Author: kasmir

The Republic of Turkey has its longest common border with its neighbour, the Syrian Arab Republic. Tensions at this border have been ceaseless since the outbreak of the domestic violence in Syria in 2011 that later turned into civil war.
Starting as what can be described as a pro-democracy movement (BBC, 2014), it soon became a national turmoil with expressed demands for the resignation of the country’s president, Bashar al-Assad. The conflict has long since gained a rather sectarian spirit, mainly between Syria’s Sunni majority as the opposition and Assad’s Shia Alawite faction. By August 2014, the fatality rate of the conflict had risen to more than 190.000 (BBC, 2014).

Additionally, the US State Department stated on record in 2012 that the al Nusra Front was not only involved in early fighting in Syria, but had already established a nationwide presence carrying out hundreds of attacks in every major city in the country. Officially, the group is designated as a foreign terrorist organisation and considered an alias for al Qaeda in Iraq (DoS, 2012). The ascent of these excessively violent, highly equipped and well trained extremist jihadist groups in the region, with the financial and hardware support from a number of foreign countries such as Qatar, has recently gained international attention to the point of forming a coalition among world powers led by United States. The Islamic State (IS, considered to be an offspring of al Qaeda) has shot to the top of the list and is currently leading the pack as the main unified terrorist organisation.

Turkey, despite its geopolitical position, has so far shown little interest and much reluctance in getting actively involved in the coalition to fight the IS. Unlike Iran and – to a lesser degree – Russia, Turkey has taken its place on the side of the countries which support regime change in Syria. That notwithstanding, the country’s passive stance towards IS has triggered various allegations concentrating on the fact that the extremist militants seem to have been assisted by Turkey.

Secret operations of a number of C.I.A. officers in Southern Turkey were reported by the NY Times in June 2012. The report further claimed that, paid for by Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, different weapons were allegedly being transmitted mostly across the Turkish border via a shady network of intermediaries. The US government had also acknowledged that Syria’s neighbours would provide arms to the rebels (NY Times, 2012). Similarly, there is ample evidence that, for the purpose of IS fundraising in general as well as the recruitment and courting of foreign fighters, Turkey has effectively become a safe haven and easy route of transit to fighting hot spots in Syria (Daily Beast, 2014).

In 2012, Reuters reported that ‘’Turkey has set up a secret base with allies Saudi Arabia and Qatar to direct vital military and communications aid to Syria’s rebels from a city near the border. It’s the Turks who are militarily controlling it. Turkey is the main co-ordinator/facilitator. Think of a triangle, with Turkey at the top and Saudi Arabia and Qatar at the bottom.’’ (Reuters, 2012). Turkey has a long-established policy of standing side by side with Saudi Arabia and Qatar in providing support to the Syrian opposition either military or financially in pursuit of their policy to topple the elected Syrian government and to overthrow Assad. This has led to a critical internal perception within the country mostly from secularists asserting that such a strategy has been directly beneficial to IS to further prosper. Yet all of these allegations have been strongly rejected by the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi), Turkey’s ruling party. In support, the government reported that Turkey has managed to track down, detain and deport more than 1,000 European fighters back to their countries of origin (Todays Zaman, 2013).

During more recent fighting between the IS and the Syrian military in the town of Kobane, located in Syrian Kurdistan, Mr Demirtas, the co-leader of HDP (Haklarin Demokratik Partisi) Turkey’s pro-Kurdish political opposition party, claimed that the Islamist Jihadists were firing on the defending Syrian Kurds from the Turkish side of the border. This was later ruled out by the Turkish military. Moreover Sebahat Tuncel, HDP Istanbul MP, claimed that ‘’…for two years, Turkey has been sneaking in arms and food and support to the al Nusra and IS while publicly saying it does nothing.’’ (LA Times, 2014).

However, there has also been a strong affinity in Turkey towards the extremist groups in Syria as voiced by a number of Sunni Turks who feel sympathetic towards the jihadists on the grounds that Sunni Muslims have long been subjected to oppression (Williams, 2014). On December 3^rd at the ’60-nations’ meeting in Brussels (RFE/RL, 2014), it was reiterated by the coalition powers that the priority rests upon a common commitment towards defeating IS rather than focusing on regime change in Syria. However, it was made clear that the latter was still the primary concern of both President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu.

Turkish scholars and analysts inside the country display varying views on this matter. Mr Ufuk Ulutas, the director of the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA), takes an AKP-supporting stance. He indicates that ‘’there is also no need for Turkey to change its current position because the US-led operation is clearly unsuccessful. The recent suicide bombings in Kobane show this. The coalition is pursuing a misguided strategy and there is no reason why Turkey should be part of this.’’ (Al-Monitor, 2014).

Turkey has placed pre-conditions for more operational participation with the coalition rather than a merely tactical cooperation. By establishing a Safe and No-Fly Zone (NFZ) inside Syria, similar to the NFZ before the successful take-over of Libya by NATO and a number of allied Islamist extremist groups, Turkey is suggesting a similar tactic to assist the opposition in their combat with the Syrian military and to provide security for the internally displaced civilians. Yet, a substantial agreement over this matter has not been reached between Turkey and the US-led coalition powers, especially with the US government still undecided over the question of a Libya-style offensive. Instead of condemning and preventing the atrocities and humanitarian disasters committed by groups like IS, Turkey seems to insist merely on a more consolidated and sophisticated practical plan for the overthrow of the Assad government. Considering the bigger picture, Turkey’s geographical location and the mass influx of Syrians seeking refuge to the country, validates the significance of the conflict for the government.

As a direct consequence of the Syria-IS war, the long standing hostile Turkish-Kurdish status quo inside the country has recently experienced renewed tensions. The conflict in the Kurdish town of Kobane between Kurds and IS militants has seen Iraqi, Syrian and Turkish Kurds uniting in a new form of alliance, without ignoring the significant internal disputes still existing among the different Kurdish groups in the region (Al Jazeera Turk, 2014). However, the degree of atrocities committed in Kobane by the extremists has also raised a general domestic outrage, especially in the provinces with high-density Kurdish populations. It has also been argued that the AKP’s use of its historically less supporting attitude towards the Kurdish ethnicity as a justification for its passive condoning of IS, aims at weakening the Kurds by letting them fight Islamists first (Ananicz, 2014).

In 2012 a resolution process had begun among PKK (Kurdistan Isci Partisi) and the Turkish army in order to promote dialogue between the parties and to put an end to the previous armed conflicts. However, no constitutional or legal reforms have so far been implemented. Didem Akyel Collinsworth, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, thinks that ‘’…the state still sees PKK elements as the largest domestic security threat. That mentality hasn’t entirely changed in Turkey, and therein we see the dilemma of which way to go – you can see this reflected in Turkey’s policy […].’’ Moreover, with Turkey’s next elections due in June, direct involvement with respect to the conflict in Syria would not be one of the ruling party’s priorities. It would be strongly rejected by the Turkish public from a domestic point of view, primarily due to its public security implications. Therefore, it would be in the AKP’s best interests to keep the domestic status-quo as peaceful as possible.

Meanwhile, Turkish politics have had their own share of long existing, yet recently amplified, internal clashes between a number of Islamist groups that resulted in a large number of arrests of editors, columnists, journalists and police officials. These arrests have dominated the headlines of domestic media up to the end of 2014. Hurriyet Daily News, a news agency known for its secularist opinions, argues that the underlying motive for the recent outrage throughout the country dates back to 2009 when criticism was aired by Fetullah Gulen, the self-exiled leader of the Hizmet movement, about an Islamic group called Annotators locally known as Tahsiyeciler (Hurriyet Daily News, 2014). Fetullah Gulen has remained a close ally of the Turkish government until late 2013. Both the Annotators and the Gulenist groups are subscribing to the same Islamic source as their main book of reference, namely Risale-i Nur. However, the fact that the Annotators advocate a reinterpretation is strongly objected by the Gulenists (Hurriyet Daily News, 2014).
Pro-Gulen media outlets, like the Daily Zaman and Samanyolu TV, have been consistently and fiercely critical of the Annotators which have been alleged of conducting criminal activities and maintaining a workable relation with al-Qaeda (Hurriyet Daily News, 2014). After the release of all its members that had been taken into custody, the Annotators counter-sued the Gulenists. This, however, served no practical consequences at the time, taking into account of the close ties between latter and Turkish government. In a recent turn of events, President Erdogan pledged then to root out the parallel state, whereby he now also referred to his former allies, the Gulenists (Foreign Policy, 2014).

As a defence to the many attacks on several mainstream media outlets, the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), Turkey’s main political opposition party, has called for a collective unification of all the opposing forces against the ruling political system (Hurriyet Daily News, 2014). The CHP also accused the AKP of nepotism by leaking a long list of names involved in backhanded interactions linked to the party and its members (Al Monitor, 2014). Overall, it seems no longer to be an argument whether Turkey has turned into a country that is prone to censorship. The Freedom of the Press and the Freedom of Speech have been severely limited with the vast share of domestic press coming under the control of government.

Similar to the buoyant internal political issues, the Turkish population has been equally dismissive about the AKP’s official position with regards to the Syrian conflict. A Turkish opinion poll, conducted by Metropoll, in September 2012 showed 56% of the surveyed dissenting with AKP’s approach of confrontation and support of an intervention in Syria against the elected Assad’s government in order to force latter’s ultimate fall and replacement (Metropoll, 2012).

Szymon Ananicz, a research fellow at the OSW department for Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia, also discusses that ‘’lack of public support for more active involvement in the conflict – especially in the pre-election period – along with the destabilisation of the state structures, will limit Ankara’s ability to take the initiative in the Syrian conflict. It is likely that, at least in the short term, Turkey will continue its policy based on the defence of its own territory and non-confrontation.’’ (Ananicz, 2014).

The Syria vs IS conflict is proving to be a showcase of the potency of Turkey’s foreign policy. So far it has mostly been dominated by the country’s official defensive approach towards its own territory and ensuring domestic security rather than taking on the role of a proactive international player. The argument could be that the country’s geopolitical position prevents any supporting stances and thereby jeopardizing its territorial security against any potential threats. Nevertheless, the Turkish government has recently approved a cross-border military intervention in Iraq and Syria (Al Jazeera, 2014).

Turkey’s cautious approach has as well been claimed to be a resulting aftermath of the 49 Turkish hostages that were taken at the Mosul consulate in June 2014 by IS militants. Objecting to the allegations of ransoms paid by the government in return for the release of the diplomatic employees, the AKP argued that the release was merely the consequence of political and diplomatic negotiations with the IS (Middle East Monitor, 2014).
Additionally, the Turkish public’s attention has been diverted by the Gezi protests in 2013, followed by corruption cases directly involving government officials in December of that year. In such a polarised domestic political climate, a civil conflict seems almost inevitable in response to any foreign policy the government would undertake to follow with respect to Syria and IS. Lauren Williams, a freelance Journalist based in Beirut and Istanbul, also stipulates that Turkey is challenged by its policy alternatives. She argues that ‘’whether the Erdogan government softens its hard line on Assad, collaborates more cooperatively with the United States in anti-IS policy, or hardens its position by resisting cooperation with the Kurds and continuing to back the mainly Sunni opposition in Syria, it risks rallying some sectors of society while alienating others even further […].’’ (Williams, 2014).

Yet, it remains questionable how long this passive policy can survive. The less Turkey would remain indifferent with respect to the humanitarian tragedies taking place at its borders, the more isolated it risks to become in the International community. The AKP’s foreign policy against the Syrian government has given rise to criticism by the leading opposite political parties, i.e. CHP and HDP. Both parties openly question AKP’s sincerity in combating IS. The argument put forward by the parties is that the underlying reason and main point of focus of the government is the toppling of the Syrian regime rather than IS. However, the primary step would logically be to put a permanent end to the jihadists’ recruitment inside the country.
Additionally, as reported by Thomas Seibert, the Turkey correspondent for Der Tagesspiegel, illegal border trade and smuggling diesel fuel between IS and Turkey is also another domestic interpretation behind the Turkish government’s reluctance to actively fight against the extremist group (Seibert, 2014). It allegedly implies the existence of a hidden cooperation between the AKP and IS.

On the other hand, as Turkey has been the recipient of a mass influx of Syrian refugees, the matter is perceived divergently among the nation’s public. A survey conducted by Hacettepe University in Ankara in November 2014 provides statistics of Turkey’s internal perceptions on this matter. 70% of the Turkish population perceive the Syrian refugees as an economic burden. Concerning issuing work permits for Syrian refugees and sharing the neighbourhood with Syrian residents, the approximate opposing percentages are respectively 47% and 50% (Hugo Hacettepe University, 2014).

Alongside with defending its territorial security against the IS offensive, protection of national interest is also conceived to be a major concern for the Turkish government. Yet, disparities have been showcased among public opinions in the country that seem to be invalidating the credibility of such claims.

At the same time the AKP is reluctant, with respect to its foreign policy towards the Syria-IS conflict, to take a pro-active role in supporting PYD (Demokratik Birlik Partisi), the sister organisation of PKK in Syria. However, it recently allowed for the transit of Free Syrian Army forces, the alleged moderate opposition, through its borders to enter Kabane (DW, 2014).

Soner Cagaptay, an analyst for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on Turkey, concludes that Turkey’s Syria policy carries conflicting priorities.
Degrading IS, overthrowing Assad and subduing PKK all at the same time
(LA Times, 2014). The question should be asked whether the AKP actually considers the PKK as a greater threat than IS, since it regards the PKK as a terrorist organization. In light of this, Turkey could be seen as using the rise of IS as leverage over controlling its Kurdish minority. The conflict in Kobane has definitely hindered the resolution process, signing and executing the long negotiated peace agreement with the Kurds.

Taking in to consideration the fact that Kurds are making up one fifth of Turkey’s population, the term protection of national interests is debatable. This stance seems to tie in with contradictory policies towards interventions as shown by not just the Turkish government, i.e. the US intervention in Iraq on behalf of Iraqi Kurds and the later refusal to intervene on behalf of Kurds in Syria. Equally, using military force against the PKK, Turkey not only refuses to do the same to protect Kurds against the IS, but is also seen as an ally against the Kurds themselves (Guiton, 2014).

Another consequence of Turkey’s foreign policy may well be that the IS offense and security threat to the wider region is effectively assisting the Kurdish struggle and paving the path towards Kurdish independence. David Gardner, a Financial Times columnist, reported of a former Turkish diplomat claiming that ‘’the primary result of [Daesh] is that it increases sympathy for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state.’’ (Gardner, 2014). The Turkish diplomat further maintained that such a consequence would give rise to further bloodshed in the region.
Consequently, the official policy for regime change in Syria by Turkey may have serious repercussions in the region. Turkey’s border and the AKP’s foreign policy have been essential in allowing support to IS and their proxies in Syria.

The Turkish population has condemned the government’s strategy of silent support for IS and the toppling of Assad regime. Such a stance due to the fact that the Turkish government allegedly fails to accept the consequences of increased security threats of a prolonged war as well as the economic and humanitarian burden of a continuing influx of Syrian refugees. From a domestic point of view, with elections coming up in June, Turkey is also facing massive internal political conflicts. Therefore, further instability will be caused by the government’s continuing ambiguous foreign policy on Syria which will be stressed by any renewed fights with IS from and near Turkey. These events may well enable the Kurds to obtain wider support in Turkey itself and worldwide political support to further their independent movement away from Turkey.

The AKP’s reluctance to turn away from their passive or active support for IS may thus very well result in much more than just Syrian human catastrophes and in the very least a lot more than what the Erdogan government is bargaining for.

Author Biography 

Golnaz A. Jafari obtained her B.A. in English Language & Literature from Tabriz State University in her native Iran, she has also studied LLB in International and European Union Law and LLM in International and European Union Business Law respectively from University of Birmingham, United Kingdom, and the Vrije Universiteit Bruxelles, Belgium. Golnaz is specialized in International law, Global governance, International Economic law and organizations as well as European Union law, Policy structure & Institutional framework in general. In automn 2014, Golnaz joined GPPWs internship program.

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Picture Credit: Jan Sefti

The example of Cyprus clearly shows the urgent need for a more integrated and better regulated EU economic structure. The small island is awash with Russian money, the origins of which are dubious. 

By Eleni Courea

* This article, along with the image, was originally published by Project for Democratic Union

Cyprus. With a population of just over a million, the island primarily conjures images of sandy beaches, salty halloumi cheese and UN peacekeeping troops on idle patrol in the midday sun. There’s not much industry or agriculture, and very little to export. Yet, the islanders enjoy a very comfortable standard of living – the 23rd-highest in the world according to The Economist – dependent on an annual 3 million tourists and a 120-billion-dollar financial industry.

But it wasn’t sun or sand that splashed the wonky-shaped Mediterranean island onto the front pages of virtually every major international newspaper. On 24 March 2013, The Economist ran an issue depicting Cyprus as a sinking ship in shark-infested waters, with a headline borrowed directly from Jaws 2: “Just when you thought it was safe…”. It was a story we’d all heard before: the banks were in deep trouble and needed to be rescued at all costs.

After a long and painful negotiation process, Cyprus ended up receiving a €10 billion loan from the ECB and IMF, on the condition that it subjected itself to a set of austerity measures. The final agreement forced the government to completely close down Cyprus’s second-largest bank and impose a staggering 47.5% haircut on all uninsured deposits exceeding €100,000. In other words, small Cypriot businesses, universities, and families who had amassed large savings in their neighbourhood Bank of Cyprus branch found that all deposits over €100,000 had been slashed in half. Not even charities were spared; their deposits suffered a 27.5% haircut, and the Cyprus Anti-Cancer Society continues to protest outside the Nicosia Presidential Palace to this day.

The European Central Bank was not Cyprus’s first call when, in 2013, its state finances began to go awry.

This year, the Cypriot economy, which contracted by –2.8% in 2014, has finally embarked upon the slow road to recovery. But still, all is not forgiven. No other floundering European economy was forced to make its citizens finance the bailout from their savings; and Cypriots hold the EU directly responsible for their plight. Cyprus, which was referred to by European bankers as ‘a special case’, was punished for its lax financial controls, as one of the regions’ most prosperous tax havens.

Before 2013, Cypriots had always been great lovers of Europe. Since Cyprus’s accession to the European Union in 2004, the blue and gold EU flag has flown freely – outside government buildings, but also schools, company offices and hotels, with far more enthusiasm and regularity than in many other EU states. And yet, the European Central Bank was not Cyprus’s first call when, in 2013, its state finances began to go awry. The Cypriot President at the time – Dimitris Christofias – spent months in negotiations with Moscow, in an attempt to secure a multi-billion-euro loan from Russia. By the time the European Union began getting truly involved in resolving the Cypriot crisis, the new president, Nicos Anastasiades, had entered office and the prospect of Russian help had already gone out the window.

Why, then, was Christofias so cosy with Putin? The answer is simple, and at this point, well-known: Cyprus is awash with Russian money. The figures are shocking – in 2013, the BBC estimated that between one half and one third of all Cyprus bank deposits were of Russian origin. Russian millionaires, including President Putin himself, were said to be harbouring €30 billion on the island. Meanwhile, those who have lived in Cyprus’s biggest city, Limassol, for the past decade have experienced a remarkable transformation; shop signs and advertisements along the palm-lined streets are no longer printed in Greek and English, but instead, in Greek and Russian. The city is frequently referred to as ‘Limassolgrad,’ because of the sheer number of Russians that live in it.

While Cyprus is a proud member of the European Union, there are still buckets of dodgy Russian cash floating around its economy.

The problem is that the origins of all this investment are dubious. Cyprus has not simply turned into a popular Russian expat destination, but a money-laundering hub for the East. As far back as 1994, a reporter from The Independent sounded the alarm with an article claiming that Russians were, quite literally, arriving at Cypriot banks with suitcases stuffed with up to €15 million in crisp $100 bills. It was not NGOs or watchdogs, but local bankers themselves who complained about Russians shoving millions in cash into taxis and bringing them in straight from the airport. When, in 2013, the BBC asked the Director of the Moscow office at Tax Consulting UK, why so many Russians had been pouring their money into Cyprus, he replied: “Because they weren’t asked many questions about the origins of the money. Other countries are more careful.”

The Cypriot government, of course, categorically denies this accusation, claiming that it has strict money-laundering checks in place. But the reality is that many of the glistening new roads and sun-soaked buildings in Cyprus were paid for by Russia’s dark shadow economy. Perhaps it was Russia’s illegal arms sales to Iran that financed the new Limassol marina. It’s impossible to know. What we do know is that, while Cyprus is a proud member of the European Union, there are still buckets of dodgy Russian cash floating around its economy. This money would not even be allowed to enter most other EU countries, let alone finance major government projects. This lack of regulation and control categorically proves that, economically, Cyprus is not a fully integrated EU member. If similar situations are to be averted and the European Union is to survive, there is an urgent need for a more democratic, integrated and better regulated EU economic structure.

Cover and in-text image: By Olivier Hansen, “Cyprus president Dimitris Christofias”, via Flickr under Creative Commons Licence 2.0.

“We live in an era of stagnation, rapid impoverishment, rising inequalities and socio-ecological disasters. In the dominant discourse, these are effects of economic crisis, lack of growth or underdevelopment. […] [But economic] growth is the cause of these problems and […] it has become uneconomic, ecologically unsustainable and intrinsically unjust.”

– D’Alisa et al. 2014

On September 2nd 2014, no less than 3000 scientists, activists and artists met in Leipzig, Germany, for the 4th International Degrowth Conference. Seemingly, “degrowth” has gained momentum – a development that grabs the attention of decision-makers throughout politics and economic actors. This may seem counterintuitive as, at the core of it, degrowth questions the most fundamental narrative of last 40 years’ political economy: economic growth as the guarantee for prosperity, wealth, progress and human rights. It is hence worth to take a closer look at what degrowth is all about.

This article aims to provide a general overview of the current degrowth-discourse in all its different facets; it hereby hopes to increase the understanding of degrowth as a diverse field of different, but not contradictory ideas. Above all, the goal is to show that the current degrowth-discourse is far more complex than a simple “less economic growth” and may very well be a starting point for considerable changes in the political economy of the coming decades. These changes will, according to the degrowth-consensus, happen with or without current policy- and decision-makers; making knowledge about degrowth desirable especially for them.

What is degrowth?

„Degrowth signifies a critique of the growth economy. It calls for the decolonization of public debate from the idiom of economism and for the abolishment of economic growth as a social objective. Degrowth signifies also a desired direction, in which societies use less natural resources and organize and live differently than today.“

– Federicio Demaria 2014a

Ideology? Economic concept? Framework? Paradigm? Social movement? The degrowth scholars – many of them based at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, the current center of the academic debate – deliberately avoid to settle this. As a superordinate term, the conceptual openness of degrowth is also used as a unifying strategy. With its specific history and political approach, degrowth is furthermore strongly connected to the Global North (discussion of the term in Myers/Kent ) and there is an on-going discussion whether the concept of degrowth also inherits potential for scholars, politicians and activists from the Global South. Keeping this in mind, we will now take a closer look at the variety of degrowth concepts, starting out with a short historical review.

(1) Historical background

First to be mentioned is the French term décroissance that was initially used by André Gorz in the 1970s (Gorz 1975, 1977). Back then, the emphasis of degrowth was put on the limits to economic growth due to limited natural resources. This specific focus was not by chance: “The Limits to Growth” (Meadows et al. 1972), a study performed by the Club of Rome in 1972, raised the global awareness of declining natural resources and the necessity for a social change in resource use. The findings and radical hypotheses of this study (together with other events like the first global oil crisis) triggered a worldwide socio-ecological movement and found expression in a variety of scientific literature, new social and political movements as well as new international institutions.

Later, in the 1980s, the scope of the term degrowth extended to the critique of utilitarianism, and eventually, in the early 2000s, added elements of a critique of “sustainable development”. Today the term degrowth gets more and more established: at international conferences, in research programs and scientific articles. The central concern however remains conceptualization and creation of alternative societies (D’Alisa et al. 2014).

(2) The idea of degrowth

To illustrate this, there a pretty and concise image: Three elephants and a snail. The first elephant stretches upwards and hence represents the idea of economic growth: more of the same. The second elephant stands motionless and thereby represents the concept of stagnation: ever the same. The third elephant finally lays flat on the ground, representing what recession means: less of the same.

All three elephants typify different paths of development within the same, growth-oriented, paradigm. Each of them strives to maximize, keep or reduce the same: material wealth, employment, resource use and so on. This illustration demonstrates the current landscape of public, political and economical discourses about economic growth and ecology, using terms like green economy, sustainable development, green new deal, steady state economy and many more.

Right next to the three elephants, a snail symbolizes what degrowth means in comparison: something completely different. The emphasis on slowness here reflects degrowth discourses about a “deceleration” of the every day life as well as about an affluence of time as elements of a degrowth society (cf. Rosa 2004, 2005, 2010). The small size of the snail compared to the elephants illustrates discourses about the quality of life, which weights more than the plain quantity of today’s material affluence (cf. Schumacher 1973 [1989], Fatheuer 2011, Welzer 2011) and relates to the necessity of a general change of societal valuing systems (Fromm 1976 [2005], Illich 1973 [2000]). The snail is hence the symbol and leitmotiv of the degrowth movement.

(3) Analytical overview over the themes of the degrowth discourse

Within the degrowth discourse, we can localize five main motives which partly overlap and are inspired by different (academic) backgrounds: (3.1) The limits to growth, (3.2) degrowth as autonomy, (3.3) degrowth as re-politicization, (3.4) degrowth as critique of capitalism and (3.5) degrowth as societal transformation. In the following, we will have a closer look at each of them in order to give a better understanding of what degrowth means to the different degrowth scholars. Such broad understanding is the precondition for any policy maker who wants to talk about degrowth or criticize it.

(3.1) The limits to growth

As stated before, the discussion about the limits to growth is closely connected to the rise of the degrowth-discourse itself. Hence, this issue represents the broadest and most controversial field within the debate and is occupied by at least five different perceptions of “limits”.

1. A) Among degrowth-economists, we find the conviction that the traditional growth economy is inefficient, since the costs rise faster than the achieved prosperity. In return, inequality and the concentration of wealth increase. (Piketty 2014) Apart from that, it appears to be obvious that resource-based economic growth cannot sustain itself endlessly in a world of limited natural resources. (Jackson 2011)
2. B) Feminist scholars argue that economic growth is limited because it is inevitably based on the unfair exploitation of reproductive labour, for example the unpaid care-work of women for children and relatives (Duden 2011, Federici 2012). Additionally, a growth-economy establishes unequal access to resources and their distribution (Mies/Shiva 1993). Moreover, the increasing financialization of life undermines the social cohesion and does not contribute a better quality of life (Fraser 2012).
3. C) Ecologists argue that economic growth is limited because it is unsustainable, which the strong causal relation between GDP and CO₂ emissions confirms. Furthermore, the modus of growth does not allow a necessary dematerialization of society; therefore, the resource access is unlimited – impossible in a world of limited resources (Brand 2012). In a nutshell, this conviction refers to the critique of a topical idea among policy-makers: the decoupling of economic growth from resource use. From an ecologists’ point of view this is a dangerous illusion, because economic growth rests on consumption, which requires (material) products, transport and a production process. A closed recycling cycle as the basis of a decoupled economy would be the first successful perpetuum mobile. Thus, the ecological limits of growth cannot be evaded within the growth paradigm – decoupling does not lead to dematerialization.
4. D) Besides this, economic growth is necessarily finite due to rebound-effects. This means that technical innovations can not achieve their aims to reduce resource-use, because the increased efficiency of technology also increases the total use of it and thus the total consumption of resources. If airplanes for example use fuel more efficiently, flights become cheaper and people can afford to fly more often – this causes the total amount of flights to increase and foils efficiency savings. This also accounts for other forms of resource efficiency like energy efficiency. Additionally, with the diminishing marginal utility of new goods comes the difficulty to create new markets for the ever growing economy (Altvater/Mahnkopf 2007).
5. E) Finally, natural scientists broadly argue that economic growth is limited due to strict natural boundaries (Meadows et al. 1972, Altvater 1991, Rockström et al. 2009). Not only will Climate Change restrict growth – agricultural goods become much harder to produce in context of extreme weather effects – additionally peak oil, peak phosphorus, peak sand and many more will limit unrestricted economic development.

These perspectives do of course not all coexist peacefully. Even though they complement each other and often refer to one another, there is serious reciprocal critique. To give just one example, feminist scholars often criticize that the catastrophic “fife-minutes-to-midnight” atmosphere, created by natural scientists, blindly reproduces the specific gender and power relations which led to the current socio-ecological crises (Bauhardt 2009, Beck 2010). Furthermore, it is to be taken into account that not all authors perceive themselves as part of degrowth discourse, even though they might be adopted intensively by it (e.g. Rockström et al. 2009); this applies specifically to natural scientific approaches.

(3.2) degrowth as autonomy

Autonomy is issued particularly by authors like Ivan Illich (1973 [2000]), André Gorz (1983) and Cornelius Castoriadis (1990), which are today still vividly discussed by degrowth scholars. Their argument does, in contrast to many limits-to-growth-scholars, not assume that strict external, ‘natural’ boundaries of human development exist. Limits are here understood as the results of a collective social agreement for which the ‘natural’ boundaries (e.g. CO₂ level of the atmosphere, pH value of the oceans) do not offer helpful orientation. Thus, according to these authors, there is a need for a new collective self-limitation to regain autonomy over the means of adjustment to the external conditions (cf. Illich 1973 [2000]), otherwise practical constrains will reproduce authoritarian power relations. In this analysis they conform to feminist scholars and anti-capitalist approaches.

(3.3) degrowth as re-politicization

The concern of this theme in the degrowth discourse is to use degrowth as a “missile word” in both the academic and the political context, to challenge the pseudo-consensus of sustainable development (Demaria 2014b). This attack comes from the term “sustainable development” that today advocates a priority of economic interests over ecology or social equality. Already in 1992, sustainability of economic growth meant continuous and stabile growth instead of ecological economics (Brand 2012: 28). This trend was reinforced in the past 20 years, producing concepts like green economy and green growth (critical: Wissen 2012).

Scientists and activists who want to use degrowth as a means of re-politicization therefore also call for a politicization of science, which ought to get involved against technocratic and growth-oriented politics. At this point, theoretical and practical aspects of the degrowth-discourse overlap.

(3.4) degrowth as critique of capitalism

Anti-capitalist scholars conceptualize economic growth as a capitalist imperative, used to solve social struggles over inequality with increased material wealth for everyone. From a politic-economical perspective it appears that internal economic drivers, like the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (Marx 1894 [1975]: 221), cause the necessity for unlimited economic growth. Consequently, anti-capitalist scholars understand degrowth as a sketch of another, non-capitalistic society.

Modern political economists use Marx’ works as well as the works of later Marxists in a contemporary context and find these thoughts relevant for current ecologic and economic issues. To give an example, Brand and Görg (2003) investigate the financialization of nature through patents on genetic information, which are being established with the regulations of the Convention on Biological Diversity. They conclude that such instruments – the accumulation of nature as capital in form of patents – are effects of a capitalism, that, driven by crises in the centre (e.g. collapsing real estate markets), expands into its periphery; geographical as well as economical. In doing so, new practices of capital accumulation (e.g. annuities from patents) are being implemented by new state-alike actors (e.g. TRIPS) and lead to an increased deprivation of rights of indigenous people, women and local population as well as to intensified exploitation of natural resources (Brand/Görg 2003: 72ff., 215ff.).

(3.5) degrowth as societal transformation

Finally, we can identify scientists and activists in favour of societal transition or transformation projects as part of the degrowth discourse. This understanding of degrowth is far closer to (local) social movements than to academic institutions and aims to realize concrete utopias on smaller scales, e.g. transition towns, urban gardening, foodsharing. The goal of these local initiatives is to contribute to a more “humane” society, which leads a deliberately simple life in communities without material abundance.

Such communities produce goods with a high use-value instead of high profits, they are social inclusive, participatory, they try to reduce the amount of wage work and counterbalance the lower financial income by pursuing principles of sharing, local goods exchange and communal use of goods. In doing so, the production of goods becomes decentralized, the need for new goods decreases and the consumers regain sovereignty over the means of production.  Local money, basic income or maximal wages can often be found as elements of such societies which ensure fairness as well as societal participation. Thereby, the transition projects are generally formed by grassroots initiatives of local communities and thus do not depend on official legitimation or the establishment of legal frameworks. These “nowtopias” perceive themselves as a vivid exemplification of another society, as nucleoids of the future which already exist today.

Why is degrowth relevant to policy makers?

The diversity of the discussion sketched above shows that the idea of degrowth unites both natural and social scientists with – among others – economists, artists, social movements and feminist activists. Given the huge participation in the 4^th International Degrowth Conference in autumn 2014, as well as the growing institutional and scientific relevance, it has become clear that degrowth is no longer a political niche phenomenon. Economic as well as ecological circumstances indicate that policy-making of the next decades will have to face ‘the growth issue’. Either activists or scientists or the plain confrontation with economical and ecological limits will put degrowth on the policy-makers’ agenda.

Apart from this, the degrowth-idea also offers considerable new opportunities for aspiring policy-makers. Being not yet established in conventional politics, it needs to be adapted to and implemented in the current policy discourses. Talking about implementation, we also have to consider that there is a significant lack of critique on degrowth, both from sciences and politics. But such critique is needed in order to harmonize the concept, which is inherently connected to the Global North with its affluent consumer societies, with the needs and concerns of people from the Global South. Additionally, many of the scholarly degrowth ideas need to be critically transmitted into political practise – a task which calls for experienced policy makers.

Here, one feature of degrowth needs to be highlighted: it is one of the few truly trans-disciplinary fields and implicates far more than just “less economic growth”. Trans-disciplinary means that the concept bridges the traditional boundaries between and within science, economy, social movements and politics. This is because degrowth is about other forms of social life, about different relationships with nature and one-another – in short: it is about moving towards a different society.

The uniting element here is the conviction that the current ways of living in the Global North need to be dematerialized. The current growth economies will in all likelihood drift into stagnation sooner rather than later, with consequences for the democratic autonomy, individual wellbeing and social peace. In this context, turning away from growth paradigms can open up new spaces of societal participation and can thus revive democracy – and what could be more fascinating than engaging in a process that shapes our common future

Author Biography

Daniel Buschmann graduated in Political Science and Philosophy which he studied at Leipzig University and Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius. His main areas of interests are critical social theory, political ecology and socio-ecological transformations. Currently, he is writing his Master’s thesis in political science on “Characteristics of Hegemonic Discourses in Socio-Ecological Transformation” at the University of Vienna.

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Picture credits:

Cover Picture: Logo of the Degrowth conference, Leipzig 2014, available here

Picture 2: by author, with reference to Frederico Demaria’s opening session of the Degrowth conference, Leipzig 2014, available here

The first of January 2015 marks the date in which the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) came into existence. The EEU is a result of a progressive process of gradual integration. One of the first steps of this process was the signing of a treaty to set up a Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan in 2007. Then, in 2010, the same countries launched a Common customs tariff and a common customs territory which entered into force along with the ECU customs code. This subsequently lead to the removal of physical border controls between these countries in 2011. However Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan had plans to expand the structure of the ECU to allow for further economic integration in a single economic space supported by an economic union. The idea for creating the EEU was embraced by Russia as being a priority.

On the 18^th of November 2011, the three presidents Vladimir Putin from Russia, Nursultan Nazarbayev from Kazakhstan and Alexander Lukashenko from Belarus gathered to sign a treaty to launch a Eurasian Economic Union based on the European Union by 2015. The treaty prepared the countries for further integration and established the Eurasian Commission and the Eurasian Economic Space which began functioning in 2012. In May 2014 the same three presidents signed a treaty to officially establish the EEU in 2015 and committed to guaranteeing the “free movement of goods, services, capital and work force”, as well as coordinating economic policies in key sectors such as agriculture, energy, transport and industry.

The same year, two other former Soviet countries agreed to join the Union after succumbing to Russian pressure. On the 10^th of October 2014 Armenia signed an official treaty to join the EEU and became a member on the second of January 2015. Kyrgyzstan also signed an agreement on the 23^rd of December to join and hopes to become an official member by May 2015. Only will time will tell if this decision will bear positive economic fruits for these countries.

However EEU members are already showing signs of disagreements. In 2014, Russia halted the import of certain Belarussian products so that Belarus would be prevented from reselling EU products in Russia due to the economic sanctions imposed on it by the West over the Ukrainian Crisis. The movement of Belarussian food to Kazakhstan was also halted from passing through Russian territory out of the same fear. The president of Kazakhstan claimed that the sanctions imposed by the West are not only affecting Russia but straining the relations between it and EEU members.

Despite its official founding this year, the EEU still clearly has a long way to go before consolidation. Although the initial signs of economic integration between the three founding members were generally positive, the recent disputes between members has highlighted the vulnerability of the fledgling union. For the two most recent members, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, these signs can hardly be encouraging and it is yet to be seen what effect joining the EEU will have on their economies.

*Cover image ‘Санкт-Петербург, Константиновский дворец‘ by Karim Massimov

For the past months, there have been regular marches in Dresden, and now in other parts of Germany, associated with the movement called ‘Pegida’ – roughly translated to ‘patriotic Europeans against the Islamification of the Occident.’ 

By Liam Fitzgerald

* This article, along with the image, was originally published by Project for Democratic Union

Those joining the marches legitimize their rallies with the slogan ‘wir sind das Volk’ – ‘we are the people’ – in order to criticize the political elites in Berlin, Brussels, and elsewhere. The reasons behind joining the weekly marches may be diverse, but the main argument is that Germans, and other Europeans, are supposedly under threat of losing their identity and their livelihoods to immigration from Muslim countries and that European culture is being supplanted by that of immigrants. In general, there is a serious feeling that political elites are not addressing the everyday social and economic problems of many a citizen.

The mistake made by Pegida, their supporters, and the AfD, the only political party to have backed the marches, is to equate real social inequality and long-time unemployment with immigration. In a very basic way, the people behind Pegida are instrumentalizing the fears of the multitude of their followers for their own ends: that is to attack the established political parties and mainstream political consensus by claiming that their support for an open and diverse Europe is destroying the continent’s culture and disrupting its economy.

Quite on the contrary, Europe, and especially Germany faces a very dire problem. This is an aging population. In the future, jobs will not be done, because skilled workers are rare. The social system will not be sustainable, because too few people of a working age must carry the costs of too many pensioners. Europe faces an irreversible loss of competitiveness, economic well-being, and cultural attraction if it does not manage to reverse the trend of population decreases in the next decades. The key to this is immigration and hands outstretched to those who wish to come, live, and work in Europe. The European Union was, after all, built upon the premise that open societies that welcome diversity and open borders were the only path to prosperity and peace, and this is part of the Union’s attractiveness to aspiring member states and their population.

Many in Germany have realized this and across the Republic, marches demonstrating for cultural diversity and for openness and against Pegida’s narrow-mindedness have demonstrated the welcoming side of European citizens. Indeed, outside Dresden, demonstrations modeled on the example of Pegida have utterly, and satisfyingly, failed. The most notable instance of ordinary citizens saying no to Pegida’s xenophobia and inherent racism was in Cologne, where the magnificent Cathedral for once was not lit up. This symbol of Europe’s Christian heritage was not to be instrumentalized by those who, wrongly, see in themselves the saviours of that heritage.

With last week’s attack on Paris based satirical paper Charlie Hebdo in mind, it is high time that Europe wakes up to the fact that it will only survive and prosper if it is open to diversity and welcomes immigrants with open arms.

Cover and in-text image: “Gegendemonstration” courtesy of Aki Alexandra Nofftz, released via flickr.com under Creative Commons 2.0. No changes were made.

On the of the current EU Presidency system.

By Erika Marty

* This article, along with the images, was originally published by Project for Democratic Union

The Presidency of the Council of the European Union has transformed itself along with societal constraints and the debate surrounding how vital and necessary the position is in modern day politics. The initial importance of the Presidency can be found in political and societal contexts during its establishment, and its drawbacks have been highlighted by amendments and continuing reforms to the position. While the position of “EU President” may have been a good idea given its implications at the time of its establishment, the need for national representation in European governance today is less important. Today it is essential to have a focus on effectiveness, efficiency, and the legitimacy of continent-wide political action.

Establishment and Reforms of EU Presidency

What today is the EU Presidency was first established in 1958 under the European Economic Community. During the first year, the position was held first by Belgium and then by West Germany, for six months each. The EU and its presidency have primarily been affected by two amendments, the Maastricht Treaty and perhaps more importantly the Treaty of Lisbon. The Maastricht Treaty solidified the European Union as it is known today, when its organizational name changed from the prior European Economic Community in 1993.  The Treaty of Lisbon then altered the structure of the EU Presidency substantially. It established a long-term President of the European Council, as well as a post of Vice-President dedicated solely to foreign policy. This move addressed the constitutional framework of the EU, required majority voting in several policy sectors in the Council of Ministers, and legal rights and procedures to leave the EU if desired.

The President position is not held not by an individual, but rather by a national government. During the establishment of the EU Presidency, there were only six member-states and the system was set up so that the position was rotational and with six month terms. The original six members were called the Inner Six – Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg, France and West Germany.

As the number of states within the EU increased, problems with a lack of coordination among member-states quickly emerged. In order to address this problem, the idea of trio presidencies was implemented in 2007 and finalized in 2009 by the Treaty of Lisbon, whereby three separate presidents would cooperate on the same political agenda.  During the initial years of EU creation, the EU Presidency held political power and responsibility in all sectors of integration and decision-making.  Following the Treaty of Lisbon which came into effect in 2009, centralized power was greatly reduced as new positions addressing foreign affairs and security were created along with the division of the European Council and the Council of the European Union into two separate entities. The development of the Treaty of Lisbon was necessary for three reasons according to its supporters. Those three reasons were the need for greater efficiency in the decision-making process, an increased role for both the European and national parliaments, and greater cooperation and coordination internally within the organization.

Problems with the Current System

The inability of the current system to work effectively has been analysed and debated extensively over the course of its existence. One of the main critiques of the current system and the EU Presidency is that the parallel presence of a permanent presidency alongside the rotating national chairing of individual Council compositions inhibits European governance. Another weakness is the system’s lack lack of legitimacy, as the President is chosen by national governments that have to find a common denominator. This led to the surprise nomination of Herman Van Rompuy as the first permanent President of the European Council.

Others have criticized the EU and its presidency as one where only strong nations preside and weaker nations have little say or influence in the political and economic agenda. The current system of the EU Presidency contains a lack of administrative capabilities and experience demonstrated by the smaller, newer member-states and the expenses in both time and finances in running such a complicated administrative organization. The Council Presidents have also largely encountered difficulty in trying to promote their own national interests and the amount of time to reach consensus is simply not available due to the rotating nature of the system. The Treaty of Lisbon is widely cited as the turning point in the necessity of the European Presidency as it fragmented the position by creating competing presidency positions and competition between the Commission President, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the President of the European Council.

Diverse leadership and national presidency inhibits European governance in several ways.  Following the Treaty of Lisbon and the fragmentation of the organization into several sectors, competition between leading branches has emerged. The creation of a European Council President has put him or her in direct competition with the rotating President of the European Council of Ministers. The extra institutional layers have simply led to a more complicated leadership process and one that leaves the EU Presidency without a formal institutional outlet for their policies. Nationalism has also largely affected the ability to govern within the current system as diverse member-states have opposing views on key topics such as immigration. A stark example of this was the spike in support for far-right parties, particularly France’s National Front, in this year’s Parliament elections.

The lack of legitimacy in the current system and problems with coordination plague the efficiency and credibility of the union. The legitimacy problem stems largely form the length of time the Presidency serves.  Many argue that the six-month term lengths are too short for leadership to establish legitimacy. As Professor Vernon Bogdanor describes in the 2007 Federal Trust Report, “legitimacy depends ultimately on the individual citizen feeling that he or she is part of the polity under which he or she lives”. This idea demonstrates the difficulty for citizens to feel part of the larger EU polity due to the fragmented nature of the leadership organizations. The struggle for legitimacy was also outlined during a European Parliamentary Conference in January 2014 when the Greek Parliament President Vangelis Meimarakis, whose country was in control of the EU Council Presidency, stated that “[i]t’s not just to make things effective but to get acceptance” when policy decisions are made at the EU level.

Why We Need a Real Presidential System

While the EU presidency has lost a significant amount of political power and responsibility following the Treaty of Lisbon amendments, the need for effective, efficient, and legitimate continent wide political action has never been greater.

The many and varied difficulties facing the EU Presidency position have led to a debate regarding the necessity of the EU Presidency.  The problems of nationalism within individual member-states translate over to common EU policy agendas and complicate the process. The difficulties in promoting common policy agendas among the different branches of government within the EU have led to the need for a credible EU image as a unified entity, especially when addressing foreign conflicts. According to Professor R. Daniel Kelemen at Rutgers University, “the EU has the necessary minimal attributes of a federal system and crucially the EU is riven with many of the same tensions that afflict federal systems”. The potential for the creation of a true presidential system in the EU is present along with much of the political and democratic framework.

The need for a strong presidential system is evident in the various problems facing the currently fragmented leadership in the EU. The focus needs to be on strengthening the presidential role while also limiting the effects of national influences and enhancing the ability of weaker and smaller member-states to play a role in shaping policy objectives. A federally-unified Europe under a strong presidential leadership that represents the constituents of all member-states is necessary to promote a strong image of the EU to the rest of the world and thus increase political, economic, and social influence. The current state of fragmented leadership does not allow the EU to respond to foreign crises and conflicts in an efficient and swift manner. Under a real presidential system, the EU would more effectively be able to pass and promote policies aimed at advancing all member-state ideals while also creating greater legitimacy for the leadership.

In-text Image: “President Van Rompuy” courtesy of President of the European Council via Flickr, released under Creative Commons.

Cover Image: “European Business Summit, Brussels, 19 May 2011” by President of the European Council, released under Creative Commons 2.0

The Viking Saga II: In the Land of Ice and Snow…

Green pines and a soft carpet of snow covers the ground where the wanderer walks. As he looks towards the heavens and sees the Northern Lights shining in the dark night sky, a shooting star flies past. On the horizon, far to the north, there is a fire. The wandered might not reach the Frozen Seas but the fire lies within reach. There is warmth there, the warmth of a future, although a future not without its risks. Still, the wanderer cuts a path to that northern horizon, heading towards the fire’s glow. This is his land, the land of Ice and Snow. This is Lapland.

Although Finland is not a littoral State in the Arctic, the Arctic region does include the northern part of Scandinavia, and the country has territory within the Polar Arctic Circle. For these reasons Finland is a member of the Arctic Council and is involved in arctic matters, especially in regards to its most northern region of Lapland; every event occurring in the Arctic might affect Finland and its Arctic/Northern Region. Furthermore, in the event of high tensions or an open conflict, Finland will arguably be one of the most affected States and will share the greatest burden of such a situation; it will be on the front line in a war against Russia, a position that might be worsened by the recent NATO enlargement in the country and the wider Scandinavian and Baltic region. And it must be remembered that Russia has had interests in Scandinavia over the last 400 years, waging wars with the Swedish Empire and seizing and attacking Finland in turn during the Winter War (Winter 1939 – 1940).

Finland sees itself as an active actor in the Arctic region, and one that will address the limitations and the opportunities given by the Arctic in a sustainable, environmentally friendly way, and through cooperation (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013). As such, Finland’s Arctic strategy rests on the fact that Finland is an Arctic country and that it will address policies and actions as such, which it states as the first pillar of its strategy. Arctic expertise is stated as the second, while sustainable development and environment is the third, and International Cooperation is the fourth. The Finnish aim is the promotion of growth and enhancement of competitiveness.

The country, of course, recognizes the changing environment in the Arctic and its future activities thus aim at the protection of the environment and the promotion of stability in the region. Finland also plan to take advantage of the new opportunities given by the Arctic, via the region of Lapland, which is within the geographical area of the Arctic. One of the current benefits Finland enjoys is the fact that – as mentioned in previous articles – it is a leader in Arctic maritime technology and shipping. In other words, Finland is a leading country in designing and building ships able to sail through iced-waters[i], and it aims to further enhance this area through cooperation with other Arctic countries. Mining, transport and logistics, and energy resource development (oil and gas) are sectors that the Finnish Arctic Strategy also aims to develop and reinforce, as an example of how Finland is following through with  the second pillar of its strategy and how it aims to take advantage of the expertise it has in the previously mentioned areas [ii].

The last pillar has a lot to do with the security of the Finnish Northern Region and the Arctic as well, keeping in mind that every escalation of tension will be highly sensed in Finland. Finland accurately labels that the development of the Arctic economy and people’s welfare needs a stable and secure region. Preparedness is the core element in this area along with cooperation between the authorities, industry, NGOs and citizens. The Finnish defence forces are primarily tasked with supporting civilian safety and rescue services in SAR operations as well as in the event of a natural catastrophe or environmental damage, as the possibility of an armed conflict in the Arctic was assessed as improbable given the declaration of cooperation and observation of international laws signed by the Arctic states (Prime Minister’s Office, 2013).

However and as Colonel Aikio (2009) pointed out, a traditional threat against Finland is much more likely than an unconventional one such as terrorism. Although the cooperation between the EU and NATO has improved, a war is still possible just as what took place in Georgia in 2008 (Aikio 2009). Still, the tasks of the Finnish military forces are concentrated on Crisis Management and the seeking of alliances, along with a decrease in capabilities. A threat then, might come in a Regional crisis, or a political, economic and military pressure format, as well as any strategic attack that aims to seize territory. The regional crisis pointed out by Aikio (2009) might be an Arctic or Scandinavian one, especially when he recognizes that the increased accessibility of the Arctic will trigger the military presence of other nations and disputes for the resources in the region.

Following this, it is easy to deduce that Finland is somehow forced to increase the quality and quantity of its military forces, moreover if tensions between Russia and Norway, Denmark or all of NATO increase, forcing Finland to face a similar situation as the Winter War or at best, the Cold War[iii].  The Finnish Strategy fortunately takes note of the possible outcomes of these events and points out the need of having forces with preparedness and cooperation that are fully prepared to execute operations in the Arctic/Lapland area thanks to investing in equipment and training for specific Arctic operations. As cooperation is an important aspect for Finland, there is a prioritization of the Nordic Defence Cooperation, and the air forces of the Scandinavian Nations, with the exception of Denmark, have held some joint exercises aimed at the enhancement of Arctic capabilities. Sea surveillance has seen also some cooperation with other Arctic area Nations and some EU nations as well. According to the Finnish Security and Defence Policy (2012), the monitoring of the development of issues at the Arctic is also important along with using different initiatives and institutions to address any situation that might arise [iv].

According to Rudd (2010), NATO is proving to be a key element for Finland’s co-operation and defence strategy; the Finnish Armed Forces are making themselves meet NATO standards for capabilities and are taking part in NATOs Partnership for Peace as well as with Sweden in a strategic airlift program. Similarly, the EU is viewed as important for combating terrorism and organized crime, along with the promotion of a defence industries co-operation. Finland aligns itself with the EU approach of civil-military deployments when managing crises abroad and places a strong emphasis on the EUs frameworks for the Arctic (security) policy. Yet both commitments are perceived as essential for the nation’s security taking into account the Russian actions in Georgia and the political development as well. Even a full membership at NATO is being considered (Rudd 2010).

According to Rudd (2010), the assets that Finland has are intended to be deployed only within Finnish territory and in Arctic operations, unless an EU neighbour is under threat such as with the mutual defence assistance between Finland and Sweden. Conscription is to be kept and the high level of those on compulsory service will be taken as an advantage for future training. Hardware is also to be re-capitalized on and is aimed at meeting NATO standards, though there is a presence of both Western and Soviet/Russian equipment within the ranks. Upgrades are to be done with an emphasis on ground-bases, reserve ground units and regular ground units.

The unit present at Lapland, the Jaeger Brigade, is tasked with the development and evaluation of tactics and weapons for Northern use. The navy won’t suffer any transformation and will keep its fast attack crafts, mine warfare and coastal defence ships. The air force has a squadron of F/A – 18 C/D at Lapland and it is receiving an upgrade of its air-to-air and air-to-ground capacities, given the fact that the F/A – 18 are a multirole assets optimized for air-to-air and ground attack operations. Exercises with tankers from partner countries have also taken place (Rudd 2010). Huebert, Exner – Pirot, Lajeneusse, & Gulledge (2012) remark that Finland is aiming at acquiring a new aircraft and the F – 35 option has been on the table, and such desire is a mere manifestation of Finland’s growing concerns about the Arctic and what events might take place.

Finally, Finland states that for internal security issues, several similar models can be implemented within the framework of cooperation with other Arctic nations, such as cooperation in air and sea rescue operations. Finland, according to the same strategy, has expertise in that sort of operation and can export such knowledge to other Arctic areas. A project involving a Coast Guard cooperation mechanism is on the Finnish wish-list to enhance the internal security of its own waters and territory along with that of the neighbouring nations’.

What then should Finland do regarding its Arctic/Lapland policy? Indeed, Finland is placed in a undesirable strategic position in which it is almost surrounded by a Russia that can – and recently has – turn to aggressive behaviour, and a NATO and EU that, if anything, desires to expand to the East. Last but not least, all of the Finnish neighbours have aims and potential clashes in Arctic territories and resources. In any situation the security of Finland is tied between those three elements and a problem in one area means problems in the others. Finland might rely on the assumption that a conflict is very unlikely but that does not mean that it is an entirely impossible situation and a Russian re-awakening should be a fact that Finland and its Armed Forces should consider. The cooperation between NATO, the EU and Sweden are great steps in order to guarantee a certain degree of security, but Finland must also think to increase and update more of its assets and the presence of units not only in the North but in the whole territory – especially in the areas bordering Russia.

Enrolment with NATO might provoke a negative attitude from Moscow but it would also increase the deterrence of a Russian invasion like in the Winter War of 1939 – 1940. Also, Finland should work more closely with Sweden for the sake of its hardware if NATO equipment is unavailable, as it would allow both nations to secure themselves and their Northern regions from any geopolitical storm in the Arctic. They should also further their defence cooperation beyond consultancy and assistance in war-time to a closer and joint development of land combat systems, naval assets and even air assets, if those are to be upgraded[v]. This can also help Finland to continue to lead one of the Arctic economic sectors of navigation and ice-breakers. Besides Sweden, Norway, Denmark and other Western nations might be interested in Finnish products or Finnish technical assistance.

Finland has a lot of opportunities in the arctic area despite the fact that it does not have an Arctic Coast. But it must realise that a deeper and further procurement of security is a need not only for the economic development of Lapland and its safeguard, but of the whole country as well. And that may mean that a hard approach should be taken in a future.

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[i] Clients of Finland in this area are: Canada, Norway, Russia, the United States, and China. Also, there are several Finnish companies are involved in Arctic development projects.

[ii] The Saami – Lapland native people – and Finnish population are also an important aim whose welfare is to be provided by education, infrastructure and socio-economic opportunities.

[iii] Even Finnish troops took place in a NATO exercise hosted by Sweden in 2009, at the Swedish Lapland territory. See: Huebert, Exner – Pirot, Lajeneusse, & Gulledge (2012), p. 20.

[iv] It is important to point out that the same Defence Strategy mentions the Swedish attitude of supporting and acting in favour of any EU or Nordic country suffering a disaster or being under attack, willing to provide and receive military assistance.  Actually there are some security-related relations between Finland and Sweden which are strong and makes each other consult and express their own points of view when it comes to defence and security policies. See: Finnish Security and Defence Policy (2012), p. 71. One explanation might come from the fact that both nations share a close history, since Finland was part of the Swedish Empire until the Napoleonic Wars and there is a significant amount of Swedish population in Finland and Finnish population in Sweden.

[v] Col. Aikio (2009) points out some potential areas for defence and assets cooperation between Finland and other Scandinavian countries. See: p. 54.

Sources:

Col. Aikio, H (2009). Finnish Defence Forces in Transformation. Military Power Revue der Schweizer Armee. N 2. 2009, pp. 44 – 55.

Huebert, R., Exner – Pirot, H., Lajeneusse, A., & Gulledge, J. (2012). Climate Change and International Security: the Arctic as a Bellwelther. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions. Arlington, Virginia, USA.

Prime Minister’s Office (2013). Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region 2013: Government resolution on 23 August 2013. Prime Minister’s Office Publications. Helsinki, Finland.

Prime Minister’s Office (2012). Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012: Government Report. Prime Minister’s Office Publications. Helsinki, Finland.

Rudd, D (2010). Northern Europe’s Arctic Defence Agenda. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. Vol. 12, N.13, spring 2010, pp. 45 – 71.

*Cover image ‘Finland Grunge Flag‘ by Nicolas Raymond

Will Mideast Revolutions Achieve Democracy?

After two years of revolution, protests, and violence, it is unlikely that genuine democracy will flourish in the Middle East.

Democracy, an ancient term and political system, is perceived today as the “ideal” form of governance. It is promoted by the West and lately aimed at the Middle East and developing world.

Implementing democratic systems differs from country to country and it’s highly influenced by many factors. The main factors are considered to be: 1) War and military occupation, 2) Changing the balance of international powers, 3) Social and economic development, 4) Globalization and 5) Changing political culture.

Many countries, including Germany and Japan, have embraced democracy after World War II when the main factor was the war, military occupation and the changing balance of international powers.

The democratization process in these countries turned out to be successful. Nevertheless, the main question raised among scholars is: does democracy work in countries which are not ripe or ready to embrace this system?

The skepticism among scholars and international community is misguided as well as predictable.

Every “wave of democracy” over the last century – after World War I and World War II – has followed deep introspection about the readiness of these countries to actually rule democratically. While in some countries democracy found progress and sound foundations, other countries seem to be stalled or even trapped in a transition limbo.

In the past two years, the international community has been stunned by the struggle of many Muslim countries to change their system of governance. Commonly referred to as the “Arab Spring,” these ongoing changes in North Africa and the Middle East have resulted in extreme violence, chaos and instability.

What we all have witnessed during the Arab Spring was revolution as a mean of achieving democracy or something else better than the current regimes.

Seemingly, revolution has been the last effort for the people to change their lives. Do these people really want democracy, or do they just want to get rid of the old traditional regimes?

This situation reminds me of the animated movie Finding Nemo and the effort of Nemo to go back to the ocean and be free. The confusion at the first moment in the ocean begs the question: “Now what?”

After two years of revolution and massive protests, the Arab Spring has stagnated. Only Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen have shown some progress in regime change towards democracy, although the process has been very slow and bloody.

Egypt democratically elected Mohamed Morsi as president in a very revolutionary way, only to later demand his resignation. This raises the question of the democratic voting system. Why do people vote when the person elected will be ousted in less than a year?

Is the revolution towards democracy turning into a war among powerful people and their ambition to rule the country? Yes, most of these countries have shown their willingness to embrace democracy over the authoritarian system, but do they really want secularism?

One would assume that after two years people in this region would be aware of the political changes that have taken place and strive towards stability for the sake of their well-being. On the contrary, these countries are descending further into violence and are stuck in a vicious cycle of confusion where the democratic process is actually turning into religious wars. Only time will tell whether people become more aware that progress requires moving forward and not reverting backwards to something which they were escaping from.

*Cover Image ‘APTOPIX Mideast Egypt‘ by Zamanalsamt

The ‘Alþingi’ of the North: The birth of the rounded Ice Table

The ‘Alþingi’ was one of the first parliaments of the world. Established in Iceland circa in the year 930, free men and chieftains treated issues of concern as equals. Nowadays, the Arctic Council is a current sort of ‘Alþingi’, where every actor and stakeholder having issues with the Arctic can discuss them in an organization intended to include every Arctic-related actor.

Established in 1996, the Arctic Council aims to promote cooperation, coordination and interaction between the eight Arctic Countries: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States[1]. Native populations and others inhabiting the region are included as well[2]. Environmental protection and sustainable development are the core issues, although following the accessibility of the Arctic, issues such as search and rescue and oil spills are also included (Arctic Council, 2014; Andersen & Perry, 2012).

One of the most striking and interesting aspects of the Arctic Council is the Observer Status, which is open to Non-Arctic states, inter-governmental or inter-parliamentary organizations (both global and regional) as well as non-governmental organizations (Arctic Council, 1996). For instance, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom were granted the Observer Status. In the case of the European Union, the establishment of cooperation with the European Commission and the EU’s Northern Dimension was implemented (Arctic Council, 2000; Arctic Council, 2002; Arctic Council, 2009)[3].

In a move that sparked some controversy, the Council in 2013 granted Observer Status to China, India, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea and Singapore. Controversy was particularly focused on China, given the implications of that granting and because of the Chinese activities in the region, not to mention the strategic implication for the security of certain Arctic States. On this aspect a further analysis will be made.

Managing the ‘Niflheim’

The ‘Niflheim’ is one of the nine worlds of the Yggdrasil, the Three of Life, in the Nordic Mythology. It consists of fog, mist and ice[4]. The ‘Niflheim’ is no other than the Arctic region and the Arctic Council is bound to preserve it.

The Arctic Council addresses any issue that the Arctic is facing, thus having 4 main frameworks or cross areas to do so. The first is ‘Environment and Climate’, with two main areas: Climate Change and Environmental Protection. The second is ‘Biodiversity’, with two main areas: Arctic Biodiversity Assessment and Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program. The Third is ‘Oceans’, with six areas: Search and Rescue, Arctic Ocean Review, Emergency Preparedness, Marine Environment, Shipping, and Oil & Gas. And the Fourth is ‘Arctic Peoples’, with three areas: Health & Well-Being, Indigenous Peoples Today, and Languages & Cultures (Arctic Council, 2014).

The Arctic Council has seven main work groups: The Arctic Contaminations Actions Programme (ACAP), the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna’s Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (CBMP), the Emergence Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), and the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG). Additional groups are the Ecosystem-Based Management Experts Group (EBM), four task forces, and the Arctic Economic Council (Arctic Council, 2014)[5].

The Arctic Economic Council is an interesting one, since it signals their recognition of the Arctic as an important and active economic region. Indeed, in the Kiruna 2013 Declaration, the Arctic Council pointed out the importance of economic endeavours to the region and the peoples’ sustainable development, and that it was important to promote the local Arctic economies, thus creating the TFCB[6]. This Task Force is co-chaired by Canada, Finland, Iceland and Russia and it is the core of the Arctic Economic Council. Its objectives are to foster businesses development in the Arctic, to engage in polar cooperation, and to provide a business perspective to the work of the Artic Council (Arctic Council, 2013; Arctic Council, 2014).

Another important aspect worth to be mentioned is the University of the Arctic, whose activities go in accordance with the aim to educate, inform and promote interest in the Arctic. By the initiative of the Arctic Council and the Circumpolar Universities Association (CUA) in 1997, it was inaugurated in 2001 at Rovaniemi, Finland. Being a network of colleges, universities, research institutes and other organizations, it aims at benefiting students, the public and private sector, as well as the North through international collaboration (University of the Arctic, 2014).

Last but not least, the Council is headed by the Chair of the Arctic Council, assisted by the Arctic Council Secretariat. The Secretariat is tasked mainly with administrative and organizational support, as well as communication and outreach activities (Arctic Council, 2014).

The future: Challenges and Risks

The Arctic Council is a relatively new body that saw its first steps when in 1989, under the initiative of Finland. The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy was the product of the meetings held between 1989 and 1991 and it was assisted in preparation by the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the  Nordic Saami Council, the USSR Association of Small Peoples of the North, the United Kingdom, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the United Nations Environment Program, the International Arctic Science Committee, Germany and Poland(Arctic Council, 2014).

Clearly intended to discuss environmental and peoples’ related issues, it was never intended to deal with military-security issues. The inclusion China as an Observer and the current assertive Russian attitudes towards the Arctic and in Ukraine will definitely enforce the Council to treat such issues[7]. The lack of military security and the risk of instability in the region can affect the environment and the people living there. To secure the environment and the Arctic inhabitants, it is best for the Western Arctic countries to enhance their military capacities to keep Russia in check in order to secure the desired  stability; military security is simply a capital need and a mandatory step to be taken for the benefit of the region.

Regarding China, the opposition was spearheaded by Canada and Russia. Canada raised concerns about the respect for the Arctic States’ sovereignty and the cultural identity of indigenous communities by the Observer States. In addition, it expressed its concern about a possible overshadow of the indigenous peoples’ voice within the Council.  Russia, in turn, it is entirely opposed to opening the door to non-Arctic States and international organizations, like Greenpeace. The reasons for Russia are that the Arctic Council should remain a regional-focused organization and not become globalized by accepting other countries, along with the fear of facing problems in administration (Bertelsen, 2013; Sevunts, 2013).

Indeed, the fact that a Chinese Rear-Admiral stated that The Arctic should belong to everyone could give a hint of their real intentions. Moreover, a Chinese tycoon bought some land near potential strategic deepwater ports (Mroczkowksi, 2012). This might indicate that China will use the facilities to host both commercial and military vessels following the “Arctic for All” principle. If the presence of the Chinese Navy is allowed, it could have some serious implications for the security of the United States as well as Europe. Moreover, the naval assets could be used not only to secure the Sea Lines of Communication at the Arctic, but also some valuable resources that China is interested in. In fact and as Mroczkowksi (2012) points out, strategic minerals and rare earth is drawing attention of Chinese mining firms. In addition, there is a Chinese research centre in the Svalbard Islands. These activities have become a source of unease since they are being used, according to Guschin (2013), as a cover to disguise the real interests China has in the region. Those ‘true interests’ might be more strategic-military rather than environmental or concerns about indigenous peoples.

A closer and more concrete issue is Russia. It has been sending aerial and naval assets to the Arctic seas and skies, threatening the stability and security that the Arctic Council desires. The events in Ukraine, in addition, has risen doubts about collaboration with Russia on Arctic issues and of international cooperation sustainability, especiialy given Russia’s willingness to make use of military power to meets it territorial ambitions (Klimenko, 2014). It’s worth mentioning that Russia perceives the Arctic as a region of strategic importance thus increasing its military presence in the area along with the abovementioned patrols and flights in the region to secure it. The hint is that Russia will also make use of those military assets to secure its own Arctic region, breaking the Arctic stability and opening the way for potential instability.

Last but not least, the close relations between China and Russia, despite some cautious attitude of the latter towards the former, could create a block within the Arctic Council that can increase the likelihood of turmoil. This situation could be fuelled by their mutual support in that case one of them (or both) decides to use the Arctic as a scenario to wage a challenge against the Arctic Western nations, NATO or the West in general[8].

The Arctic Council is indeed a product of the post-Cold War wishful thinking that regarded stability, international cooperation and the death of power politics as the road the world would take from then on. However, as facts and the real situations are showing, it is time to consider military and security issues on the table, as well its implications on the world. The history indeed does not end, nor the old game of power politics; The Arctic will be but one of the areas where this will take place in a very intense way, and the Arctic Council has to include security and military issues if it really wants to contribute to the stability and security of the region. Between military clashes and internal divisions, perhaps the leaders of some Northern and Western nations might take wise decisions that will keep the Niflheim out of the Ragnarök, the twilight of the Gods.

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[1] Each of the eight member states holds a chairmanship every two years.

[2] The Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Saami Council and the Association Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation and other indigenous population representative organizations. See: Arctic Council (1996). Declaration of the Establishment of the Arctic Council.

[3] However, the European Union was not granted with the Observer Status, due to some frictions on seal ban by the EU. See: Sevunts, L. (2013). Arctic Council has tightrope to walk in potential decision to admit China. Alaska Dispatch News. Retrieved from: http://www.adn.com/article/arctic-council-has-tightrope-walk-potential-decision-admit-china

[4] See: Højberg, M. (2014). The Nine World in Norse Mythology. Retrieved from: http://www.viking-mythology.com/theNineWorlds.php

[5] The task forces are: Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Prevention (TFOPP), Task Force on Black Carbon and Methanes (TFBCM), Scientific Cooperation Task Force (SCTF), and the Task Force to Facilitate Circumpolar Businesses Forum (TFCBF). Task forces were the Task Force for Institutional Issues (TFII), the Task Force on Search and Rescue (TFSR), and the Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response (TFAMOPPR).

[6] See footnote 4.

[7] See: Arctic Council. (1996). Ottawa Declaration of 1996, p. 2.

[8] China has been supporting Russia at a certain point after the invasion of Ukraine (Crimea and the Luhansk region). In addition there has been some close projects for resource exploitation, according to Klimenko (2014).

Sources

Bertelsen, T. N (2013). Canada, Russia hold key to China’s Arctic Access. gbtimes. Retrieved from: http://gbtimes.com/world/canada-russia-hold-key-chinas-arctic-access

Guschin, A. (2013). Understanding China‘s Arctic Policies. The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/understanding-chinas-arctic-policies/?all=true

Højberg, M. (2014). The Nine World in Norse Mythology. Retrieved from: http://www.viking-mythology.com/theNineWorlds.php

Jesse B. (2002). The Icelandic Althing: Dawn of Parliamentary Democracy. In J. M. Fladmark (Ed.), Heritage and Identity: Shaping the Nations of the North, (1-18). The Heyerdahl Institute and Robert Gordon University. Donhead St. Mary, Shaftesbury: Donhead. Retrieved from: http://www.viking.ucla.edu/publications/articles/icelandic_allthing.pdf

Klimenko, E. (2014). Russia’s Evolving Arctic Strategy. SIPRI Policy Paper No. 42. Stockhol: SIPRI. Retrieved from: http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP42.pdf

Mroczkowski, I. (2012). China’s Arctic Powerplay. The Diplomat. Retrieved from: http://thediplomat.com/2012/02/chinas-arctic-powerplay/

Perry, C. M; & Andersen, B (2012). Chapter 2. Emerging Strategic Dynamics in the High North. In: New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and Cooperation (pp. 6 – 30). Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

Sevunts, L. (2013). Arctic Council has tightrope to walk in potential decision to admit China. Alaska Dispatch News. Retrieved from: http://www.adn.com/article/arctic-council-has-tightrope-walk-potential-decision-admit-china

The Arctic Council (1996). The Ottawa Declaration. Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council.

The Arctic Council (2000). Barrow Declaration on the occasion of the Second Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council.

The Arctic Council (2002). Inari Declaration on the occasion of the Third Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council.

The Arctic Council (2009). Tromsø Declaration on the occasion of the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council.

The Arctic Council (2013). Kiruna Declaration on the occasion of the Eighth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council. Arctic Council Secretariat.

The Arctic Council (2014a). Arctic Council. Retrieved from: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/

The Arctic Council (2014b). History: Forerunner to the Arctic Council. Retrieved from: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/history

The Arctic Council (2014c). Task Forces of the Arctic Council. Retrieved from: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/task-forces

The Arctic Council (2014d). The Arctic Council Secretariat. Retrieved from: http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/the-arctic-council-secretariat

University of the Arctic (2014). About UArctic. Retrieved from: http://www.uarctic.org/about-uarctic/

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*Cover Image: ‘AC_flag_stadshotellet‘ by arctic_council, released under Creative Commons 2.0 (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

The plans laid out by the Commission for an EU federation in 2012 certainly had their merits, but any European state must grow out of the will of citizens, not bureaucrats.

By James Bartholomeusz

*This article, along with the in-text image, was originally published by Project for Democratic Union

Set your mind back to the autumn of 2012. London had just hosted a dazzling Olympic Games, Ebola was nowhere to be seen, and it would be over a year more until Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage would surge to victory in the European elections. With Isis as yet non-existent, the Assad regime in Syria was still international public enemy number one, and Yanukovych was still in power in Kiev, cuddling up to Putin over the Eurasian Union. In Greece, the paramilitary leaders of Golden Dawn were still at large.

In amongst all this, a paper was published by the European Commission that went largely unnoticed outside the Brussels bubble. This document, however – entitled ‘A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union’ – is one of the most radical to have come out of any EU institution this century. It maps out a comprehensive response to the Eurozone crisis and the collapse of the financial sector more widely, and makes a seismic recommendation: the transformation of the European Union into a full federal state.

The blueprint proposes a three-stage plan for the acceleration of the EU into a federal state, based on the development of the European Monetary Union. First, it is recognised that the halfway-house of centralising monetary policy with the ECB whilst leaving fiscal powers largely at member-state level was an error, and is clearly now unsustainable. To remedy this, all central bank responsibilities should be handed over to the ECB (enshrining a so-called ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’), whilst the ability to bailout failing financial institutions should be given to a new European Resolution Authority (a ‘Single Resolution Mechanism’). Further to this, continent-wide investment and structural reform should be amalgamated under a Convergence and Comptetiveness Instrument (CCI) to coordinate efforts between member-states. All of this, the Commission believes, can be achieved under existing treaty provisions, but further developments would require a new round of negotiations between Eurozone and non-Eurozone member-states.

A new treaty or treaties would aim at progress via two further stages. In the second, the EU would be given the power to set requirements for national fiscal policy in accordance with the conditions of the agreed CCI plan. This would be accompanied by a European Redemption Fund. Returning to the principle that national public debt should not exceed 60% of GDP – as laid out in the Maastricht Treaty – all member-state debt above this level would be mutualised in a single EU pot and managed centrally. Although this process would need to be handled very carefully, to counteract the possibility of fiscal freeloading by net beneficiaries at the expense of others, it would provide a basis for budgetary solidarity between a set of states using the same currency.

In the third stage, the banking system of the Eurozone would be fully integrated and presided over by the ECB, mimicking the relationship that exists between central and private banks in ordinary countries. The natural implication of this move would be the creation of a full federal budget for the EU, administered by an EMU treasury within the Commission. With all macroeconomic responsibility held in Brussels, the EU would at last have become a proper federation, with the nations of Europe as member-states possessing devolved powers. Given that every member-state bar two is on the path to adopting the common currency, this federation would map on almost exactly to the current Union.

For those who know the vision of the Project for Democratic Union, a lot of this will sound very familiar. (Indeed, the PDU was founded only a few months later, though unrelatedly; a product of the same economic and political circumstances as the Commission’s findings.) We would certainly welcome an economic union of the EU along these lines, yet there are important points at which we part ways with this plan. Chiefly, this has to do with democracy.

Of the European institutions, the PDU feels closest kinship with the Parliament – the Union’s only directly elected body. We believe that the crisis in the Eurozone will never be sufficiently and durably solved without the democratic participation and support of Europe’s citizens. The Commission has achieved wonderful things for our continent in past decades, but it is also an unelected, largely unaccountable bureaucracy that has amassed steadily greater power to itself at the expense of democratically-elected national governments. The autocratic nature of the Commission, coupled with its theological commitment to imposing austerity whether ordinary Europeans want it or not, are the primary causes behind the recent reaction against the European project.

In keeping with this, something that stands out upon reading the blueprint is the uneasy way in which democratic accountability is appended haphazardly to the end of in-depth policy discussions, as if everything will work so long as public opinion is nudged in the right direction. Naturally, the economists of the Commission know best; if voters can just be brought into line, then the system will function perfectly rationally. This is a delusion. Too many Europhiles, even the most well-meaning, remain in denial as to how toxic the EU has become for a large number of citizens. We are just about treading water as it is, struggling to even justify a Europe of nations – in this climate, no grand project for European federalisation can be carried out from on high. The will of ordinary citizens must drive the process, and for that to happen we must convince people again of the European ideal.

Fast-forward two years, to the present day. There are now glimmers of hope for the future of Europe – embodied, for example, in the appointment of the Juncker Commission as a result of May’s Parliamentary elections – but there is still much work to be done. Most fundamentally, any institution tasked with overseeing the European economy must be directly elected by the Union’s citizens. A federal Europe, founded upon full economic and political union, would be a great thing indeed, but it will never be a lasting solution unless it comes about from below.