Author: kasmir

Lee Kwan Yuen, Singapore’s founding father and first Prime Minster passed away on 23 March 2015 at the age of 91. His death has again reminded the world of the Singapore miracle under his lead: Lee, the British-educated Chinese Singaporean became Singapore’s first Prime Minister in 1959 after Singapore gained full self-government from the British. Six years later, Singapore was expelled by Malaysia. Lee led his people to build an economy from scratch: When he retired in 1990, his nation had become one the wealthiest and least corrupt states in Asia. Within one generation’s time, Singapore had joined the first world club.

In the days following his death, Lees accomplishments have been praised by many global leaders. US President Barak Obama described Lee as a “remarkable leader’ and “a true giant of history”; Britain’s David Cameron acclaimed him for “one of the great success stories” while Xi Jinping, China’s president called him China’s old friend. and Narendra Modi, India’s Prime Minister, said Lee was both a “far-sighted statesman” and “a lion among leaders.”

Despite the tribute, Lee Kwan Yew’s authoritarianism has also made his legacy disputable. The wealthy nation is by far still a one-party state where “political opponents are targeted and contrary views muzzled” according to the Human Rights watch.However, it is important to understand the “Singapore Model” or so called “Asian Value” in the historical context before discussing the future of this state and nation.

The Singapore Miracle

When Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965, this Chinese-dominated, impoverished island was facing numerous challenges: The separation caused the import-substitution strategy to be aborted; its role of trading post for the region was threatened by a confrontation with Indonesia; unemployment was at 10% and expected to increase due to the withdrawal of British bases which employed around 40,000 workers.

Most Chinese people in Singapore (accounted 62% at independence and 78% in 1990) were originally from the rural areas of China’s south Guangdong and Fujian Province, most of whom or whose parents could not survive at home and thus sought a better life in Southeast Asia. The insecure feeling has been prevailed among them. Job creation and the provision of decent housing became the first priority for Lee Kwan Yew. The Housing Development Board (HDB) built more than 10,000 low- and middle-income housing units per year in early 1960s, while the Economic Development Board (EDB) sought to attract investment and new jobs.

Lee and his government launched an export-oriented strategy. Because Singaporeans lacked the skills and capital to develop enterprises of the necessary size and sophistication on their own, Lee targeted foreign investors to develop the manufacturing and financial sectors. To attract foreign firms, the government undertook measures to improve the labor climate and investment environment. Key investments were made in infrastructure, exchange rates were managed, tariffs and duties on imports and exports were set at low rates. With all these measures, world trade and investment flows began to boom and American and European manufacturing firms started to arrive. Singapore’s real GDP growth accelerated to 12.9% in 1966–1973, unemployment dropped to 3.6% in 1978, manufacturing sector’s share of GDP grew from 14% in 1965 to 24% by 1978. Singapore was recognized as a “little dragon” together with other East Asian nations (South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan).

In 1979, Lee’s government initiated a three-year wage correction policy to push Singapore’s factories to upgrade to higher technologies and increase efficient use of labor by restructuring. Automation, mechanization and computerization were encouraged and higher value-added and skills intensive investment promoted. The economic growth averaged 7.7% during 1979 to 1985. By the time Lee Kwan Yew left office in 1990, Singapore’s manufacturing sector kept a growth of 9.5% due to the electronic components industry. Meanwhile, it had become Asia’s third most important financial sector with an annual 15% growth in financial service, only behind Tokyo and Hong Kong. Singapore became one of the wealthiest nations per capita and has been considered to be one of the world’s best places to do business. According to the Singapore Department of Statistics, Singapore’s per- capita GDP surged more than 50-fold to S$71,318 ($51,717) from 1960 to 2014,.

Shadows over the Legacy

The Singapore Miracle was largely shaped by its founding father Lee Kwan Yew. After the retirement, Lee Kwan Yew still had an influence in the country’s politics. However, the economic miracle, discipline, efficiency, cleanliness and incorruptibility have been achieved at other costs: all media has been strictly controlled by the government under the argument that “press freedom must sometimes be subordinated to the needs of nation building and that media regulation is necessary to ensure responsible journalism and to protect the reputations of public officials and institutions.” Politically, Lee and his People’s Action Party (PAP) maintained its iron grip partly by squashing dissent, bankrupting political opponents in court or imprisoning them without trial. He created a “nanny state” that punished people for littering or not flushing the toilet, banned chewing gum and encouraged graduates to produce smart babies. Meanwhile, caning is a widely used form of legal corporal punishment in Singapore. In 2012, the number of caning sentences has still reached 2,500, despite a decline since 2007.

Dictator Idol

Lee Kwan Yew’s Singapore model, namely the rapid economic growth achievement under authoritarian governance has been considered as a perfect example by political leaders from other Asian countries. China, for example, wanted a similar model to pursue economic growth under the one party rule, as the political leaders consider the democratic India too poor, Taiwan too chaotic and the Western democratic model doesn’t “conform to China’s actual conditions”. China’s economic reform since 1978 has partly been inspired by the Singapore Model. Recently, China’s president Xi Jinping said that China’s modernization process has been undeniably shaped by the “tens of thousands of Chinese officials” who went to Singapore to study Lee’s model. 

Lee’s coined term of the Asian Value even received praise from dictators of other continents. He was awarded the prestigious “Order of Honor” by his Russian admirer Vladimir Putin. In Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili passed Lee’s books around like bibles. However, none of these leaders have been able to emulate the lack of corruption and the high efficiency of the Singaporean government. The Singapore miracle can hardly be replicated, not just because of its leadership and management style, but as well due to its geographical uniqueness and a wider set of beneficial circumstances that are not as easily replicable.

A New Crossroads for Singapore?

The Singaporean government declared one week of national mourning after its founding father Lee Kwan Yew had died. The political leaders and Singaporeans from all walks of life showed their respects. For the old generation, the memory of poverty and instability is so impressive that they consider the sacrifice of democracy and human rights for economic growth necessary for the nation. This sacrifice is in fact an important part of the “Singapore Model” spirit. For those who had struggled to survive before, human rights were a luxury then and are seen as a luxury now. They were truly emotional when they said goodbye to the founding father.

But how long should the “sacrifice” last? According to the World Competitive Yearbook for 2014 published by the International Institute for Management Development in Switzerland, Singapore ranked as the world’s third most competitive economy after the U.S. and Switzerland. But it still ranked 153 out of 180 countries in a 2015 press freedom index published by Reporters Without Borders, one spot behind Russia and nine after Myanmar. After Lee’s death, protest and criticism are not allowed. Amos Yee, a sixteen-year-old Singaporean boy who criticized the late Lee in an online video, has been charged by the government. He faces a fine and up to three years in jail if convicted. On March 29, the government announced a new regulation to tighten grips on Internet News sites, which has been considered as a new attempt to stifle Internet-based media that often are critical of Singapore’s government. 

The continuous strong control is of Mr. Lee’s wish, who always expected fear from his people instead of love. But is it also what the Singaporeans expected? Looking at Singapore’s Asian neighbors, Taiwan has moved to a new era after two peaceful transitions of power through political parties; In Indonesia, when its former dictator Suharto died in 2008, people were free to mourn or celebrate. Singapore, one of the world’s wealthiest nations, lags behind its neighbors in other aspects.

The rapid development of social media is believed to provide more information and possibly lead changes in the country, especially among the young generation, who also desire freedom and happiness through other means than wealth. In 2011’s general election, although the ruling party PAP still won the great majority of seats, its share of the popular vote slipped to around 60%, the lowest since Singapore’s independence. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (Lee Kwan Yew’s son), admitted that many Singaporeans wish for the government to adopt a different style and approach, and desire to “see more opposition voices in parliament to check the PAP government.” The PAP might keep its ruling position in next year’s general election, but more opposition voices will tell more authentic stories of today’s Singapore. It is time for Singapore and its government to think about its future in a time without Lee Kwan Yew.

Author Biography

Chen Yu studied financial management and worked as an accountant and journalist in China. She is now pursuing her Masters degree in Willy Brandt School of Public Policy. Her research interests are EU-China relations and economic development in Asian countries.

“The new Union should be committed to and promote sustainable growth.” By James Bartholomeusz

In his Parliamentary hearing before taking office in October, new Commissioner for Jobs, Growth and Competitiveness Jyrki Katainen referred to a “sustainable social market economy” as the end goal of EU economic policy. Such a goal goes far beyond the €315bn that the Juncker plan seeks to inject into the European economy from June onwards, although this will undoubtedly be an important stepping stone. The aim in the medium- and long-term should be to create conditions under which the EU can blossom as a world leader in a future-minded form of capitalism.

The term “sustainable growth” has been thrown around a great deal recent, to the extent that it risks becoming nothing more than a voguish PR phrase. We need to reassert exactly what it means by first asking: what is “unsustainable” growth?

There are two ways in which growth might be considered unsustainable. The first is, most obviously, environmental. It is no exaggeration to say that the development of modern industrial capitalism has been a catastrophe for the planet. Technological advancement has fostered a hugely increased global population, along with an increasing proportion of that population enjoying an increasing level of material wellbeing. Yet these changes have also meant fundamental readjustments to the planet’s ecosystem – caused by a host of factors including global warming, deforestation and resource depletion – with the very real risk that the favourable conditions which first allowed our species to develop could soon disappear.

Fortuitously, technological progress has also given humans the tools with which to re-forge a sustainable symbiosis with their environment. We now have the very real prospect of transitioning largely or wholly to reliance upon renewable energy, as well as minimising the impact of pollution caused by our modern amenities. Yet the necessary shift cannot occur without concerted political will. Here, the European Union – as the world’s single largest economic bloc – can afford to be a leader. Europe must launch a multifaceted strategy to reduce carbon emissions, invest heavily in green energy and other eco-friendly projects, and instigate the harshest of restrictions against pollution and the dumping of waste.

Growth has also – all too recently – been shown to be unsustainable in social terms. Seven years on, the legacy of the 2008 financial sector collapse is still very much with us, in the effects of austerity measures and the periodic scares that the Eurozone is about plummet once more into crisis. Whether one’s instincts are for austerity or Keynesian investment, for or against the single currency, all must agree that cause of the crisis was an economic model in which unfettered greed at the highest level of the private sector was allowed to drive Europe and the rest of the world into the dust. It is impossible to measure the social impact of the crisis, both on people within Europe and those in countries beyond our borders who rely on our economic stability and prosperity for their own.

The neoliberal dogma that the free market, left to itself, will automatically deliver the best outcomes for society finally appears to be receding. In its place, we need to install an ethos of active government intervention which supports and directs business – especially small- and medium-sized enterprises – in delivering stable and socially-productive growth. This ethos, of course, cannot exist without a comprehensive welfare state which provides “cradle to grave” support for every citizen and ensures that the proceeds of growth are shared equitably across society.

All of this could be achieved within the existing state of the European Union, but it is hard to see how the current ragtag negotiation between 28 stakeholders is the best system under which deep economic reform should take place. The imperative for sustainable growth is not a stand-alone justification for federalism, but it certainly adds weight to the plethora of other arguments.

In-text image: ‘Western European broadleaf forest’ courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

Cover image: ‘Lichtung‘, by Sascha Kohlmann. Released under Creative Commons 2.0 license

For more than four years now Syria has been one of the the most blazing trouble spots in the world. Especially due to the emergence of ISIL and their high degree of violence, the ongoing mediation initiative of the United Nations seems to have been forgotten by most observers. Therefore this series deals with Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi and Staffan de Mistura, three men who have been trying to bring peace through diplomacy in a conflict that transcends most people’s imagination of violence. The following article briefly analyzes the mediation of Syria’s first Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and Arab League, Kofi Annan, from February 23^rd until August 2^nd 2012.

Kofi Annan, Press Conference of the Action Group for Syria, June 30th 2012

By Felix Troeltzsch

Kofi Annan does not have to be introduced. The diplomat from Ghana, who spend his entire career in the United Nations (UN) became most famous as the seventh Secretary-General of the United Nations. Nevertheless, already before that, during his numerous positions in the world organization, he developed a reputation as excellent diplomat, mediator or like one of his most famous biographers puts it, “A Man of Peace in a World of War”. Although his tenure was not flawless, Kofi Annan is one of the most popular UN Secretary-Generals and one of the most acknowledged diplomats of our time. Having this in mind, it is easy to understand, why Ban Ki-moon picked Kofi Annan to solve the knotty and complex crisis in Syria.

Appointment, Budget and Team

The former UN Secretary-General was appointed as Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and League of Arab States (JSE) on February 23^rd 2012 by the United Nations and Arab League, just shortly after a new UN report attested that the Human Rights situation in Syria had worsened significantly. During the appointment Ban Ki-moon, the current Secretary-General of the UN, and his counterpart from the Arab League Nabil Elaraby, described that the “Special Envoy will provide good offices aimed at bringing an end to all violence and human rights violations, and promoting a peaceful solution to the Syria crisis”.  Accordingly, from the very beginning on, Kofi Annan took over the job as mediator in Syria with the clear task to not only confine the violence, but to solve the conflict in its entirety.

For its ambitious peace mission the UN estimated a budget of more than US$ 7,4 million, whereof about US$ 3 million alone were intended for personnel costs. The rest of the money was supposed to cover the travels, technology, equipment and all other expenses of the operation. In doing so, compared to other UN peacemaking efforts, that most of the time do not exceed US$ 2 million, Kofi Annan had been granted an unusually big budget by the United Nations and Arab League.

The Joint Special Envoy used a large share of this money to assemble old companions, mediation experts, regional experts, communications experts and experts in international law, creating one of the most elite mediation-teams one can imagine. Eventually Kofi Annan was supported by one Under-Secretary-General, two Assistant Secretary-Generals and eight employees whose experiences ranged from 15 to at least five years of relevant work in the  United Nations. Moreover, all team members were not only highly experienced in their fields, but, more importantly, they were Annan’s personal picks. In the fashion of a Hollywood action movie, he had known and had worked with all of them before his mission in Syria and insisted on personnel matters. Thereby, his communication officer Ahamad Fawzi, his two deputies Nasser Al-Kidwa and Jean-Marie Guehnno and his personal advisers Allan Doss and Ruth McCoy accounted for Annan’s most important staff members. Before their engagement in Syria each of them had a distinctive diplomatic career in the UN or in  foreign services.

Four Phases of Mediation

While in office, the go-between tried all he could to solve the conflict in Syria through diplomatic means and in terms of that continuously sought the direct contact to all relevant actors. During the his mediation, Kofi Annan went on 17 trips to Syria and all important regional and international players like Iran, the USA, Russia, China, Turkey, Jordan etc. He talked three times to Bashar al-Assad in person and maintained steady contact to Syria’s opposition leaders.  Moreover, if he could not attend them in person or via video-chat, he was always represented during the meetings of all relevant international organizations by one of his deputies.

Broadly speaking Kofi Annan’s mediation effort can be divided into four phases. Firstly, from February 23^rd until April 21^st the go-between established his contacts and prepared everything for his mission. During this period he developed his Six-Point-Peace-Plan[1], traveled to the United Nations in New York, the Arab League in Kairo, visited Syria and all its bordering countries except for Israel. Thereby the JSE explored the international support for his mission and tried to set the basis for peace. He convinced the UN Security-Council to support his plan and to establish an observer mission in Syria. Moreover, Kofi Annan even negotiated a ceasefire between the conflicting parties, which came into effect on April 12^th 2012. Although this first phase of his mediation was the most successful one, it was soon marred by new battles in North and West-Syria and because the ceasefire did not hold longer than a single day.

In the second phase of his mediation from April 13^th until the Massacre of Houla on May 26^th, the JSE tried to implement his peace plan. Despite emerging violence, he still stated that his plan was “on track” and positively acknowledged all peace efforts of the conflicting parties. Annan did not travel at all during this period of his mediation and belittled violence as isolated incidents. Only after UN staff members got attacked during routine controls on May 10^th May 15^th and after 108 women and children were killed during the Massacre of Houla on May 25^th, Annan started to criticize the Syrian government vehemently and seemed to notice that his current approach on the conflict did not work out.

Due to the catastrophe of Houla, Kofi Annan accepted the temporary failure of his peace plan and started to negotiate again. In the third phase of his mediation from May 28^th until June 30^th the go-between visited Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar and the USA to create united pressure on the Assad government. In the wake of these efforts the “Action Group for Syria”, consisting of all relevant international parties, passed its “Final Communiqué”, later known as the Geneva I declarations, in which it called for a peaceful solution of the Syria conflict and a democratic process in the country. Having in mind the strategic and diplomatic discrepancies  between Russia, the USA and China in the UN Security-Council at this time, this agreement clearly was a hard-earned diplomatic victory by Kofi Annan. Especially Russia, who had been backing Bashar al-Assad since the beginning of the civil war, seemed to lose patience with the Syrian dictator and thus created new hope for a peaceful solution of the conflict.

Unfortunately for the Syrian people and Kofi Annan’s efforts however, the demands of the Action Group for Syria were not implemented at all and strong fighting spread even further to Syria’s two biggest cities Aleppo and Damascus. Therefore, in the last phase of his mediation, Annan tried to follow through with the decisions of the Action Group for Syria without success and, after hundreds of civilians died again during the Battle Tremseh on July 13^th and since Russia and China vetoed a strong resolution of the UN Security-Council on July 19^th, bore the consequences of his failure to stop the fighting. Eventually Kofi Annan laid down his office on August 2^nd 2012.

Styles of Mediation

After this very broad view of Kofi Annan’s peace efforts in Syria, the decisive question of this series can be approached: How did the Joint Special Envoy mediate and which styles of mediation did he use? The last article already constituted the three variables of scope, method and focus originating from Svensson and Wallensteen’s famous book “The Go-Between” as basis to analyze the mediation style.

• Scope: inclusive mediation

Kofi Annan clearly used an inclusive scope during his entire mediation effort. He made sure to include all relevant regional and international actors as well as Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian opposition. He spoke personally to leaders from the USA, Iran and Russia and seemed to emphasize the importance of the international community and especially of regional actors like Turkey, Jordan or Lebanon to pressure Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian opposition. Thereby, he did not reject talks with the Syrian government, even after their troops had broken the ceasefire and massacred hundreds of civilians in Houla and Tremseh. The only relevant country that Kofi Annan never visited was Israel, presumably to keep his credibility in front of his irreplaceable Arab allies.

• Method: fostering mediation

The go-between mediated mostly in a fostering manner. Especially during the first weeks and months, he tried to create trust and positive dynamics instead of threats. Annan even coordinated the deadline for the first ceasefire on April 12^th with Bashar al-Assad, before he informed the UN Security-Council and the Arab League about it. Only after the truce in Syria failed and the violence erupted again, the go-between criticized the Syrian dictator openly. However, besides open criticism, the JSE did not use any forcing tools like threads, direct pressure or strict deadlines – not even after the massacre of Houla or the Battle of Tremseh.

• Focus: wide peace

Already the mandate made clear that it was not only the job of the Joint Special Envoy in Syria to stop the violence, but also to end human rights violations and to initiate a political process of democratization in Syria. Furthermore, this clearly wide focus was reflected in Annan’s Six-Point-Peace-Plan, where he also demanded a democratic process in Syria, the freedom of movement for journalists, an amnesty for political prisoners and the free passage of humanitarian aid.

Added together, Kofi Annan used an inclusive, fostering and wide style of mediation until his resignation in August 2012. In doing so, he most probably intended to calm the situation in Syria and create trust between him and the conflicting parties. However, as a result of this light strategy his peace mission lacked sufficient pressure, which is why neither Assad nor the Syrian opposition was ever forced to stop fighting or to implement Annan’s peace plan. Therefore, after the ceasefire was broken, the fighting intensified and no party implemented the Six-Point-Peace-Plan, it remained the former UN Secretary-General’s only tool to lay down his office and to clear the way for a new mediator with new ideas. This put new pressure on all regional and international actors, who were interested in a peaceful solution of the Syria crisis and therefore may account as one of Kofi Annan’s smartest decisions during his five and a half months in office.

[1]    The six main postulations of Annan’s plan were: 1) starting a democratic political process in Syria; 2) ceasing all fights and violence; 3) ensuring humanitarian assistance for refugees, fighters and internally displaced persons; 4) releasing political prisoners on both sides; 5) ensuring the freedom of movement for journalists; 6) ensuring the freedom of assembly in Syia.

Author Biography

Felix Troeltzsch is a regular contributor at the Global Pubblic Policy Watch. He recently graduated from the University of Jena with a master’s degree in Political Science, focusing on International Relations and Peace Studies. Before that, he studied International Relations and American Studies at the University of Leipzig and University of Warsaw. Felix is mainly interested in international conflicts, security policy, human rights, the European Union and the Middle East. During several stays abroad he has dealt intensively with the Balkans and the Black Sea region.

Picture Credit: United Nations Geneva under a Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) license

It is essential to create a European public sphere as legitimator, commentator, and forum for discussion as well as a check on Union and regional politics. By Florian Le Gallo

See also this previous article on the need for a European public sphere.

Whilst every citizen of a Member State is also a citizen of the European Union, very few of them feel involved in a process which takes into account their voice. The debate about the ‘democratic deficit’ of the Union has been ongoing for several decades now. In the 2001 Laeken Declaration, the European institutions warned about the lack of democracy in the EU policymaking process and the necessity to strengthen the role of the European public. Yet it has also been argued that the successive reforms of the European institutions have given more and more power to the European Parliament, which, as a democratically-elected body, represents the will of the people. However, is this enough to involve the European people in the institutional processes? There is the further problem that referenda and European elections – the only way for European citizens to directly express their opinion about the EU – have largely revolved around national rather than European issues. Given this, the European Union cannot just continue with its marginal reform but must create a brand new place for the European public sphere.

The European Union is a historically unique initiative. Gathering different peoples all across Europe, it is not a nation-state whose legitimacy rests on a national consensus; it is consequently necessary to design arenas where those peoples are able to discuss common issues. The EU has the responsibility to produce this public sphere where a European demos could display its richness and feel involved in the democratic process of the Union. According to the Greek meaning of the term, the demos is the polity where citizens form a unique political body made of their different interests and points of view but also work for the general good of the polis (city). The spirit of European democracy, which is already well-established in every Member State and which has been codified by the European treaties, should then find a real and practical presence in the lives of citizens who wish to take the European project into their own hands. It is thus high time to involve them in the policymaking process. The Union’s legitimacy would be greatly reinforced.

We shall thus exhort Member States and national party leaders to bring European issues into national public spheres and ensure the EU institutions reform toward this path. Just as national civil societies are legitimate commentators on national politics, the European people should also play this role for European issues. A reinforced democratic Union would enable citizens to both have a voice in the policymaking process and be able to control policy outcomes. We need fully-fledged European parties across national borders; this would help European elections become discussions of Europe-wide issues, rather than just midterm vehicles for national party politics. (In this respect, responsibility also lies with national political leaders.) We also suggest the direct election of a President of the Union.

Issues concerning the whole continent, as we have seen with the recent economic crisis, could be better tackled if managed by a directly elected body which would also be representative of all the citizens. A more direct involvement of EU citizens in the policy-making process would reinforce the institutions’ accountability and bring them closer to citizens’ needs.

We believe the EU public should become a full member of the Union policymaking process. With the European people as a legitimate actor commenting its action, the EU would achieve a more democratic base and better fit the interests of its peoples. Reforms should therefore be instigated with the aim of bringing a new democratic spirit to the European project.

Image: “Puerta del Sol square in Madrid after the demonstration on 15 October” by Rafael Tovar via Flickr. Published under Creative Commons License 2.0.

The PDU takes a look back at Boris Nemcow’s life, his horrible death and what it all says about Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin and Russia at large. 

By Olena Lobunets

A late Moscow evening. Moskvorecky bridge is still busy. A handsome couple is walking towards the square, just a stone away from Kremlin. Note: both the bridge and the square are under constant surveillance by the Russian intelligence services. A large snow-cleaning vehicle slowly follows the couple. Note: there is no snow on the streets of Moscow. At some point the snow-cleaner shields the couple from the cameras, only to show a man jumping into a quickly disappearing car, and then – a lonely figure of a woman. Her companion is lying on the ground. He is killed with four skillful shots in the back. The shots were fired from a Makarov gun. The bullets were twenty years old, all from different manufacturers. The officials announced their strong intention to find the killer of Boris Nemcov, a prominent opposition leader. The “guilty” from Caucasus were soon captured and, after a bit of torture, rushed to admit their involvement.

Who was Boris Nemcov and why did somebody kill him in one of the most heavily watched spots of Moscow? Why did the surveillance cameras fail to provide the vital evidence? Was it really the fault of misty weather and well fed Moscow pigeons?

Arguably hardly a threat to seriously popular Papa Putin, Nemcov appeared on the political scene in the rocky nineties. First as governor of Novgorod, then as Deputy Prime Minister, Nemcov had vast political experience and an unusually spotless reputation. His popularity, however, was seen negative by some who blamed liberals like Nemcov for the Soviet Union’s collapse.

At the same time, Nemcov’s recent victory in Yaroslavl provided a different perspective. In two years time charismatic and knowledgeable Nemcov had every chance to become a member of the Russian Duma and a potential candidate in the next Presidential elections. After all, Russia is a big country, and concentration of intelligent and brave there is not as negligible as Putin’s propaganda machine wants the world to believe. Under the right circumstances, with somebody like Nemcov in Kremlin, Russia would obtain a real chance for a sip of fresh air.

It turned out that just before the killing Boris was working on the report uncovering the scale of Russian military involvement in Ukraine. After his death Nemcov’s appartment was thoroughly searched. Could it be that the motive behind the murder were Nemcov’s political activities and his fierce criticism towards Vladimir Putin? The Russian authorities immediately branded the murder a callous provocation. The Russian media went hysterical blaming Ukrainians, ISIS, and CIA all working together to undermine Mother Russia in some thick worldwide conspiracy. But then the events took unexpected turn.

It was officially announced that Nemcov’s murder was an act of revenge of offended Islamic extremist Dadaev, a Chechen whose accomplice had conveniently committed suicide. Straight after the announcement Dadaev denounced his admission of guilt pointing at the signs of torture on his body. Strangely enough, all that was gladly reported by the Russian media. Dadaev’s “capture” became a pure embarrassment both for Kremlin and for Kadyrov. The latter being a piece of particularly bad news for Putin. Kadyrov’s fall has only one logical continuation – the political death of Vladimir Putin, the “great victor” in the second Chechen war. The circumstances of Nemcov’s murder assume support, doesn’t matter silent or explicit, of the Kremlin. However, the four shots in the back of Nemcov ricocheted in an unexpected direction. The reputation damage to the Kremlin has been aggravated by every additional shameless lie, making it more and more difficult for Putin to keep from losing face.

 Once again Russia became a police state sending its young men to die in a bizarre and pointless war with its close neighbour.(…) Later Putin would proudly acknowledge his “ingenious” Crimean plan, effectively giving evidence against himself fit for trial before an International Court.

Only a few years ago Russia was a promising country gradually returning to normal life after its surreal communist past. The cold war was over. The western world embraced a new partner that supposedly shared its democratic values. Of course, there were two wars in Chechnya, and a war in Georgia; clear signals that something was not quite right. The world was unimpressed and forgiving. And then – the medieval-style annexation of Crimea and brutal violation of Ukrainian borders. Overnight Russia declared itself the world’s adversary, rapidly descending into political and economic isolation. The Russian economy, built on ruthless exploitation of natural resources, suddenly collapsed. The country slipped into criminal dictatorship and collective nationalistic hysteria. Once again Russia became a police state sending its young men to die in a bizarre and pointless war with its close neighbour. The supposed secrecy of direct Russian involvement in Ukraine gave the world an excuse to remain relatively calm. Suddenly military invasion became an acceptable tool for promoting one’s territorial ambitions and geopolitical interests. Later Putin would proudly acknowledge his “ingenious” Crimean plan, effectively giving evidence against himself fit for International Court. The world frowned but largely ignored Putin’s brazen admissions, reinforcing the villain’s confidence, not mentioning another spike in his popularity among a majority of excitable Russians.

The question remains: why and how did all of that happen? And the answer is depressing. All that was simply a bone thrown to Russian long-suffering, impoverished population; the old good bone called “Great and Victorious Mother Russia”. The scary thing is that the trick had worked, appealing to the ugliest sides of the Russian soul. But is it all about Mother Russia and Putin’s “geopolitical interests”?

The West once again failed to grasp the essence of mafia politics. The world was stunned when Putin suddenly disappeared and Kremlin’s criminal clans started to show the signs of internal struggle; the struggle that was less about Mother Russia and more about the ability to capture a fair amount of money without being instantly murdered or imprisoned.

Now it seems that some invisible force has been unleashed, turning Putin into a political victim instead of a controlling villain.

In the course of the last fifteen years Russian criminal power built a unique web of pocket sharing agreements between various “Papas” participating in a myriad of Russian businesses not excluding Gazprom, Rosneft and Surgutneftegaz. Such agreements were reinforced by means of word and fear. When Kadyrov and Putin showed signs of weakness, the great panic unfolded. The most informed “pockets” became a liability, and had to be removed from the picture. As a result, quite a few well informed figures, mostly from Viktor Yanukovich’s clan, accidentally and brutally killed themselves, triggering a chain reaction of mutual annihilations of oligarchical criminal groups.

Unfortunately, the Russian people remained the spectators, not the participants in this strange chain of events. It is often said that the Russians are guilty of apathy and non-resistance to their dictators; and that their muteness and obedience pose a danger to the outside world. Nowadays it seems that the collective guilt of Russians is deeper. The popularity of President Putin increased after annexation of Crimea; remarkably, it jumped even higher after Nemcov’s murder. Now it seems that some invisible force has been unleashed, turning Putin into a political victim instead of a controlling villain. Sadly, that force has nothing to do with the will of ordinary Russians. What a shameful choice to sit and watch for a dictator to stand or to fall. It doesn’t matter whether it is Putin, Stalin, Genghis or Ivan the Terrible. In that respect Russians differ greatly from their neighbours in Ukraine.

Nonetheless, on the third of March near Saharov centre thousands of Russians gathered to say goodbye to Boris Nemcov. Those were the Russians that had always valued freedom and couldn’t be fooled by extreme mass propaganda imposed on them by Putin’s media. Some were carrying slogans “Russia will be free!” and “Heroes never die!” It seemed like a large crowd. but was it large enough to bring about change?

Image: “Support of prisoners of the Bolotnaya square case” by Ilya Shurov via Flickr under Creative Commons licence 2.0.

Theoretical Framework

Third Party Intervention has been gaining currency in the international arena since the end of Cold War and especially after the NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo. The entry of a third party may change the structure of the conflict and, depending on the capacities of the intervention; it can also alter the power balance and the parties’ behavior (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, n.d.) .

Before proceeding with the application of the different theories of Morality in International Relations to the Kosovo case, we first need to comprehend the two issues briefly.

1. Understanding Statism

Walzer superimposes the rules of domestic society to international relations while giving the theory of Statism. According to this states are analogous to individuals in the domestic societies and enjoy same rights and privileges in the international arena as individuals within their countries. Walzer contends that the states derive their rights to non-intervention and territorial integrity from the individuals, who compose the political community within that country (Doppelt, 1978). And the right to sovereignty and territorial integrity is analogous to the individual’s right to an autonomous process of social development. Falling short of calling Aggression an anathema in the international arena, Walzer goes on to say –

“Aggression is remarkable as it is the only crime that states can commit against others; everything else, as it were, is a demeanor.” (Walzer, 1977)

A crime against other states in the form of aggression can lead to a situation of anarchy in the absence of a central authority. In his book Just and Unjust Wars, Walzer categorically states that only an act of aggression can be responded by military force. He even severely restricts the occurrence of a preemptive or preventive war. His backing of a nearly absolute right of a state to non-intervention is based on the principle of self-determination of people, even if the country is ruled by authoritative governments. As per him the free institutions imposed by an external power denies a people the right to self-determination. Self-determination according to the political philosopher is the right of a people “to become free by their own efforts” if they can. Foreign intervention according to him tips the domestic balance of forces in a decisive way and a long-term intervention would be a danger to the freedom.

The only time, Walzer says, a state forfeits its right to non-intervention “when it turns savagely upon its own people”. “When people are being massacred, we do not require that they pass the test of self-help before coming to their aid. It is this very incapacity that brings us in,” elaborates Walzer. He enlists the Nazi Holocaust against Jews and the Pakistani government’s “systematic slaughter” against its own (Bengali) people in the then East Pakistan in 1971 as the fit cases calling Humanitarian Intervention. In this exception he does not let other motivations of the intervener’s in between the moral justification of the intervention as long as they are not getting in way of the intervener’s objective of helping the people.

2. Understanding Moral Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism talks about global distributive justice. The members of the present world order share the responsibility of the human rights violations caused by the order. Charles Beitz supports these arguments and seeks reformation of the unjust institutions of the state. In his book Political Theory and International Relations, Beitz challenges the basic assumption of Walzer’s statism. Arguing that the state comprises of men ‘enamoured’ with power, the state cannot be analogous to individual men who forms the domestic society.

In response to Statism, Beitz says that “only those states whose institutions satisfy the appropriate principles of justice can legitimately demand to be respected as autonomous sources of ends” i.e. the right to non-intervention (Beitz, 1979). Unlike Walzer, Beitz argues that a state enjoys right to non-intervention as long as it respects human rights.

Statism, Cosmopolitanism and NATO’s Military Intervention in Kosovo   

NATO’s decision to intervene in Kosovo has been a controversial one. It violated the international law of respecting the sovereignty of a state and along with it the multilateral military offensive against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was without a mandate from the United Nations. More so it also flouted its own charter that stated that NATO was an alliance for “defensive” purposes and none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence. Even as Serbian Military action was not a direct attack on any of the NATO member states, the alliance chose to launch offensive air strikes (Yost, 2007).

So, the US authorities had built up a case against the Milosevic regime in Yugoslavia for its human rights violation, for failing to accede to the Rambouillet international Peace accord and an imminent danger of genocide.

Invoking the memories of Adolf Hitler’s Holocaust against the Jews in German, then US President Bill Clinton said in his statement announcing the air campaign in Kosovo, “What if someone had listened to Winston Churchill and stood up to Adolf Hitler earlier? How many people’s lives might have been saved?”[1]

Taking a leaf out of the Bosnian conflict, Clinton went on to add, “We learned that if you don’t stand up to brutality and the killing of innocent people, you invite the people who do it to do more of it. We learned that firmness can save lives and stop armies.” It was also projected as the duty of the democratic US to stand up against the brutal Milosevic’s regime. The fear of the conflicting spilling into other European countries also loomed large (Yost, 2007).

The cautions of the US and other European Countries were reflected in the UN Security Council’s Resolution. Even as the UNSC authorization was lacking, the Kosovo conflict was categorized as an international crisis and a threat to regional peace and security, rather than internal matter of a country (Wedgwood, 1999).

In the absence of a ‘conscience-shocking’ violation of human rights or an imminent danger of it, Statism prohibits Humanitarian Intervention, as an intervention done to stop a lesser crime would inflict death and destruction associated with military force. However, the NATO members and the UNSC repeatedly expressed their alarm at “impending humanitarian catastrophe”. The Racak Massacre in January 1999 and the increased use of force by the Serbian troops against Kosovars after the failed Rambouillet Talks did point at an impending danger of ethnic cleansing or genocide. So applying Statism in the light of these facts would deny the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the right to non-intervention and would justify the NATO’s Humanitarian Intervention.

Also the US and other European Countries were alleged to have hidden motives as fighting Russia for influence in the Eastern Europe would also not discount the humanitarian grounds of intervention under Statism.

The Milosevic-led Yugoslavian government did not enjoy the confidence of the Kosovars seeking greater autonomy that spiraled into a movement for freedom. On this count, Statism would prohibit a foreign state or alliance to intervene in Kosovo as Walzer stresses on a people’s right to self-determination to be free.

Milosevic’s regime is not likely to stand Beitz’s Cosmopolitanism’s scrutiny based on just institutions. The large scale exodus of Albanian refugees from Kosovo pointed towards an abusive State authority and therefore will have no moral claim to non-intervention. Under Cosmopolitanism it is the moral obligation of the member states of the international community to halt the tyranny of another state.

The Yugoslavian government’s rule can be classified as a tyranny against the Kosovars and Kosovars revolt against is seen as the resistance to the tyranny. So NATO’s intervention has been termed as assistance to a victimized population seeking freedom and not a unilateral decision as against the wishes of the people (Teson, 2009).

Conclusion

Even as the NATO’s Humanitarian intervention had a feeble support from the then international law, its grounding on the aspect of moralism was strong. Both strains of Moralism support the NATO’s case for intervention in Kosovo on the side of the Albanians, but, the two theories still fail to address the extent of human rights violations that will make humanitarian intervention permissible. This leaves a huge room for the states to use the provision for their own selfish motivations.

Author Biography

Ritu Sushila Krishan has been a Journalist working in India for 8 years, and for better part of her stint she has been covering defence and strategic issues along with social conflicts. Presently she has been pursuing her Masters degree from Willy Brandt School of Public Policy and interests herself in conflicts revolving around religion.

[1] President Bill Clinton’s statement on 23 March 1999, a day prior to the air strike is available at http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=42001 and the one made on 25 March 1999, a day after the air strikes were launched is available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/303693.stm . Both the statements make it morally imperative for the US to end the tragedy of gigantic proportions.

Sources:

Beitz, C. (1979). Political Theory and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Doppelt, G. (1978). Walzer’s Theory of Morality in International Relations. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8(1), 3–26.

Garamone, J (1999). Clinton Makes Case for Kosovo Intervention. U.S Department of Defense. Retrieved from http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=42001

President Clinton, B (1999). America’s Clinton Statement: Stabilising Europe. World, BBC News. Retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/303693.stm

Ramsbotham, O., Woodhouse, T., & Miall, H. (n.d.). Ramsbotham_et_al._third_parties.pdf.

Teson, F. (2009). Kosovo: A Powerful Precedent for the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention. Amsterdam LF, 1(2). Retrieved from http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/amslawf1&section=21

Walzer, M. (1977). Just and Unjust Wars. United States: Basic Books.

Wedgwood, R. (1999). NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia. American Journal of International Law, 93(4), 828–834. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555347

Yost, D. S. (2007). NATO and the anticipatory use of force. International Affairs, 83(1), 39–68. Retrieved fromhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2007.00602.x/full

Image: ‘Dragaš Bag, Kosovo, Autumn 2001‘ by Cuito Cuanavale, released in Flickr under Creative Commons License 2.0 (CC BY 2.0).

“The Union should have at its command a single European army, with the monopoly of external force projection.”  

By Mario Zorro, Ella Fuller and Ece Kepekci

Image: “European Flag” Published via Flickr.com under Creative Commons Licence 2.0.

Since the financial crisis of 2008, Europe has mainly focused on its internal problems and has neglected the development of its foreign policy. As the international situation today seems more complicated than ever, it is clear that Europe needs to do more to to act collectively in order to combat security threats with greater effectiveness. The creation of a single European army, as the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker recently expressed, is a vital step in preserving Europe’s security as well as her interests on the global stage. A prerequisite for the creation of such military capacity, however, is the establishment of collective democratic control over a such a powerful tool.

The recent events in Ukraine, the instability in the Mediterranean and the Middle East all highlight the case for a single European army that has the monopoly of external force projection. In particular, the reaction to the crisis on our eastern border has highlighted a lack of unity and strength, and underlined Europe’s fundamental foreign policy inertia and division.

The creation of a single European army would empower a more robust and commanding Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which would allow for better and more rapid response to international political crises than is currently possible. It would equally reassure the EU’s smaller member states, particularly in the East, who currently do not possess the means to defend their national territory.

Furthermore, a strong and unified European military presence could provide the much needed direction and cohesion required at a time of increasing tensions in a multi-polar international context. A single European army would mean that Europe is more capable, united, and resolved when protecting itself or asserting its interests vis-à-vis any adversary. In such a time of heightened tension it is ironically the creation of Europe’s army in itself—rather than the actual use of any military power—that could contribute to more stability and security around Europe’s borders.

Moreover, the existence of a European army would solve the problem of European security currently being too reliant on the United States of America. The Union needs to build capability so that it can unilaterally react to security threats and guarantee the safety of Europe and her allies if necessary, all while maintaining a strong collaboration with our partners on both sides of the Atlantic. After all, Europe is and should be best placed to determine its own security and military objectives without having to be dependent on external support and be subjected to external interests. This is especially needed as the United States’ security interests have begun to shift, with their focus pivoting more towards Asia than previous regions of interest. Europe can no longer rely on the security dividend provided by the strength of the US military and will have to live up to its responsibilites.

A single European army would eliminate the gap in military capabilities between the European Union and the larger armies on the international stage, immediately making Europe one of two big NATO members.

Military spending would be made more efficient. Defence industries across member states would be able to follow a stronger common framework; and R&D as well as military hardware would become less diverse and more standardised—which would result in a more efficient and effective system as a whole. The creation of a single European army would encourage the development of a stronger independent European intelligence, allowing European policymakers to make policy choices based on the best information available.

Crucially, the creation of a single European army would encourage further European integration, which is vital in order for the Union to secure and maximise its role internationally. It would enable the citizens of Europe to democratically decide their own fates in matters of security and military strategy. 

Sovereignty and constitutional obstacles still remain as strong barriers to this ambitious project and, for a single European army to be created, an overhaul and strengthening of European institutions is essential. It would be a great mistake for Europe not to advance towards a stronger and more complete union and this clearly includes the question of military integration. 

Fundamentally, Europeans will be able to cope better with potential threats arising in an increasingly multi-polar world if they work together as one. At the same time the creation of a single European army would be a catalyst for the much needed strengthening of European institutions as a single unified European army would require one single state and parliamentary control.

The creation of a single European army does not necessarily mean the EU’s role as a mediator would be compromised. Mediation and the utilization of military power are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In fact, a mediator with military assets of its own could watch and secure the peace agreements and conditions more effectively, and could also allow the EU to protect vulnerable populations and secure the delivery of humanitarian relief in more successful ways. It would equally allow the EU to be a stronger pillar in the United Nations’ peacekeeping system.

Fundamentally, the European Union must realize that only in unity beyond the sole economic aspect, can it maintain and extend its influence and power internationally. A single European army is a necessary component in realising this objective and a crucial way to combat the foreign policy inertia and division that currently inhibits the EU from effectively addressing political conflicts that affect its interests internationally.

Cover Image: “EU Grunge Flag” Published via Flickr.com under Creative Commons Licence 2.0 (CC BY 2.0)

India, Kashmir Dispute and the Muslim Identity

The idea of nation itself has undergone a sea change and today nations can be accepted as a set of ideas around which an identity is being constructed to define who belongs to the country and who do not. But for India the restructuring of nationalism took place just at independence as Pakistan was carved out as Muslim Homeland. India instead of choosing the nationality of race decided to opt for the nationality of territory cutting across religions (Varshney, 2002) and was home to nearly 13 percent of Muslims at the time of independence.

The secularism of India has been anchored in the Constitution of India, but the Hindu-Muslim cleavage never healed in the post-independent India in the presence of the nationalizing host state of India, presence of national minority of Muslims, in whose name an external national homeland was claimed in 1947 in the name of Pakistan (Brubaker, 1996). And the revival of Kashmiri freedom movement aided by the insurgency from across the Line of Control (LoC) dividing India and Pakistan (Swami, 2007) considerably shaped the Muslim Identity in the rest of the India as well. Symbol selection and manipulation by politically active elites of both Hindus and Muslim communities have shaped the Muslim Identity in the country (Copland, 2014) and Kashmir has been an important symbol that has epitomized this struggle. Kashmir continues to shape the identity and the domestic politics in India.

The predicaments of the Muslims in the rest of India owing to the Pakistan’s intervention in Kashmir were duly expressed by a group of non-Kashmiri Muslims in a Memorandum to the United Nations in 1951. Signed by 14 distinguished Indian Muslims of that time, the memorandum questioned Pakistan’s constant announcement about their “determination to protect and safeguard the interests of Muslims in India”. “This naturally aroused suspicion amongst the Hindus against us and our loyalty to India was questioned,” said the memorandum. Regarding Kashmir and its impact on the fortune of Muslims it said: “In its oft-proclaimed anxiety to rescue the 3 million Muslims from what it describes as the tyranny of a handful of Hindus in the State (Jammu and Kashmir), Pakistan evidently is prepared to sacrifice the interests of 40 million Muslims in India – a strange exhibition of concern for the welfare of fellow Muslims. Our misguided brothers in Pakistan do not realise that if Muslims in Pakistan can wage a war against Hindus in Kashmir why should not Hindus, sooner or later, retaliate against Muslims in India?”

At the same time failing to gain support of the minority communities of Hindus and Buddhists in Jammu and Kashmir, the leaders of Kashmiri Muslims, even Sheikh Abdullah, pitted the movement against the subversion of the right of the self-determination of the Muslim-dominated Kashmir by the Hindu-majority India (Varshney,1991). The divide along communal lines became more evident during the summer of 2008 as the whole valley broke out in agitation and a stone-pelting population was dealt with heavy hand by security forces. Booker Prize winner and political activist Arundhati Roy talking against the Indian occupation in the Valley in her Essay said: “It allows Hindu chauvinists to target and victimise Muslims in India by holding them hostage to the freedom struggle being waged by Muslims in Kashmir.”

Many scholars, including Samuel Huntington, have pointed out that the economic modernization generates a politically conscious community that seeks greater opportunities for physical, social and economic mobility. Others have also identified that in most of the contemporary poly-ethnic societies developmental needs expressed in terms of cultural values, human rights and security (Brown, 1997).  This could not be more evident than in the situation of the Kashmir Valley. A close scrutiny of the situation shows that the employment among the youth remains abysmally low, in stark resemblance of the situation for the majority of the population during the rule of the Hindu Dogra King (Ganguly, 1996).

The antinomies of nationalism of India and Pakistan and the question of Muslim Identity in India can be extrapolated to the Myron Weiner’s model explaining ‘The Macedonian Syndrome’. The model has three actors – an irredentist state, an anti-irredentist neighbor, and a shared ethnic group crossing the international boundary (Weiner, 1971). The ethnic group has to be in minority in the anti-irredentist neighbor. The situation gets exacerbated as the two neighbors have a disputed territory. Since Partition Pakistan continues to have irredentist claims on the Kashmir Valley and the rest of the Muslim population of the anti-irredentist India. The Muslim community being the national minority of the country is also a key- actor in this triadic relation.

The situation can also be understood in the light of the triadic configuration used by Rogers Brubaker while explaining the National Question in the New Europe as the boundaries were drawn cutting across communities similar or different from each other. Brubaker saw the relation between nationalizing state, national minorities and external homelands. As per this configuration, nationalizing states are poly-ethnic and are still in the stage of nation-building making it imperative for them to promote to varying degrees the language, culture, demographic position, economic flourishing or political hegemony. Then there are self-conscious national minorities striving for greater cultural or territorial autonomy.  Muslims are the national minority sof India and not Sikhs, Jains or Buddhists. Therefore the Kashmiri Muslim’s demand for more freedom has a negative impact on the greater Muslim Identity in India. And the triad is completed by an external national ‘homeland’ of the minorities. Pakistan on the basis of common religion with the Muslims of India have been closely monitoring their situation and closely protest alleged violation of their rights and assert its obligation to defend their interests. A case in point would be the resolution passed by the Parliament of Pakistan to denounce the anti-Muslim communal riots in Gujarat in 2002.

The separatist leaders have been constantly invoking the common religious thread between Kashmir and Pakistan to assert secession from India.  In 2008 separatist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani said during one of the protest that Islam would guide the struggle and that it was a complete social and moral code that would govern the people of a free Kashmir. He said Pakistan had been created as the home of Islam, and that that goal should never be subverted. He said just as Pakistan belonged to Kashmir, Kashmir belonged to Pakistan (Roy, 2008). It is such stances of the Kashmiri leader that given fodder to the Hindu chauvinist outside the Valley and then the ensuing stereotyping of the rest of the Muslims and their putative nationalism towards Pakistan.

The triangular relationship is also exhibited in the clash of the informal symbols of nationalism prevalent in the Valley and the formal nationalism as promoted by the Central Indian government. For instance as the insurgency started in the Valley in 1990s, celebrations of events associated with the Indian nationhood such as Independence Day and Republic Day are not celebrated by the masses. Whereas, the Pakistan backed militant groups designed social calendars to mobilise the masses and included events like Pakistan’s Independence Day. In the same fashion, cricket matches between India and Pakistan served an important political function as the Kashmiris cheer the Pakistani team. The efforts of the Indian Central government in generating national symbols have also been thwarted by the exposure of the Kashmiri population to Pakistan radio and television that have been instrumental in giving an alternative version of the Kashmir issue and strengthening the religious bond between Pakistan and the Kashmir Valley. This aided with the alienation of Kashmiri Muslim masses has put up questions around the legitimacy of the Indian authority (Tremblay, 1996).

While Pakistan can hardly afford to give formal citizenship to the Muslims of the country, its continuous monitoring of their situation and interference in their affairs; and privileges given to the Muslims from the Kashmir Valley and the rest of the country has given rise to two mutually antagonistic nationalisms – one towards India and other towards Pakistan. The recent example has been the suspension of 67 Kashmir Muslim students from a university in Northern India after they rooted for Pakistani team during a cricket match on March 3, 2014 and the immediate response from Pakistan and Pakistan-based terror outfit Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD) separately offering scholarship to the expelled students highlighted this third party intervention attempting to exploit the existing fissures in the society[1].

Just like the Valley of Kashmir secessionist movement was waged in Punjab. The economically strong backbone of Punjab helped it bounce back as opposed to Kashmir where one crop season and the militancy had destroyed the economy. Sikhs, who have been victims of the carnage of 1984 following the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, are performing really well and are respected across the country. This is in complete contrast to alienation faced by the Kashmiri Muslims and the aspersion it casts on the Muslim Community in the country as general. The other factor complicating the complex issue is the support of Pakistan that has been created in the name of providing a secure future to the South Asian Muslims and thus seen as the ‘external’ home for the Muslims of India.

Conclusion

Under international Law, a state has the right to protect its citizens even when they live in other states. But they cannot legitimately claim to protect their ethnic co-nationals living in other state and holding the legal citizenship of that state. While Kashmiris right to strive for self-determination is indisputable, Pakistan’s irredentist claim on the basis of a movement that saw a resurgence in 1990s (considerably long time after Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession with India) complicates the situation.

Monitoring is the key aspect of the triadic relation and Pakistan – projecting itself as the homeland of South Asian Muslims – take complete leverage of that situation. Pakistan backing the movement in Kashmir, can react back on the nationalizing state that is India, where the minority might be accused of disloyalty in reaction. Hindu fundamentalists have already been holding the “attitude of Muslims that Muslims were different from the nation” as the main reason of the country’s partition (Varshney, 2002). They contend that the success of movement in Kashmir is deemed pernicious for the secular fabric of India and will have a ‘domino-effect’ in the poly-ethnic society of India. In India the question of minority is intricately linked with the Kashmir conflict and to many the conflict reflects a struggle for the creation of Pakistan – an event commemorated as a tragedy in India and celebrated in Pakistan as a momentous occasion.

Pakistan might be exploiting its ethno-religious ties with the Kashmir valley driven by geo-political reasons and denotes an “unfinished” business” of the partition. But India, trying to save its secular fabric, finds it difficult to hand over the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir to a ‘Muslim’ Pakistan just because of the religion. Moreover, so when the existence of this minority puts a question mark on the creation of Pakistan itself (Cohen, Shooting For A Century, 2013).

Author Biography

Ritu Sushila Krishan has been a Journalist working in India for 8 years, and for better part of her stint she has been covering defence and strategic issues along with social conflicts. Presently she has been pursuing her Masters degree from Willy Brandt School of Public Policy and interests herself in conflicts revolving around religion.

_

[1] Support for the Pakistani cricket team is nothing new in Kashmir. It is seen as another way of expressing anger against the Indian state, a reflection of a protracted ethno-national conflict. Late in November 2011, a court in Srinagar acquitted 12 men, 28 years after they were accused of digging a pitch at the first International match held at the Bakhsi Stadium in Srinagar. It was an India Vs West Indies tie, in 1983. The 12 Kashmiris were accused of attacking the pitch during the lunch break. The match became a legend in Kashmir, the home side booed by supporters of the separatists and eventually losing the game.

Sources 

Brown, M. E. (1997). The Causes of Internal Conflict an Overview . Cambridge : MIT Press.

Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge(pp. 55-76): Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, S. P. (2013). Shooting for a Century. Brookings Institution Press.

Copland, I. (2014). Islam and Political Mobilization in Kashmir , 1931-34, 54(2), 228–259

Ganguly, S. (1996). Expalining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilisation and Institutional Decay. International Security, 21(2), 76–107.

Roy, A. (2008, August 22). Land and Freedom . The Guardian.

Tremblay, R. C. (1996). Nation , Identity and the Intervening Role of the State : A Study of the Secessionist Movement in Kashmir. Pacific Affairs, 69(4), 471–497.

Swami, P. (2007). India-Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The covert war in Kashmir, 1947-2004. Routledge.

Varshney, A. (1991). India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism. Asian Survey, 31(11), 997–1019.

Varshney, A. (2002). Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India. Yale University.

Weiner, M. (1971). The Macedonian Syndrome : An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development. World Politics, 23(4), 665–683.

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Image Credits: ‘Dal Lake in Kashmir’, by Ritu Sushila Krishan

For more than four years now Syria has been one of the the most blazing trouble spots in the world. Especially due to the emergence of ISIL and their high degree of violence, the ongoing mediation initiative of the United Nations seems to have been forgotten by most observers. Therefore, this series deals with Kofi Annan, Lakhdar Brahimi and Staffan de Mistura, three men who have been trying to bring peace through diplomacy in a conflict that transcends most people’s imagination of violence. 

Joint Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi and his Deputy, Nasser Al-Kidwa (left), prior to the meeting of the Action Group for Syria on January 11th 2013

By Felix Troeltzsch

By today, the civil war in Syria has been running for more than four years, claimed more than 200,000 lives and has forced more than 10 million people to flee their homes. When taking a look at the coverage of western media  of the conflict, it is hard to believe that everything started off as peaceful protest after 15 kids wrote graffiti-slogans for more freedom and against high living costs on walls in the south Syrian city of Dara’a. Unlike most other Arab countries that were affected by demands for freedom, democracy and economic perspectives, in Syria these essentially laudable demonstrations turned into a full fetched civil war, a humanitarian catastrophe of long forgotten magnitude and a peerless rise of religious extremism. It is hard to imagine that two years ago any policy-maker would have expected the emergence of an Islamic organization that could dissolve boarders and create state-like structures like laws and social services this quickly.

Diplomacy remains the only tool

In spite of a huge media interest and the constant intensification of the crisis, western countries as well as the international community reacted passively towards the civil war in Syria for almost two years. Only in October 2014, after ISIL started to threaten major cities in Iraq, the US government decided to intervene in Syria with air strikes. A military UN-Peacekeeping mission has, despite many drafts, not been established. However, history has shown that the absence of military solutions might result in a moment to shine for diplomacy. From February 2012 until today three distinguished Special Representatives of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) that entered the scene have been trying to mediate between the conflicting parties in Syria.

The most important thing to know about mediation is that it must always be voluntary and peaceful: before talks can start, all conflicting parties have to agree on the peace process and the mediator. Apart from that, it can assume many different shapes and forms. The UN Charter mentions mediation as a means of settling disputes peacefully (Article 33, Chapter VI) and specifies that the “Security Council may decide [on peaceful measures] to give effect to his decisions” (Article 41, Chapter VII). This means that one way of initiating mediation missions is straight through the UN-Security Council. However, in the long history of conflicts most peace efforts happened independently from the UN Security Council and involved third party mediators of other origin. With regard to their so called Good Offices, many UN Secretary-Generals have mediated themselves or send their special representatives to solve conflicts (Ramcharan 1982: 140; Fröhlich 2002: 51).  Moreover, like the recent example of the Minsk II talks showed again, not only UN officials, but also representatives of states or other institutions of any kind, that have an interest in appeasing the respective conflict, can initiate mediation processes.

In the case of Syria, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon began the mediation with his Good Offices, but did so on behalf of the UN General-Assembly and the Arab League. Therefore, on February 23^rd, 2012 Kofi Annan was appointed the first Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States. The former UN Secretary-General stepped down on August 2^nd 2012 and was succeeded by Lakhdar Brahimi on August 17^th, 2012. Besides Annan, Brahimi qualifies as one of the most distinct diplomats worldwide and served for example as SRSG in Haiti, South Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq. However, Brahimi as well failed to resolve the conflict in Syria on May 31^st, 2014 and the Swedish-Italian diplomat Staffan de Mistura took his place on July 10^th, 2014. De Mistura previously worked for the UN World Food Program and as an SRSG in Afghanistan, Iraq and South Lebanon and is still in office today.

No good place to go between

Despite their exceptional experience, diplomatic network and knowledge of the conflict, so far all three mediators failed to make peace in Syria and none of their actions seemed to have any positive long term effects on the peace-process. On the contrary, the civil war has constantly become more violent, more complex and more complicated to solve (Holliday 2012).

Kofi Annan identified three major reasons for the failure of his mediation: Firstly, he claimed that there was no sufficient political will of many important third-party countries for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The UN-Security Council was not on the one hand able to agree on any sort of strong resolution due to the blockade of Russia and China, while on the other hand the USA, Great Britain, France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar lost out on the chance of convincing the Syrian opposition of a peaceful political process. Secondly, the special religious and ethnic division of the Syrian people in Alawis, Sunnites, Yazidi and Kurds prevented the protests from spreading throughout the whole society and therefore from developing as much leverage as similar activities in Egypt or Tunisia. Thirdly, according to Annan, the most important reason for the failure of his mediation was the lack of cooperation by Bashar al-Assad and his government. Since then, Lakhdar Brahimi and Staffan de Mistura have been facing a very similar set of challenges. Until today, the United Nations has failed to initiate a robust peace operation, the Syrian government still refuses to make concessions towards the Free Syrian Army and the rise of ISIL also demolished the smallest chances for the Syrian people to unite against Assad.

However, after four years of civil war, the situation in Syria has massively increased in complexity and not even intelligence services seem to know what exactly is going on between ISIL, the Free Syrian Army and Assad’s government troops. The only thing that observers can agree on is that violence and the humanitarian situation are becoming worse day by day. People that had the chance to flee did so in the past four years. Most remaining Syrian inhabitants are now either involved in fighting, internally displaced or unable to leave the country due to poverty, weakness or other reasons. Syria has developed into something that western politicians wanted to prevent it from – the biggest humanitarian catastrophe after the Second World War and a nightmare for diplomacy and every mediator.

Analyzing mediation

Usually every external agent tries to shape his or her assigned conflict in order to resolve it. Yet, if it is not possible for the mediator to change the conflict, the conflict is likely to change the mediator until he or she must either adapt to the new situation or lay down office. Due to many different influencing variables, Syria has been a conflict almost impossible to change. Having in mind all casualties and war crimes that happened in past years, it is not hard to figure out why Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi laid down their offices. On the other side it is very interesting to understand HOW Annan, Brahimi and de Mistura tried to resolve an apparently unsolvable conflict and WHICH lessons they learned from their respective predecessors.

Mediation can be analyzed in various different ways and from many different perspectives. Traditional literature alone offers a vast number of propositions for variables that have to be taken in account: Most authors emphasize the timing and context of the mediation (ripeness of the conflict, support from third-countries), the usage of power (leverage) by the mediator and his or her style of mediation as the most important factors for success or failure. Due to reasons of space and complexity here we  shall only concentrate on the mediation styles and investigate the peace missions with regard to the following three dimensions taken from Isak Svensson’s and Peter Wallensteen’s highly acknowledged book “The Go-Between” (Svensson/Wallensteen 2010, 15-24):

• Scope – inclusive or exclusive mediation?

                Who does the mediator include into his peace efforts? Does he speak with all conflicting parties or does he exclude certain actors for specific reasons?

• Method – forcing or fostering mediation style?

                How does the mediator try to influence the parties? Forcing methods include pressure, threads and strict deadlines. More fostering mediators would rather use positive dynamics and rewards.

• Focus – narrow or wide peace?

            Which priorities and demands does the mediator have for his efforts? A wide or sustainable peace does include the end of the fighting and broader societal goals like human rights, democracy, working state institutions or equality before the law. Narrow objectives are solely war related and include ceasefires or fighting restrictions.  

Looking at Syria, one must inevitably wonder why Kofi Annan, Lahkdar Brahimi and Staffan de Mistura have not been able to pacify the conflicting parties before ISIL could start to spread chaos. Was it the fault of the international community, of the mediators themselves or are there, maybe, simply conflicts that cannot be pacified by diplomatic means? With contemplation to the three dimensions of Svensson and Wallensteen this series will trace the most important steps of the three go-betweens, see which mediation strategies they used, identify possible mistakes and in doing so try to approach  answers to these question.

Author Biography

Felix Troeltzsch is a regular contributor at the Global Pubblic Policy Watch. He recently graduated from the University of Jena with a master’s degree in Political Science, focusing on International Relations and Peace Studies. Before that, he studied International Relations and American Studies at the University of Leipzig and University of Warsaw. Felix is mainly interested in international conflicts, security policy, human rights, the European Union and the Middle East. During several stays abroad he has dealt intensively with the Balkans and the Black Sea region.

Additional Literature:

Fröhlich, Manuel (2011). “Leadership for Peace: The Special Representatives of theSecretary-General” In: UN Peace Operations as Political and Managerial Challenges, Hrsg. Wolfgang Seibel, Julian   Junk, Till Blume und Francesco Mancini. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Holliday, Joseph (2012). Middle Eastern Report 5: Syria’s Maturing Insurgency.Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War.

Ramcharan, Bertrand G. (1982). “The Good Offices of the United Nations Secretary Generalin the Field of Human Rights,” American Journal of International Law (76), 130-141.

Svensson, Isak und Peter Wallensteen (2010). The Go-Between: Jan Eliasson and the Syles of  Mediation. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Picture Credit: United Nations Geneva under a Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0) license

HISTORY OF KASHMIR

The Islam practiced in the Kashmir valley differs from the one practiced in the rest of the country and also in Pakistan. It was this difference that gave the Valley its clarion call for freedom in the name of Kashmiriyat – which since 1930s has come to be defined as “a reflection of a peerless tradition of regional nationalism, standing above petty religious rivalries” (Rai, 2004). This loosely defined term, just like many other politically useful terms, has been used to set the people from Jammu and Kashmir apart from the rest of the India, has been the rallying point for individuals and groups seeking a separate state. However, it was the context and demography of the state that eventually necessitated the use of religion (Sharma, 1985). The history and context of Jammu-Kashmir played an important role in shaping the development of events in the Valley. Islam was not brought to Kashmir by attackers and the people were not converted at gun point. Rather, the people willingly converted and started following the Sufism strand of Islam.

Religion started gaining traction in public/political sphere in 1846 as British installed ‘alien’ Dogra Hindu ruler in the state of Jammu and Kashmir without any consideration for the denizens of the state. The Dogra-Hindu state saw the Hindu minority community of Kashmiri Pandits flourishing. Forming a mere five percent of the population of the state, the community was profusely represented in the state administration and government machinery. In the run up to 1947, the year in which India gained independence and Pakistan came into existence, the religious nature of the state has triggered inter-religious rivalries to stake claim on the politico-economic resources. July 13, 1931 is being referred as the beginning of the Kashmir’s struggle for freedom. Juxtaposed to the ongoing Indian struggle for freedom, on this day 22 demonstrators and a policeman were killed in Srinagar (the capital of Jammu and Kashmir) while challenging the legitimacy of the Dogra rule (Rai, 2004).

At the time of independence, the Hindu ruler of the Muslim -majority state signed the Instrument of Accession with India on October 26, 1947, in lieu of the New Delhi’s military support against the Pakistan-backed tribesmen from the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP). The tribesmen had attacked Jammu and Kashmir to forcibly liberate the Muslims of Kashmir.  The subjects of Hari Singh, who have started an uprising in 1931, under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah accepted the Instrument of Accession along with the assurance of the Indian government to protect the autonomy of the state. Then Prime Minister of India Jawahar Lal Nehru, himself a Kashmiri Pandit, promised plebiscite to the population of Jammu and Kashmir to decide the future course of the state. By November 1947, both India and Pakistan formulated public positions that would make difficult for both of them to retreat (Lamb, 1993).

Source: Kashmir Study Group (www.kashmirstudygroup.com)

In what would remain the main bone of contention between India and Pakistan, New Delhi took the matter to the United Nations for resolution. As a UN enforced ceasefire came into being, one-third of Jammu and Kashmir was under Pakistan’s control. The UN Resolution passed in August 1948 offered a multi-point solution. The resolution asked for returning to status quo before the 1947 that entailed withdrawal of Pakistani troops and tribesmen from the state and in the meantime territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the UN commission. At the same time the Indian government was to remove bulk of its forces from the state paving way for plebiscite and final resolution of the conflict. However, both India and Pakistan have not adhered to the resolution and further strengthened their foothold in their respective parts of the state.

In supporting the decision to accede to New Delhi, Sheikh Abdullah identified more similarity between the basic tenets of the Idea of India that is Secularism and Kashmiriyat. Nearly a year after Jammu and Kashmir leader Sheikh Abdullah defended India’s stand in his speech in the UN Security Council Meeting[1] by saying: “It was because I and my organization never believed in the formula that Muslims and Hindus form separate nations. We neither believe in the two-nation theory, nor in communal hatred or communalism itself. We believed that religion had no place in politics. Therefore, when we launched our movement of ‘Quit Kashmir’ it was not only Muslims who suffered, but our Hindu and Sikh comrades as well.”

To get a clear picture about the conflict, a popular myth that assumes that the dispute of Kashmir is all about the ‘cohesive and homogenous’ people of a shared ethnicity seeking the right of self-determination, needs to be busted. Presently the assumed cohesiveness and homogeneity of the populace of Jammu and Kashmir is contrary to the ground reality. The religion-wise breakup of the population as per the 2001 census showed that the Muslims constituted the predominant religious community of the state at 67 percent, Hindus came next at 29.6 percent, Sikhs 2.23 percent, Buddhists 1.16 percent, Christians 0.14 percent, and others form the remaining part. The population was also divided into three main geographical regions of Hindu majority Jammu, Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley and Buddhist-populated Ladakh. While the denial of the right of self-determination has led to the alienation of the population of Kashmir Valley, the neglect of the other communities socially, economically and politically – Hindus and Buddhists – have created schism between Jammu and Ladakh’s relations with the state government-based in Kashmir. The situation can be summed up that contrary to the assumption of Kashmiris being a ‘homogenous, monolithic’ group; it has many small communities each striving for a better socio-economic development and a political space for itself (Behra, 2006). This mistaken impression often results in assessing the relation of only the Kashmir valley with the Indian state and not that of the whole state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The demographic realities of the state further add to the complexities of the conflict. On one hand, the continuous encroachment of the Indian government of the promised autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir and the meddling with political institutions in the valley has alienated the now educated and better informed youth of the valley (Ganguly, 1996). And on the other hand, the constant refusal of the Kashmir-Muslim headed government to share power with other communities forced Jammu and Ladakh regions to seek a greater integration with India has pushed the regions of Jammu and Ladakh towards the Central Government (Behra, 2006). It was not before 1990s that the call for freedom took a violent turn and an armed insurgency began in the state. The rising insurgency in Kashmir found an ally in the radicalisation taking place in Pakistan following 1971 war. This eventually led some leaders in Kashmir to seek a separate homeland for the Kashmiri Muslims – which constitute nearly 99 percent of the population of the Kashmir Valley after Kashmiri Pandits were driven out by the violent campaign against them in 1990 by militants. The crystallized divisions became evident in 2008 as the protests of the Kashmir Muslims against the land transfer to the Hindu Amarnath Shrine Board were met with not only equal but more vocal protests by the Hindu in Jammu Region[2]. The Kashmir conundrum is a classic case where ‘minority rights and justice’ forms the central issue. The Buddhist and Hindu community in the state reject independence for the state for the fear of being dominated the majority Muslim community, which in turn has similar misgivings regarding the Hindu-dominated India (Cohen, 2013). In its quest to prop up Kashmir as the jewel of Indian secularism, the Indian State has also reinforced the Muslim community status of the majority of the population in the state. The Kashmiri Muslims also do not shy away from asserting their different identity and as often seen in the support of Pakistan Cricket Team when it plays against the Indian team.

Over 60 years after the issue was highlighted, India and Pakistan have tried to rationalize their contention around Kashmir, by touting as important for their respective water security. Many major rivers have their sources in the state. But the state is still an emotive issue between the two countries. In a nutshell initially the Kashmiris – both Hindus and Muslims- had considered themselves vitally different from their counterparts in the rest of the country. But, the movement that started against the “unequal relationship” between the rulers and the ruled that gave way to communal bias as “political consciousness” spread to Kashmir.

Author Biography

Ritu Sushila Krishan has been a Journalist working in India for 8 years, and for better part of her stint she has been covering defence and strategic issues along with social conflicts. Presently she has been pursuing her Masters degree from Willy Brandt School of Public Policy and interests herself in conflicts revolving around religion.

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[1] The UNSC Meeting was convened on February 6, 1948 to hear India’s complaint against the attack of the Pakistan-backed tribesmen who entered Jammu and Kashmir to liberate Kashmir by force. (Sheikh Abdullah’s statement to Security Council Official Records, Third Year, Nos. 16-35, Feb 6, 1948.

[2] For more detailed information on the subject read Roy, Arundhati (2008), “Lands and Freedom”,  The Guardian http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/22/kashmir.india

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Sources

Behra, N. C. (2006). Demystifying Kashmir. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Cohen, S. P. (2013). Shooting for a Century: Finding Answers to the India-Pakistan conundrum. HarperCollins Publishers Indua.

Ganguly, S. (1996). Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilisation and Institutional Decay. International Security, 21(2), 76–107.

Lamb, A. (1993). Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy. Oxford University Press.

Rai, M. (2004). Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir. Permanent Black.

Roy, A. (2008, August 22). Land and Freedom . The Guardian.

Sharma, P. (1985). The National Question in Kashmir, 13(6), 35–56.

Sheikh Abdullah’s statement to Security Council Official Records, Third Year, Nos. 16-35, Feb 6, 1948

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Image: ‘2000 years old Sree/Siri Sharada Devi Temple, Sharada, Kashmir, Pakistan‘ by Irfan Ahmed, released under Creative Commons 2.0 license.