. There are approximately 3 million people living and working abroad who are entitled to vote in the Romanian Presidential election. For the first election round the Romanian Foreign Ministry sent a total of 600,000 ballots to its embassies. The shortage of ballots led to thousands of Romanians across embassies in Europe unable to vote. The extra voting precautions taken by the Romanian Foreign Ministry left many citizens waiting in line as the embassy closed and were therefore, also unable to vote. At the embassies in Paris, London, and Vienna local police had to intervene after people, angered by how poorly the vote was organized, refused to leave (Pop, 2014).

For many Romanians the Foreign Ministry’s failure to provide an adequate number of ballots for external voters is not only a violation of their Constitutional rights and election fraud but also, a dreary reminder that their country’s communist past still lingers closely behind. Chapter 1, Article 17 of the Romanian Constitution, adopted in 1991, states the following, “Romanian citizens while abroad shall enjoy the protection of the Romanian State and shall be bound to fulfill their duties, with the exception of those incompatible with their absence from the country.” This statute does not state whether or not voting in national elections is a compatible duty while being abstinent from the country. Nevertheless in Article 36 from Chapter 2 Fundamental Rights and Freedoms the following is stated with regards to voting, “Every citizen having turned eighteen up to or on the election day shall have the right to vote.” Again, this statute is vague; it fails to specify where a citizen must reside on election day. Nevertheless, taking this statute in its most literal definition it can be interpreted that the place of residence on election day does not matter since it was not mentioned. If this interpretation is applied to the 2014 Presidential Elections then the constitutional rights of many expats have been violated.

This stripping of the right to vote brings forth questions regarding who should be held accountable and who should organize and manage external voting in national EU-Member State elections in the future. Currently, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for organizing and managing national elections abroad. Since the announcement of Prime Minister Ponta winning the first election round (not an overall win because he failed to earn the majority vote) responses from Romanian Public Officials have thus far been mixed. Prime Minister Ponta apologized for those who were not able to vote but argued that extra measures were needed in order to prevent voting fraud (Economist).

Prime Minister Ponta’s rational was not perceived well by the public because this was not the first time Ponta had been in the spotlight with allegations of corruption (Pop, 2014). Consequently, numerous protests were organized following the conclusion of the first election round. After protests erupted outside the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Prime Minister Ponta said that his Foreign Affairs Minister Titus Corlățean would be held responsible for any future problems in the next voting round set for 16 November 2014. However, some officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shifted the blame onto the Central Electoral Authority and the representatives from the candidates’ political parties for not being present at the voting booths. The blame game finally erupted when Titus Corlățean decided to resign after the decision was made to create additional voting stations abroad for the next voting round. He stated in a press conference that the creation of additional booths was illegal and grounds for contesting the results of the second round. Many speculate that the now former Foreign Affairs Minister’s resistance to the creation of additional political booths was purely political because the votes abroad were expected to go to Iohannis being the pro EU and westernization candidate (Euractiv, 2014). Nevertheless, the international attention provoked by protesters, which led to the creation of additional voting booths, enabled the number of external voters to more than double to 397,000 votes on Sunday, 16 November, 2014. The addition of these external votes from the second voting round contributed to the internationally unanticipated victory of Klaus Iohannis’s after securing 54.5 percent of the vote. As it currently stands, Klaus Iohannis will serve as Romania’s President and Victor Ponta will continue with his role as Prime Minister (BBC, 2014).

There is not a similar case in an EU member state, regarding the right to external voting in national elections, that can be compared to the recent events in Romania. This is primarily because according to Directive 94/80/EC EU citizens have “the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals.” If we incorporate this directive into Romania’s Presidential election than this right was violated in the first round but then, to a greater extent, provided in the second voting round. Since the adoption of Directive 94/80/EC it is relevant to this case to compare how other member states make external voting accessible. Good governance practices have already been put into place in Member States such as Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Lithuania, Spain, and Sweden. These states have adopted measures to inform EU citizens of their rights under Directive 94/80/EC by sending post individual letters or polling cards containing information about their electoral procedures. Member states such as Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia enable citizens to be privy to their rights by providing information on their website on external voting procedures for national elections. Furthermore, Germany and the United Kingdom have gone as far to create a dedicated “helpline” to external voting rights and procedures (European Commission, 2012). In addition, some member states have facilitated greater access to external voting by using multiple voting methods. For example, citizens of Estonia living in another EU member state can vote in their national elections by voting in person, voting by mail, and e-voting. Other examples of central and eastern member states utilizing multiple methods of external voting for their expatriate citizens include Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia (Administrative Cost of Elections, 2007). Romania has not yet adopted these good governance electoral procedures, which were praised by the European Commission in their most recent 2012 report on the implementation of Directive 94/80/EC.

The European Commission’s (EC) position on external voting is that national election practices can have a negative impact on the EU’s free movement right and thus contradict the very foundation of EU citizenship that was put into place to give EU citizens additional rights, as opposed to taking them away. Consequently it is not surprising that the incident in Romania’s Presidential election would not be likely to occur in European Parliament elections. EU citizens living in another EU country have the right to vote in either their host country’s European Parliament elections or in their home country’s European Parliament elections, so long as their national rules provide. This system allows for EU citizens to vote without stripping Member States of their sovereignty. Nevertheless, the system used in the European Parliament elections is currently mutually exclusive from the system used for national elections in the EU.

Bauböck (2007) sheds light on the classic argument against external voting- that individuals who will not be subjected to laws should not be allowed in the process of making them. This is a strong oppositional argument in conjunction with a similar argument- that many expats are so detached from their country of citizenship that they do not possess the competency to decide who should lead. Some member states have even adopted policies which give legitimacy to these arguments against external voting. For example, in the UK a citizen cannot vote in a national election once they have lived in another country for over 15 years (Administrative Cost of Elections, 2007). While these oppositional arguments are worth noting can they be applied to a post-transitional state such as Romania?

Considering the intertwined relationship between the EU and Romanian national governance, and in light of the recent controversy, a seemingly simple solution would be for the EU to assume control over the organization and management of external voters in future national elections. The EU could assume control on the grounds of protecting its freedom of movement foundation. Even so, the solution is not that simple. If the EU were to assume control over its expat voters’ national voting rights’ a system would be created in which national elections are dual managed and thus threaten the sovereignty of EU Member States. Considering the recent increase in EU skepticism, shown in the 2014 European Parliament elections, giving one more national power to Brussels would not be a popular option. Another issue with shifting this power to the EU is that national voting rights for expats is only a problem for a small number of member states. In Romania, a recent member state and a country still dealing with its communist past, dual-election management with the EU may sound like a good idea but for other member states it would completely threaten their sovereignty. Consequently, Romanians are left with no immediate solution. Nevertheless, either one of two future scenarios are likely:

1.) International and national pressure from the new presidential administration result in Romania adopting more good governance practices and we see a gradual shift away from their communist past
or
2.) continued mismanagement and/or corruption at the national level result in the EU being pressured to take a larger role in Romanian national governance in order to protect its citizens and its status as an EU member state.

For now, it’s up to Romania.

About the Author

Bonnie Bethea is currently a Master in Public Policy (MPP) Candidate at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy at the University of Erfurt. Bethea’s research,writing, and academic interests include Eastern European politics, regulatory affairs, and Transatlantism.

References:

ACE The Electoral Knowledge Network. (2007). Voting from Abroad. Retrieved November 15, 2014, from https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/va/onePage

Bauböck, R. (2007). Stakeholder Citizenship and Transnational Political Participation: A Normative Evaluation of External Voting, 75. Retrieved from Fordham L. Rev. 2393.

BBC. (2014). Ethnic German wins Romania vote. Retrieved November 26, 2014, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30076716

CONSTITUTION OF ROMANIA. (1991). Retrieved November 15, 2014, from http://www.cdep.ro/pls/dic/site.page?den=act2_2&par1=2#t2c2s0a36

The Economist (2014, November, 4). Romania’s Elections Polls Closed. Retrieved November 15, 2014, from http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/11/romanias-elections

European Commission. (2014). Electoral rights RSS. Retrieved November 15, 2014, from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/citizen/voting-rights/index_en.htm

European Commission. (2012). Report from Commission to European Parliment and Council on Application of Directive 94/80/90. Retrieved November 26, 2014, from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/citizen/files/com_2012_99_municipal_elections_en.pdf

Pop, V. (2014, November 3). Romanian PM ahead in presidential elections. Retrieved November 15, 2014, from http://euobserver.com/political/126343

Schwartz, A. (2014, November 10). Romania rocked by protests ahead of presidential election runoff. Retrieved November 15, 2014, from http://www.euractiv.com/sections/elections/romania-rocked-protests-ahead-presidential-election-runoff-309884

*Cover image ‘Sibiu – Romania’s Orthodox Cathedral‘ by Camil Ghircoias

Naxal Women: Challenges That Lie Ahead

“A Naxal or Naxalite is a member of any of the Communist guerrilla groups in India, mostly associated with the Communist Party of India (Maoist)” – Wikipedia

Contrary to popular belief, war has never been an exclusively male domain. Women also get drawn into war as combatants, survivors and peace makers. India’s Maoist war which seeks to overthrow the state to establish a socialist-communist society is no exception with women being impacted on both sides of the spectrum: as perpetrators and survivors.

While many of the Naxal leaders have claimed that their support base has been in its waning phase, they have also deployed a different strategy which focuses on increasing the participation of women in the Naxal cadres. Current reports suggest that sixty per cent of lower naxal cadres now comprise of women with their numbers steadily increasing. This has raised concerns amongst government quarters who see it as a method to elicit social acceptability in the tribal areas.

Mapping the movement shows that women have supported it at various levels since its inception in Naxalbari, a small village in West Bengal. In the 1960s and 70s women joined the struggle as they were influenced by their male counterparts and were determined to bring about a social change. The class struggle subverted the need for equal participation and rights since most of the women were employed to do courier tasks, provide logistical support for robberies, or stealing arms and were not entrusted with organisational work.

Several women found themselves retreating to their traditional feminine roles and observed that the movement was replete with nuanced gender blind episodes. As it progressed, some women found a constricted space to express concerns over their rights since it was subverted by the larger albeit “more important” issue of class equality. In the October 2004 cease fire agreement between the Government of Andhra Pradesh and the Naxalite leaders, none of the women were represented.

At present, the movement’s support base largely comprises of tribals who, driven by their poverty stricken conditions, see no other alternative but join the Maoists in their war against the State, mining corporations and the upper caste. In his book “Lets call Him Vasu” based on the Maoist war in Chattisgarh, Shubhranshu Choudhary has extensively highlighted the various reasons that drive women to join the war. Many pick up the gun to avenge the sexual exploitation they faced at the hands of security forces. Many find naxalism as a route to free themselves from the clutches of patriarchy and domination from the upper caste. Rebecca, a naxalite, says “state repression” drove her to take up arms and join the rebels too: “we don’t live this hard life for nothing. I had no choice but to join the revolution. Now there is no looking back,” she says defiantly.

Women’s bodies often becomes sights of war. The warring sides inflict violence upon women to avenge the treatment meted out to them. It is no different for women caught in the conflict between the State and Maoists. A naxalite woman could be raped by State forces or suffer torture at the hands of Naxalites if they quit. Rape and sexual abuse is rampant within the Maoist cadres, Shobha Mandi also known as Uma in her latest book,”Ek Maowadi ki diary”, highlights that she was repeatedly raped and assaulted by her fellow commanders”.

“We had women from 16 to 40 years of age in our group. Almost all those I knew had experienced some form of sexual abuse or exploitation when they had stepped outside their homes to work or at the hands of security forces,” says Rampati Ganjhu, a former rebel commander from the eastern state of Bihar, “these women joined us to seek revenge but things are very different now. More and more of them are disillusioned and some women in particular are being abused by the male leaders.”

The tough forest life as a Maoist guerilla saps the strength from many drop outs who suffer from kidney problems, ulcers, joint pain and reproductive tract infections. This further adds to their hardships when they want to start life afresh. The societal fabric that exists in the region rarely offers a way for women to be independent and empowered in the cultural and the financial domain. Many women have also brought to fore the mismanagement that prevails in granting rehabilitation packages for those who have quit the movement.

There is also a rapid increase in female headed household since most of the men either lose their lives in the conflict between the State or Naxalite movement or join the naxalite movement.Women find it tough to cope in the absence of socio-cultural, governmental and financial support. Kalavati, a Sarpanch leader from a Gond tribe, speaks of her difficulties in implementing the construction of roads in her village. The Maoists hinder the project claiming that it would make them more vulnerable to the Indian security forces. This also impacts other developmental and humanitarian initiatives like health, sanitation and education due to lack of connectivity. She has devised other alternatives to help alleviate the condition of women in her village like providing them with earning opportunities by cooking and delivering food with the help of government funds. However, largely women have to struggle in the absence of support mechanisms.

Partly to blame is the media which contributes towards glorifying the image of women maoists and this pattern has been observed not only in the case of women maoists in India but worldwide. Media tends to be transfixed on the image of the woman guerilla and rarely encapsulates the desperate conditions which prevail in the rural hinterlands and in turn propel these women to join the movement. In fact, there is only recent emergence of interest in studying the impact of Maoist war on Women in the rural hinterlands of India.

In order to check upon the ever increasing number of women maoists, it is imperative that the Government implements policies and introduces adequate safety measures for the women. A woman goes on to impact her entire community therefore it is extremely crucial that positive measures are taken to alleviate them from their poverty stricken conditions and at the same time weaken the Maoist support base.

Author Biography

Pratibha Singh is a researcher and writer on issues pertaining to women in conflict zones at the Institute for Transnational Studies. She is currently a graduate student at the Willy Brandt School of Public Policy in Erfurt, Germany.

References

BBC News, “Why Women join India’s Maoist Groups”, November 2013

Paul, Stella, “Tribal women leaders seek safety & innovation as Maoist insurgent conflict continues”, Women’ News Network

Ramana, P.V., “Women in Maoist Ranks”, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, August 2013

Saiful, Haque, “Wife swapping, Adultery, Rapes. Former Woman Maoist’s shocking revelations on the ultras”, India Today, June 2013

Singh, Pratibha, “Women’s Role in the Naxalite Movement”, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, April 2013

Singh, Vijaita, “Women Maoist Commanders play a big role in encounters”, Indian Express, March 2014

Picture credit: Flying Cloud